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ABSTRACT 
The philosopher Eric Vaegelin (1901-85) held that at the 
heart of an adequate political philosophy must be a 
philosophy of consciousness., This study discusses 
Voegelin's thought in its significance for "political 
theology", by which is understood that mode of theo- 
logical thinking which focuses on the relationship of 
Christian faith to the pursuit of social justice. 
The study falls into two parts. Part One is an expos- 
ition of Voegelin's thought with the perspective of 
political theology continuously in mind. Chapter One 
justifies the choice of this perspective. There follow 
chapters an the symbol of the meta. yy, which Voegelin 
takes from Plato and which is fundamental to his thought, 
and on the rational structure of symbols and their 
articulation. Then the modes of symbolic discourse most 
important for Voegelin are considered in turn: myth, 
classical philosophy, Christian theology, history, and 
politics. Part One finishes with a discussion of 
Vcegelin's work on the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. 
Part Two concentrates on three topics central to the 
concerns of Voegelin and political theologians alike. 
Besides being intrinsically important, these topics 
permit one to estimate how valuable is Voegelin's work as 
a resource for political theology. The topics are the 
relationship between individual and societal transform- 
ation; the scope and limits of Christian hope for the 
attainment of a just social order within history; and the 
nature of political responsibility and irresponsibility 
in the light of faith. The thesis ends with a summary of 
its conclusions. 
It is argued that Vaegelin's thought offers a powerful 
and constructive challenge to political theologians, but 
that political theology in turn provides a vantage point 
which reveals certain serious shortcomings in Voegelin's 
powerful thought. In particular, it is argued that 
Vaegelin fails to articulate adequately the social 
implications of his own philosophical principles. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ERIC VOEGELIN AND POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
The Life's Work of Eric Voegelin 
Eric Voegelin (1901-85) recalled in 1977, 
In 1943 1 had arrived at a dead-end in my attempts 
to find a theory of man, society, and history that 
would permit an adequate interpretation of the 
phenomena in my chosen field of studies. The 
analysis of the movements of Communism, National 
Socialism, and racism, of constitutionalism, liber- 
alism, and authoritarianism had made it clear beyond 
a doubt that the centre of a philosophy of politics 
had to be a theory of consciousness: but the acad- 
emic institutions*of the Western, world ... did not 
offer the intellectual instruments thatýwould make 
the political events and movements intelligible. 
This curious default of the school philosophies in 
the face of an overwhelming political reality had 
attracted my attention ever since I was a graduate 
student in the 1920s (An-E:, 3), 
By 1943, in other words, Voegelin held that political 
movements are essentially ar-ticulations of consciousness, 
dependent upon the vitality of the self-interpretations 
that underpin them. Therefore, as a philosopher and a 
"spiritual realist", his proper response to the over- 
whelming reality was to-understand those movements and 
make them intelligible, rather than to ally, himself with 
one movement among others: 
If the realist would throw himself-into the general 
melee as one of the contestants, he would defeat his 
philosophical purpose. In order to be heard he 
would have to become a partisan himselfj and in 
order to become a partisan, he would have to 
surrender the standards of rationality. If an the 
other hand he has sufficient spiritual strength as 
well as philosophical consciousness to take his 
position beyond the disorder of the age. ... he 
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will remain socially ineffective to the point of not 
even being understood (quoted in Cooper, 1986: ix). 
This grim explanation of 1945 approaches the threshold 
of despair. For if partisanship "would defeat his phil- 
osophical purpose", so, surely, would a thorough failure 
to be understood by the age. Such a failure would 
threaten to reduce his philosophy to the retrospective 
interpretation of social calamity. 
Any such dejection never discouraged Voegelin from a 
lifelong and unremitting dedication to the search for 
understanding. Stupid responses to his work, after-all, 
would only confirm its urgency. He claimed, in fact, 
that his stance of deliberate impartiality provoked 
others into wilful misrepresentations of his, thought: 
I have in my files the documents according to which 
I am a Communist, a Fascist, a National Socialist, 
an old Liberal, a new Liberal, a Catholic, a 
Protestant .... This list I consider of some 
importance, because the various characterizations of 
course always name the pet bete noir of the 
respective critic. ... critics of this type can 
become objects of enquiry but they cannot be 
partners in a discussion (AX: 46). 
It must be said that Vaegel'in's stance was clear, at 
least, to the Nazis. Writers manifest their convictions 
by their very selection of subject-matter. In a sequence 
of books during the 1930s Voegelin had courageously 
examined the National Socialist imagery of race. After 
the Anschluss he was immediately sacked from his 
university post and had to flee Vienna to elude the 
Gestapo. As it turned out, though, in preparing his 
escape he attracted the suspicion of the American vice- 
consul in Zurich: 
I was neither a Communist, nor a Catholic, nor a Jew 
and therefore had no reason whatsoever not to be in 
favour of National Socialism and be a National 
Socialist myself. That anybody could be anti- 
National Socialist without being motivated by an 
ideological counter-position, or because he was a 
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Jew, is, indeed,, as far'as my experience goes, " 
inconceivable to most people in the academic world 
whom I know (AX: 43-44). 
There is 'a familiar but pointed observation of 
politically committed theorists, that neutrality amounts 
to tacit or indirect support for those in power. ' 
Such an accusation cannot. reasonably be directed at 
Voegelin. He is keenly aware of the corruption by which 
an intellectual can act as a servile ancilla potestatis 
(OH IV: 200-01). To be free from partisanship entails 
"neutrality" only if all parties equally deserve to be 
praised and condemned. He himself dismissively charact- 
erizes such neutrality in the course of reviewing an 
American book an Soviet politics. It succeeds in 
steering a safe course between "adulatory comrades" 
and enemies of the Soviet system, but 
an objectivity due to equidistance from two 
parochialisms does not rise very high above the 
level an which the exaggerated distortions occur 
(1946d: 214). 
On the contrary,. a rational, publicly conducted search 
for intelligibility entails the exposure of relevant 
falsehood. In this sense "neutrality" is itself a 
strenuous commitment, and is potentially a politically 
charged activity. If they had thought-his theorizing 
politically irrelevant, the Nazis would certainly have 
wished to leave in peace a prominent-(and Aryan) 
intellectual. 
Voegelin, in fact, considered philosophy not,. merely 
as an theoretical discipline, but as a made of resistance 
to disorder. In a passage that seems decisive for his 
own self-understanding, he recounts how Plato (428/27-347 
B. C. ) was a young man at the time of the rule of theý 
Thirty Tyrants and their overthrow by the democratic 
party. According to the autobiographical Seventh Letter, 
Plato was invited to participate in the administration oV, 
the Thirty, but was soon disenchanted: he was shocked by 
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the policy of the Tyrants, well-known in, our own 
time, to consolidate their regime by involving 
citizens, among them Socrates, in criminal actions 
which would make them reliable supporters because a 
change of the regime would expose them to the 
vengeance of the victins (QH TTT: -4). 
Plato "withdrew in disgust from the oligarchic regime". 
But the returned democrats, though moderate on-'the wholeo 
ignored Socrates's earlier defiance of the Tyrantsp 
charged him with impiety, and executed him. 
[Plato] had understood that participation in the 
politics of Athens was senseless if the purpose of 
politics was the establishment of just order; he 
had, furthermore, seen that the situation in the 
other Hellenic poleis was just as bad as in Athens, 
if not worse; and above all he had understood (what 
modern politicallreformers and'revolutionaries seem 
to be unable to understand) that a reform cannot be 
achieved by a well-intentioned leader who recruits 
his followers from the very people whose moral 
confusion is the source of disorder. When he had 
gained these insights in the course of fifteen 
years, he did not fall, however, into despair or 
sullen resignation, but resolved-on that "effort., of 
an almost miraculous kind" to renew the order of 
Hellenic civilization cut of the resources of his 
own love of wisdom, fortified by the paradigmatic 
life and death of the most'just man, Socrates,, 
(rbid: 5). 
Voegelin speaks of philosophy as an imitatio Socratis: 
He contends that to devote one's life to "the search for 
truth" does not renounce political responsibility along 
with party allegiance. On the contrary the search for 
truth itself promotes the establishment of just order. 
Philosophy is not a doctrine of right order$' but the 
light of wisdom that falls on the struggle; and help 
is not a piece of information about trutho but the 
arduous effort to locate the forces of evil and 
identify their nature (Ibid: (32-63). 
In contending that political movements--are ultimately- 
articulations ofýconsciousness, Voegelin does not, of 
course, deny that such movements--alsoi for instance, 
reflect economic interests or class structures.. Rather, - 
it specifies. the nature of philosophy's own proper 
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contribution to political society- and insists on its 
urgency. 
Nevertheless, it is not mere wilfulness that leads 
such a scholar as Thomas Altizer, whose "admirable 
perspicacity" is acknowledged by Voegelin himself, to the 
view that "Voegelin, like Ricaeur, is radical and 
reactionary at once and altogether, thus baffling all who 
attempt to employ him either for political or theological 
ends" (Altizer, 1975: 758). 
In the first place, the disdainful tone in which 
Voegelin identifies "modern political reformers and 
revolutionaries" as intellectually blind seems ominous. 
All of them, one wanders? This tone is quite pervasive, 
especially in his-less formal writings and lectures. It 
might suggest that he would require, nascent political 
movements to abstain from all concrete action till they 
had attained freedom from any possible moral confusion 
(thereby disabling any movement that heeded him). We 
shall see that Voegelin is by no means a naive moral 
purist: but also that there may be grounds for Altizer's 
use of the word, "reactionary". Voegelin's readers will 
profitably be alert for. any consistent difference of tone 
between his allusions to ruling groups and to "reformers 
and revolutionaries". 
Secondly, Voegelin's conception, of the "struggle" may 
well be too restrictive to satisfy those engaged in a 
search for social justice. In an essay of 1981, "Wisdom 
and. the. Magic of the Extreme", he refers to-his attempt 
to recover "certain structures of consciousness whose 
repression by, the public unconscious is one of the causes 
of the contemporary disorder" (1981: 287). This state- 
ment characterizes his lifelong effort; according to, a 
short paper of 19730 "On Classical Studies", his research 
into Classical philosophy was not impelled by antiquar- 
ianism, but by his belief that "the Greek differentiation 
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of reason in existence has set critical standards for the 
exploration of consciousness behind which nobody is 
permitted to fall back" (1973a: 5). But an anecdote in 
the same paper, suggests that he envisages the "struggle" 
primarily as one of individual intellectual authenticity. 
He recalls with approval the occasion when the partic- 
ipants in a conference on comparative religion were 
challenged by one of their number over the disparity 
between their scholarly work and their everyday opinions: 
One could not forever explore "religious phenomena". 
and pretend to their importance, without unreser- 
vedly professing that man's search for the divine 
ground of his existence, as well as the revelatory 
presence of God in the motivation of the search, 
constituted his humanity; in brief he confronted 
them with the question of 
, 
truth implied in their 
admirable achievement as historians. Not everybody 
present was pleased by such tactlessness (Ibid: 7). 
Now, it is legitimate to demand that scholars seek to 
integrate their lives with their thought. ' But if 
Voegelin means by his challenge that one's humanity is 
entirely constituted by one Is search for the divine 
ground and one's response to the divine presence so 
revealed (and the word "constituted" has connotations Of 
exclusiveness), then political and communal concerns 
become secondary. If, however, membership of society is 
also a constitutive dimension of being humant then. any 
tendency to depreciate the pract 
I ical expressions of such 
membership would seriously distort Voegelin's account of 
human and political existence, by severing the trans-- 
cendent and the concretely historical dimensions of human 
existence. '21 
The matter is'important because Voegelin'9 s'gn'fic- 
ance . as a philosopher is being increasingly recognized. 
In the' article cited above, Altizer called him 
"certainly 
One of the major thinkers of . our time"s whose volume 
Is-rael and Revelation "may some day be. perceived as 
the 
most important work of Old Testament scholarship ever 
written in the United States" and Who is "at once a 
Greek 
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scholar of first rank and a philosophical mind equal or 
superior to any in America today" (Altizer, 1975: 757). 
It is not necessary to arbitrate such claims; 'but it is 
worth noting that they can be made by a scrupulous- 
scholar who is not uncritical of Voegelin. 
Since Vaegelin's death in 1985, his reputationýin the 
U. S. A. has led to the founding of the Eric Voegelin 
Institute for American Renaissance Studies at Louisiana 
State University, and of a Voegelin archive at the Hoover 
Institution, Stanford, California. The publication in 
the U. S. A. of a college textbook in which his philosoph- 
ical framework is applied to the study of world religions 
suggests that he now belongs to the academic mainstream 
there (Carmody & Carmody, 1987). Most notably, the 
massive Project of publishing The Collected Vdrks of Eric 
VoeSelin has been undertaken.: 3 As yet, though, his work 
is little known in Britain. 
The Naturg. and Situatign of Political TheologýL 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss and evaluate 
Vaegelin's thought from a particular standpoint, that of 
its significance for political theology. By "political 
theology" I mean the theology which takes as its focus 
the relationship between Christian faith and the pursuit 
of social justice. In this formulation the word "focus" 
is not a synonym for "content" or "subject matter". 
Political theologians would not accept that they merely 
choose one topic, that of politics, -among many others of 
equally legitimate theological concern. They claim that 
. political theology is a fundamental theology, distinctive 
less by its content than by its methodology and by the 
sources of its theorizing. Its thrust may be primarily 
critical, as in the work of such writers as Johann 
Baptist Metz, JUrgen Moltmann, and Dorothee S611e; or, 
like "liberation theology", it may tend rather towards 
prophetic advocacy. 
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A point of terminology must first be clarified., 
Francis Fiorenza (1975b, 1977) distinguishes "political 
theology" from "liberation, theology" (though he discusses 
them in connection with each other). He takes the German 
writers, Metz, Moltmann and S61le as representative 
political theologians, and associates liberation theology 
with Latin Americans such as Leonardo Boff, Gustavo 
Guti6rrez and Juan Luis Segundo. For the purposes of 
this thesis, however, it is more useful to adopt the 
usage of Alfredo Fierro (1977: 17-19). Fierro speaks of 
"political theologies" in the plural, while accepting 
that the differences among them are sometimes'acute and 
that reciprocal (though rarely hostile) criticism 
abounds. The different schools "agree in projecting a 
theology thatIs practical, - public and critical", and it 
is this shared ground which constitutes "a shift of major 
importance in theology" (Ibid: 19). 
The point of Fiorenza's distinction must nevertheless 
be borne in mind. The German theologians tend to work 
out a critical response to secularization, to the 
alienations of market society, and to the-supposed 
individualism of existentialist theology. The Latin 
Americans are primarily concerned by the failure of 
"developmentalism" and the economic exploitation of their 
continent by the great powers (Guti6rrez, 1973: 21-42). 
They would criticize any implication that the European 
secularized situation is universal; as for their own 
work, it seems to them that to overlook the economic and 
political dependencies characteristic of Latin-America 
would render $political theology" "apolitical".. They 
regard their main challenge to be not unbelief (and its 
political consequences) but the virtual dehumanization of 
whole societies (Forrester, 1988: 64). -4 
I 'To clarify the object of our attention, tan charac- 
teristics of political theology are now identified. 10--- 
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1. Political theology sees itself as a critical correct- 
ive of other modern theology. It rejects any privatized 
account of the nature of faith as an inherently distorted 
response to the gospel, a response which "delivers faith 
up to modern ideologies in the area of societal and 
political theory" (Metz, 1968,111). -- 
Xatthew Lamb (1978: 4-54) offers a typology by'which 
political theology is contrasted with: - ' 
a. "Palaeomorphic theologies", which mediate'between 
faith and culture through accepting some earlier cultural 
form as normative. To use Lonergan's terminology, such 
theologies are "classicist" (1974: 231-38). 
b. "Neamorphic theologies", which take contemporary 
forms of reason and culture as normative (e. g. Protestant 
"liberal'theology", and Roman Catholic I'modernisd'). 
c. "Fideomorphic theologies", which accentuate the 
opposition between the truth-intention of faith and the 
norms of any cultural matrix (e. g. the theology of Barth, 
and some "pentecostalist" theologies). ' 
d. "Criticomorphic theologies", which attempt to do 
justice to the valid articulations of types (a) to (C)t 
while criticizing the exclusivism they have in comm n. 
Unlike types (a) to (c), criticomorphic theologies are 
aware of their own grounding; they are fully aware of the 
historical nature of subjectivity, without allowing 
subjectivity to be dissolved by any kind of cultural 
determinism. 16 
e. "Political theology" accepts the positive insights 
of priticamorphic theologies, but criticizes their fail- 
ure to recognize how far the supposed "ground" of each 
theology is instead a ireflection of social interests. 7 
2. Political theology is "reconstructive": it is not 
satisfied with critique alone, but attempts to "determine 
anew the relation between religion and society, between 
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Church and societal 'publicness', between eschatological 
faith and societal life" (Metz, 1969: 111). , 
, 
Two examples may be offered of what is meant by this. 
Lamb (1978: 46-48) suggests that political theology is 
distinctive in that it takes seriously the "dialectic of 
the Enlightenment", "in the sense of the fundamentally 
new possibilities of freedom an the one hand, -, and the 
enormous threats to human dignity an the other". a 
In accepting this dialectic, political theology logically 
rejects the "Christendom! ' model, "the direct and immed- 
iate translation of Christianity into concrete sacio- 
political institutions" (Fierro, 1977: 49,. cf. also, 
Gutierrez 1973: 53-61; Metz, 1970: 37; S611e, 1974: 3-6). 
A second example of "reconstruction" is Fiorenza's 
discussion of the. relationship between the Church's 
religious identity and its socio-political mission (1984: 
195-245). He describes how the Church's social mission 
has variously been, deemed to be improper, subsidiary and 
temporary, unofficial, partial,, and constitutive; and 
then discusses the principles by which the disagreement 
might be resolved. 
3. Contemporary political theologians take pains to 
distinguish the discipline from what has sometimes gone 
by the same name, namely a form of theology which simply 
underwrites some dominant political movement, rational- 
izing a prior world-view of which the foundations are, in 
fact, non-theological. 0 In fact, because in Germany the 
term politische Tbeologie recalls the theology which 
endorsed nationalistAdeologies, Sdlle prefers to speak 
of the "political interpretation of the Gospel". 
However, because the usual English term for a discourse 
that accepts the function of buttressing the existing 
political power is "civil religion". the anglicized term 
"political theology"'scarcely prompts the same misleading 
associations. """ 
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4. Contemporary political theology does not-equate 
"politics" with the'activities of the state, -the govern- 
ment, or formal political parties (Fierro,, 1977: 184; 
Lakeland, 1984: 10). It deliberately, steps. behind-, the 
domination of the political imagination by the nation- 
state to retrieve the Aristotelian conception of politics 
as that wbich contiributes to the good of the coAwnity, 
-a subject to which even ethics itself is no more than 
introductory (Aristotle, 1955: 64). Any activity which 
influences the way society is governed, which affects a 
society's perception of its governors, or which modifies 
the relationship between the governors and. those they 
represent, is "political". From such a wide definition 
of politics, it naturally follows that those with no 
party allegiance and those who hold no public office do 
not thereby render themselves "apolitical". " 
To accept this broad notion of the scope of politics 
does not preclude one's sometimes using the word 
"political" in a more specific sense: for example, to 
designate the kind of decision about economic policy 
which logically cannot be, made on economic grounds alone: 
In an industrial democracy there is comm nly a 
conflict between economic growth and social justice 
and when a choice has to be made two opposing 
propositions will be advanced. The first will aver 
that if priority is given to justice growth will be 
inhibited, the second that if priority is given to 
growth justice will be delayed. This conflict 
between social and economic ends can be resolved 
only by political means (Calvocoressi, 1979: 169). 
Poliltical theology does not consider itself bound always 
to. -be "political" in this latter, more restricted 
sense. Ym 
5. Political theology tends not to prescribe particular 
Political programmes or allegiances. As Metz explains 
this restraint: "the Church is a_particular institution 
in society, yet presentw a universal claim; if this claim 
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is not to be an ideology, it canýanly be formulated and 
urged as criticisýdl (1969: 123, author's emphasis). Even 
if theology's critical potential is universal, its 
comrk-ndations are necessarily specific and local. - To 
affirm theology! s "contextuality" is to acknowledge its 
legitimate diversity (Forrester, 1988: 150-51). Segundo 
argues that a theology which claims universal applic- 
ability is inherently conservative, because it "lacks any 
be. re-and-now criteria far Judging our real situation" 
(1977: 8-9). 10 - 
6. There is a tendency, however, for theologians of both 
"schools" to endorse some-form of socialism --in striking 
contrast to previous generations of politically concerned 
theologians, such as those of the French Restoration 
(Fiorenza, 1977: 159-66). Naturally, this endorsement 
occurs in different degrees, ranging from explicit 
advocacy (Fierro, Segundo, S611e) to an unstated sympathy 
which the reader readily infers from the direction of a 
writer's criticisms. Speaking from his own perspective,, 
Segundo contends that his decision for, socialism is not 
universal, but depends on, the particular modes of 
capitalism and socialism available to Latin America 
(1974: 115). Such judgments, according to Segundo's 
special use of the term are "ideological"; that is, -they 
bring faith to bear. on concrete situations-" 
Fierro,, equally explicit, goes still further than does 
Segundo, working out what possibilities remain for 
theology once histovical zmtex-inlism Is decisively 
accepted (1977; 364). Others are more cautious: their 
positive choices are implicit in their "determinate, 
negations", in their "critical contestation of socio- 
Political conditions" (Metz, 1970: -37). (They might, 
indeed, direct their criticism against what-is dominant 
Just because it is dominant, without implying that itAs 
uniquely evil. ), Thus Metz, in an address to a group of 
Vest German Social Democrats, acknowledges that he uses 
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the term "socialist" in a positive sense, while he has 
"made critical use" of "bourgeois" and "capitalist" - by 
which, in this context, he means that he has used them as 
terms of depreciation. He admits that such a usage is 
problematic (1981: 80-81). 10 
What is "problematic" is not the fact that the terms 
are elusive. It might be said that the terms "Christian" 
and "adult" are equally so. We need category-words, even 
though no categories are neatly self-contained. But' 
danger arises when the language slides between the 
empirical and the frankly emotive. In Metz's address, 
"socialism! ' has no determinate content which might in its 
turn have to be negated. 
I Similarly, Moltmann offers an account of five "ways 
towards the political liberation of man" (1974: 332-35; 
cf. also 1984: 110). It is true that these ways do not 
amount to a "programme" of the kind discussed by our 
fifth point. They are, in general, "utopian" goals which 
few would reject; such as "peace with nature", liberation 
from the vicious circle of pollution', and "a significant 
life filled with a sense of the whole" (liberation from 
"senselessness and godforsakenness"). But first among 
the five ways is'an option for socialism, based on the 
unargued and-non-theological premiss that"Ithe'vicious 
circle of poverty can be broken only through economic 
co-determination and control of economic power by the 
producers". Moltmann-writes, '"If and in so far as . 
socialism .... means the satisfaction of material need 
and social justice in a material democra6y, 'socialisiils 
the symbol for the liberation of mn from the viciouq 
circle of poverty' (emphasis in original). Moltmann does 
not claim that any particular socialist party or regime 
meets his'specific'ations. ' But it is reckless to mix 
empirical-and symbolic language, so casually: especially 
so, in view of the formidable body of thought deriving 
from max Weber which holds state socialism to be not a 
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liberation from capitalism but a malign intensification 
of its rationalizing spirit (Weber, 1947: 48-50). "0 The 
issue at stake here is the political responsibility of 
political theology's own discourse. 
7. The apparent discrepancy between political theology's 
suspicion of party programmes and its affinity with 
socialism is explained by its characteristic adoption of- 
an intermediate commitment, the "option for the poor". 
This, option is not a "program " in that the poor are not 
taken as a designated class of people who can be 
identified apart from a critical and 
, 
continuing social 
analysis: they are those people who in practice suffer 
the burden of social injustice. In case of a successful 
revolution, for example,. those who take a consistent 
option 
, 
for the poor would not be bound to the newly 
established power, even if they had previously supported 
it, but would seek to be aware of those groups who might 
be newly victimized by the revolution's very, success. 
, 
The option would prompt an affirmation of socialism in the 
specific case that socialism was envisaged as the only 
practicable alternative to a manifestly oppressive 
capitalism., 
The option forthe, poor is not absent from "First 
World" theology. " Naturally, however, the option has 
been most forcefully articulated from the Third World". 
In explaining its adoption by the Church in Brazil,, 
Cardinal Paulo Arns-of Sao Paulo conveys much of the 
distinctive tone of liberation theology itself: 
We'are not a church of geniuses who suddenly decided 
to apt for the poor - the option came from pure 
necessity: 85% of our population is oppressed-and 
its oppression clearly showed us that we live in a 
social and economic situation of injustice. ... 
The first rights-of the poor that-we defended can 
be called liberal rights: Habeas Corpus, defence 
against torture, imprisonment for years without 
trial. In this struggle many worked together with the church. 
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In the struggle for political rights - electionst 
the right of criticism in Congress, etc. -' many 
others struggled with us and even praised us. 
But when it came to the rights that only affect 
the poor - strikes, agrarian reform, humanizing 
slums, etc. - with rare exceptions, only the poor 
remained united in this struggle. 
.**. The defence of the poor is a threat to the 
whole system which reacts with all the virulence of 
its being (Arns, 1981). 
As Arns goes on to explain, "the option for the poor is 
not a class option in the marxist sense of the word. The 
Gospel is indeed universal, but the powerful will only 
see the newness of the word of God through the eyes of 
the poor and through the rejection of profit as the 
centre and the only absolute of social organization". 
The "determinate negation" here flows from a prior 
affirmation of those whose dignity is negated. 
8. Effective recognition of such human dignity requires 
what Metz calls a "political theology of the subject" 
(1980: 60). The word "subject" does not here refer to 
"the isolated individual, the monad who only afterwards 
made sure of his co-existence with other subjects"'. But 
"the idea of truth without reference to subjects is 
irrelevant and even dangerous, with the result that truth 
and relevance are bound to converge to the extent that 
truth becomes the type of relevance that applies to a1 11 
subjects" (Ibid: 62,60). Elsewhere Matz goes further: 
the very function of religion is rooted in subjectivity: 
If we are to achieve a postbourgeois and post- 
individualist "rescue of the human subject". 
religion seems to me indispensable. Without 
religion, I see the barbarism of a blind negation of 
the individual breaking out within a postbourgeois 
society (1981: 70). 
Metz therefore holds that'solidaritY*is not to be at the 
eXpense of individuation; he does not spurn the language 
Of "Conversion of heart"; and he writes, "even the poor- 
est and most damaged'individual remains higher in value 
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than any total determination of societal and economic 
reality" (Ibid: -71, - 74). Likewise, S61le's Deatb by Bread 
Alone is entirely concerned with the search for authentic 
interiority, the meditative experience of, the divine, and 
the experiences of grace and personal identity.. 
S61le also avers that subjective consciousness is the 
primary locus of social change: 
If someone asks, How does one become a Christian'for 
socialism?, I would reply: love your neighbour and 
pay attention to your own experience. ... The more 
you become involved with your neighbour, the more 
you must care about his world, his life .... his 
social environment. Then you 
' 
want to understand the 
causes of your neighbour's misery, and to bring 
about changes. The person who is basically compas- 
sionate gets-to the roots of the problem and is 
radicalized (S611e, 1976: 424). 
Among liberation theologians, Segundo Galilea (1974: 
19-33) uses the notion of "encounter" to argue that 
contemplation and politics are mutually constitutive: as 
a consequence of the Incarnation, the Christian 
encounters Christ in other people and other people in 
Christ. Guti6rrez, speaking of the "encounter with God 
in history" reiterates the traditional conception that 
every person is a "temple of the Holy Spirit" (1973: 
192-93). Segundo (1977: 208-40) contrasts minority 
consciousness and mas6 consciousness, not in order to 
posit two discrete groups of people, of which one group, 
the mass, is, of minimal significance, but to emphasize 
that "conscientization", -like the gospel message itself, 
aims to nourish "the minority character in each and every 
human being" (Ibid: 231). 
Again Fierro takes a contrary stance (1977: 233-36), 
though he seems careful to preserve an element of 
ambiguity, perhapsýeven of deliberate confusion., He- 
argues that "stress'an individual conversion has ever 
been an obstacle to social change". His first explan-, - 
ation of this sentence is modest:, -self-canversion "is not 
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independent of the surrounding social systemý, but is 
"conditioned* by the milieu; the gospel suzo ns to 
conversion not only* on the individual but also on the 
political and social level; we must scrape from the 
notion of conversion "the barnacles of excessive 
individualism! '. But he goes an to make a far more 
intransigent deduction: 
when gospel conversion ceases to be interpreted as a 
process centred on the individual and comes to be 
understood as a process centred around groups and 
collectivities, then it ends up corresponding-to 
what is otherwise known as liberating revolution. 
"Conversion" is the Christian name for revolution. 
Vhat he means by "revolution" quickly becomes clear: "in 
the last analysis, societal transformation comes down to 
a transformation of production relationships".. He asks, 
"Vhich comes first, the new person or the new society? ". 
and answers the question with a surprising confidence 
which nevertheless remains slightly evasive: 
the older moralism naively believed that the conv- 
ersion of human individuals would be enough. ... Cbut] current theology knows that there can be no 
transformation of human beings without a transform- 
ation of society. ... Real conversion to a new humanity must necessarily go by way of revolution. 
Revolution will not automatically produce new human 
beings, but it is the-necessary social precondition 
for that on the collective level. 
Fierro stops just short of claiming that the trans- 
formation of production relationships guarantees the 
conversion of individuals. But he has no doubt that it 
has a wholly causal relationship with that conversion. 
His view of the relationship between "infrastructure" and 
"superstructure" is that of unqualified historical 
materialism, and renders subjectivity virtually 
inconsequential. 
9. Political theology concerns itself with the present 
less as the fruit of the past than as the foundation of'. J7 the future, the present as it is oriented (or not) to the 
eschatological Kingdom of God (Lamb, 1978: 41-42). A 
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"palaeomorphic" or a "Ifideamorphic" theology, correctly 
stressing that human effort cannot directly construct the 
Kingdom (because the Kingdom depends on the divine gift), 
will tend to distance itself from any program s which 
seek social transformation within history. Political 
theology, recognizing their provisionality, nevertheless 
takes them seriously. Lamb therefore suggests that "the 
eschatological orientation of religious praxis is a 
dialectical unity of identity and non-identity with the 
concrete social praxis of secular and ecclesial commun- 
ities and institutions"' (Ibid: 44). 
Metz commonly invokes the "eschatological proviso" in 
this connection (e. g. 1968: 114). This 
does not, bring about a negative but a critical 
attitude to the societal present. Its promises are 
not an empty horizon of religious expectations; 
neither are they only a regulative idea. They are, 
rather, a critical liberating imperative for our 
present times (Ibid). 
To link the concepts of the eschaton and the future, 
therefore, is not to deny that the eschatological rule of 
God is also a present reality, though a "disputed and 
hidden" one, subject to resistance: for the eschaton has 
already begun, and its power determines the present 
(Moltmann, 1977: 190,192). By uniting the two concepts 
one rules out any conception of the Kingdom of God which 
minimizes the'significance of history, but also implies 
that human creativity or achievement is itself a sign of 
a further, more profound reality. 
The problematic of a "theology of hope", as set out 
clearly by Fierro, lies in the relationsbip between the 
historical and the eschatological: 
we might maintain that the Christian hopes for the 
same thing that other human beings hope for: i. e., a 
more humane society; the only distinctive. 
-element. 
in 
the Christian hope is that it regards a more human 
society as a promise and gift from God. Or, an the" 
ather hand, we might claim that the, Christian hopes 
for something in addition to that hoped for by other 
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human beings: i. e. , for a kingdom of ý 
God that is to 
be realized in a future that will transcend history 
and this world (1977: 298). 
This position, though clearly set out, is scarcely 
persuasive: what, Fierro calls a "dilemma" assumes that 
the "basic alternatives" are mutually exclusive. But the 
two modes of hope can be understood as compatible with 
each other, even as essentially inter-related. More 
important still, Fierro represents Christian hope 
positivistically, as if it were directed at a "thing" out 
there (perhaps some desirable set of circumstances),, a 
thing either different from or identical with the thing 
perceived by others. His language excludes the possib- 
ility that Christian hope is structured by a deeper 
perception into the saAke_ ! 'things". , 
Most political theology here builds on an insight of 
Teilhard de, Chardin which directly rejects the dichotomy 
posited by Fierro. Teilhard fears that the Christian 
might "repress his taste for the tangible and force 
himself to confine his concern to purely religious 
objects". As he argues, one familiar counsel, that the 
value of human action lies in the intention put into it, 
is only partially true: the intention "puts a priceless 
soul into all our actions" but "does not confez- the bope 
o. f resurrection upon their bodied' (1964: 52-55,62-63, 
emphasis in original). 
, As Moltmann explains, if history is an "open system! *, 
then only the transcendent kingdom gives a decisive 
orientation to the transformative possibilities which are 
immanent in history: conversely, for those without a, ý 
commitment to historical transformation, any dream of the 
transcendent kingdom is a mere mode of escape: "the 
doxological anticipation-of-the beauty of the kingdom and 
active resistance to'godless and inhuman relationships in 
history" are mutually reinforcing (Moltmaunp 1977: 190). 
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"Anticipations" of the Kingdom are concrete, but are also 
consciously preliminary: "they represent what is to come 
and not themselves", and they preclude both complacency 
and any attitude of resignation which settles for the 
partial truth that "the world is unredeemed and every- 
thing is still ambivalent" (Ibid: 193-95). Ia 
10. Political theology is practical; it "engages in 
praxis". 10 As to the relationship between theory and 
praxis, two different emphases are discernible. One 
emphasis goes back to the Hellenic philosophers. For 
Aristotle, praxis, as opposed to both theoria and poiesis 
(technical skill), inherently serves ethical action: for 
St. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, theoretical and 
practical knowledge, though they can converge, differ in 
their intentionality, the latter being ordered to ethics, 
politics, and so an (Post, 1970: 246-47). From this 
perspective, political theology is validated only in 
right action, in "practice that is truly directed towards 
building up the community" (Lakeland, 1984: 13). Thus 
Moltmann, having worked out his theology of-the cross, 
then asks, "Vhat are the economic, social and political 
consequences of the gospel of the Son of man who was 
crucified as a Irebel"? .... The freedom of faith is 
lived out in political freedom. [It) urges men on 
towards liberating actions .... 11 (1974: 317). -2'0 
But when Gutidrrez'describes his own mode of doing 
theology as "critical reflection an praxis" (1973: 6), 
he represents praxis as the foundation of theory, not 
only its goal. According to Segundo, the liberation 
theologian starts from the suspicion that all existing 
ideas, including theology, are "intimately bound up with 
the existing social situation in at least an unconscious 
way" (1977: 8). Existing ideas are, therefore, a shaky 
foundation on which to construct theory. ýI' Thus I Fiorenza 
(1977: 169-70) finds that whereas the German theologians 
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typically move from theory to praxis, the liberation 
theologians move from praxis to theory. -02" 
However, this difference of emphasis is, not an 
opposition. That both ýschools acknowledge the dialect- 
ical interplay between praxis and theory, is manifest, 
for example, in-Segundo's account of the-hermeneutical 
circle (1977: -, 9-38), and in Metz's description of 
theology as a "second reflection", -undertaken in specific 
social conditions (1969: 111). Guti6rrez writes, "What 
Hegel used to say about philosophy can likewise -be 
applied to theology: it rises only'at sundown"-(1973: 
11). But, as Verkamp observes, (1988: 16), such 
reflection after sundown, if it is not, mere musing, must 
inform the next day's activity, and therefore-implies 
that theory intermittently guides practice. Segundo, 
too, acknowledges that if ideas are not innocent, neither 
are interests (e. g. 1977: 98-106)., "Commitment" is no 
more self-validating than is theory. - 
To put the same 
point in a more positive way, ccmmitments-and interests 
are not inherently mindless or impermeable to truth, nor 
is theory inherently blind to its own conditions. 213 
Political theologians also differ in their account of 
the scope of praxis itself, - Fierro (1977: 20-23) uses 
the term uncompromisingly, to denote action aimed at the 
transformation of society, deriving it from Marx's famous 
eleventh thesis against Feuerbach. As Fierro renders 
that thesis, "Philosophers have done nothing more than 
interpz-et the world in different ways; but it is really a 
matter of t"nsforizing it". one might, add the eighth 
thesis, "All social life is essentially practical. All 
mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their 
rational solution in human, practice and in the compreh- 
ension of this practice", (Marx, 1977: 157), As Fierro 
writes, belief is "no, longer identified with a way of 
thinking but with a way of acting", and "present-day. 
theology has decided to be active and transforming in the 
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practical realm. It means to be a theology with hands as 
well as with eyes" (Ibid). 
But though Fierro cites Metz as one-who approves of 
theology's shift to praxis,, Metz gives the, term aýmuch 
broader application. He refers to critical discourse, 
for example, as itself praxis (1969: 122-24), which 
implies that interpreting the world-does not leave it 
unchanged, and"that "ways of thinking" ought not to be 
polarized with "ways of acting". Metz later deepened his 
reflections on this theme, speaking of "the. dangerous 
memory of the freedom of-Jesus Christ". Such"a memory 
"regards history as something more than a screen for , 
contemporary interests". It "mobilises, tradition as'a 
dangerous tradition", which inherently challenges the 
"prevailing'consciousness" (1980: 88,90) Similarly, 
praxis includes Joy and sorrow (because they-renounce the 
"prevalent-apathy, of society"); and it includesýsolid- 
arity with the past suffering of those who have been- 
overcome. For"Ievery rebellion against suffering is fed 
by the subversive power of remembered suffering. The 
memory of suffering continues to resist the cynics of 
modern political power". Metz's expansion of the concept 
rescues praxis from presupposing a one-sided anthropology 
according to which human beings simply exert control-over 
nature and history (Ibld: 57-58,110). It also follows 
from Metz's description that praxis includes the critique 
of unduly narrow notions of praxis! -ý-4 
At the other pole to Fierro stand Lonergan and 
Fiarenza. Lonergan adopts the Aristotelian usage by 
which the products of poiesis pass beyond the maker's 
6ontrol to be used at the will of others, 'whereas praxis 
is the "doing" which always results from one's own 
deliberation guided by practical wisdom. Theology as 
such is "basically a praxis", by which is meant that the 
most fundamental questions in theology "are resolved far 




For Lonergan as against Fierro, then, 
praxis is constituted by the intrinsic character of an 
action ordecision, 'not by the. goal which is sought by 
it. Fiorenza speaks of "the total praxis (intellectual 
as well as imaginative, symbolic as well as conceptual, 
individual as well as social) of religious conversion and 
flowing from religious conversion" (1977: 143). Far from 
praxis's defining what counts as conversion, any 
conversion constitutes praxis. 
Sdlle likewise insists that praxis must not be 
abandoned to "instrumental reason"; that is, to action in 
the service of a particular predetermined nexus of ends 
and means (1974: 77-81). Echoing, but refining Segundo's 
notion of "suspicion", Clodovis Boff argues similarly 
(1987. - 14-17,186-93): theology, including political 
theology, cannot be merely the "voice of praxis", cannot 
be empirically derived from praxis or pragmatically 
oriented to it. It has an internal autonomy. But at a 
diffe. rent level all theorizing, like any other activity, 
takes its place in the flux of'historical and sociaL 
purposes, and cannot be independent of them. ýO 
Terry Eagletan writes, 
It is not just as though we have, something'called 
factual knowledge which may then be distorted by 
particular interests and judgments, although this is 
certainly possible; it is also that without partic- 
ular interests we would have no knowledge at all, 
because we would not see the point of bothering to 
get to know anything. Interests are constitutive 
of our knowledge, not merely prejudices which 
imperil it (Eagleton, 1983: 14). 
This point is well taken. However, even if interests are 
constitutive of knowledge, it remains possible. that 
knowledge will transcend the, interests that give rise to 
And, in 
, 
the context of a discussion of "praxis",,, a 
second-point is especially important. In Eagleton's,, - 
formulation two meanings of the word "interest" might 
easily but misleadingly be elided: that of the various, 
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external factors which undoubtedly influence one's 
thought (and perhaps even exert a pressure which 
approaches "hegemony"), and that of an innate orientation 
which endows one's thinking with vitality as well as 
direction. It is possible that one can become relatively 
emancipated from"Ovested interests" even as, one becomes 
more effectively impelled by--some innate drive, towards 
knowledge. 
As will be seen in Chapter Two, Vaegelin draws an 
classical philosophy to postulate of human beings an 
inherent orientation to a transcendent Truth which 
exercises an erotic attraction an consciousness. In 
other words, "Truth" itself is an "interest", which 
precisely impels one to "disinterestedness". In its 
relationship to truth, consciousness is marked bv both 
intentionality and participation, by activity and 
receptivity. Particular interests, of either ofýthe, two 
types just mentioned, guide the seach for knowledge. 
without necessarily constraining it. Once gained, 
knowledge might either confirm or threaten one's previous 
interests. There isl, therefore,, an-inherent tension but 
no necessary incompatibility between the disinterest- 
edness of a theoretical discipline and the, interests 
which motivate its practitioners: and in this-respect. 
Voegelin, offers a theory of consciousness which is richer 
and more subtle-than that implied by Eagleton and Fierro. 
, -Voegelin regarded himself as a philosopher, not as a 
theologian. Since he was persistently single-minded in 
pursuing his scholarly goals, he considered it no part of 
his task to engage in dialogue with theologians on their 
terms. -24& Conversely, among the political theologians 
considered in the previous section, only Matthew Lamb has 
discussed Voegelin at any length. It therefore seems 
necessary to explain briefly why the focus of'this thesis 
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is not arbitrary. The twofold explanationAs rooted, 
firstly, in certain difficulties internal to political 
theology itself, difficulties on which a study of- 
Voegelin casts light: and secondly, in the contention 
that Voegelin's work is flawed in a way that is high- 
lighted by the insights of political theology but is 
likely to be overlooked by those who do not take such 
theology seriously. 
Accordingly, Part One of the thesis will offer an 
exposition of Vaegelin's empirically wide-ranging, but 
theoretically consistent work, with the concerns of 
political theology as the main principle behind the 
selection of topics. Part Two will discuss three themes 
which lie close to the heart both of Vaegelin's Phil- 
osophy and of political theology. Voegelin's treatment 
of these themes will be considered in orderto explore 
both his potential contribution to the discipline and his 
deficiencies in the light of it. The three themes are: 
(1) the relationship between consciousness and social 
structures, between personal and societal trans- 
formation; 
(2) the relationship between hope for societal trans- 
formation within history and eschatological hope; 
(3) the theoretician's discharge of political respons- 
ibility. =7 
In the remainder of this section, we shall introduce 
these themes: first from the standpoint of political,, 
theology,, and then from that of Vaegelin's own work. 
Voegelin's Potential Contribution 
to Political Theology 
1. Perhaps the most powerful articulations of political 
theology have emerged from the experience of a brutal and 
dramatically manifest social injustice: "Liberation 
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theology was, and is, the creative, authentic attempt to 
give a genuinely Christian answer to this situation of 
real suffering 
14 (Greinacher, 1986: 81). But the very 
source of the prophetic power of such theology gives rise 
to a theoretical problem. 
We have noticed the insistence of liberation theol- 
ogians that they cannot simply take over the findings of" 
European theology. There are crucial differences in 
religious culture as well as in specifically political or 
economic circumstances. It follows that'the'exporting of 
liberation theology is no less problematic'. 
For example, there are three reasons why liberation 
theologians can assert legitimately that a politically- 
oriented theology deserves a privileged status. Firstly, 
there is the social context of political injustices and 
abuses so pervasive and so stark as to threaten the very 
life of anyone who challenges them. Secondly, since such 
bodies as trades unions and co-operatives are virtually 
crushed lest they offer effective resistance to the 
ruling powers, church groups emerge as potentially the 
most effective focus for mutual support and'social 
protest. Thirdly, and no less important, 'liberation 
theologians can reasonably rely on the persistence of a 
rich communal faith (for example, in the "Basic Christian 
Communities"): hence their slight concern with "European" 
problems of secularization. ýý10 
It seems plausible to suggest that such communities' 
experience of profound, shared suffering, intrinsic 
social relevance, and vigorous faith (experience which 
is, in the narrow sense, "non-political") is the very- 
condition of liberation theology's political witness. - 
Therefore, the claim that "everything is political" is 
sustainable only as long as it is *mown by experience to 
be non-exclusive. It has the valid sense that no area of 
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one's life is separable from the political reality which 
is its context and its formative condition. But it- 
becomes false if it implicitly denies'the parallel ' 
statements that "everything is spiritual" or "everything 
is psychological". The members of a Latin American base 
community, united in a shared, life of scriptural reflect- 
ion and sacramental participation, may be relativelV - 
innine from such a mistake. - To apply the findings of the 
liberation theologians in the'absence-of such an integ- 
rated experience will betray their own intentions. If, 
therefore, one acknowledges the spiritual disintegration 
of Europe diagnosed by such writers as Metz and S611e. it 
follows that any European version'of a, liberation 
theology will require a complementary "non-political" 
renewal of spiritual awareness; and that it'might well be 
self-defeating to reproduce liberation theologv's partic- 
ularity of focus in the secularized European context. 20 
A due awareness that theological persDectives and 
tasks vary by no means implies that Europe can comfort- 
ably seal itself off from the challenge, of liberation' 
theology. ' For the twentieth century has also seen the 
growth of a new sense of human unity. ' As Rahner notes, 
whereas once, say, the siege of Vienna was "of no real 
immediate moment for the history of South East Asia"* 
there is a centripetal force at work Ii-L humanity 
today, driving individual cultures and historical 
spaces together .... into a sinFle. common 
existential space for all-human beinFs (1983: 77). 
Thusl in so far as European Christians account themselves 
members of one body with those suffering in the "Third 
World", they can (and must) seek to share something of 
the experience of suffering: obviously imperfectly, but 
sufficiently to share their aspirations for liberation. 411 
They can recognize' too, that Europe is united with, says 
Latin America, by the nexus of co-mm rcial exploitation, 
and can accept the consequences of that recognition for 
the practice of their faith and'their politics. *"I 
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Now the reasons why some people and, not others are 
open to such an insight, lies not in the economic data 
themselves, but in consciousness. To put this. point in. 
another way, political discourse, like spiritual, and 
psychological discourse, is a way of structuring and 
articulating one's experience of the world. There can be. 
no rule of thumb to prescribe which mode of discourse is 
most appropriate at a given time, and no externally 
objective state. of affairs compels a uniform human 
response to it., Any account of the human situation 
which, like Fierra's, entails the view that-consciousness 
(or "conversion") is minimally significant, cuts away the 
grounding of praxis itself, by diminishing people's 
awareness of both their f1reedom to respond and, the 
significance of their response. 
If Fierro were-right in this, then Voegelin's work" 
would be of no interest. Those political theologians who 
do affirm the role of the subject, however, will be much 
helped by anyone who can give an adequate account of the 
r-elationsbip between subjective, personal, transformation 
and societal transformation. It is reasonable to look to 
Voegelin, as a political philosopher, for such help. aO 
2. Czeslaw Milosz has written, 
Even a theologically trained Christian must puzzle 
over the Gospel references to the future Kingdom of 
God. ... The Gospels have been invoked both by 
millenarists of every persuasion and by pessimist- 
ically inclined Christians, for whom the earth will 
always be a valley of tears (Milosz. 1985: 181). 
We have already cited, Moltmann's suggestion, that 
anticipations of the Kingdom in history, are genuine, 
though preliminary and provisional. He, deduces that 
"hope becomes realistic and reality hopeful" (1977: 192). 
In his earlier Tbeology of Hope, he postulates hope as 
the Median virtue between the two vices of presumption 
29 
(the impatient demand for the present fulfilment of hope) 
and despair (the premature and arbitrary anticipation of 
its non-fulfilment). Against Pascal's dictum "we never 
live, but we hope to live; and as we are always preparing 
to be-happy, it is inevitable we should never-be so" 
Moltmann insists that living without hope is "like. no 
longer living", and that hope "is itself the happiness of 
the present" (1967: 23,27,32). - 
Moltmann, to be sure, never overlooks the persistence 
of suffering and conflict in history. As he testifies, 
"Since I first studied theology, I have been concerned 
with the theology of the cross" (1974: 1). However, he 
also writes, 
Hope alone is to be called "realistic" because it 
alone takes seriously the possibilities with which 
all reality is fraught. It does not take things as 
they happen to-stand or to lie, but as progressing. 
moving things with possibilities of change. HoDe 
and the kind of thinking that goes with it conseq- 
uently cannot submit to the reproach of being 
utopian, for they do not strive after things that 
have "no place", but after things that hav; IsnO 
place as yeV but can-acquire one (1967: 25). 
These sentences embody the remarkable assumption that 
change means growth. They "take seriously" only'sone of 
the possibilities with which reality is fraught. Since 
decline and regression are at all times , no less possible 
than progress, it would be more accurate to assert that 
hope, but not "hope alone" is "realistic"; that realism 
allows, but does not entail hope. It is true, as 
Moltmann aptly notes, that "meaningful action is always 
possible only within a' horizon of expectation. otherwise 
all decisions and actions would be desperate thrusts into 
a void and would hang unintelligibly and meaninalesslv in 
the air" (1967: 326-27). But exDectatiori CAn have. the -'- 
character of fear as well as of ho*De: and dPfPr5'ivP. (or 
even "desperate") action inspired by fearful Pwpectatio'n 
is "meaningful". 
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There are three types of challenge. all farzaidable. to 
the suggestion that only hope is realistic.. 
Firstly and most dramatically, among the most vivid 
contemporary "anticipations" are those of catastrophe; 
economic, ecological, nuclear. As a literary genre, 
dystopia is as common as utopia. It may be true that a 
person filled with hope acquires resilience sufficient to 
meet grim circumstances with courage, and even with Joy. 
But foreboding is no less sane than hope, and is not 
inherently a sin against hope. -0: 3 
Secondly, according to Henri Bergson progress can be 
defined only in retrospect. The achievement of-social 
progress can only be posited of a society "such that, if 
men once tried it, they would refuse to go back to the 
old state of things" (1935: 80). The example with which 
Bergson illustrates his subtle argument'(1935: 78-81) 
concerns the inter-relationship between equalitV and 
liberty. As values they are necessarily in tension, 'but 
they are opjx)sed to each other only as long as they are 
conceived as mechanistic forces. For a society to grow 
in its capacity to reconcile the two values there is 
required an enhanced quality of moral perception. And if 
we could envisage such moral advances, we should already 
have attained them! They are by definition unforeseeble. 
If Bergson is correct, Moltmann is incautious in linking 
the rhetoric of hope with that of progress. 01 
The third challenge to Moltmann's assertion derives 
from the argument which Freud set out most clearly in 
Civilization and its Discontents and The Future of an 
Illusion. "Happiness, in the reduced sense in which we 
recognize it as possible, is a problem of the economics 
of the individual's libido" (Freud, 1985: 271). In other 
wordso happiness is a function of the capacity bv which a 
person balances the search for pleasure against the 
avoidance of pain. According to Freud.. whereas religion 
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destructively restricts the scope of su. ch adaptation by 
imposing an all its adherents one path to happiness, 
civilization defends the psyche against threat only at 
the cost of systematically frustrating the libido: thus, 
"there are difficulties attaching to the nature of civil- 
ization which will not yield to any attempt at reform! * 
(Ibld: 306). Freud therefore considers happiness to be 
unattainable. Instead of the search for it he advocates 
an "education to reality", by which infantilism is 
renounced and the full extent of human "helplessness" and 
"insignificance" accepted (Ibid: 233). O's 
The difficulty which face sa political theology of 
hope may be expressed in another way: not an grounds of 
external threat or psychological. theory, but on the 
grounds of the intrinsic character of the future as-such. 
Metz distinguishes "our" future from "God's" future: 
God is not "above us" but "before usli. His 
transcendence: reveals itself as our "absolute 
. future". This future is ,. . -not erected out of the potentialities of our human freedom and human 
action. Rather, this future calls forth our potent- 
ialities to unfold themselves in history. Only such 
a future - one that is more than just the project- 
ions of our abilities - can call us to realize truly 
new possibilities (Metz, 1969: 88-89). 
Now, political theology seems obliged to connect - 
"hope" with the removal of historically manifest, social 
injustices. But in so far as such a-result is aimed at, 
no matter how humbly, it seems to belong to "our" future 
not to "God's". And in terms of the spiritual insight of 
Buddhism, for example, the. very will-to remove suffering 
embodies the craving which ensures the, reproductionýof 
suffering (Carrithers, 1983: 
-60-66). 
Perhaps with this anomaly, -in mind,,. Metz goes an to 
distinguish between the terms IIfuture"Y., (a reality 
grounded in itself, -which comes to us as God's gift) and 
"goal" (which "appears exclusively as the correlate of 
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the present", and which people (or, at least, powerful 
people) falsely imagine to-, be within their control)., 
(Ibid: 98-99). 13a Moltmann (1985: 132-35) similarly 
distinguishes between terms which signify beco-ning, a 
more or less predictable extrapolation from the present 
(Latin futur-uzff, French futur), and terms which signify 
what is candng from the future as something qualitatively 
new (Latin adventus, French avenir). English and German 
have each a single-term only, with contrasting etymo- 
logies (i. e. Zukunft is cognate to adventus). , 
Such distinctions, however, fail to extricate Metz or 
Moltmann from the difficulty they see so clearly. When 
we symbolize the eschatological Kingdom we extrapolate 
from our present experience in a twofold manner: the 
Kingdom will not only fulfil our experience of good but 
will also provide a "rectifying alternative", to our 
experience of historical evil (Keck, 1972: 222). Even 
what Metz calls "future". (the historical state which 
approaches us as God's gift rather than as the function 
of the human capacity to control events) will-necessarily 
be present under the conditions of material finitude and 
human sinfulness; it will have its own propensity to 
decay. One cannot use such distinctions to-espouse a 
form of historical optimism, and one cannot imagine that 
the "future" and the "absolute future" form a continuum. 
The Kingdom will overturn history - incl, uding "God's 
historical adventus" - as well as crown it. ý 
Metz is well aware of the poignancy Of this dilemmm; 
As he writes, "If 'progress' exists at allt it is only in 
opposition to its nalve generalization"' (1980: 100). -, 
The 
history of freedom is itself a history-of guilt, and 
requires a consciously held soteriology if, it islnot. to 
engage in "an irrational mechanism of exoneration or 
guilt-repression" (Ibld: 127). 
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The problematic will be clear. In so far as an apDeal 
to the "possibilities latent in the present" grounds an 
implicitly generalized exhortation to "transform social 
structures", political'theology threatens to disallow (as 
"mystifications") such attitudes as "detachment" and 
"patience". And yet these spiritual qualities will be 
required by mature individuals in any conceivable 
historical situation. Political theology cannot'dissolve 
Kilosz's's "puzzle". And therefore one has to posit an 
authentic Christian hope (in other words, not merely 
"consolation") which can survive the erosion of histor- 
ical optimism. 1ý 
3. According to Lamb, political theology "mediates faith 
dialectically, emphasizing how it transforms human 
action". He contrasts the character of such a theology 
with the perspective of certain other thinkers (among 
them Voegelin), who tend to emphasize the disClosive 
character of religious truth. "Such an approach, no 
matter how sophisticated, minimizes the transformative 
effect of religious and doctrinal symbols on human 
experience" (1979: 81-83). If, however, one guards 
against an exclusively activist"interpretation of praxis, 
as does Metz in allowing that it has a "pathic" as well 
as an active dimension, then it becomes dubious to oppose 
Voegelin to praxis-theologians simply an the ground that 
he favours; a "disclosure" model of truth. Disclosures 
have their roots in experience, whether individual or 
communal: both the experience and the disclosure'it - 
evokes have a social context and social implications. 1107 
-Contrasting Voegelin with the-political theologians# 
Lamb suggests that in Voegelin's thought transcendence is 
disclosed as a "dimension or structure aliready present 
implicitly or explicitly in human experience" (Ibid: 83s' 
author's emphasis). In political theologyt however, 
transcendence is "not disclosed as already present" but 
is experienced as an "imperative challenge capable of 
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transforming or converting the present unfreedom of human 
existence" (Ibid). 
Ve shall shortly see that Lamb's criticism of Vaegeliu 
is not without weight. In opposing disclosure to praxis, 
however, Lamb misleadingly represents the event of 
disclosure itself as somehow serene, divorced from any 
sense of crisis. On the cantrary, ý'as has already been 
said, Vaegelin holds that philosophy is intrinsically a 
resistance to social disorder. Far those whose 
intellectual activity leaves the status quo unchallenged, 
he recovers the Platonic term "philodoxers", who are 
specifically contrasted with true "philosaphers". 00 
The key disclosures of Vaegelin's own life occurred 
precisely through crises, whether intellectual or 
civilizational. It seems, in fact, that no one floats 
downstream to a new vision. alo 
I cite Lamb's criticism at this point because it also 
unwittingly points to an impasse for a praxis-oriented 
theology itself: namely, that when it is stressed 
exclusively, it cuts itself off from its own sources of 
nourishment. There are two aspects to this impasse. 
Firstly, Lamb's polarization I represents praxis as 
determining the very relevance of the transcendent. But 
if the transcendent cannot an principle be experienced 
im diately, it is unlikely to be experienced as the 
ground of a social struggle either. Secondly, to posit 
an opposition (and not merely a distinction which allows 
for complementarity) between a Vaegelinian "disclosive" 
theology and political theology may well itself be 
socially destructive, by Judging the whole of reality 
according to the single criterion of usefulness for a 
previously settled purpose. Worship will be evaluated in 
terms entirely of its social function, community 
dissolved into alliances, the notion of leisure thinned 
Out to that of recuperation for further work. Such an 
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instrumentalist mentality must impoverish the psyche, 
even should the goal sought be as magnanimous as the 
enhancement of human f reedom., 4'0 
At this point, the problematic of praxis overlaps-with 
those of hope and of subjectivity. PoliticaLtheology is 
keenly and correctly alert to the danger that such 
spiritual dispositions as detachment, patience, and- 
contemplation will renounce human responsibility for the 
world. But to the extent that aggressively intervening 
in situations can sometimes worsen them, granted the 
bitter knowledge that supposed solutions can entail 
unforeseen and destructive side-effects, "non-action" can 
also express political responsibility. -" 
It is an inadequate reply to this point to say that 
praxis has its own "theoretical moment", that it demands 
analysed action and not mere'blundering: for praxis tends 
to utilize "analysis" only to refine its strategies, not 
to question its ideological ends. -4= 
In 1986, Charles Davis argued for a shift in emphasis 
by which social action,, rather than "inwardness"' should 
be regarded as the "privileged locus", for religious 
experience" (1986: 115). His argument was directed 
against the identification of. religious experience with 
interiority, from which it would follow that social and 
political action are at best regarded as legitimate 
consequences of a prior spirituality., ta But in, 1973,, 
Davis had recorded the stronger claim, which he regarded 
as a "serious challenge to theology as currently under- 
Stood", that "truth does not yet exist; it cannot be 
r eached by interpretation, but it has to, be produced by 
change". He added his own view: 
The pra. yis of christians, like all pra. xis, demands, a 
critical analysis of present society, intended to 
uncover the contradictions latent within it. These 
contradictions, if Christianity is more than ideo- 
logy, will occur where Christians with their faith 
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and hope are 
' 
situated in an objective conflict with 
the social order. Conscious Christian DraXiS iS' 
the actualization of the conflict thus uncovered 
(Davis, 1973: 166,167). 
This position seems to be incoherent. If truth does 
not yet exist at all, what status has one's exposure of 
societal "contradictions"? Can light, "fall on" the 
struggle (which would suppose some source of disclosure), 
or does it only "flow from" the struggle? the latter, 
what first inspires anyone's struggle? What, in any 
case, is "the social order"? If it extends into one's 
pysche (which has its own divisions), how can one simply 
be in. "objective conflict" with the social order? 
Secondly, unless Davis recognized that "Christian 
life" transcends the boundaries of "Christian praxis", 
his position would be viciously restrictive. No action 
that failed directly to contest "the social order" (such 
as feeding one's baby, doing a humdrum job honestlyO 
suffering an illness patiently> could express, faith. In 
fact, in 1980, Davis did come close to denving anv such 
transcendence: 
Christian faithis grounded when emancipatory social 
action brings us to the limits of'human meaning. so 
that we experience in Christ a transcendent source 
of hope and liberation (1980: 6). 
Granted that human beings are social beings. does it not 
follow that all human action is by definition "social 
action"? If so, "emancipatory social action" simply 
means actions which in some way, manifest or intangible, 
support others. Perhaps any action that expresses truth 
not falsehood, acceptance of others not hostility to_ 
them, challenges the "social order" by refusing to 
Collude in it. If, however, "emancipatarv social action" 
is for Davis synonymous with "praxis", he here dismisses 
all Christian faith that is not canscioual. r directed to a 
single end, and posits not a "privileged locus" for 
religious experience, but an exclusive ons., 44 
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It is consistent to argue that Christian theology 
needs to learn from praxis theory to recognize its own 
latent political function, while also recognizing that 
other criteria than political responsibility may 
appropriately govern human decisions. But praxis theory 
cannot itself embody the criteria to determine whether it 
is more appropriately applicable to a given situation 
than contrasting insights and modes of discourse. 460 
To sum up: if "the subject" and subjective experience 
are affirmed they must necessarily be affirmed even when 
their social relevance is obscure. Otherwise, in the 
name, of praxis one embraces a tyrannous brand of 
epistemological positivism. Against that, Voegelin's 
thought is an effective prophylactic., 415 
VdeSelin In the Light of Political Theology 
This study will also argue that the perspectives of 
political theology offer a necessary corrective to, 
Voegelin's work: more strongly, that political theology 
is a vantage point from which certain deficiencies of 
his thought can be brought into focus. The same three 
themes may be reiterated from the reverse perspective, 
though very briefly, since their substance has already 
been indicated. 
1. At the heart of Voegelin's work is the insistance that 
symbolic and propositional discourse are authentic only 
in so far as they are rooted in and continuously fed by 
the experiences that engendered the discourse. Since 
political theology focuses on the experiences of those 
who suffer from or those who oppose social injustice, its 
natural tendency to extraversion may entail the lack of 
an adequate account of consciousness. I shall sugg est 
that the limitation of Voegelin's thought lies -not , in its 





Lamb suggests), -but in the restricted class of exper- 
iences he regards as authentic sources of disclosure. 
For him these sources are experiences of transcendent 
reality by the meditating consciousness. but scarcely 
experiences of communal solidarity or struggle. On his 
account, ultimate reality is disclosed to the solitary 
searcher who experiences the direct attraction of 
transcendent being and responds to that attraction with 
an "open soul". Is it not equally true that ultimate 
reality can be disclosed as the "depth dimension", of 
faithful action - both the actions we commit ourselves to 
and the actions of others from which we benefit? Does 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition properly lay more emphasis 
on the communal and practical dimensions of faith than 
Voegelin attributes to it? 
2. A particular hope underlies Voegelin's work: that a 
renewed openness to the truth of reality will bring about 
freedom from ideologies. By clarifying the nature of 
those deformations of consciousness which make political 
movements destructive, the authentic philosopher is to be 
a force for political good. 'As will be seen, he holds 
the most devastating ideologies to be those which pretend 
that the evils inherent in historical existence can be 
dispelled. In his view, humanity's most profound hope is 
to be directed beyond history. The question arises 
whether his position implies that the particular concrete 
goods which can be accomplished by temporal action are 
virtually discounted merely because they are not irrev- 
ersible. Ve shall enquire whether Voegelin diminishes 
the scope of legitimate Christian hope for the trans- 
formation of the world within historyo so introducing a 
dichotomy between historical and eschatological hope. 
3. Vaegelin has cited as his model of the philosopher's 
discharge of political responsibility Plata's strategy of 
withdrawing from the corrupt Athenian government in order 
to form an ideal alternative community, whose wisdom 
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could then be brought to bear on the political order. 
But the notion of "praxis", even "Amore open form, 
embodies a claim that political wisdom cannot even be 
acqui. red apart from a commitment to Just and responsible 
action in the present, and that it is radically 
misleading to envisage a sequence by which one first 
becomes "wise" and is then able to act authentically. It 
will therefore be necessary to consider the potential of 
Voegelin's philosophy to nourish responsible particip- 
ation in political life, as well as his critique of those 
ideologies which consecrate political irresponsibility. 
If it were to turn out that Vaegelin's work at once 
depreciated the communal dimension of human existence, 
removed effective hope to a realm outside the temporal 
order, and diminished the scope of Christian respons- 
ibility for the world, we should have to speak of him, an 
arch-critic of ideologies, as himself an unwitting 
servant of those particular ideologies of conservatism 
which, as we shall see, he explicitly and cogently 
criticizes: one who, in enunciating a set of insights, 
however valuable, impedes the recognition of other urgent 
truths and obstructs those who engage in a "struggle" 
quite as intrinsic to Christian existence as his own 
struggle for understanding. Vaegelin might still have 
much to offer political theology, but he would also stand 
to be Judged by it. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HUMAN EXISTENCE IN THE METAXY 
It would be a travesty of Voegelin's whole method to 
interpret him as positing certain "ideas" or "theories", 
which might then be "applied"' to-a range of empirical 
data and serve as a key to interpretation. But certain 
principles consistently inform his analysis. These 
are not simply axioms, because he expliciti' argues for y 
them; in the theoretical introduction to The World of the 
Polls, he describes them-as "the principles which .... 
furnish the critical foundation for Order and History' 
(OH 11: 7)., The most fundamental among these principles 
is that human existence is lived. in the meta. yy or the 
In-Between, a term he takes from Plato, who in turn 
derives it from Anaximander (fl. 560 B. C. ). Vaegelin 
writes, 
Reality was experienced by Anaximander as a cosmic 
process in which things emerge from, and disappear 
into, the non-existence of the Apeiron [the 
Boundless]. Things do notýexist out of themselves,, 
all at once and forever; they exist out of the 
ground to which they return. Hence, to exist means 
to participate in two modes of reality: (1) In the 
Apelron as the timeless arche of things and (2) in 
the ordered succession of things as the manifest- 
ation of the Apelron in time (OH IV: 174). 
To express the same experience of reality, Plato has 
developed the symbol of the meta. yy, of the-in- 
between, in the sense of a reality that partakes of 
both time and eternity and, therefore, does not 
wholly belong to the one or the other. There 
appears to be a flow of existence that is not 
existence in time (Vaegelin, 1967a: 261-62). 
These statements, explains Voegelin, are not to be, 
regarded as "absolute" truths. They constitute a lield 
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or consciousness, in which there is f irst an insight into 
the mystery and structure of the process, and, second, a 
reflexive recognition that through that very insight 
one's participation in reality is brought ta'awa. 'rene". 1 
Vaegelin gives his most lucid account of the metaxy in 
an essay of 1970, "Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization in History".. A lengthy quotation, which 
will then be explicated, cannot be avoided, since it 
articulates the foundation of Voegelin's entire'work: 
Existence has the structure of the In-Between, of 
the Platonic Xeta. yy, and if anything is constant in 
the history of mankind it is the language of tension 
between life and death, immortality and mortality, 
perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness; 
between order and disorder, truth and untruth, sense 
and senselessness of existence; between amor Dei and 
amor- sul, 1 'Ame ouverte and 1 lame close; between the 
virtues of openness toward, the ground of being such 
as faith, love, and hope, and the vices of infolding 
closure such as hybris and revolt; between the moods 
of Joy and despair; and between alienation in its 
double meaning of-alienation from the world and 
alienation from God. If we split these pairs of 
symbols, and hypostatize the poles of the tension as 
independent entities, we destroy thereality of 
existence as it has been experienced by the creators 
of the tensional symbolisms; ... Ultimate doctrines, systems, and values are phantasmata 
engendered by deformed existence. What is constant 
in the history of mankind, i. e. in the time dimen- 
sion of existence, is the structure of existence 
itself; and regarding this constant structure 
certain propositions can indeed be advanced. There 
is, first of all, the. fundamental propositi6n: ' 
1) Man participates in the process of reality. ' 
The implications of the fundamental proposition, 
then, can be expressed by the following propos- 
itions: 
2). Man is conscious of reality as a process, of 
himself as being part of reality, and of his 
consciousness as a mode of participation'in its 
process. 
3) Vhile constantly participating, man is able to 
engender symbols which express-his experience of 
reality, of himself as, the. experiencing agent,, and 
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of his conscious experiencing as the'action and' 
passion of participating. 
4) Man knows the symbols engendered to be part of 
the reality they symbolize -, the symbols conscious- 
ness, experience, and symbolization denote the area 
where the process of reality becomes luminous to 
itself. 
To the positive statements we't finally, can add 
three corollaries of a cautionary nature: 
5) Reality is not a given that could"be-observed 
from a vantage, point outside itself but embraces-the 
consciousness in which it becomes luminous. 
6) The experience of reality cannot be, total but. _has the character of a perspective. 
7) The knowledge of reality conveyed by the-symbols 
can never become a final possession of truth, for 
the luminous perspectives that we call experiences. 
as well as the, symbols engendered by them. are Dart 
of reality in process (Voegelin, 1970b: 220-21). ' 
The truth of these propositions can be tested, but not 
by the methods applied to propositions concerning objects 
of the external world. Rather one must place the 
, 
propositions "in the historical field of experiences and 
their symbolizations": 
The validating question will have to be: Do we have 
to ignore and eclipse, a major part of the historical 
field, in order to. maintain the truth of the prop- 
ositions, as the fundamentalist adherents of this or 
that ideological'doctrine must do; or are the prop- 
ositions recognizably equivalent with the symbols 
created by our predecessors in the search of truth 
about human existence? The test-of truth, to put it 
pointedly, will be the lack of, originality. in the 
propositions (1970b: 222). 
There is no truth apart from the. human experience of 
participation in a reality which embraces and transcends 
consciousness., Participation is more than-an aspect-of 
human existence. In that there is, no vantage, point 
Outside it, participation "is existence itself". _ 
Therefore, "the role-of existence, must be, played in_ 
uncertainty of its-meaning$ as an. adventure of decision 
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an the edge of freedom and necessity*. One therefore 
experiences existence as "20staxic"- 
It In obviously not eiq)1rically demonstrable that all 
buman beings experience the world In this way; but the 
experience to available to all who undertake a meditative 
reflection, and is not merely a series of propositions 
one can decide to accept or reject. It has been articu- 
lated by philosophers whose Insight is representative, 
not arbitrary. That is, on the one hand it Is ultimate 
*in the sense that intelligibly it cannot be out- 
experienced or out-sy=bolized by further experiences of 
reality" (CH V: 107); on the other hand. - the truth of 
the insight Is not vitiated if some people are not 
explicitly aware of its truth. Elsewhere Vaegelin 
writes that human consciousness "has reality in the form 
of participation .... even when the existential 
tension is low and the reality realized by consciousness 
correspondingly small" Qn-R: 168-69). a 
In this account EhL* two key terms are "particiDatiOn" 
and "tension". "Participation" signifies that, within 
the whole field of reality, human consciousness is 
inherently both Q) active, creative, directed by intent- 
ionality, and (ii) receptive, responsive to a reality 
that is not merely constituted by the self or the 
consciousness. As Vaegelin explains. at this point he 
differs from the phenomenology of Husserl. It would not 
make sense to reject "the magnificent work Husserl had 
done in clarifying the intentionality of consciousness". 
But intentionality is a substructure within comprehensive 
consciousness. "Reality, it is true, can move into the 
Position of an object-of-thought intended by a subject- 
Of-cognition, but before this can happen there must be a 
reality in which human beings with a consciousness occur" 
(An-P: 10-11)., ' When Vaegelin writes that *the exper- 
ience of reality has the character of a perspective" he 
refers to this single perspective of participation, which 
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is not merely one standpoint among others but is necess- 
arily shared by all human beings-0 
, 
To say that reality is characterized by "tension" 
implies that no existing entity,, fact, value or , 
proposition is absolute or autonomous: for example, 
There is no such thing as a "man" who participates 
in "being" as if it were an enterprise that he 
could as well leave alone; there is, rather, a 
"something", a part of being,. capable of exper- 
iencing itself as such, and furthermore capable of 
using language and calling this experiencing 
consciousness by the name of "man" (QH 1: 1-2). 
There are, therefore, no entities, which can be finally 
known or defined within this realitv: not the single 
human person, not "God", not the metaxv itself. We can 
never conceive of an entity or a fact apart from its, 
context: it "exists" only in a constantly shifting , 
relationship to other "existing" elements within the flow 
of reality. I cannot know myself objectively, for 
example, because "I" do not exist as as self-contained 
entity apart from the reality of which I am part, and one 
cannot know the part without knowing the whole. I 
experience the flow of historical existence only in so 
far as it emerges from and dissolves into the Apairon 
(i. e. I experience existing things in their "lasting" and 
"passing", in their "ordered succession"); conversely. I 
cannot experience the Apeiron "neat", but onlv as it 
reaches into historical existence. I cannot know 
"freedom! ' as an absolute, but onlyýas it exists in 
tension with deprivations of freedom, whether threatened 
or actual, and as it exists in tension with other factors 
which delimit its scope; factors such as "obligation" or 
"fraternity"'. And similarly, one must not define reality 
in such a way that it is reduced to its immanentýdimen- 
sion - for "immanence" only has existential meaning as 
one element in a field that embraces it. 
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Now, one might assert at this point that Vaegelin is 
is merely defining the transcendent into existence by a 
kind of ontological argument. "' But it is Voegelin's 
contention that we do experience both immanent and 
transcendent reality, and that 16the several meanings of 
reality can be made intelligible by going through the 
successive acts of reflection on the process of 
consciousness"': 
If, in a first act of reflection on the process we 
turn toward the pole of the known the oblect of 
cognition will be something we acknowledge as real. 
If, in a second act, we turn toward the pole of the 
knower, the human carrier of cognition as well as 
, 
his images and language symbols referring to the , known will move into the position of the something 
to be acknowledged as real. And if, in a third act. 
we turn toward the experiential process and the 
cognitive tension as a whole, the process will be 
something we acknowledge as real .... The 
consciousness of reality becomes a Droce! 5s within 
reality (Voegelin, 1970a: 187). 
Vaegelin sums up the matter in his last major work: 
"Consciousness, then, is a subject intending reality as 
its object, but at the same time a something in a 
comprehending reality; and reality is the object of 
consciousness, but at the same time the subject of which 
consciousness is to be predicated" (OH V: 16). 
Nothing has so far been established about the 
transcendent except that it cannot be repudiated without 
reductionism. The argument might seem remote from any 
political relevance. Its critical potential appears in 
Voegelin's attack on positivism. He writes of 
Feuerbach's Essence of Cbristianity, 
Feuerbach was disturbed .... by the fact that dogmatic propositions, be they theological or 
philosophical, survive socially, even when their 
fallacious character has been thoroughly analysed 
and exhibited to public view. There must be some 
reality engendering them and sustaining their life, 
after all, and since to a doctrinaire believer, 'if 
he is well shaken by rationalism, this reality-can 
neither be a transcendent entity nor a truth exper- 
ienced, the symbols must have some world-immanent 
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cause. ... Thus Feuerbach interpreted, the sVmbols 
as projections of the world-immanent consciousness 
of man. His psychology of projection has remained 
one of the pillars of the-ideologist's creed ever 
since (Voegelin, 1967a: 252-53). 
Vaegelin argues that Feuerbach's critique of "fallacious" 
doctrines, however justified, lures him into a position 
which is. no less fallacious, because it implicitly claims 
a privileged access to the experiences that engender 
religious symbols; this claim is plausible only because 
Feuerbach smuggles in as an assumption what needs to be 
shown, that human consciousness has decisively advanced 
to a position of positivist enlightenment from which 
theological statements could be dismissed as naive and 
obsolete. Feuerbach's positivism purports to arbitrate 
all truth, regardless of its own character as an artic- 
ulation of consciousness from within reality. For 
Voegelin, on the contrary, 
neither is there a tensional Metaxy without the 
divine and human reality as its poles, nor are there 
such poles other than those experienced in the 
existential tension. The Metaxy and the poles 
belong together as parts of the one reality that 
becomes cognitively luminous in the experience 
(Voegelin, 1981: 265). 
The In-Between of existence is not an empty space 
between two static entities, but the meeting-ground 
of the human and the divine in a consciousness of 
their distinction and interpenetration (Voegelin, 
1971b: 351). 
Reductionism occurs when a thinker does not enter into 
this "meditative complex"'but reifies its parts. This 
process may result either in definitions which wrongly 
claim to be definitive, or in the kind of dogmatic 
rejection Voegelin attributes to Feuerbach, by which the 
divine pole is denied and reality contracted into the 
pole of an immanent human consciousness. 7 Just as one 
Might dismiss (necessarily without "proof") someone's 
claim to lack any experience whatsoever of'freedom, so 
Voegelin would dismiss the claim to have no experience of 
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transcendence, without,. of course, -attributing 
dishonesty 
to the claimant. For, 
Divine reality is, being revealed to man in two 
fundamental modes'of experience: in the experience 
of divine creativity in the cosmos; and in the 
experience of divine ordering presence in the soul. 
The two modes are always structures in man's 
, consciousness of divine reality, but they are not 
always conscious in the form of reflected knowledge 
("The Beginning and the Beyond", Hoov). 
Only at that historical moment when reflexive awareness 
has developed will the two modes of revelation be 
explicitly discerned: once discerned, however, any 
retreat from such awareness by competent thinkers 
manifests the existential disorder which, in his German 
writings, Vaegelin called Real i tatsvez-1 ust, "reality- 
loss" (Nieli, 1979: 254), and which he came to call 
"psychopathology" (An-E: 97) or "pneumopaýhology" this 
last a term taken from Schelling (An-E: 102). Though 
these expressions may appear unduly dramatic, they are 
not intended as insults but as blunt identifications of, a 
reductionism. Voegelin knows, of course, that his 
contention is controversial; as we shall see, he marshals 
textual evidence in an attempt to show that those who do 
deny the transcendent know that they are irrationally 
proscribing perennial human concerns. 63 
Consciousness, therefore, 
_is 
"the action and the 
passion of participating" in reality. When 
consciousness becomes "reflected knowledge" it may be 
called "reason" (nous). Reason is the self-aware - 
experience of the finite process between birth and deaths 
which recognizes what lies beyond itself. It is not - -, 
posited hypothetically, but -is discove-red (in the case of 
Greece, by Ionian philosophers such as Anaximander) as 
"the area of reality in which the process of reality 
N 
48 
becomes luminous to itself" <OH IV: 174,177). The 
discovery of reason engenders new language symbols: 
the Psyche becomes the site of conscious partic- 
ipation on reality; -the Depth becomes the dimension 
of the Psyche from which new insights are drawn up; 
the Nous becomes the faculty of apperceptive partic- 
ipation in the process;, Philosaphy, the love of', 
wisdom, becomes the'tension of man's existence in 
search of truth; and so forth (Ibid: 177). 1 
In other words, reason is an historical phenomenon. 
Voegelin writes of "the rise of reason to articulate 
self-consciousness" (An-T-z: 89). 
Reason did not exist in language in the history of 
mankind until it was formulated in the Greek fifth 
century as a word denoting the tension 
, 
between man 
as a human being and the Divine ground of his 
existence of which he is in search 
The word naus is applied by Plato and Aristotle to 
the consciousness of being in search of the ground 
of one's existence, of the meaning of, one's exist- 
ence - the search, the zetesis. One is in the state 
of ignorance, of agnoia; one asks questions, the 
aporein; and the answer is that the Divine nous is 
the cause that moves me to the search (Conv: 138). 
As Voegelin elsewhere explains, the search "is not a 
blind desire" but already expresses insight: 
we may characterize it as knowing questioning and 
questioning knowledge .... Without-the kinesis of beinglattracted by the, ground, there would be no 
desire for it; without the desire, no questioning'in 
confusion; without questioning in confusion, no 
awareness of ignorance. There could be nolignorant 
anxiety, from which rises the question about the 
ground, if the anxiety itselfwere not already man's 
knowledge of his, existence from a ground of. being 
that is not man himself <An-E: 148-49). 
This questioning is "inherent in man's experience of 
himself at all times". 
_,, 
But "the adequatearticulation 
and symbolization of the questioning consciousness as the 
constituent of humanity", is "the epochal feat of the 
philosophers" (An-E- 
'' 
93). Nous, the, symbol they 
developed, signifies both the human capacity for "knowing 
questioning" about the ground, and also the,, ground itself 
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which is experienced as theAnitiator of questioning. 
So, in the Fbilebus, Plato narrates how the gods give 
light (i. e. the light of the truth about the process of 
reality) to the human race through Prometheus. ""' 
It is important to-, note that nousis a more compreh- 
ensive symbol than the Latin z-atio,, by which knowledge is 
severed, from its roots in erotic attraction-towards the 
Ground. Already Heraclitus recognized this attraction, 
and distinguished within it the modes of faith, hope and 
love. There is no reason apart from the experience of 
attraction, and no true experience of attraction without 
reason (An-R: 184). In this way, Voegelin's account of 
the nous enables him to avoid polarizations which are 
implicit in later and narrower notions of reason: such as 
the opposing of reason to experience,, to vassion or 
emotion,. to faith or to revelation. For the nous Is 
itself a passion, (motivated,, by, an erotic. attraction); 
and, (as is articulated by-the Prometheus myth) is itself 
a revelational symbol. 
Because reason is intrinsically a search, it never- 
escapes being also "ignorance" (agnoia). Now, ignorance 
is "profoundly disconcerting" for "from its depths wells 
up the anxiety of existence", (OH 1: 2). But because this 
"anxiety" arises-within the dynamic of divine attraction 
and human search, is not an alienation f rom the ground of 
being. " Agnoia cannot be dispelled by knowledge, for it 
is the very condition of that wondering that, is intrinsic 
to philosophy (An-E: 94, citing Aristotle). 
'Conversely, 
agnola is itself a form of knowledge, "and not the least 
part of that knowledge is the distinction between the 
knowable and the unknowable", (OH 1: 2). -Voegelin 
therefore speaks of "knowing questioning and,, questioning-, 
knowledge" (An-R: 148). He later worked out the concept 
of "reflective distance" to signify. that "the thinker 
engaged. in the quest for-truth can remain, or become, 
aware of the structure of his quest". The thinker must 
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imaginatively symbolize truth", but is-, not obliged to 
regard these symbolizations as absolute (OH V: 40). 1ý2 
I The exposition so far may be summarized in the words 
with which Voegelin introduces 'Order and History. 
God and man, world and society form a primordial 
community of being., The community withAts 
quaternarian structure is, and is not, a datum of 
human experience. It is a datum of human experience 
in so far as it is known to man by virtue of his 
participation in the mystery of its being. It is 
not a datum of experience in so far as it is not 
given in the manner of an object ' of 
the external 
world but is knowable only from the perspective of 
participation in-it (OH 1: 1). 
Voegelin here goes on to a preliminary discussian, af 
the symbolisms by which early civilizations articulated' 
their experience of this community of being. 'There'is 
first the symbolization of society"and its order as a 
m1c. rocosmos, an analogue of the cosmos: -"earth and heaven 
are so impressively the embracing order into, which human 
existence must fit itself, if it wants to survive, that 
the overwhelmingly powerful and visible partner in the 
community of being inevitably suggests its order as the 
model of all order" (OH T: 5). Secondly, typically'after 
a breakdown in the social order so radical as to dispel 
the previous trust in cosmic order, society may be 
symbolized as a macroanthr-opos, the individual person 
writ large. But this second symbol itself neglects-oneý 
essential aspect of human experience, namely, particip- 
ation in the coyaminity of being. In these circumstances, 
gifted persons (cf. OH TT: 202) may become explicitly 
aware of their partnership with God in the: -community of 
being. They thereby'become representative figures. -This 
is what Vaegelin means by "the leap in being": it is a 
"Platonic periagogd, "an inversion, or'conversion toward 
the true source of order". 
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EItl results in more than an increase of knowledge 
concerning the order of being; it is a change in the 
order itself. For the participation in 
_bein%r changes its structure when it becomes emphatical1v a 
partnership with God (OH 1: 10). 
A converted society will "experience itself Ar, qnAlItAt- 
ively different from all other societies that have not 
taken the leap". As in the case of Israel, the communitv 
will experience itself as a "chosen DeODle". whose life 
is meant to be a, response to the divine initiative. ý This 
very symbol will itself become a tool for interpreting 
historical existence (Ibld). 
The "leap in being" is itself a symbol, and is not 
susceptible to precise definition. It has, for example, 
more than one mode. Voegelin points to the distinctively 
different experiences of Israel and of Hellas (the term 
Voegelin uses for Greece under its civilizational rather 
than its geographical aspect): "In Israel it assumed the 
form of historical existence of a people under God; in 
Hellas it assumed the form of personal existence of 
individual human beings under God"(0H 11: 169). " 
Secondly, the leap in being permits an "existence in 
immediacy under God" (e. g. OH IT: 4). In other words, 
God is not merely present to consciousness through some 
intermediate agency which partakes of divinity (such as a 
divine-human ruler, or the stars). But the structure of 
the metaxy is not changed by the leap in being, and human 
beings are not delivered from its inherent tensions, such 
as those between perfection and imperfection and between 
the divine attraction'and the counterpull of appetite. 1-4 
Thirdly, "the leap in being, while it gains a new 
truth about order, neither gains all of the truth, nor 
establishes an ultimate order of mankind. The struggle 
for the truth of order continues on the new historical 
level,, (Ibid: 3). 
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The "leap in being" is one instance of the noetic 
advance Vaegelin calls "differentiation". He gives the 
following three principles: 
(1) The nature of man is constant. 
(2) The range of human experience is always present 
- in the fullness of its dimensions. 
(3) The structure of the range varies from compact- 
ness to differentiation (OH 1: 60). 
In view of all that has been said about the fluid 
tensions of the metaxy, and the qualitative change in the 
order of being introduced-by the "leap", Vaegelin's first 
principle will not be suspected of postulating the exist- 
ence of some static entity named "human nature". But all 
people have the same constitutive experience of the 
metaxic structure of historical existence, of partic- 
ipation in being. 
The second and third principles have already been 
illustrated, in the operation by which the differing 
aspects of an experience (the object known, the reality 
of the experiencing consciousness, and the experiential 
process itself) can be progressively discriminated. In 
the compact experience, one might say, these elements are 
latent or unthematized, and the more differentiated 
awareness represents a gain in human understanding. But 
the structure of reality remains unchanged in the sense 
that the more penetrating and nuanced awareness is still 
no more than a perspective on reality, not a full 
knowledge of it. Any claim to full knowledge would turn 
a differentiation into a deformation. 
As an example of the differentiating processo Vaegelin 
cites the Hellenic philosophers' exploratiOn. Of 
th8, 
structure of consciousness: Compactly, the experience 
that reality extends beyond one's field of consciousness 
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"is present in the pre-Socratic intimations of the same- 
ness of being and thinking, and-of the logos of discourse 
with the logos of being", 
On -a more differentiated level', the observation of 
the process has induced Heraclitus, Aeschylus, and 
, 
Plato to develop the symbol of a "depth" of the soul 
from which a new truth of reality can be hauled up 
to conscious experience. ... The Hellenic thinkers 
have transferred the older term [psyche] into the 
symbol for a site or matrix of experienc'e that 
surraunds, and comprehends the area of conscious 
experience. In its new symbolic meaning, the psyche 
has depth and its depth is unbounded; one can 
descend into the depth and explore'it .... 
(dragging up) from the depth a'truth about re 
, 
ality 
that hitherto had not been articulate experience 
(Vaegelin, 1970b: 224-25). 
This new insight is a differentiation: that is, it is not 
entirely new, nor is it a truth about some reality 
previously completely unknown. 
Vaegelin sums up the insight gained through the 
differentiation of consciousness in three alternative 
f ormu 1 at i ons: 
There is psyche deeper than consciousness, and there 
is reality deeper tha 
' 
n, reality experienced, but 
there is no consciousness-deeper than consciousness. 
Or: 
We experience psyche as consciousness that can 
descend into the depth of its own reality, and the 
depth of the psyche as reality that can rise to 
consciousness, but we do not experience a content of 
the depth other than the content that has entered 
consciousness. 
Or: 
We consciously experience psyche as a reality 
extending beyond consciousness. ... (Voegelin: 1970b: 224-27). 
Many of Voegelin's analyses take the form of tracing 
differentiations or identifying deformations. " Nor does 
he hesitate'to tracethe process across cultures. For 
example, he suggests (OH IV: 229) that it would be an 
54 
"extraordinary theological assumption" to think of the 
compact experience of the r-ealissimum which drew from 
Parmenides the exclamation "Is! "t as other than the God 
who revealed himself to Moses in the far more different- 
iated thornbush episode 
I 
of the third chapter of Exodus. 
According to Voegelin's analysis, this narrative subtly 
distinguishes between the complex layers of what is 
mystery and what may be revealed: 
The flame in the thornbush seen by Moses is not God 
himself, but the "messenger of Yahweh"; from the 
flame of the messenger, then, sounds a voice 
proclaiming itself as the "God of the Fathers"; only 
when Moses has veiled his head is he permitted to 
approach and hear the command-to lead Israel out of 
Egypt; the command, then, is endowed with added 
authority by the identification of the God of the 
Fathers with the "I am who I amý'; and thisý , differentiating revelation of the divine source of 
authority in depth finally leads-to the revelation 
of the impersonal name of God as the "I amý' (Ibid). 
Thus the narrative embodies a series of advances in 
depth: 
from the angelic fire to the divine voice and from 
the God of the Fathers, whose credibility is perhaps 
not unquestioned among the people whom he let fall 
into bondage, to the God who Is in his tetra- 
grammatic depth behind whatever he reveals himself 
to be when he lets himself be seen by man; and, on 
the human side, from questions, hesitations, doubts, 
and resistance to ultimate surrender (lbid). 
I 
The Virtue nf Attunem nt and its Repudiation 
Voegelin postulates a hierarchy of existence, based 
not an speculative reason but an the human experience of 
transience: 
The more lasting existences provide by their 
structure the frame into which the lesser existence 
--must fit, unless it is willing to pay the price of 
extinction. A first ray of meaning falls on the 
role of man in the drama of being in so far as the 
success of the actor depends upon his attunement to 
the more lasting and comprehensive orders of. 
society, the world, and God (OH 1: 4). 
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In this way, Voegelin endorses Plato's formulation 
"God is the Measure". That claim was an explicit 
rebuttal of the sophist, Protagaras, whose insistence 
that "Man is the Measure" affirmed human autonomy in a 
way which manifests a failure of attunement; in other 
words it reveals "the vices of infolding closure such as 
hybris and revolt" as opposed to "the virtues of openness 
toward the ground of being such as faith, hope and love" 
(Vaegelin, 1970b: 220). 110 Voegelin praises Plato's own 
sense of attunement to the "ultimate mystery of reality": 
he "did not impose an index of apocalyptic finality on 
the meanings which, at this or that point of its course, 
flare up in man's consciousness": 
In the Republic he even made it a'point that a 
paradigmatically ordered polis, the kalliPoli-- 
would begin to decline from the moment of its 
establishment because it is beyond man's abilitV to 
translate the mystery of the cosmos into Derfection 
in history. This equanimity was further fortified 
by Plato's insight that the culture of a society is 
always integral, expressing its attunement and 
adjustment to the order of the cosmos regardless of 
its position in the pattern of civilizational 
"advance". Good and bad are always in balance 
(OH IV: 223-24). "-'31 
According to Voegelin, it is the repudiation of 
attunement which constitutes the heart of ideoloRY- it 
will therefore be helpful to trace one of his ' 
attemPts to 
substantiate such an accusation, his critique of Comte in 
From Enligbtenment to Revolution. `; "', This critique will 
also reveal a significant aspect of Voegelin's scholar- 
ship. Usually, his expository prose is dense, meticulous 
in its attempt to deal accurately with comPleX material. 
It. is occasionally incisive, often cumbersome. . 
But he 
relishes intellectual combat, and an the trail of PhilO- 
sophical outrage he writes with a zest which. transcends 
his manifest critical purpose. 
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Comte as an Ideclogist 
Vaegelin discusses Auguste Comte (1798-1857) "both in 
his quality as an astute philosopher of history and in 
his more sinister quality as a spiritual-dictator'of-, 
mankind", as one whose insight has formed much of the 
"totalitarian practice of our times" (FIR: 136). Voegelin 
is no antiquarian, and is as interested in Comte's 
reception by others as with Comte's own thought. - 
He argues"that there was long assumed to be an 
incision in Comtels''life, between a first period, in which 
he appears as the theorist of positivism and the founder 
of the the science to which he gave'the name sociology, 
and a second period in which"he became the founder and 
the Grand-Pr6tre of the'new Religion de l'HumanitL6. ' Such 
liberals as John Stuart Mill and Emile Littrot regarded 
the second period as manifesting a catastrophic decline 
in Comte's powers. Mill, - reviewing Comte's later work', 
wrote in the Westminster Review, "Others may laugh, but 
we would rather weep at this melancholy decadence of'a 
great intellect"; and Littrd, ' (who left thd Sdcl6t6 
Positiviste in 1851), mentioned a crise c6r6brale of 1826 
and suggested that the "absurditýiesll of the late work 
were pathological rather than philosophical. 
It becomes clear that Voegelin's sights are trained an 
a still twitching prey; 'for he examines Littr6's 1864 
biography of Comte "to see-at precisely what point a man 
becomes insane in the eyes of a liberal, intellectual- 
Positivist"-(E. R: 137-38). Littr6 accepts in full the 
"law of the three phases", whi'ch Comte claims to have 
discovered in 1822. This, law states that the mind pas ses 
through thealogi'cal and metaphysical states which are- 
essentially transitory in order to arrive at a definitive 
Position in which it conceives of phenomena as governed 
by entirely immanent laws. For Littr6, therefore, 
Comte's derangement appears only in his later attempt to 
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reintroduce 1'dtat th6clogique- Voegelin's point is that 
Littr6 is here r-epresentative: one cannot understand the 
gravity of the Western crisis unless one realizes 
that the cultivation of values beyond Littr6's 
formula of civilization as the dominion of man over 
nature and himself by means of science is considered 
by broad sectors of Western society to be a kind of 
mental deficiency (BR; 140). 
Voegelin's own analysis places Comte in a historical 
context in which the destruction of the prestige of both 
Catholicism and the monarchy had led such an influential 
thinker as Saint-Simon to declare himself the "scientifi -C 
pope of humanity and the vicar of God on earth, the 
successor to Moses, Socrates and Christ". By recalling 
this claim Voegelin demonstrates that one need not invoke 
notions of sudden derangement, to explain the Proclamation 
in the Catechisme Positiviste of 1852, by which Comte 
assumed for his associates "the general leadership of the 
affairs of the earth in order to construct, at last, the 
true providence, moral, intellectual and material" 
(ER: 141). On the contrary, the Proclamation fits into a 
clear tradition. Vaegelin finds, in fact, that Comte's 
main work of positivist theory, the Cour-s de Fbilosophie 
Positive (ro vals. , 1830-42), is already explicitly 
messianic, and underpins the quasi-religious formulations 
of the "second period". m" 
Voegelin continues his analysis, always following the 
line of Comte's own explication: 
The works of Comte are not simply a series of treat- 
ises an various-subject matters. , 
They are connected 
with each other as the "elaboration" of an original 
"iiituitionll .... The famous h7gidne cdr6brale 
which aroused Xill. is therefore entirely appropriate 
to Comte's "operation": once the initial orientation 
and vision are given, the accumulation of new mater- 
ials and the opinions of others can, only disturb a 
process of which the end is known at the beginning 
(ER: 150). 
58 
Voegelin's case is clear: the central positivist 
insight, so acclaimed by Littr6 and Kill, already 
embodies an, intellectual megalomania by which reality 
must not be allowed to divert the tranquil course of 
Comte's meditation. For Comte believed-that the sequence 
of the three phases was not merely a phenomenological 
description of his own intellectual development. It was a 
societal law. His own life became for him the paradigm, 
even the apoalypse, of all human progress. -So, there 
emerged the cult in which every detail of Comte's 
reflections, habits, finances must be communicated to his 
colleagues; the cult by which the chair on which his 
"Beatrice", Clotilde de Vaux, sat during her visits to 
him should be preserved as a sacred relic; the cult in 
which Comte administers sacraments and "signs himself as 
Fondateur de la Religion de l'Humanit, 611: 
By his authority as the High Priest of the Occid- 
ental Republic he sends diplomatic notes to the 
non-Western powers. And finally he sends an 
ambassador to the General of the Jesuit Order 
suggesting that he associate himself with Comte in a 
demand to the Pope that the ecclesiastical budgets 
be abolished (F. JI; 158-59). 
Voegelin is not simply trying to titillate his 
readers. For him Comte is essentially an "intramundane 
eschatologist" (ER: 145), one who is in the grip of 
Real i t6tsverlust; therefore, the more thorough and 
logical the thinker, the more spectacular the absurdity. 
He concludes that Comte and Littr6, are "brothers under 
the skin though the virtues and vices are variously dist- 
ributed between them! ' (F. R: 143). Comteýhas a profound , 
insight into the extent of the civilizational crisis and 
the need for some spiritual authority, but is a megalo- 
maniact convinced he can plan and-govern the course, of, 
history. Littr6 is free from the urge to, dictatorship,, 
but has no sense, of the spiritual crisis or of "the 
problem, of the institutionalization of the spirit", 
cannot discriminate between Christianity and the failings 
of the Church, assumes that with the destruction of 
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ecclesiastical prestige the crisis will be over, and is 
therefore appalled by any attempt, including Comte"s, 'at 
spiritual reconstruction. The two polar attitudes 'are 
equally failures of llattunement". ý'ýý11- 
Vaegelin elsewhere-asks why competent thinkers engage 
in such denials of reality. He finds that Comte and the 
liberal positivists alike "achieved a certainty about the 
meaning of history and their own place in it, which 
otherwise they would not have had"': however, "uncertainty 
is the very essence of Christianity": 
Ontologically, the substance of things hoped for 
[cf. Hebi-ews 11; 11 is nowhere to be found but in 
faith itself; and epistemologically, there is no 
proof of things unseen but this very faith. The 
bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may snap easily. 
The life of the soul in openness toward God, the 
waiting, the periods of aridity and dullness, guilt 
and despondency, contrition and repentance, , forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent 
stirrings of love and grace, trembl'ing on the edge 
of a certainty which if gained is loss - the very 
lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a 
burden for men who lust for massively possessive 
experience 122). 
The preservation of attunement is arduous. But it is 
pernicious to suppress the consciousness that historical 
existence'is essentially "an adventure-of decision an the 
edge of freedom and necessity" (OH 1: 1). 
r-ritica C-01"nAnts on Maekelin's Account of the Metaxy 
Voegelin moved to Vienna in 1924, and must therefore 
have been affected by'the radical cliallenge issued to 
mystical and metaphysical traditions by the Vienna Circle 
in the 1920sýand 1930s (Nieli, 1979: 4-18). The chall- 
eng4 was posed in'Neurath's dictum, "If'a question can be 
asked at all it can also be answered - it is senseless to 
speak of unsolvable riddles. ". Carnap I contended that a 
word has meaning only if there'exists an empirical crit- 
erion for its application; and he wrote an article 
If 
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against Heidegger baldly entitled, "Die Ubez-windung der 
Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache" ("The 
Overcoming of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis, of 
Language"). From this standpoint, the whole metaphysical 
tradition is based on a crude error by which the word 
"is" is converted from a copula ("I am hungry. ") into an 
bogus ontological assertion ("I am. "). 
Of course, it did not take long for philosophers to 
realize that the prohibition of metaphysics is itself a 
metaphysical position. Once science and logic are no 
longer accepted as absolute, the doctrines of the Vienna 
Circle appear rigid and repressive. --20 
In any case, prohibiting metaphysics would not amount 
to refuting metaxic symbolism. That the metaxy exists is 
not a proposition of metaphysics. The metaxy is a symbol 
which requires human beings to take both history and 
transcendence seriously. It rules out, for example, what 
Voegelin (following Hans Jonas and others) identifies as 
the primary thrust of ancient forms of*Gnosti'CiSmo the 
representation of the world as a prison from which 
humanity must escape, "an alien place into which man has 
strayed and from which he must find his way back home to 
the other world of hi's origin" <aE! I: W. Equallv it 
prohibits one's limiting "reality" to the reality Of 
phenomena. I wish to argue, however, that Vaegelin's Own 
use of the symbol of the metaxy distorts the structure of 
historical existence in three ways. 
1.. As is shown by his- discussion of COIate, Voegelin 
insists on the need to interpret historical movements at 
the level of* spirit. ' Naturally, this Position entails 
his rejection of the materialist view of history. He 
remarks, for instance, that people are 
shocked by the horrors of war and by Nazi atrocitiQ$ 
but are unable to see that-these hQýrors are AO more 
than a translation, to the physical levele of t1le 
61 
spiritual and intellectual horrors which character- 
ize progressive civilization in its, "peaceful" , phase; that the physical horrors are no more than 
the execution'of the Judgment (krisis) passed upon 
-the historical polity (QH 
111: 147). 
'However, 
he sometimes gives the impression that onl. r 
spirit can be regarded as a, causal principle in history., 
For example, in his essay of 19740 "Reason: the. Classic 
Experience", (An-R: 89-115), he provides a "diagram of 
the points to be, considered in any study of human 
affairs", in which three horizontal columns (Person 
Society - History) represent the dimensions of human 
historical existence. An arrow indicates that the "order 
of foundation" of these dimensions moves in one direction 
only, from Person first, to Society, then, to History. 
"Inversions of the order of foundation" are "not 
permitted". "Specifically, all 'philosophies of, histary', 
which, hypostatize society or history as an absolute, 
eclipsing personal existence and its 
, meaning. 
are 
excluded as false. " <An-E:, 113-14). His legitimate 
refusal, to absolutize society or history. however. does 
not Justify Voegelin in 
, 
asserting, equally undialectic- 
ally, that society or history has no formative. impact on 
the, human spirit, so virtually transforming "personal-,,. 
existence and its. meaning" into an absolute. 
This assertion is no momentary, slip. Com nting on 
the,, nineteenth century"Icrisis"s Voegelin, notes the 
growth of an "escapist cliche" which is typical of 
liberalism: that the rhythm of Revolution and Restoration 
can be muted, that the notion of crisis can be "swallowed 
up-by the category of progress under the guidance of, 
reason". The 
, 
clich6 is escapist because it dodges the, 
real issues of the crisis: - 
society is by definition-An a state of crisis when 
its remedial forces, while perhaps present, are 
socially ineffective. ' The, social, problems which 
,, urgently require a solution cannot be solved because the spiritual and moral strength for the task is 
lacking in the ruling group. ... The true 
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alternative would be the restoration of spiritual 
substance in the ruling groups of a societv. with 
the consequent restoration of the-moral strength in 
creating a just social order (ER: 180). 
As Voegelin admits, the pragmatic'value of this alter- 
native is not high: "the appearance of Plato did not, 
changeýthe course of the Hellenic crisis, the case of 
Nietzsche did not serve as a, warning to Germany, nor did 
the appearance of Dostoievsky make a dent in the tsarist 
syste&' (Ibid). Even so, it remains f or him the true 
alternative, and its neglect in-favour of ! 'propaganda for 
gradualism! ' (let alone for revolution) can only aggravate 
the crisis. 
One ought not to depreciate the restoration of spirit- 
ual substance to ruling groups - or to anyone else. But 
Voegelin, finds himself coynTn nding as the only legitimate 
response to social crisis a measure he admits is unlikely 
to work, repudiating on the strength of it all altern- 
ative, measures. Such a position. supposes. that any 
institutional change (such as that in the legal system) 
is always futile without a prlor conversion, and, does not 
itself have the-, potential to form the moral sense; that 
the present rulers (who ex hypothesi gain from the 
injustice over which they preside) must be left, in, power, 
pending their 
'" 
conversion; and, that concrete political 
acts of-resistance or reform cannot possibly mediate the 
spiritual conversion of those carrying them Out- It- 
seems that Voegelin does not' e1fectively recognize the 
reciprocal influence of spirit and culture. 
2.. It, seems that people of different Sifts and temper-,, 
aments differ widely in the extent to which the search 
for meaning occupies the foreground of their conscious-,,, 
ness. The search_must never, to be sure, be prohibited 
in the name of activism. Nor will it be acceptabip, 
however, to posit, the noetic search as the 
criterion of the "good life". " 
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Xichael Ignatieff has usefully discussed the tradition 
in which this aspect of Voegelin's thought seems to be 
rooted, a tradition of which the foremost representatives 
are St. Augustine and Pascal: "for Christians", writes 
Ignatieff (though, in fact, he is characterizing only one 
Christian tradition among others), "the tragedy of need 
is that human beings do not naturally 'hunger and thirst 
for righteousness' as they hunger for food". He notes 
"the perplexing fact" that lives given over to the 
satisfaction of ordinary material needs seem to be self- 
validating: 
The simplest pleasure has the capacity to produce 
more genuine assurance of the worth of existence 
than many a tortured chain of reasoning about'God's 
ultimate purpose for mankind. The terror of life, 
for Augustinians, was that it is so inexplicabIg 
endurable (Ignatieff, 1984: 61,75-76). 
Now Vaegelin never explicitly maintains that all those 
who lack interest in philosophical enquiry are spirit- 
ually numb. But it is for him the nor-in that the search 
for the good is primarily conducted by meditative 
practice, the bics tbeoretike. : 27 
Another indication that Voegelin works with a somewhat 
monolithic image of the "search" (within the "August- 
inian" tradition referred to) is the way in which he 
uses Pascal's concept of the 
* 
di vert I ssemen t- Vdivert- 
Issement is any activity which distracts a person from 
awareness of the true human lot, which is so miserable, 
says Pascal, "that nothing can comfo rt us if we think of 
it closely". ItIs not the diversion itself that is to 
be condemned but people's practical assumption that "the 
possession of the things which they seek would make them 
truly happy". Voegelin writes, 
Pascal's analysis is deeply embedded in the 
Christian tradition, but it also .... recognizesp 
as a new. phenomenon of mass relevance, the man who 
is obsessed by the pursuit of happiness to the point 
of being blind to his creaturely finiteness. 
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The Christian contemptus mundi is an the point of 
being forgotten and action in the world becomes the 
absorbing passion of man. ... Pascal recognizes, 
as Helvetius did later, the uneasiness of existence, 
the ennui, as the mood which drives man into 
diverting action. But, unlike Helvetius, he 
recognizes the diverting character of action and, he 
knows that the ennui may be overcome by searching in 
another direction than the release of vassion. The 
return into the creatureliness of existence in order 
to meet the Grace of God is the Christian answer to 
the anxiety of existence (ER: 53-56). 
This passage calls for com nt on three grounds: 
(a) Pascal's insight is hardly as new as Vaegelin 
implies. It is conveyed, for example, in the narrative 
of the Tower of Babel in Genesis, and especially in the 
Gospel parable of the rich fool who is soon to die. 
(b) Pascal's overall argument, however, is by no means 
biblical. As Voegelin makes use of it, its terminologv 
precludes the essential attention to loving action. The 
equation of "action" with "diverting action" establishes 
a false polarity by which the release of pas I sion through 
"diversion" is opposed not to loving action but to the 
noetic abstention from action: and only such abstention 
is taken to express a graced awareness of creatureliness. 
(c) the search for human fulfilment is representpd As 
mere escapism. That is a travesty. as Villiam EmDson has 
argued pungently: 
EPascal said] that any man feels miserable if he 
shuts himself up alone for longr P., nnu&rh And that that 
proves that his ordinary occupations are only a 
device for hiding from himself his real And fundo- 
mental misery. it is logicallv on a par with saying 
that all men are really and fundamentallv dyine of 
famine, and that they onlv kppn nn AAtinGr in order 
to delude themselves into forgettirw this truth 
(Empson, 1987: 559-60). 
Empson's, mocking tone misses the angUiSh-which underlies 
Pascal's argument. But the structure of his critique is 
valid. Against Pascal, for example, Empson identifies as 
an authenticýhuman desireq "affection and good humour an 
a basis of adequate mutual respect". The Christian can 
properly accept the legitimacy of such a desire without 
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sharing Empson' s aggressive secularism. The contemptus 
mundi must not be allowed to nurture indifference to 
others' true human. fulfilment- or even to one's own. 
3. Vaegelin'discusses"the tensions of the metaxy almost 
exclusively an a "vertical axis". They are those between 
"life and death, immortality and mortality, perfection- 
and imperfection, time and timelessness" (1970b: 220). 
Reason, too, is oriented exclusively to the transcendent: 
"The consciousness of being caused by the Divine ground 
and being in search of the Divine ground - that is 
reason. Period. " (Conv: 138). 
This type of formulation, which recurs in endlessly 
nuanced variants (thus scrupulously avoiding the danger 
of reification) requires a series of complementary 
assertions to be free from distortion; unfortunately 
Voegelin rarely makes such assertions. We'have'suggested 
above that "noetic consciousness" in Voegelin's sense is 
far from dominating many people's consciousness. It is 
obvious enough that activists might be oblivious-to their 
need for'growth in spiritual'awareness. The contemp- 
lative, though, needs equally to avoid disdain for the 
pragmatic. Existence in the In-Between is, not leasti 
the experience of struggle amidst and between imperfect- 
lons (imperfect social structures, or governments, or 
flawed courses-of action), which are nevertheless of 
crucially different value. 
Now it is true that Voegelin does'not deny this. 
According to his own methodological principles, he'cannot 
simply re-define'for his own purpose the symbolic term 
"m6taXyu as generated by Anaximander and developed by 
Plato. No one symbol can fairly be burdened with the 
task of'articulating the whole human condition, 'and-we 
should value the symbol of the metaxy for what it can 
illuminate, not discard it for what it fails to'express. 
I Further, Voegelin insists, following Aristotle, on the 
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"integral nature" of human beings. Each person is at 
once, a zoon, noetikon, a zoon politikon and a zoon ,- 
histo, rikon, and also a being who participates. in the 
whole "hierarchy of being from the nous down to 
Einorganic] matter" (An-R: 91-92). 
But Voegelin's analysis, which begins by positing an 
integral human nature, -goes an to claim that it is 
thougbt (not that comprehensive openness which includes 
love and hope), which "intends the ground": 
The ground can be reached in this process of-thought 
and be recognized as the object desired by the 
meditative ascent through the via negativa: the 
ground 
- 
is not to be found among the things of the 
external world, nor among the purposes of hedonistic 
and political action, but lies beyond the world 
(An-E: 96). 
This passage is at best ambiguous. It is true that 
the divine ground is not to be found in the external 
world as one object among others. But it is equally true 
that the divine ground can and must be reached by a via 
positiva no less than by a via negativa; that the two 
approaches must condition each other. To relegate 
politics to the realm of the trivial by placing the 
adjectives "hedonistic" and "political" in apposition, as 
if politics could not embody virtues such as justice and 
compassion, is negligent or mischievous. It is a reduct- 
ionism equal to that of associating action as such with 
the inauthentic action which is divertissement. 2" 
Vaegelin's value as a corrective to the arrogantly 
blind social engineer still stands. But by failing to 
di. stinguish between authentic action (which mediates 
spirit) and corrupt action (which denies spirit). 
he splits salvation from historical fulfilment. This is 
quite as serious an error as conflating them, and is 
itself a contradiction of one crucial truth about the 
metaxy; that historical reality is, not least, constit- 
uted by human action. ý10 
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Since Vaegelin appreciated the writings of Jacques 
Maritain (Sandoz, 1981: 64), a passage from Maritain's 
Integral Humanism may appropriately demonstrate how a 
spiritually mature sense of the metaxy can nourish the 
very commitment to political transformation which 
Vaegelin distrusts: 
The Christian must strive all the moze to realize in 
this world .... the truths of the Gospel; he will 
never strive enough to this end, he will never, . devote himself enough to improving the conditions of 
earthly life and to transfiguring this life. This 
state of tension and of war is necessary to the 
growth of history; it is on this condition only that 
temporal history prepares enigmatically its final 




HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE METAXY: 
EXPERIENCE AND SYMBOLIZATION 
According to Vaegelin, all theoretical accounts of 
human life and consciousness operate in a complex field 
where experience and symbolization constantly interact, 
even if some theories (such as those which claim to 
describe the world objectively, not merely, to symbolize 
it) claim otherwise. ' 
If language-symbols are to articulate experience 
without radically falsifying it, they need to embrace the 
whole range of human experiences, including the most 
elusive ones. I begin by illustrating how such an 
attempt is made. 
While imprisoned during the Spanish Civil Wart Arthur 
Koestler passed the time practising his childhood hobby 
of geometry. He scratched a series of mathematical 
symbols an the wall of his cell, and suddenly discovered 
in himself a feeling of "enchantment" at Euclid's proof 
that the number of prime numbers is infinite. His 
elation was qualified only by a nagging discomfort, 
which, when located, turned out to be an awareness that 
he was likely soon to be shot! 
Then I was flowing. on my back in a river of peace, 
under bridges of silence. It came from nowhere and 
flowed nowhere. Then there was no river and no 1. 
The I had ceased to exist. 
It 
, 
is extremely embarrassing to write down a 
phrase like that when one has read The Meaning of 
Meaning and nibbled at logical positivism and aims 
at verbal precision and dislikes nebulous g'ushings. 
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Yet "mystical" experiences, as we dubiously call 
them, are not nebulous, vague or maudlin - thev onlv 
become so when we debase them by verbalization. 
However, to communicate what is incommunicable by 
its nature, one must somehow put it into words and 
so one moves in a vicious circle. ... What 
distinguishes this type of experience from the 
emotional entrancements of music, landscapes or love 
is that the former has a definite intellectual. or 
rather noumenal, content. It is meaningful. though 
not in verbal terms (Koestler, 1954: 352-53). 
Koestler found that the "intoxication" of the 
experience left him with "a sustained and invigorating, 
serene and fear-dispelling after-effect that lasted for 
hours and days. It was as if a massive dose of vitamins 
had been injected into the veins". He even came to 
believe that it was for him "the groundwork for a change 
of personality". 
He carefully distinguishes the experience itself from 
the interpretation he gives of it, for "a genuine mystic 
experience may mediate a bona fide conversion to 
practically any creed". --2 He was filled, neverthelesst 
with "a direct certainty that a higher order of reality 
existed, and that it alone invested reality with 
meaning". And he also experienced the need to make 
certain propositional statements about reality in the 
light of his experience. 
So he writes that three "orders of reality" became 
manifest. First, there was "the narrow world of sensory 
perception": second, there was the "conceptual world 
which contained phenomena not directly perceivable, such 
as gravitation, electro-magnetic fields, and curved 
space": third, an order which "enveloped, interpenetrated 
and gave meaning to the second": 
Just as the conceptual order showed up the illusions 
and distortions of the senses. so the "third order" 
disclosed that time, space, and causality. thAt the 
isolation, separateness and spacio-tAmporAl limit- 
ations of the self were merelv optical 111tisions on 
the next higher level. If illusions of the first 
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type were taken at face value, then the sun was 
drowning every night in the sea; .--. and if the 
conceptual world was mistaken for ultimate reality, 
the world became an equally absurd tale, told by an 
idiot or by iaiat-electrons which caused little 
children to be run over by motor cars .... EOnel 
could not hope to grasp in cognate terms the nature 
of ultimate reality. It was a text written in 
invisible ink; and though one could not read it, the 
knowledge that it existed was sufficient to alter 
the texture of one's existence, and make one's 
actions conform to the text (Ibld: 353-54). 
Koestler's narrative of "the hours at the window" 
yields five insights which lie at the heart of Voegelin's 
thouSht: 
1. Symbols arise from experience and are quickly deformed 
unless they continue to be nourished by experience. 
Voegelin says that the truth of symbols is evocative, noý 
informative. Thev 
do not refer to structures in the external world but 
to the existential movement in the Metaxy from which 
they mysteriously emerge as the exegesis of the 
movement in intelligibly expressive language. Their 
meaning can be said to be understood only if they 
have evoked in the listener or reader the corres- 
ponding movement of participatory consciousness 
(1981: 261). 
Vaegelin cites Aristotle's fragment On Rra7er, concerning 
the mystery religions: "Those who are being initiated are 
not required to grasp anything with the understanding, 
but to have a certain inner experience and so be put into 
a particular frame of mind, presuming that they are 
capable of the frame of mind in the first place"'. As 
Vaegelin explains, "the cognitio Dei through faith is not 
a cognitive act in which an object is given, but a 
cognitive spiritual passion of the soul" (OH ITT: 275). 
It follows that there is available no abstract language 
for articulating the experience, "but only the concrete 
language created in the articulation of the event": 
the more abstract the language of the tension 
becomes, the more liable is its user to forget that 
language is part of the divine-human encounter in 
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which man's tension toward the ground becomes 
luminous to itself (OH IV: 39). ,, 
2. No description can render one's, entire experience, 
for all description is conditioned by factors operating 
at three levels. Firstly language itself introduces 
distortions, such as the misleadingly clear-cut grammar 
of "subject/object" which splits a unified field of 
experience into apparently disparate entities, and cannot 
simultaneously express their unity. ý3 Secondly'and 
thirdly, description can never escape the perspectives of 
one's cultural heritage, - Ae" the limits of one's own 
intellectual capacity and linguistic skill. Interpret- 
ation, therefore, necessarily distorts, and if the 
interpretation were taken to be definitive the experience 
itself would be destructively misrepresented. 
3. Experience, nevertheless, can and must be articulated 
(at least to oneself and however tentatively),,, because 
the dangers of evasion are even mare acute than the 
dangers of verbalization. According, to the psychoanalyst 
Marion Milner, everyone 
must have same emotional attitude towards the 
uncertainties of life, whether he call them Chance 
or Fate or Destiny or God. '. .. In anv case the 
more unadmitted it is, the more likelv it is to be 
crude and childish, since it seems that onlv those 
attitudes which are in some way expressed can become 
truly mature (1986b: 142). 
As the philosopher Barry Cooper has remarked, "Nothing 
can be said about experience that is not articulate, not 
even that it has occurred 11 (Cooper, 1986: 210-11). 
Xilner goes an to suggest, for example, that someone who 
heroically repudiates religion in the name of 
maturity and truth may go through life giving 
intellectual assent to the scientific view of the 
universe and still be quite unaware that his 
feelings, as distinct from his opinions, lacking the 
educative and purging influence of expression, have 
remained far more infantile and distorted than those 
expressed in the forms he has rejected (Ibid: 143). 
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Koestler is perhaps too harsh, -therefore, in speaking of 
the "debasement" worked by language. A limited -power, of 
denotation and connotation becomes a debasement only if 
verbalization is taken as-definitive. 
It follows that if there is, a transcendent dimension 
of reality, it cannot be absolutely ineffable. -Vaegelin 
writes, 
The ultimate essential ignorance is not complete 
ignorance. Man can achieve considerable knowledge 
about the order of being, and not the least part of 
that knowledge is the distinction between the,.. 
knowable and the unknowable (OH 1: 2). -4 
For his part, Koestler insists that the experience, (and 
not just its explication)-was "meaningful". In fact, one 
might say that it was-not an experience at all "apart 
from! ' its meaning. 0 Indeed, meaning is itself an 
experience; for there is no such thing as "meaning"' 
except as human beings appropriate it. Voegelin writes 
of "the impossibility of separating language and 
experience as independent entities": 
There was no engendering experience as, -an autonomous 
entity but only the experience as articulated by 
symbols. ... The truth of consciousness# 
its 
verification and advance, could not be identified 
with either the truth of statements or the truth of 
experience; it was a process that let its tr uth 
become luminous in the procedural tension between 
experience and symbolization. Neither the exper- 
iences nor the symbols could become autonomous 
objects of investigation for an outside observer 
(An-R: 11-12)., -- 
4. Even though all interpretation is provisional, the 
interpretation of an experience can compel one's assent. 
Koestler speaks of "direct certainty": and he entitled a 
tw enty-year segment of his autobiography by the symbol,, he 
developed to render this one experience, The Invisible 
Vri tI ng. What is more, his interpretation of the 
experience leads him to dismiss all theoretical accounts 
of the world which, by compressing into narrow, compass 
what is allowed to be real or significant, would explain 
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the experience away. Without succumbing to what he , 
considered "the temptation to surrender and creep back 
into the warm, protective womb of faith", Koestler 
abandoned "the concise, rational, materialistic way of 
thinking which, in thirty-two years of training in mental 
cleanliness, had become a habit and a necessity like 
bodily hygiene" (1954: 353). For example, he cannot but 
use a symbol, "orders of reality", that positivists would 
reject as non-empirical. 
5. By his own assessment, at least, the complex event 
which was Kaestler's interpreted experience transformed 
his life. (It is striking that he renders this trans- 
formation in symbolic terminology which is common to 
several religious cultures: "The I had ceased to exist". ) 
Taken together, the experience and its symbolization 
possess a power beyond that of mere opinion: it has the 
"persuasive force" which is what Voegelin, drawing on 
Hebr-ew, s 11: 1, means by "faith". -" 
All societies symbolize their experiences. Voegelin 
describes four "typical features" which occur even in the 
earliest cultures' acts of symbolization (OH 1: 3-8). 
The first feature is the predominance of the 
experience of par-ticipation in "the community of being". 
The experience is of such intimacy that "the consubstant- 
ialitY of the partners will override the separateness of 
substances". "Everything that meets us has force and 
wi. 11 and feelings animals and plants can be men 
and gods .... the feathery morning sky is the falcon 
Horus and the Sun and Moon are his eyes .... 
Second is a "preoccupation with the lasting and 
passing (i. e. the durability and transiency) of the 
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partners". There-arise symbolismB of'hierarchy: "All 
human, beings are outlasted by the society of which theV 
are members, and societies pass while the world lasts. 
And-the, world not only is outlastedý'by the gods. but is 
perhaps even created by thee a 
The third feature is the attempt to, render intellig- 
ible the essentially, unknowable by analogy with what is 
known. Such attempts "have a history in so far as 
reflective analysis, responding to the pressure of exper- 
ience, will render symbols increasingly more adeauate to 
their task". Symbols, then, are not irrational, not 
immune to critique and revision. As Vaegelin explains, 
in "The Beginning and the Beyond", their meaning is 
not to be tied to the symbols so tightly that it can 
be conveyed only by strictly repetitive adherence to 
their language; it rather is assumed to be trans- 
lateable without distortion into the lanquave of 
reflective analysis. This assumption. then. can be 
sustained, only if one assumes the original svmbols 
to contain, however compactly veiled. a rational 
structure that can be made intelligible through 
reflection (Hoov). 
Symbols can be elucidated without becoming-redundant and 
without their capacity for illumination being exhausted. 
For, Christians, the cross of Christ is an indispensable 
symbol. But not all possible understandings-of the cross 
are equally valid, so it must always be pz-eacbed to the 
community's actual, and potential, members. 
The fourth feature is humanity's reflective awareness 
of the analogical character of its symbols. Any exper- 
ience of existential order may become the source far such 
analogies; the rhythms of nature, the identified revol- 
utians of sun and moan, '-the order'of society. In turn, 
symbolizations of divine order may be used to interpret 
existential orders within the world. The fact that 
analogy is a reflectively aware act has two consequences. 
Firstly, the activity of symbolization must-not be 
dismissed as "projection", as if those concerned were" 
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deluded about what they were doing. Secondly, many 
cultures have shown a striking tolerance for conflicting 
symbolisms, accepting that the order of being can 
properly be represented in more than one way. 
Every concrete symbol is true in so far as it 
envisages the truth, but none'is completely true in 
so far as the truth about being is essentially 
beyond human reach. ... The free, imaginative play 
with a plurality of symbols is possible only'because 
the choice of analogies is understood as, more, or 
less irrelevant compared with the reality at which 
they aim (OH 1: 7-8). 71 
Voegelin therefore posits a dual structure by which 
symbols are at the same, time freely chosen on the basis 
of human experience and determined by a reality to which 
they constitute a response (and which might transcend all 
human experience)., Symbols, like the consciousness from 
which they emerge, have aspects both of creativity and of 
participation. This twofold structure has been aptly 
expli cated in the concept of "appresentation". David 
Levy describes how Alfred Shutz borrows the term 
"appresentation" from Husserl to refer to the way in 
which an item of experience is taken to stand for 
something else, such as a footprint on Robinson Crusoe's 
island for another human being: 
In all these cases an object, fact or event is not 
experienced as a"'self", but 'as standing for another 
object which is not given in immediacy to the exper- 
iencing subject. The appresenting member "wakes" or 
"calls forth" or "evokes" the appresented one (Levy, 
1981: 9, citing Shutz). 
As Fiorenza writes, "'In all communicative action more is 
appresented than is directly perceived" (1984: 217). 
. 
The awareness that symbols'neither "refer to" reality 
nor "construct" it, but "appresent" it', determines what 
is meant'by the "truth"'of symbols: 
'Their meaning is not simply a matter of semantic 
understanding; one should rather speak of-their-,. 
meaning as optimally fulfilled when the movement 
they evoke in the recipient consciousness is intense 
and articulate enough to form the existence of its 
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human bearer and to draw him, ýin his, turn, into the 
loving quest of truth. Only the whole of this 
process, not any part of it separated from the 
others, is the truth of reality as it becomes 
luminous to itself (Vaegelin, 1981: 26ý1'). 
_Symbols, 
though, always provisional, are, likely to 
persist, since dimensions of human existence do not 
simply disappear. Discussing the symbolic complex of 
mortality and immortality in an essay of 1967, Voegelin 
suggests that two perennial perceptions are expressed by 
this symbolism. Firstly, "Man, while. existing, in timiý, 
experiences himself as participating in the timeless" 
(1967a: 264). Secondly, 
Mortality means that man's life having lasted for a 
while will succumb to death; 'immortality means that 
man's life will outlast death. The meaning conveyed 
by the two sentences will be more clearly conveyed 
when they are combined into one statement: Man's 
life is structured by death (rbid:, 275). 
Throughout the historical sequenc Ie in which'the , exper- 
ience of mortality/immortality is articulated, particular 
insights will emerge into (or fade from) consciousness, 
and conflicts of doctrine will therefore arise between 
the various articulations. But the conflict of claims 
concerning "propositional" truths about mortality/ 
immortality cannot be resolved apart from the willingness 
to undergo the meditative experience which engenders the 
symbolism. 's 
Central to I Voegelin's thought, then, I is the belief 
that certain human experiences are fundamental. They 
cannot be repudiated, though they may certainly be 
distorted. 1c, Much of his work traces the history of 
symbols which express such persistent experiences. 
Already in 1938, for example, * in Die politische 
Religionen, he describes the vicissitudes of, f our-such 
symbols; of hierarchy, of the ekklesia, of the 
relationship of "spiritual and temporal" (an unfortunate 
choice of terms,, because of its implication that', the 
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temporal is by definition non-spiritual) and of 
apocalypse. 
He holds that the differentiation and the corruption 
of publicly influential symbols is at the heart of polit- 
ical history. Bringing such processes to consciousness 
could be a serious contribution to political life. 
This contribution is exemplified by Vaegelin's essay 
of 1940, "The Growth of the Race Idea". Its argument, 
though wide-ranging in the scope of its reference, is 
simpler and-more focuS ed than that of--his elaborately 
constructed major works. " 
Vaegelin explains that his essay concerns the idea of 
race "as it is used by modern creeds, of the type of 
National Socialism, in order to integrate a comminity 
spiritually and politically". He will not take a part- 
isan stand on the race question, and distances himself 
both from "the convinced believers in the all-importance 
of racial differences" and from "the equally convinced 
disbelievers, inclined to stigmatize the race idea as a 
mad illusion without solid foundation in fact" (Voegelin, 
1940b: 284). Rather, heýexplains that the race idea is a 
political idea: -that is, its function is not to describe 
social reality but to constitute'reality by establishing 
a symbol, which forges group identity. 12" it is therefore 
beside the point to criticize such an idea, however 
correctly, on the grounds that it is not empirically' 
verifiable. The symbol 
is based on an element of reality, but it does not 
describe reality. It uses the datum in order to 
represent by means of that single, comparatively 
simple element a diffuse field of reality as a unit. 
As a consequence, heated argument is possible about 
the merits of any symbol. Those who belong to the 
social group and believe in its-existence will' 
always be able to point to the. element, of reality 
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which-'is contained in the group symbols, and to 
prove that their social group is really a unit. 
Those who are politically opposed to the group in 
question will always be able to point out the 
discrepancy between the symbol and the reality which 
it represents ( Ibid: 285-86). 313 
Further, it achieves little to criticize a political idea 
as if it were a disinterested scholarly hypothesis which, 
once corrected, would be retracted. Reviewing a book by 
Albert R. Chandler, RosenberS-Is Nazi Mytb, Voegelin 
remarks how "painfully obvious" are Chandler's 
conclusions, "that a number of authorities on the race 
question would not agree with Rosenberg; that his ethics 
can hardly find support in the Gospel", and so forth: 
The great problems raised by the Xytb; of the rise 
of intramundane religiousness, of its causes, of its 
social appeal, of the apparent helplessness of the 
Christian churches in the face of this threat, etc., 
are barely mentioned (1946c). 
Vaegelin himself, therefore, does not directly attempt to 
assess the "truth" of race symbolism, but instead 
describes its growth and function. 
The race idea is "one historical instance of the, 
general class of body ideas". Therefore, he begins his 
analysis with the "body" images current in Greek society, 
and finds that they are rooted in a sense of shared 
anc*estry, -but that the imagery is. not abandoned when 
kinship ceases to be. the foundation of social unity. 
Instead,, devices such as formal "naturalization" are 
invoked so that people are deemed tolbelong to the family 
group. "Genealogies" may be established by cult as well 
as by blood. Granted minimal initial plausibility, the 
symbolic idea can stretch far beyond its original 
reference group without snapping. 
,A second root of race symbolism is the Pauline idea of 
the homonoia, like-mindedness,. which unites-the I, 'mystical 
body"-of Christ. The idea of the comm n ancestor has not 
disappeared altogether in this symbol, since Christ is 
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conceived as the "second Adam! ', -the 
father, of humankind 
spiritually as Adam was bodily. But the main emphasis of 
homonoia falls elsewhere, an the belief that 
the pneuma of Christ is able, because of its 
pleroma, its fullness, to live in an indefinite 
number of human persons at the same time. Christ 
living in the members of the community constitutes 
the spiritual bond between them. ... This constr- 
uction, - however, has the grave danger of dissolving 
the personality of Christ into the multitude of men 
who compose the ecclesia. We find, therefore, as an 
alternative speculative construction the idea that 
the ecclesia is the mystical body, and Christ is its 
head (Ibld: 290). 
The two symbolisms have the capacity to control each 
other. The image of pneumatic unity expresses and 
requires openness to the whole of humankind; it stresses 
the dignity and uniqueness of individuals and the 
cbarismata that enable them to act an behalf of the 
community; and it is non-hierarchical in tendency! But 
without a complementary image of organic unity the image 
of pneumatic unity is potentially centrifugal. 
Voegelin then traces the process by which, in Europe, 
the pneumatic symbol of the mystical body came. to be 
secularized and "particularized". 
, 
That is, the notion of 
community was transferred from "like-mindedness" to other 
symbolisms, such as the one in which humanity is unified 
by the common possession of "reason". Also, new symbols 
arose which postulated the unity of particular groups 
rather than of humanity as a whole, such as the symbols 
of nation and class. Once the figure of Christ is 
rejected as the source of unity, the subsequent spiritual 
groupings *$can evolve almost any new set of symbols out 
of. elements which, are offered by the civilizational, 
situation of the moment", such as "a pagan nationalism as 
well as of an equally pagan internationalism"; and "it 
may integrate into a new symbolic system economic 
factors,,, as in the case of, communism,. Eorl biological 
factors as in the case of racismP (Ibid:, 294). 
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The material basis of the race idea shifted away from 
the emphasis an blood., Though the age of discoveries 
provided a wealth of information on the "physical, 
institutional and characterological differences of the 
races", the 18th century Histolre Naturelle of Buffon 
still had as its dominant idea the unity of humankind, 
according to which the white race is normal and all 
others exotic variations caused by climate: so it is 
clear that "the correlation between racial differences 
and psychological or cultural traits is not yet due to a 
causation running from the body to the mind, but to the 
climatic differences which cause both independent of one 
another. A race, of course, can change when it is 
transferred to another climate" (Ibid: 296). 
The concept of race became more fluid from the late 
eighteenth century onward, as the growth of historical 
consciousness brought to awareness such phenomena as the 
rise and fall of nations, the conquest of one people by 
another, and the patterns of migration. Voegelin 
compares two multi-volume works, one by the German 
liberal democrat Klemm, and one by the French aristocrat 
Gobineau, in order to show how a pattern of conquest- 
miscegenation which they both took to be axiomatic could 
be evaluated quite differently, in line with their 
respective attitudes to the fall of the French ancien 
r6, Time (Ibid: 298-99,302). A shared perception of the 
dynamics of socio-political evolution could accommodate 
widely differing social views. 14 
I 
Voegelin identifies another factor. A community 
united in the pneuma of Christ was *'open" # in that it 
found its common centre $$in a substance beyond the field 
of earthly experience". During the course of the modern 
age, the human personality and the political community 
each came to-be represented as autOTIOMOUS9 oriented to 
nothing beyond itself , or e1closed" (Ibid: 
303). 
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Voegelin argues that this "closure", of the. commýunity 
brought about a fateful transmutation of the conception" 
of race. In a Christian anthropology, evil in the world 
is "intimately'connected with the status of man in 
general and every single human being in particular". '" 
Closure to transcendence, with a consequent rejection of 
the notions of sin and salvation, means that evil is also 
imagined differently. "The consciousness that there are 
evils which cannot be'abolished but can only be made more 
bearable by humble endeavour has become rather dim even 
in countries which consider themselves Christian" (Ibid: 
307). In particular,,, a closed group which attributes 
absolute worth to itself might well identify evil with 
those forces which are held to threaten the group, forces 
which become, a "counter-ideall. "- At this point Vaegelin 
applies the notion of the "counter-ideal' directly to the 
phenomenon of anti-Semitism, for the Jews formed a 
convenient counter-idea to the unified image of Nordic 
race and German closed community, 
Nowýif race is a political idea, which seeks efficacy 
not truth, it is only, to be expected that-, the-symbal is 
always susceptible to manipulation for directly political 
purposes. For example,,, a "sincere racial, theorist like 
Guenther has advanced the idea of the 'blonde inter- 
national' and considered a war between nationsýwhich 
contain Nordic elements a racial calamity of the, first 
order" (Ibid: 300)., However sacred racial identity is 
held to be, though, its articulation could not be allowed 
to obstruct political goals by seeming to undercut the 
importance of national boundaries. So even under the 
Nazis, examination of the theoretical basis of the race 
was prohibited beyond a restricted circle. 
Naturally, the counter-idea itself is a political 
idea, not a descriptive one: 
from the beginning the idea of the Jewish race was 
never conceived on purely biological lines but was 
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identified with a spiritual substance which may 
appear in persons who are not in any anthropological 
sense, Jews. 
Thus, H. S. Chamberlain coined the term, an "inner Jew": 
a man may become a Jew very quickly without becoming 
a Hebrew; it may be sufficient to have intercourse 
with Jews, to read newspaperst etc., in order to 
become a Jew spiritually and characterologically. 
... There is enough of a factual 
basis to provide 
a tangible devil, and there is enough elasticity in 
the idea to manoeuvre any opponent [of the closed 
society] into the position of the Jewish Satan 
(Ibid: 309). "Ilro 
In the last section of his essay Vpegelin tries to 
show why the symbolisms of race and the demonic counter-_ 
race emerged more virulently in Germany than elsewhere. 
He points out that the German political community was 
integrated too late to be formed by either of the , 
symbolisms which would have, inhibited the growth of 
racialism: the Christian senseof the sovereign value of 
each human person, or the Enlightenment's dominant Image 
of a humanity which is united by the possession of reason 
and political rights. Emergent Germany, on the contrary, 
was influenced by what Voegelin calls "the. superstition 
of science", the "belief of general popular acceptance 
that social and politi. cal, p' roblems are scientific 
problems of the same, type as those of the,,. natural 
sciences": and he notes the "hectic sequence of 
scientific fads" which manifests this "superstition": 
In the first half of the 19th century, when 
economics was the fashion, symbols had to be based 
on economic materials as inthe system of Marx. - The 
second. half of the 19th century saw the, rise of 
biology, and social problems , had to be expressed in, 
terms of evolution and genetics. ... And now the biological type of ideas is threatened by dissol- 
ution from within because the latest fashion of 
science, psychology, develops a symbolism of its 
own, interpreting the belief in the earlier economic 
and biological symbols as the satisfaction of 
certain psychological needs (rbid: 314). 1-7 
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The characteristics and achievement of this essay may 
now be summarized: 
1. It is "non-partisan", in the sense that Voegelin 
thinks impartiality to be intrinsic to philosophy; it 
does not have the explicit purpose of discrediting race 
symbolism as a "mad illusion". 
2. It nevertheless embodies the philosopher's 
"resistance to disorder". Perhaps Nazism was able to 
rise to power and stay in power partly because there were 
insufficient such points of intellectual resistance. 
Anyone who works through the essay is likely to develop a 
degree of immunity to the rhetoric of race. Vaegelin, of 
course, does not imagine that philosophy can of itself 
bring about the periagpg6 of all National Socialists to a 
life of truth. But the corrupted imagery needs to be 
challenged at the level of the imagerýyl itself. At the 
conclusion of her own "anamnetic experiment", Marion 
Milner found that strenuous attempts to think out the 
problems of her life were always failures, if by 
"thinking out" was meant deliberate step by step 
reasoning. It was the activity of dwelling steadily an 
the images that engrc; ssed ber that made possible a 
01sensible and ordered life" <Milner. 1986b: 190). 
Vaegelin's essay is a notable attempt to dwell an the 
images that engrossed a whole society. 
3. Although Vaegelin never calls the racial imagery of 
National Socialism "false", he does not shirk the 
responsibility of evaluation. His account of the notion 
of. the "inner Jew" in particular, by showing how the 
symbol is manipulated, however implausibly, to the 
advantage of the powerful group which wields it, is a 
case where the refusal to obfuscate amounts of itself to 
condemnation. 'a 
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It would be a different strategy, complementary and 
equally necessary, to direct attention to the institut- 
ional or bureaucratic practices which protected and 
reinforced the symbolism of Nordic superiority. Vaegelin 
was naturally well aware of these. Once safely in the 
United States, he explained the systematic terrorism 
practised by the Nazis in the short paper "The 
Totalitarian Climate". 1s Vaegelin does not address 
himself to such measures in his formal works. He is 
writing within his own sphere of competence, as a 
philosopher. In addition, it is obvious that German and 
Austrian publishers could scarcely have published 
explicit attacks on the Nazis. Even granted Voegelin's 
discretion, Die politische Religionen. was seized from the 
presses in 1938, as soon as the Nazis occupied Austria. 
But the omission, ' at least when the reader's attent ion 
was not, drawn to it as soon as practicable (for instance 
in the essay of 1940), points to a serious deficiency in 
Vaegelin's account of symbols: he ignores the recipr'ocity 
between consciousness and its symbolic articulations on 
the one hand and institutional structures an the other. 20 
4. According to Vaegelin's own firm principle, racialism 
is explained at the level i3f spir-it; he sees it as the 
demonic corruption of a symbolic complex (of homonoia and 
the "Mystical body") which, if it remains open to trans- 
cendence, authentically articulates human consciousness 
in the metaxy. When "closure" - the conferring of absol- 
uteness on any historical, and therefore partial, 
perspective on reality - becomes socially dominant, there 
inevitably follows spiritual and social destruction. 
It will now be clear why Voegelin, as a philosopher of 
history and society, strives always to deal with symbols 
(reflectively interpreted) rather than with "ideas". The 
belief that there is no such thing as an autonomous idea 
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or "truth" apart from the experiences which give rise to 
it and the symbols which articulate it, determined both 
his characteristic method and the very course of his 
life's work. He abandoned a huge project on the history 
of political ideas, the analyses of which took "over four 
thousand pages of typescript" and a fragment of which was 
to appear in 1975 as From Enligbtenment to Revolution 
(Sandoz, 1981: 76-77) because "ideas turned out to be a 
secondary conceptual development" which eventually were 
assumed to refer to a reality other than the reality 
experienced. And this reality other than the- 
reality experienced does not exist (AX: 79). 
For ideas always draw their force from the matrix of 
sentiments in which they are rooted: the idea 
grows and dies with the sentiments which engender 
its formulation and, with the great thinkers, its 
integration into a system of thought approximating 
the asymptote of rationality. Only insofar as the 
idea is understood as the approximately rational 
expression of the life of sentiments can we 
understand it as a historical entity (ER:, 68). 
With this insight gained, Voegelin courageously changed 
course and set himself a new task, "to establish the 
experiences as the reality to be explored historically" 
(Ibid: 81). ý21 
But experiences can be explored only by exploring 
their articulations through symbols. This conviction led 
Voegelin to a further methodological principlet that the 
reality of experience is self-interpretatives so that the 
interpreter must approach the sources with respect as 
well as with a critical spirit. Characteristically, 
therefore, he worked from the original sources (learning 
many languages to do so). ýý 
Vhen, for example, Vaegelin wishes to illustrate the 
manner in which the symbol "son of God" is transferred 
from Pharaoh, first to Israel as the "'Chosen People" ("my 
son, my first-born") and then to Jesus (e. g. Mark 1: 11) 
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heýbegins, by citing such Egyptian Pyramid texts as "This 
is my son, -my first barn .... / This is my beloved with 
whom I -have been satisf ied". He demonstrates how the 
Pharaonic sonship was conceived as repiresentative, so 
that the whole people participated in the divinity that 
emanated from Pharaoh; the symbol reinforced social 
stability by stressing every person's firm integration in 
the social order. Hence one can glimpse how scandalous 
those emerging from cosmological civilizations found the 
claim made by Christianity, accordingýto which "an, 
ordinary man of low social status" is claimed to be "the 
representative mediator and sufferer for mankind" (OH I: 
74-76; cf. also Conv: 95-96). In this way, even ý 
Vaegelin's more speculative remarks are invariably rooted 
firmly in his sources. 
It is interesting to note, again, why he selects for 
analysis in From Enlightenment to Revolution the works of 
Helvetius, and Turgot. Both are considerable if not 
outstanding figures whose writings were quarried by 
better-known ones; Helve'tius by Bentham, Turgot by Comte. 
His choice allows Voegelin to consider certain symbols 
and concepts of the Enlightenment in the period of their 
gestation, before they became "doctrinally established". 
In his discussions of Comte and Marx he claims not 
merely just to attack their arguments, but to show, 
where these thinkers recognized the validity of 
metaphysical questions but refused to consider them 
because such consideration would make their 
irrational opining impossible (NEE: 25). 
. Thinkers of this stature, Vaegelin assumes, know what 
they are doing, and if they are to be to be refuted must 
be refuted not least out of their own mouths; "the 
reality of experience is self-interpretativell.: 2: 3 
In any society, truth and untruth are in tension, 
though the personal, social and historical balance can 
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shift towards one or other pole. Writing in 1967, 
Vaegelin delivered a sombre verdict, never substantially 
retracted, that our present age "must be characterized as 
an age in which deficient existence, as well as its 
symbolic expression, is socially predominant" (Voegelin, 
1967a: 257). Concrete political evils could not be 
cogently challenged, still less rectified, unless the 
issue of deficient existence were addressed. But defic- 
ient existence cannot be remedied only from the scholar's 
study, and Voegelin's analysis appears to understate what 
many thinkers would hold to be a crucial insight: that 
authentic noesis itself cannot be nourished in the 
absence of certain kinds of prior commitment (such as the 
Commitment to those people who are concretely oppressed 
by ideologies) that are nt; t tbenselves noetic. Noesis 
and the political (as well as the "private") practice of 
love are related reciprocally. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOUR MODES OF SYMBOLIC DISCOURSE: 
MYTH, PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, HISTORY 
xy-th 
Reviewing the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss in an 
essay evocatively entitled "The Big Loose Poems that Rule 
Us", the Australian poet Les A. Murray has noted, 
It is fair to say that everywhere outside the 
quasi-rationalist enclave which Western man has so 
recently created, the elaboration of myths has been 
perhaps the great human endeavour, since it is 
through them that man has attempted to order and 
make sense of the world and to live in a civilized, 
balanced way in that world. And, of course, this 
same use of myth still goes on in a disguised way 
within the Western enclave, too (1984: 50). 
The very first, somewhat cryptic, sentence of Order and 
History makes an analogous point: "The order of history 
e merges from the history of order" (OH I: ix). In other 
words, the specific history of any human community is 
rooted in its experience and understanding of the "order 
of being". And this understanding is, in the first 
place, articulated mythically. 
Since Vaegelin holds that human beings experience the 
transfinite and are impelled to articulate what they 
experience, myth is in his view a form of discourse that 
can never become redundant. He writes that myths arise 
because "processes transcending consciousness, are 'not 
experienceable from within" and because "for purposes of 
characterizing their structures we have no other symbols 
available than those developed on the occasion of other 
finite experiences". Therefore: 
A mythical symbol is a finite symbol supposed to 
provide "transparence" for a transfinite process. 
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Examples: a myth of creation, which renders trans- 
parent the problem of the beginning of a transfinite 
process - of 
the world; an immaculate conception, 
which mediate's the experience of a transfinite 
spiritual beginning; an anthropomorphic image of God 
which finitizes an experiences of transcendence 
(An-R: 21). 1 
The "subject matter" of myth is, 
openness towards the cosmos in the depth of the soul 
.... broken by the finiteness of 
human existence 
into the, spectrum of birth and death, of return to 
the origins and rebirth, of individualization and 
depersonalization, of union or re-union with 
transcendent reality (in nature, erotic relations, 
the group, the spirit) .... The myth itself 
authenticates its truth because the forces which 
animate its imagery are at the same time its subject 
matter. A myth can never be "untrue" because it 
would not exist unless it had its experiential basis 
in the movements of the soul which it symbolizes 
(CH 111: 184). 
11 
Vhile a myth cannot be inherently "untruess, Vcegelin 
suggests, it can become "untrue" historically, by virtue 
of (1) the rise of spiritual consciousness to new levels, 
and (2) changes in people's relationship to their, 
environment. He posits a process of differentiation in 
myth: at the most archaic level mythical forces express 
themselves through symbolic actions such as rites; at the 
next level there emerges the mythos itself, the tale of 
anonymous origin which interprets the rite; ' and thirdly 
individuals will use the hitherto collective myth to 
articulate "spiritual movements" of the soul (as, for 
instance, in the tragedies of Aeschylus)., Finallyt such 
freedom with respect to the myth transforms the way myth 
is experienced by the psyche: 
when the myth need, no longer be taken "literally" 
(if it ever was), the symbols can be manipulated and 
transformed deliberately in order to fit the exigen- 
cies of differentiated personal experiences. This 
is the fourth level represented by Plato, where the 
myth retains the seriousness of its "truth" but is 
at the same time consciously an imaginative play 
(Ibid: 185). 
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Reason therefore becomes free with respect to the 
creation and the interpretation of myths. Plato will 
criticize the Homeric myths - and will then create new 
ones: and the interpretation of myths, especially by 
those outside their original cultural matrix, will demand 
refined rational skills. ýE 
But though a mature consciousness retains freedom 
towards myth (both freedom of interpretation and freedom 
to discriminate between the more and the less adequate), 
there can be no freedom from myth. Positivist science, 
Voegelin argues, was mistaken in supposing that myth 
embodies naive or superstitious propositions which must 
give way to those of a fully rational science. A 
"creation myth" for example, is intentionally symbolic. 
It articulates "not a beginning in the time dimension of 
the world', but "the experience of-a lasting cosmos 
permeated by the divine mystery of its existence": 
The reality of things, it appears, cannot be fully 
understood in terms of the world and its time; for 
the things are circumfused by an ambience of mystery 
which can be understood only in terms of the Myth. 
Since the divine Beginning, though experienced as 
real, is not an event in the time of the world, the 
imaginative creation story is the symbolism 
necessary-for its expression ("The Beginning and the 
Beyond", Hoov).: 3 
The rationalist attack an myth, though . misconceived, 
became socially effective, resulting in the loss Of 
Christian spiritual substance: 
The mythical language was, at the time of its 
original employment, the precise instrument for 
expressing the irruption of transcendental reality. 
*, * In this Epositivist] perspective only, when 
symbols and dogmas are seen in a I'literall's 
disenchanted opaqueness from the outside, do. they 
acquire the "irrationality" which brings them into,. 
conflict with logic, with biology, history, etc. 
(ER: 21), * 
For authentic myth was consciously symbolic, and its loss 
warps the consciousness. As Voegelin concludes: 
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The terror of an infinitely overpowering, as well as 
the assurance of an infinitely embracing, beyond as 
the matrix of separate, individual existence, endow 
the soul with its more-than-human dimension; and 
through the acceptance of the truth of this dimen- 
sion (that is, through faith) the separateness of 
human existence can. in its turn, be recognized and 
tolerated in its finiteness (OH 111: 187-88). 
Vaegelin argues that "positive science", far from 
superseding myth, is itself a mytb. The legitimate 
function of such "scientific" symbolic constructs as 
foreason", "race", "progress" and "proletariat" s obscured 
precisely by their pretension to displace myth. They 
might then become "perverted into intramundane, illusory 
objects, 'given', as if theywere empirical data, into 
the cognitive and active functions of man". 'Ifndividual 
existence suffers an illusi onary inflation because it 
absorbs into its form the more-than-human dimension": the 
source of evils is held to exist in institutions which 
can be changed; "the powers of man can create a society 
free from want and fear; the ideas of infinite perfect- 
ability, of the superman and of self-salvation make their 
appearance" (Ibid: 188). 
At this point Voegelin must be interpreted with care. 
He is far from identifying terms such as "reason" and 
"race" as intrinsically ideological. Once they are 
recognized as mythi . cal they can be reflecti-vely assessed, 
as are other myths, according to how adequately they 
represent the psyche's mature experience: but labelled as 
"scientific's they are in danger of being invested with a 
spurious absoluteness. As Thomas Nagel writes, 
For many philosophers the exemplary case of reality 
is the world described by physics, ' the science in 
which we have 
, 
achieved our greatest detachment from 
a specifically human perspective an the world. But 
for precisely that reason physics is bound to leave 
unexpressed the irreducibly subjective character of 
conscious mental processes, whatever may be their 
intimate relation to the physical operation of the 
brain (1986: 7). 
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Science is no more than the exemplary case, of a general 
truth. - As will be seen, the corruption by which a mode 
of symbolic discourse hardens into propositional-truth- 
claims threatens the best mythical-symbols as well as, the 
worst, the myths which assert the transfinite as well as, 
those which repudiate it. 0 
Myth is irreplaceable, because it holds together two 
dimensions of reality - the transcendent and the immanent 
- in "a balanced manifold of experiences". These 
dimensions need to be reflectively-differentiated, but 
are then all too likely to be split from each other, so 
that the experiential blocks "will he pursued to the 
extremes of a radically other-worldly faith and of an, 
agnostic metaphysics" (OH 1: 84). But the poles do not 
exist apart frois the relationship between tbeiz For this 
reason Plato himself made "Judicious-use of the myth" in 
order to link noetic consciousness with the process of, 
reality from which it mysteriously emerged and from which 
it can never be independent. The mystery, of reality 
cannot be lost or destroyed, but if mystery is relegated 
to the unconscious one is vulnerable to literalist 
deformations of myth which forgo the very different- 
iations gained by reason (OH IV: 224). ro 
One-contemporary challenge to mythical discourse needs 
to be mentioned. - It is sometimes argued that mythical 
thought is intrinsically conservative, -,, because it 
articulates the world-view of those who do--not yet think 
historically. According to Cassirert myth explains the 
present conditions of life only-by referring them to a 
remote past. Age itself becomes sacred$ and to call into 
question the norms of antiquity is sacrilegious (1962: 
224-25). A variant of Cassirer's argument is given by 
Roland Barthes. He calls myth the depoliticized speech 
of bourgeois society. -- By this he means that myth 
describes certain facets of the world without explaining 
them, thereby investing them with an aura of the given, 
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the unchangeable, what "goes without saying". It is true 
that Barthes omits to discuss the very genre of aetio- 
logical (i. e. explanatory) myths, such as the "Fall 
Stories" of Genesis which, for Cassirer, are the quint- 
essential myths. Barthes and Cassirer, nevertheless, are 
driving at, the same point: for explanation by aetiology, 
like the refusal to explain at all, inhibits the examin- 
ation of contemporary and remediable causes. -7 
It is however, unwarranted to deYine myth as 
conservative, and Vaegelin's account of myth entails no 
such conclusion. Firstly, some myths, such as that of 
Antigone are militantly "anti-conservative". In fact, 
the very myth of "the revolution" has a long tradition, 
and revolutionary movements create their own mythical 
structures to challenge those of their opponents. 
Secondly, as Plato's "playful" myth-making shows, myth is 
not necessarily a societal construction, but can be the 
fruit of individual creativity and freedom, perhaps 
explicitly in opposition to socially dominant forces. 
Classical Philmsmphy 
The Emergence of Philosophy 
Vaegelin suggests that the breakthrough to philo- 
sophy was facilitated by the "historically unique 
circumstances" of Hellenic civilization, especially the 
"absence of temporal and ecclesiastic bureaucracies": 
the transition from archaic to classic Hellas could 
assume the form of intellectual adventures by indiv- 
iduals, unhampered by the pressure of'hierarchi-es 
which tend to preserve traditions (OH 11: 166). 
In these circumstances "the break with the myth" and 
the new symbolic form of philosophy emerges in the eighth 
century in the work of Hesiod. In his Theogony, 
myth is submitted to a conscious intellectual oper- 
ation with the purpose of reshaping its symbols in 
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such a-manner that a "truth" about order with univ- 
ersal validity will emerge. ... The speculative 
reason of the thinker asserts its autonomy against 
the mythopoetic form of expression (Ibld: 126). 
Myth embodies "the compact experience of cosmic-divine 
order"; philosophy achieves the "leap in being" in which 
a "transcendent-divine source of order" is discovered, so 
that the self-consciousness of the philosopher becomes 
"the carrier of a new truth in history" (Ibid: 126,167). 
This truth is discovered by those whose social margin- 
ality frees them from domination by convention. Voegelin 
cites Hesiod's personal experience of distress and 
injustice (his father's poverty and his brother's success 
in seizing their meagre inheritance by bribing the local 
magistrates) to explain his attaining a moral awareness 
that enabled him "to pit his knowledge of truth against 
the untruth of society" Ibid: 130). For as compared with 
the Homeric myths, the Theogony manifests a newly 
critical awareness of the ethical nature of divinitye' 
The predominance of ethical forces becomes the 
. raison dletre of the reign of Zeus. The other gods 
are "earlier" gods because of their savage lusts, 
their tyrannical cruelties .... While his victory [Zeus's, over the other gods) is won by force, it is 
held by the just distribution of his honourable 
share (time) to each of the im? n rtals. 0 
Xenaphanes, Parmenides and Heraclitus, "the mystic 
philosophers", "break with the myth because they have' 
discovered a new source of truth in their souls" (Ibid: 
239). The Homeric-gods now come to be regarded as 
"unseemly", the product of capricious acts of imagination 
by which divinities are invested with human attributes, 
so that, for instance, peoples-even make the gods in 
their own racial image. Xenophanes's'conception-of God 
opposes such fancies: "One God is greatest among gods and 
men, not like mortals'in body or thought" (Ibid: 172). 
Instead of being theomorphically symbolized, experiences 
of transcendence are understood by the philosophers as 
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movements of the human soul itself. Significantly, 
therefore, by the same advance through which divinity 
comes to be understood as radically transcendent, so also 
"the true range of humanity comes into view". As always, 
of course, such a differentiation brings its own new 
danger. The process "may overshoot its mark", 
in so far as the recognition of the invisible God 
may degenerate into the denial of the existence of 
God when visibility becomes the criterion of 
existence (Ibid: 239). 
Like the "mystic philosophers", Plato attacks Homer 
not on aesthetic grounds but because of the inadequacy of 
Homeric myth. Certain symbolisms become unseemly when the 
order of existence can be expressed more adequately in 
the symbolism of the human soul. But further, 
the language of the myth becomes opaque when it 
passes through the minds of enlightened fundamental- 
ists. When 
, 
the myth is no longer experienced as the 
imaginative symbolization of divine forces, but as a 
realistic collection of dirty stories about the 
gods, 
'' 
the educational influence even of Homer can 
become disastrous (OH TTT: 101). 
On Vaegelin's own principlest it must be said, Plata's 
second reason for condemning Homer is a. poor one; ýor, at 
least, it could be Justified only in terms of the 
immediate pragmatic requirements of educational policy. 
For "enlightened fundamentalists" will squeeze the noetic 
life from wbatevex-they teach and, as Voegelin knows, 
Plato's own I philosophy has been misinterpreted no less" 
destruciively. '-O The anticipation of future abuses does 
not warrant disdain for insights attained. 
It is at least clear, though, that Plato does not 
oppose Homer an the "positivist" basis that reason does 
away with the need for myth and symbol. Plato knew that 
symbolism cannot be superseded in any such manner. 10 As 
opposed to analytic discourse (which'is exclusively 
flactivell or "intentional" towards reality), symbolic 
discourse is well-fitted'to articulate the insight that 
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consciousness is constituted by reality before'it can be 
the subject of reality (An-R: 11)., 
PbIlosopby as an Experiential Discipline '- 
Since noetic consciousness is a participation in 
reality, and since the noetic experience occurs when'the 
structure of reality becomes "luminous" (to use one'of 
Vaegelin's-favourite expressions), there can also be'no 
polarity between philosophy and revelation. Voegelin 
writes of "the theophanic event in which the nous reveals 
itself as the divine ordering force in the psyche of the 
questioner and in the cosmos at large" (An-E: 101). In 
fact, the Hellenic philosophers regarded their insight as 
an experiential response to revelation. Voegelin 
therefore repudiates the contrast according to which 
philosophy is founded on'natural reason and theology an 
supernatural revelation. This is'a false opposition 
"caused by the theologians" eagerness to monopolize the 
symbol 'revelation' for Israelite, Jewish, and Christian 
theophanies" (OH IV: 236). On the contrary, 
Unless we want to indulge in extraordinary theolog- 
ical assumptions, the God who appeared to the 
philosophers, and who elicited from Parmenides the 
exclamation "Is! ", was the same God who revealed 
himself to Moses as the "I am who (or: what) I am" 
(Ibid: 229). 
As the case of Hesiod has illustrated, philosophy is 
also experiential in a second sense: it is an act of 
existential resistance to disorder, not merely the 
enunciation of formally correct ideas. In these two 
ways, "[Plato's] philosopher does not exist in a social 
vacuum, but in opposition to the sophist" (OH TTI: 63). "' 
The central sophistic dictum is that of Protagoras. ' 
Since any verdict about the existence of the gods must be 
suspended, "Of all things the measure is man" (OH TT: 
273-74,294-95). But the sophists' belief in human 
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autonomy merely follows. from their failure to recognize 
their orientation to the transcendent. Gorgiasl, s essay 
On Being takes the "symbols developed by the mystic- 
philosophers for the expression of experiences of 
transcendence" and 
- 
treats them as if they had a meaning 
independent of such experience, naturally finding them to 
be logically unsatisfactory. The sophists, therefore, 
proceed in the same manner as the Enlightenment thinkers 
of the eighteenth century A. D., and similarly threaten to 
destroy philosophy, "for philosophy by definition has, its 
centre in the experiences of transcendence" (Ibid: 27,5). 
As in the Enlightenment, also, the claim to empirical 
generality, the comprehensive, polymathic mastery of all 
knowledge, must substitute for the universality of 
transcendence (Ibid: 281). 
In Plato, therefore, 
1the 
notion of the philosophos 
opposes that of the philodoxas (OH 111: 65-67). The 
philosopher is one who searcbes, whereas the philodoxer 
is the one of diseased soul who argues obsessively, but 
only within the limits of mere empirical fact and 
opinion. 
Critical Comments 
Vaegelin's conception of philosophy will now be clear. 
But when he works out its implications, his argument 
becomes disputable: 
We have philosophers in English, -but no philadoxers. The loss is in this instance peculiarly embarrass- 
ing, because we have an abundance of philodoxers in 
reality; and since the Platonic term for their 
designation is 
' 
lost, we refer to them as philo- 
sophers (Ibid: 65). 
Now, -we have earlier seen Vo I egelin explain how those 
in possession of a truth can be tempted to consign their 
predecessors to a realm of falsehood. On Voegelin's own 
98 
account of the metaxy, all thinkers- (not excluding Plato) 
operate within an inescapable tension between truth and 
untruth. It follows that it is legitimate to speak of 
the philosopher and the philodoxer as opposed "ideal 
types" but not to assert that any person wholly conforms 
to either type. Even if Plato himself be vindicated 
against the sophists, one must not posit two self- 
subsistent categories of'thinkers: the authentic who are 
engaged in a quest for the truth, and the'deluded who are 
only determined to obfuscate. Such rhetoric is itself a 
descent into the debating style of those "philodoxers" 
who only engage in battles of opinion, and smacks of a 
bid for dominance by the 1'philosophers'1! 1ý3 , 
This suspicion is reinforced by the defence which 
Voegelin elsewhere offers for his position. The 
discovery of transcendence, though it occurs in the 
individual consciousness, is not a mere subjective 
opinion. It is "endowed with the quality of an 
authoritative appeal to every man to actualize it in his 
own soul" (OH TT: 187). This authority 
is discernible even in such atrocious distortions as 
the colonization of "backward" peoples by the more 
"progressive"' ones. While the objective authority 
of the appeal does not endow the prophet or 
discoverer from whom it emanates with a subjective 
right to maltreat his ignorant fellow men, there 
certainly is an the other side no subjective right 
to be ignorant. The unity of mankind is the 
community of the spirit ( Ibid). 
In the literary structure of a Platonic Dialogue such a 
claim to authority might be self-authenticating. 
Voegelin's analysis of the confrontation between Socrates 
and Callicles in the Gorgias provides an instructive 
example (QIL. LU:, 28-39). Callicles, unable to defeat 
Socrates in argument, crudely threatens him with viol- 
ence. Socrates, unafraid to die, is revealed as the true 
statesman (Plato, 1960: 139-40). But then Vaegelin 
suggests without cavil that by this formulation Plato 
"claims for himself the true statesmanship of his time". 
0 G, 
He writes of "the existentialýorder represented by - 
Socrates-Plato", and adds, "the authoritative order is 
transferred from the people--of Athens and-its leaders to 
the one man Platoll (rbid: 39). 
Even this astonishing leap from the quasi-fictive 
pages of the dialogue to the historical order of Athens, 
contriving to damn all political apponents, by,, literary 
representation, is less bizarre than an earlier passage: 
The social conventions, -which Callicles despises, - 
are wearing thin; and the advocate of nature is 
brought to realize that he is a murderer face to 
face with his victim. The situation is fascinating 
for those 
' 
among us who find ourselves in the Plato- 
nic position and who recognize in the men with whom 
we associate today the intellectual pimps for power 
who will connive in our murder tomorrow (Ibid: 37). 
This passage was written, it should be noted, not during 
the period when Voegelin was indubitably at risk of 
arrest by the Nazis, but from an American professorial 
chair in the mid-1950s. As often throughout his writings 
one notices how the emotional force channelled I into his 
scholarship can suddenly burst through the conventions'of 
academic argument. It may seem gratuitous to highlight a 
passage that borders an the hysterical, and it would 
certainly be unfair to represent this kind of writing as 
the "real Voegelin". But it would be an equally unwarr- 
anted condescension to overlook (as an irrelevant 
outburst) what has survived the careful revision given to 
a major work. What makes the passage significant, both 
for his assessment of Plato and for his own intellectual 
stance, is the series of claims it implies: the title' of 
"philosopher" is first reserved by definition for those 
who maintain their consciousness in disinterested 
openness to transcendence; secondly, the title constit- 
utes them as authoritative guides to social order; 
thirdly, it is assumed that the title can be legitimately 
claimed for oneself. 'Neither the second nor''the third'- 
claim follows from the first. Equally significant is 
Vaegelin's confidence in aligning himself with Plato as 
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the true philosopher(whose insight into the requirements 
of'social order is therefore normative) precisely at a 
moment when when his customary combativeness hardens into 
a bitter animosity. 
Having'said'this, 'ane must'add-that Voegelin's'late 
work expresses an admirably subtle sense of the interplay 
between truth and falsehood, making explicit'what I have 
argued to-be implicit in the metaxic symbolism itself, 
and ruling out any'hard and fast division of thinkers 
into "philosophers" and "philodoxers". Voegelin'writes' 
that the one who resists truth may be driven to'do so by 
a true perception of the inadequacies of prevailing 
symbolizations. ' Conversely, 
The thinker engaged in 
human being plagued by 
resistance in his sloul 
part, the resister to 
consciousness-reality,, 
reality (OH V: 37). 
the formative quest is A 
the forces of self-assertive 
Just as much as his counter- 
the paradoxic, structure of 
is plagued by the truth of 
In the context of 'In Search of Order as a whole, this 
sentence seems to serve as a recognition of the greatness 
of Hegel irrespective of Voegelin's profound opposition 
to him. Unfortunately, though, Voegelin never revise-J 
his earlier assessment of'Plato's conflict with the 
sophists in the light of the later formulation, even 
though Plata's thought so affects his'own. He did not, 
it seems, caremuch for retractations. 
To evaluate Vaegelin's conception of philosophy, 
finally, itýis necessary to return to the symbol nous. "I 
He holds the discovery of nous to mark'a new epoch in 
history; one'could not retreat from the insight to less 
differentiated'modes of experience and symbolization. - 
The person of more'primitive mentality is designated 
"mortal" (thnetos) by Plato, the one who, positively 
resists the new insight is "dull-witted"- (amatbes): the 
"philosopher" is characterized-by two equivalent symbols, 
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Plata's "spiritual man" (daimonios anez, ) and Aristotle's 
"mature man" (spoudaios)- 
It is important-to notice what is and what is not 
claimed for the philosophers. Yous had already 
constituted human nature before its "discovery"; also, 
the depth of divine reality-is not exhausted by what is 
revealed as nous (so that subsequent and superior 
insights are not precluded). The philosophers do not 
expect the discovery of reason to forestall the disorder 
of history. or the, violence of human passions. Vhat they 
do claim is, that spiritual status and maturity are 
specifically functions of the noetic faculty, so, that 
Aristotle can define the human person as the living being 
possessing, nous. 
Voegelin denies that this claim for philosophy is a 
reductionism: if a, given analysis was concerned 
not. with man's personal order, but with the order of 
his existence in society, it arrived at the 
abbreviating characterization of man as the -zoon 
politikon. And if the analysis of man's existence 
in historical reality .... had been carried by 
the classic philosophers further than it actually 
was, they might have arrived at the summarizing 
characterization of man as the zoon hIstor-ikon. All 
three of the characterizations are true inasmuch as 
they summarize a valid analysis of reality exper- 
ienced, but every single one of them would become 
false if it excluded the two others and claimed to 
be the one and only definition of the nature of man 
(An-R: 91-92). 
Now to recognize the parity of these three dimensions 
of human life surely disallows one from locating the 
fully. achieved human life in any single dimension. But 
as Vaegelin goes on to discuss the "specifically human" 
reality of "existence in a state of unrest", it quickly 
becomes apparent that he regards this unrest as 
specifically a phenomenon of noetic existence, not of 
political or historical existence. For exampl. e, he 
argues, following Aristotle, that the unrest is not a 
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form of alienation (allotriosis) but is joyrul, -because 
it is itself the first phase of revelation and leads, ýone 
to that act of questioning which opens one to theophany 
(Ibid: 99,101). Unrest is for him precisely a phase and 
an an indispensable condition of, noetic life. "" 
To avoid the reductionism, he has warned against, ' 
however, Voegelin would have to grant that unrest--could 
lead people no less fruitfully into historical and 
political commitments which took the form of actic; n. 
And, in the formulation that was'criticized in Chapter 
Two above, Voegelin's conception of "action" in this 
context is restricted to "hedonistic and political" 
action (Ibid: 96). As he continues, 
Positively, Plato identifies the One (to ben) that 
is present as the ground in all things as sophia kai 
nous; and Aristotle identifies the actuality of 
thought (tou energela) as the divine life eternal 
"for that is what God is". The complex of the nous 
symbols thus covers all steps in the philosophers' 
exegesis of man's tension towards the ground of his 
existence (Ibid: 96) 
In writing "the ground of his existence" rather than "the 
ground of his noetic existence" Voegelin dissolves that 
interdependence of the three fundamental, dimensions of 
human life on which he previously insisted. Philosoph- 
ical awareness is implied to be the single way in which 
people encounter God. 
In giving an-absolute primacy to the noetic dimension 
Voegelin is not, of course, committed to the belief that 
human life can be lived exclusively in that dimension. 
Since the nous is also the faculty which perceives the 
true nature of human life as metaxic, it would be self- 
defeating to pursue immortality while repudiating that 
existence (biological, political) which is the metaxic 
scene of the pursuit. "-- But though this observation 
saves classical philosophy from entailing the advocacy, of 
sheer flight from the world, it goes no way towards 
recognizing that it is love (and, as will be argued in 
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the next- section, love indissolubly directed towards the 
ground and towards human beings) that is, no less than 
nous,, canstitutive of the search. 
Gustavo Guti6rrez prefaces his discussion of theology 
as "critical reflection an praxis"-by affirming as 
"permanent-and indispensable" the two "classical tasks" 
of theology - as wisdom and as rational knowledge 
(1973: 3-15). As wisdom, theology is a meditative- 
practice directed towards personal, spiritual growth: as 
rational knowledge, it is an intellectual discipline barn 
of the integration of faith and reason. These tasks are 
presupposed, but will, also be modified, when theology 
accepts the equally necessary third function by which it 
reflects on practical Christian living in the light of 
the Gospel. 
With two of these three functions-of theology Vaegelin 
scarcely engages. When he reflects on social and polit- 
ical theory or practice, he-does so as a philosopher, not 
as a theologian; that is, he does not justify his 
criticisms by appeal to the Gospel and the traditions of, 
its interpretation, but by appeals to reason. As for 
"theology as wisdom", he sweepingly suggests that it has 
ceased to be practised in the Christian churches: 
Some of the early Christian thinkers like Origen 
have still the real cultural syncretism of mystical 
theology and the beginnings of doctrinal theology. 
Mystical theology is no longer practised in 
combination with doctrinal theology. Origen was a 
high point, which has hardly ever been surpassed 
(Conv: 105-06). 1-7 
Voegelin concerns himself almost entirely with'the 
second of the models mentioned by Guti6rrez, theology as 
"rational knowledge". Its noetic adequacy is therefore 
all-important for him. 115 We shall see that he achieves a 
valuable precision in identifying both decisive advances 
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and influential noetic deficiencies in Christian 
theology. But I shall argue that his perspective, 
because it is not complemented with-other important, 
insights, also leads him into certain distortions. 
II 
The Pauline Advance and its Risks 
As always, Voegelin seeks the experlence which 
engenders a given mode of symbolization. He considers 
what he calls the "Pauline Vision of the Resurrected" to 
be the decisive articulation of the spiritual experience 
which underlies the Christian Testament. (That is to 
say, we have no such direct access to the experience of 
Jesus himself. ) St. Paul's experience 'must be accepted 
as a real event in the Metaxy, constitutive of history", 
which a philosopher can do no more than try to under- 
stand. But to accept the event of the divine revelation 
to Paul is not the same as accepting a theological 
doctrine. A vision is an event, not a doctrine: 
Any attempt to break up the mystery of, divine-human 
participation, as it occurs in a theophanic evento 
is fatuous. On the subjective side one cannot 
"explain" the divine presence in the vision by a 
psychology of Paul. And an the oI bjective side 
__11critical doubts" about the vision of the Resurr- 
ected would mean that the critic knows how God has a 
right to let himself be seen (OH TV: 242-43). 
According to Vaegelin, St. Paul achieves a decisive 
advance beyond Plato, and'in three ways. Tirstly, his 
vision "carried Paul Irresistibly beyond the structure -of 
creation to its source in the freedom and love of divine 
creativityll, so that "the transcosmic God and his Agape 
were revealed as the mover in the theophanic events which 
consti. tute meaning in history". Once this pneuimtic 
depth in reality has been articulated, Plato's symbolism 
of the nous no longer suffices to express the experience 
of transcendence. In, "The Beginning and the Beyond" 
(HOOD, Voegelin makes an analogous point: in the 
Judaeo-Christian experience the divine is experienced 
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overwhelmingly as a "revelatory irruption" rather than as 
the ground which is also the object of a human search. 
The pneumatic event, whether the revelation to Moses in 
the Thornbush Episode or the revelation to Paul, is an 
experience of a new and compelling power. 
Seco I ndly, Paul-achieved adI ifferentiation in the 
universal experience that historical existence has a 
goal, an eschatologica'l direction. '" And thirdly, in his 
interpretation of Incarnation Paul has 
fully differentiated the experience of man as the 
site where the movement of reality becomes luminous 
in its actual occurrence. ... [Man] is the 
creature in whom God can incarnate himself with the 
fulness (pleroma) of his divinity, transfiguring man 
into the God-man (Colossians 2: 9) (OH IV: 250-5, 
ý1). ý 
As Voegelin explains elsewhere, the noetic core of the 
Gospel movement is the same as that, of philosophy: both 
forms of discourse are symbolizations of the human 
tension towards the divi,, ne, 
_ 
by, which human beings 
experience both the attraction of 
, 
the divine and the 
"counter-pull" of "the world" (in the Johannine sense). 
In Christianity, this noetic core is given a distinctive 
pneumt1c specification through the person of Christ, in 
whom the pleromatic presence of the Spirit is definitive 
(1971a: 80-101; 1981: 279-85). 
Let us return to the first made of Paul's advance over 
Plato, by which the primacy passes from noesis to pneuma. 
It does not follow that visions elude the critical 
control of reason. Voegelin writes, "When reading the 
Gospel texts one is always astonished by the noetic 
astuteness'of the pneumatic visions" (1981: 281). Paul 
himself "was well aware that the structure of a 
theophanic experience reaches from a'pneumatic centre to 
a noetic periphery" (OH IV: 244). For example, he offers 
rational criteria for evaluating the testimony of those 
speaking in tongues in Corinth: evidently, he does not 
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think pneumatic utterances to be self-authenticating. 
Vaegelin sums up, Paulls position in thisýway; "Without 
prejudice to the existentially ordering force of pneuzma, 
the life'in'community is governedýby noud". That is, 
nous'is needed'in order to stop pneumatic phenomena from 
degenerating into incoherence. But pneuma, the ordering 
force of the divine-'agape,, is now the, primary-reality. 
Nous becomes the mark of aý "teacher or prophet whose 
existence is truly ordered by--the pneuma" (Ibid: 245). 
Here, as always, even genuine differentiations bring'' 
their dangers., Firstly, emphasizing the force of the 
divine irruption will tend, to weaken-one's consciousness 
of the active noetic quest,., So, in "The Beginning and 
the Beyond", Voegelin goes on, from his acknowledgment of, 
the pneumatic advance to suggest that the structure of 
the quest is nevertheless best articulated by the, 
classical-philosophers.: - Secondly, Paul's experience that 
reality has begun to be transfigured through the 
Resurrection of Christ needs to be critically controlled 
by Plato's noetic-sense of the limits that-metaxic 
existence sets for such transfiguration, (OH IV: 249): 
The overwhelming revelation of pleromatic presence 
as an event in the transfiguring course, of history, 
however, tempts the pneumatic visionaries to expand 
their'consciousness of epoch by imaginative 
expectations of a pleromatic, transfiguration in the 
near future. ... The imaginatively expanded 
consciousness tends to deform the epochal event 
within history into an event that will abolish 
history (Voegelin, 1981: 284). 
Undue concentration on'the, process of transfiguration 
risks neglecting whole sectors of reality and experience 
which one must equally respect-" 
Theology as a Deformation of Experience 
Voegelin argues that deformations set-in when Paul's 
perspective is accepted as normative in the absence of 
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Paul Is own spiritual expeirience. Once that happens, the 
very gain embodied in the, Pauline writings, is (ex , 
hypotbesi) abandoned, so that the loss of noetic control, 
the diminished awareness of the metaxic structure of 
reality,, becomes decisive. 
Voegelin holds that tbealogy itselr induces such 
a loss of contact with the Pauline vision. In the 
meditative process itselfrhuman reason and divine 
revelation are united. Any discipline which confines 
itself to articulating either the "human" or the "divine" 
side of the process fragments the experience. Therefore, 
Voegelin infers, such forms of discourse as anthropology, 
theology, and psychology, "are types of deformation and 
impermissible in a meditative, investigation": and Jewish 
and Christian theology, because it is a "systematic 
doctrine", "belongs among the things which have, to be 
cleared away today" (1984b: -47,46), 
ýI 
In his view, as we have just seen, the understanding 
of the. Pauline experience is a philosophical task. The 
root of theology is quite different: namely, the 
necessary but rationally dangerous defence against 
"folly". As it happens, the term "theology" is a 
philosopbical neologism of Plato, coined in the context 
of his oppositi'On to the sophists. According to The 
Laws, the sophists held the following triad of prop- 
ositions: 
(1) the gods do not exist, or 
(2) they exist but take no thought for the human racet 
or 
(3) they are influenced by sacrifices and supplicat- 
ions and can easily be won over. 
To these propositions. Plato opposes a contrary but 
symm trical sett and uses the phrase "two types of 
theology" to describe the true and the false triads 
(Plato, 1970: 411; see QH TI: 273-74). zitl 
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Voegelin's point is that Plato did not merely oppose 
false doctrines with true ones. His whole practice was 
founded an the z-erusal to reduce meditatianal symbols to 
propositional statements (Voegelin, 1981: '269-70). --l"I But 
theology, from its inception, is inherently a proposit- 
ional mode of discourse. And even-positive propositions 
about divine reality are not self-sufficient. They are 
valid only as a corrective to the falsehoods of those who 
deny the existence of the gods. 
- Voegelin illustrates his point from the writings of 
St. Anselm. He notices that Anselm uses the word "proof"' 
<probatio) not in the Froslogion itself (for "when a 
believer explores the structure of his faith the exist- 
ence of God is not in question"), but only in the 
discussion with Gaunilo, who acts the role of the "fool". 
(The "fool" is not the person of weak understanding but 
the person, possibly very intelligent, who refuses to be 
open to reality and therefore says there is no God. ) 
The symbolism of the noetic quest threatens to 
derail into a quarrel about proof or non-proof of a 
proposition when the fool enters the discussion. 
The existence of God can become doubtful because, 
without a doubt, the fool exists. If the 
fool's part in the positive propositions is 
forgotten, there is always the danger of .... believing the truth of these propositions to be 
ultimate. But the assumption of ultimacy would make 
them indeed as empty of the experiential truth in 
the, background as the fools pretend them to be 
(Voegelin, 1986: 576,580). 2: 3 
It must be noted that Voegelin does not argue 
, 
that 
Anselm was "wrong" to oppose the proposition advanced,, by 
Gaunilo (in his role as sceptic) with a counter- 
proposition of his own. Doctrine has the legitimate 
civilizational function of protecting insights already 
achieved against "the disintegrative pressures to which, 
the differentiated truth of existence is exposed in the 
spiritual and intellectual turmoil of the ecumenic 
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situation".. (OH TV: 43-44). ý21 As he further recognizes, 
doctrines are capable of exercising significant critical 
functions. ý16 
Vhat he wishes to emphasize is the'noetic'cost of the 
necessary defence against the "fool". -For doctrines, 
once enshrined, tend to be regarded as literal'and 
autonomous statements of truth'(even if the few thinkers 
dedicated to'a meditative practice are able, from their 
own experience of the "abyss" between God and the human 
mind, 'to make the necessary negative counter - statements). 
In the present instance, "the great debate aroused by the 
Proslo, gion concentrated on the syllogistic merits and 
demerits of the argument that later came to be called the 
ontological proof of the existence of God, while the 
experiential context in which the argument was supposed 
to make sense was neglected" ("The Beginning and the 
Beyond", Hoov). 
The argument, of course, is'not a "proof" in the 
. sense of a 
logical-demonstration, of an apodeixis, 
but only in the sense of an epideixis, of a painting 
to an area of reality which the constructor of the 
negative propositions has chosen to overlook, or to 
ignore, or refuses to perceive, One cannot prove 
reality by a syllogism; one can only point to it and 
invite the doubter to look. .. The more or less deliberate confusion of the two meanings Of the word 
"proof" is still a standard trick employed by the 
negators in the contemporary ideological, -debate; and it plays an important role in the genesis of the 
"Proofs" for the existence of God ever since the 
time of Anselm (rbid: 36). 
Voegelin acknowledges (. e. g. -Conv: 94-111) that any 
given experience may need to be analyzed. But once 
analysis reaches beyond experience, symbols come to be 
regarded, by defenders-and sceptics alike, as demonstr-- 
able propositions about realities erroneously taken to be 
ObJects of cognition. And then: 
Literalizing the old myth carries with it the danger 
of literalizing every myth, and, as the myth is the 
only symbolism man has to express his experience of 
divine reality, the further danger of deadening the 
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formation of man's humanity through man's openness 
to divine presence (OH TV: 37). 
In "The Beginning and the Beyond" (Hoov), -Vaegelin 
claims that the insidious "penchant to hypostatize" is 
the most serious of all obstacles to the understanding of 
spiritual experience., - The symbols petrify, the "fools" 
throw out along with the discredited symbols the reality 
which is symbolized, and propositional doctrines are then 
invoked to inhibit communal acceptance of the fools' 
repudiation. And even these latter defensive propos- 
itions, though necessary on one level, continue the 
vicious process by which noetic life is stifled. -2' In 
this sense, the doctrinal formulations provoke their own 
rejection. Such rejection is even valid in so far as it 
abandons the defective formulation: but it is disast- 
rously invalid in that it tends to repudiate "truth 
experienced" altogether. Inevitably, therefore, new and 
inferior doctrines are inevitably spawned in their turn 
(Voegelin, 1967a: 259). 2-7 
The task facing anyone in quest of truth thus becomes 
even more formidable than it need be: "To accept the 
critical achievement an its own terms exposes one to the 
danger of falling into the trap of its deformation; 
roundly to reject the deformed result runs the danger of 
losing the critical achievement", (OH V: 53). There are 
no answers which escape the ongoing tension between truth 
and falsehood, because "imaginative perversion is not a 
mistake in a syllogism or a system, to be thrown out for 
good once it is discovered, but a potential in the 
paradoxic play, of forces in reality as it moves towards 
its truth. The movement towards truth always resists an 
untruth" (OH V: 39). 
At this pointo the relevance of this discussion for 
our theme is clear. Voegelin alleges that the churches 
have nurtured in their adherents a destructive refusal to 
ill 
reason and to question. - Inevitably, once'church doctrine 
loses its secure social base, the'same entrenched refusal 
renders people vulnerable'to those ideologies which can 
only survive as long as they remain unexamined.: 210 
As we'saw in the previous section, Vaegelin holds that 
the churches have-compounded the potential for distortion 
by endorsing a false dichotomy which is as, ancient as the 
Jewish theologian Philo-of Alexandria and the Christian 
Fathers, who "sought to assign to philosophy'the role of 
theology's handmaiden", able only to construct'a 
framework of z-atic for the fuller tr'uth conveyed by- 
"revelation" (An-H: 186), Philosophy is itself a 
response to revelation. But in order to claim for itself 
a monopoly on revelation,, the Church, "by an act of imag- 
inative oblivion", eclipsed, the revelatoryýdimension of 
the Platonic z7ous. The false polarization reboundedýon 
the Christian movement: , 
history has takenýits revenge. The nonrevelatory 
reason, imagined by the theologians as a servant, 
has become a self-assertive master. In historical 
sequence, the imagined nonrevelatory reason has 
become the real antirevelatory reason of the 
Enlightenment revolt against the Church (OH V: 43). 
Critical Comments 
The broad lines of Vaegelin's critique of Christian 
theology may now be summarized (in a manner he never does 
himself). He holds, firstly, that Christians are obliged 
to explicate their own spiritual experience by means of 
an anamnetic re-appropiation of the Christ-event, which 
as an experience is not to be doubted. But secondly, in 
becoming a "science" in which insights and experiences 
turn into systems and propositions, theology has lost its 
roots and has become a form of thought which misrep- 
resents Christian experience. As a consequence, the 
attenuated sense of the que st (zetema) brought about by 
the conviction that one already possesses doctrinal 
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truth, coupled with the loss of noetic control already 
discernible in Paul himself, counts for more than the 
Christian pneumatic advance. 
To assess the status of this critique, one might first 
ask if theology really is, as VoeSelin would have it, a 
propositional science. Simply to appeal to the Platonic 
usage by which "theology" stands for two opposed triads 
of quasi-absolute propositions, as if that usage deter- 
mined the subsequent course of an entire, branch of human 
thought, is to commit a kind of etymological fallacy. It 
equates theology with doctrine and defineStheology as an 
hypostatization of meditative experience. 
But we have cited four descriptions of the theological 
task from Guti6rrez and Lonergan, none of which reduces 
theology to crystallized doctrine. In fact, no reputable 
contemporary theologian views theology as an attempt to 
demonstrate divine truth by logic apart from faith- 
experience. Vaegelin vigorously criticizes those who 
claim a uniquely revelatory status for theology. But it 
is no less illegitimate to retaliate, as he does, by 
erecting a contrary dichotomy, by which only pbilost7pby 
flows from experience. ý': ' 
Even Voegelin's negative account of doctrine as such 
assumes what he needs to demonstrate; that doctrines or 
dogmas are severed from experience.: 30 In fact, writing 
elsewhere about Toynbee's history, Vaegelin acknowledges 
that definitions di: ) not, in fact, close off the act of 
searching: "Definitions in the course of a zetema are 
cognitive resting points, which articulate the view of 
reality that has been gained at the ý, espective stage in 
the existential advance towards truth": they may be 
"superseded" and "qualified" at higher existential levels 
(Voegelin, 1961: 184). But Vaegelin fails to apply this 
insight to his discussion of doctrine. For it is a 
postulate of Christian theology that those who engage in 
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it do, so from within, the community and therefore do share 
in the pneumatic "experience of the Resurrected". -The 
"school-theology" which in Voegelin's view had-become' 
split from mystical theology (1971a: 88) was written, by 
people who were also deeply committedýto-a spiritual 
life. The integration of, theology-and meditation was 
always an aspiration even when least effectively 
achieved. -31 -, 
ITor are doctrines intended to quell discussion or to 
constitute-a "final" insight, for all doctrines, if not 
trivial', are later qualified by reinterpretation. They 
may not, -it is true, be super-seded, but Voegelin himself 
consistently states that a newly differentiated truth 
does not simply supersede previous expressions of that, 
truth., Doctrines are both the precipitate, and the, 
stimulus of a search for truth which is communal, and, as 
such have an authentically noetic function. -: 3-2 
Even if we conclude that dogma-as such does not 
dissolve noesis, however, we have not yet-, refuted 
Voegelin's charge against the churches: that they "did' 
everything that could provoke the ideological rebellion, 
under the pressure of which they auffer today" (An-E: 
191). In other words, he, charges that they colluded in 
the attack on noesis, not only by specifying the comm- 
unity's normative beliefs, but also, by their emphasis on 
doctrinal orthodoxy, conveying, that the less people at 
large thought for themselves on these matters the safer 
they would be. a-a 
Ve must consider this charge a little further. As we 
have seen, the Christian movement advances beyond the 
Hellas in recognizing the primacy of pneuma and agape 
, princ- over noesis. 
Therefore, on Voegelin' s, general, 
iples, one is. not, permitted to forego this. advance by a 
deliberate retreat to the pneumatically more compact 
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Platonic account. The practice of reasou'remains indis- 
pensable, and without it pneuma could'degenerate into the 
rampantly destructive force Voegelin knew so well from 
his experience of Nazism. To this extent, Voegelin's 
criticism is grave and cogent. But if reason provides 
the primary or decisive criterion for evaluating the 
Christian movement and Christian theology, - his critique 
itself loses touch with the the pneumatic advance. beyond 
Plato. 
At the beginning of his essay of 1971, "The Gospel and 
Culture", Vaegelin notes that the authors of the Dutch 
Catechism of 1966 felt obliged to insist - somewhat 
apprehensively - that the Gospel can offer its truth only 
to those who bring with them pressing questions about the 
meaning of their existence. Vaegelin writes that there 
is a conflict "not between Gospel and Philosophy, but 
rather between the Gospel and its unenquiring possession 
as doctrine" (1971a: 61). He adds that the very appreh- 
ensions of the Dutch bishops reveal 
an environment where it is not customary to ask 
questions, where the character of the Gospel as an 
answer has been so badly obscured by its hardening 
into self-contained doctrine that the raising of the 
question to which it is meant as an answer can be 
-suspect as "a non-Christian attitude". -.. The Gospel as a doctrine which you can take and be 
saved, or leave and be condemned, is a dead letter 
(Ibid: 61-62). 
In the case of Justin Martyr, for example, Christianity 
fulfilled his pbilosophical quest. The Logos has been 
incipiently operative in all those who live according, to 
reasan,, so that "Christianity is not an alternative to 
Philosophy, it is Philosophy in its state of perfection" 
(Ibid: 60). 
I wish to argue that this image of the quest leads 
Voegelin astray: for he implicitly limits its reference 
to the quest far meaning. ý3, * "The Gospel and Culture" 
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exemplifies his combining of a selective focus and a 
universal absolute judgment, -in a passage where he 
summarizes what the Christian movement gains and loses in 
comparison with "classic philosophy": 
It is richer by the missionary fervour of its 
spiritual universalism, poorer by its neglect of 
noetic control; broader by its appeal to the 
inarticulate humanity of the common man, more 





of the wise; more imposing through its imperial tone 
of divine authority, more imbalanced through its 
apocalyptic ferocity, which leads to conflicts with 
the conditions of man's existence in society .... 
(VoeSelin, 1971a: 77). 
The even-handed'syntactical structure through I which 
praise and censure are distributed in this assessment is 
intriguingly at odds with its tone, Three points of 
comparison are given. At least with regard to the second 
and third points, Vaegelin views the Christian "gains" 
ambivalently, but the losses unequivocally., ' 'He 
himself, therefore, seems to be guilty of the very -,. ode 
of "derailment" he once attributed to Bultmann and the 
'Ignostics", by which a valid insight is vitiated because 
the use made of it inhibits the recognition of equally 
essential complementary insights. 
The Christian Testament responds to a quest for 
meaning, but even'more fundamentally it I responds to-the 
quest for agape: in other words, to the quest for human 
community rooted in union with God, for the unrestricted 
love for people that is the condition of "remaining in 
the love of Christ" (cf. John 15: '9-10), and the quest 
for that love we recei ve from people which can then be 
experienced as the gift of God to us through them. 
Unless Jesus is understood as decisively incarnating the 
divine agape, in which others are to share (John 17: 26), 
he can be regarded only as one who achieves an essential 
noetic differentiation about the divine presence in the 
world: and there will be other, later differentiations. 
Further, the agape Jesus makes present is not to be 
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defined by its direct orientation to the'transcendent. 
For the love without which one cannot know God is for 
"one another'" Agapetoi, agapomen allelous (I John 4: 7- 
8; cf. also John 15: 12). ý3'rP 
Therefore, it is primarily the experiences of agape, 
as received from and given to God in Christ, and also as 
shared with human beings, that Christian theology must 
critically articulate. Voegelin assuredly insists that 
noesis is inseparable from faith in, hope in, and love of 
God (An-E: 183-84). But he does not, as theology must, 
explore the relationship between these movements towards 
God and the "horizontal" love of other people which-the 
Scriptures insist are inseparable from them. 
It is true that Vaegelin denies wishing to deal with 
"problems of theology". Order and Hlstcry, for instance, 
"is concerned with man's consciousness of his humanity as 
it differentiates historically" (CH IV: 302). But he 
does judge the Christian movement overwhelmingly an the 
basis that its1self-expression has degenerated from 
noesis. 437 
One may conclude that it is mistaken to split either 
doctrinal propositions or-the specifically noetic search 
from the totality of the "form of life" expressed in 
them. Vaegelin'acutely diagnoses one error but falls 
into the other'. 019 It is this unacknowledged exclus- 
iveness which in part vitiates Vaegelin's critique of 
theology, and which distinguishes him from Guti6rrez, who 
begins A Theology of Liberation by acknowledging the need 
for models other than the one which he proposes to 
examine and commend. 
In his unpublished "History of Political Ideas" 
Voegelin notes how ephemeral was "the new philosophy of 
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world-immanent nature and reason" which superseded 
mediaeval culture: 
The society that emerged from the storm had , 
acquired 
a consciousness of the accidental character of its 
existence; the problem of its historicity had to be 
faced; and after the passing attempt of finding 
order in nature and reason, the theory of politics 
became inseparably linked with philosophy of history 
(Hoov: in the chapter, "The Great Confusion"). 
Reflection on the problems of history, therefore 
pervades the whole of Voegelin's mature work. History, 
though, cannot in his view be a "self-sufficient" 
discipline: as the very first sentence of Order and 
History has it, "The order of history emerges from the 
history of order". That is: "every society is burdened 
with the task, under its concrete conditions, of creating 
an order that will endow the fact of is existence with 
meaning in terms of ends divine and human" (OH L: ix). 
The substance of history concerns the manner in which 
societies meet this burden. 33 
In Vaegelin's view the aymbolic form of history grows 
from two dimensions of awareness. Firstly, humanity 
exists within the Metaxy,, and therefore is "in tension 
towards divine reality". The awareness of this truth is 
engendered by "spiritual outbursts" or "hierophanic 
events" in which divine reality is disclosed, and is then 
articulated in the language symbols of particular societ- 
ies (since "-mankind is no concrete society at all"), 
Secondly, this reality of things has a time-dimension. 
The hierophanic events have meaning because, in their 
very historical sequence, they point "toward a fulfil- 
Ment, toward an Eschaton, out of time": 
History is not a stream of human beings and their 
action in time, but the process of man's partic- 
ipation in a flux of divine presence that has 
eschatological direction. The enigmatic symbolism 
of a "history of mankind", thus, expresses man's 
understanding that these insights, though they arise 
from concrete events in the consciousness of 
concrete human beings are valid for all (OH TV: 6). 
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Vaegelin's position here may usefully be compared 
with that of the historian, E. H. Carr. Charting the 
eclipse of the positivistic notion of history according 
to which the historian's consciousness is determined by 
"facts" (the "stream of human beings and their action in 
time"), Carr argues that consciousness and "facts" are 
correlative to one another. Just because there are no 
uninterpreted or "naked" facts, and no facts that are not 
constituted by some human 
, 
interest, it does not1follow, 
firstly, that facts do not exert some discipline on the 
historian; secondly, that history is only "something spun 
out of the human brain"; thirdly, that meaning is 
arbitrary or entirely relative (Carr, 1964: 7-30). 
Now Voegelin is not troubled by the spectre of 
relativism, but he would not hold that "the facts" 
themselves can deliver us from it: rather, he considers 
that though consciousness constitutes reality it is also 
and equally a response to reality: It has bath intention- 
ality and luminosity. Whereas Carr posits a tension and 
a reciprocity between "facts" and "consciousness", 
Voegelin would relate them both to a further, a deeper, 
reality which both reveals itself and is sought for in 
history, and thereby constitutes history., "ý 
This reality is spirit. In a lecture delivered in 
1965-66-in Munich, which attempted "a re-consideration of 
the Nazi era", he recalled Nietzsche's classification of 
the three types of history: "monumental history", which 
uses the past as a source of inspiration, "antiquarian 
history", which consoles those who want to "abide in 
custom and revered tradition"; and "critical history, 
that is,, evaluative and judgmental history" (1985: 8). 
His German audience, he says, will seek no inspiration 
from the National Socialist period, and will not wish to 
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abide in its revered customs. There remains, therefore 
iscritical-evaluative history". However, critical history 
does not consist of investigating past events "in the 
modern academic sense of critical research", or of 
imposing on them one' s own value judgments, which are 
likely to be as banal and provincial as were those 
prevalent in the period under investigation. People can 
say "That is terrible" today, as they said "That is 
wonderful" then. One must judge "from a new spirit": 
In order to write critical history, therefore, it is 
not enough to alter what one says; one must alter 
one's very being. Altering one's being, however, 
is not something which is brought about by foraging 
in the horrors of the past; rather, in reverse 
manner, it is the revolution of the spirit which is 
the precondition for being able to judge the past 
critically (Ibld). 
He concludes that events must be placed "under the 
judgment of the spirit". This is the task of "all who 
stand within 
, 
the continuity of spiritual de! solation and 
who suffer under its burdens" (Ibld). -, " 
I 
Other elements in Voegelin's conception of history may 
be treated summarily. History, presupposes freedom, for 
there would be no hiatory if social order was determined 
by instinct, as in insect societies. But this freedom, 
too, is oriented towards "the order of being": 
Every society is organized for su , 
rvival in the world 
and, at the same time, for partnership in the order 
of being that has its origin in world-transcendent 
divine Being; it has to cope with the problems of 
its pragmatic existence and, at the same time, it is 
concerned with the truth of its order. This 
struggle for the truth of order is the very 
substance of history; and in so far as advances 
towards the truth are achieved .... the single 
society transcends itself and becomes a partner in 
the common endeavour of mankind (OH IT: 2). -4: 2 
Thirdly, history is constituted by the consciousness 
attained in the present. The past is retrospectively 
interpreted by the discovery of how it leads to the 
historical present. This means that 'historians I are 
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always in danger of forming a reductively unilinear 
conception of history, according to which their own 
situation or consciousness is the fulfilinent of 
history, so eliminating from consciousness all other 
lines of historical meaning., *ý3 
In his essay "Political Theory and the Pattern of 
General History", Voegelin notes that unilinear history 
rests upon a theological view of the world, "deriving its 
strength from the Christian belief that mankind moves 
through a sequence of meaningful phases according to a 
providential plan of salvation" (1944b: 747). But this 
view was distorted by being interpretatively aligned with 
the "closed horizon" implicit in the mediaeval Eurocentric 
perapective., 4-4 
On the contrary, Vaegelin holds that history, since it 
is a function of human freedom and articulates the 
"unfolding" of human nature into an indefinite future, 
can have "no knowable meaning" (OH 11: 2). There is 
meaning in history but no meaning of history: 
History has a structure inasmuch as it has 
representative centres of reception from which 
revelation is communicated to the rest of mankind. 
This structure of history is a "mystery" in the 
sense of Romans 11: 25 (Vaegelin, 1964a: 75>. 
Vaegelin goes on to locate the "mystery" in Such 
questions as: why is there a history Of revelation at 
all. and why is not revelation simply given from the 
beginning? why is it given to representative figures, 
rather than universally? why does it provoke human 
resistance?, "m 
I It is because history has this structure, of mystery 
brimming with meaning, that a philosophy of history 
cannot be "an amiable record of memorabilia", but must be 
"a critical study of the authoritative structure in the 
history of mankind" (OH IT: 7). Truth about order cannot 
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emerge except historically; and conversely, history is 
structured by this same struggle towards the truth of 
order. History and philosophy are therefore, mutually 
constitutive (An-E: 116-36). -440 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES' 
The Appropriate Focus for Pnlitfý--al Theory 
In a letter of 1942 to Professor Karl Loewenstein, 
Vaegelin explained why he had ceased to teach courses in 
"Comparative Government". That discipline was "not a 
science but a college-institution", characterized. by a 
methodology which he described as "descriptive instit- 
utionalism! '. The empirical description of institutions 
could never be foregone, but - especially at a time of 
Ilghastly crisis" - must be secondary to an enquiry into 
the motive forces which determine the institutions, the 
kind of enquiry conducted, for example, by Niet=sche or 
Max Weber (Hoov). As Vaegelin later -wrote, "civiliz- 
ational form! '. 
results from the interpenetration of institutions 
and experiences of order. The institutions, to be 
sure, may break down under economic stresses, or 
through changes in the distribution of, power, but 
when the afflicted society recaptures its strength 
for self-organization, the new institutions will 
belong to the same formal type as the old ones, 
unless there has also occurred a revolutionary 
change in the experience of order (OH 1: 60). 
Any theory of politics "must cover the problem of the 
order of man's entire existence": that is, it must - 
presuppose neither "a free-flowing consciousness without 
c orporeal foundation", nor "a corporeal foundation without 
ordering consciousness". To describe theories which 
obscure one or other sector of reality, Vaegelin borrowed 
the term skc; tcsis from Bernard Lonergan (An-R: 200-01). 
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The philosopher can reach the, heart of political 
reality only by exploring "experiences of order". When, 
for example, in Book VIII of the Republic (Plato, 1955: 
312-49) Plato describes the decline of a good polis, he 
does so in terms of an intelligible sequence in which 
different forces of the soul successively emerge as 
socially predominant. "Not only the good polis is man 
written large, but every polis writes large the type of 
man that is socially dominant in it" (OH r1l: 70). 
Plato's analysis "is in substance a theory of the 
decomposition of the soul through the metamorphosis of 
Eros", and the analysis is seriously misunderstood if 
Plato is presumed to have intended a schematic comparison 
of political systems (Ibid: 123-29). 
In Vaegelin's view, therefore, such writers as Karl 
Popper travesty Plato. They represent him as prescribing 
some ideal political system, and oppose to his system one 
of their own preference, typically inspired by a twent- 
ieth century liberal outlook (Voegelin, 1954). Such 
misrepresentation only exposes the attackers' own 
blindness. 2 
Vaegelin shows, for example, how the Timaeus (written 
as a sequel to the Republic) artfully emphasizes the 
mytbical nature of the-paradigmatic polis ruled by 
wisdom. It exists in a remote golden age, and is 
recovered only in the form of "a drama within the soul of 
Plato" (Vaegelin, 1947: 311,316-17). As it happens, 
Popper never mentions this ruling literary device of the 
Timaeus. It is this insensitivity to myth, to the very 
genre of the dialogues, which invalidates his critique.! " 
Vaegelin alleges, then, that Popper projected his own 
"institutional descriptivism! ' onto Plato. For Plato, 
"philosophy is not a doctrine of right order, but the 
light of wisdom that falls on the struggle" (OH ITT: 
62-63). In particular, "the very conception of a 
paradigmatic polis was .... an instrument of critique 
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to be used against the not-at all paradigmatic reality of 
the surrounding political scene" (OH 11: 32). 
Voegelin arrived early at his fundamental position 
that cultural practice, including political practice, is 
always rooted in spirit. In Die politische Relig-ionen of 
1938, he wrote that life in a political community 
cannot be defined as a profane sphere, in which we 
only have to deal with questions of organizations, 
of law, and of power. ... Man lives in the 
political community with all aspects of his being 
from the corporeal to the spiritual and religious 
(1986: 77). 
In "Political Science and the Intellectuals" (Hoov), an 
unpublished paper of the late 1940s, he argued that to 
explain social order in terms of a "contract theory", for 
example, is fatuous unless one can explain what is -1the 
nature of the common bond that lends binding force to any 
contract. Unless one experienced such a bond, one could 
logically assert only that social order "originates in 
actions of individuals who want to avoid the di-sadvant- 
ages of disorder"; but this assertion scarcely counts as 
an explanation and is really no more than "a sophistic 
Opinion concerning the origin and meaning of order". 
Institutions-and strategies are devised, developed, 
maintained or modified, to express buman purposes. Just 
as one cannot understand a machine by itemizing its 
components while overlooking its function, so one cannot 
isolate a political system from the purposes that under- 
lie it; and those purposes are not merely political., * As 
Voegelin elsewhere sums up his position: 
Political science as an academic discipline focuses, 
with pragmatic intention, primarily an the instit- 
utions of national societies and the international 
organizations. These institutions are precisely the 
area of ideological .... self-interpreation 
of order (An-E: 191). 'ý 
It is striking that Vaegelin's disdain for a political 
theory that restricts. itself tall'i. nstitutional descript- 
ivism is shared with Marx. As Kolakowski-sums up part of 
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the argument of Marx's essay of 1843 "On the Jewish 
Question", "Political revolution does not liberate people 
from religion or the rule of property, it merely gives 
them the right to hold property and to profess their own 
religion" (Kolakowski, 1978: 126). Again, in the Tenth 
"Thesis on Feuerbach", Marx repudiates the standpoint of 
"civil society" in favourof the standpoint of "human 
society, or social humanity" (Marx, 1977: 158). 
Marx's position, of course, has a different basis than 
Voegelin': Marx "is known even in his early days to have 
regarded politics as obviously nothing but the expression 
and elaboration of class rule" (Buber, 1958: 82). For 
Vaegelin, contemporary institutions "offer only minimal 
opportunities of an access to the reality of knowledge"; 
and to become aware of "the great problems of thinking 
about order in Germany" one would do better to read the 
literary works of such authors as Robert Musil, Hermann 
Broch and Thomas Mann (Ibid). 1- 
Thus, as C. H. McIlwain points out (1932: 22-23), when 
Plato and Aristotle speak of a state's "constitution" 
they mean not some formal code, but that whicb nzakes the 
state wbat it is, rather as one speaks of a person's 
"constitution". The content of Plato's "politics" 
therefore includes what would today be considered to be 
sociology, ethics, even theology. Voegelin is similarly 
inclusive, not now by instinct, as it were, but through a 
conscious conviction that there is no discrete realm of 
the political. For example, In "DemcA-. ratie im neuen 
Eur, opall (1959), he recalls the famous expression from 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, commonly attributed to 
Lincoln himself, concerning "government of the people, by 
the people, for the people". Voegelin points out that 
the phrase is borrowed from the Prologue to Wyclif's 
translation of the Bible (1384), where it reads, "This 
Bible is for the Government of the People, by the People 
and for the People". Thus, not only is one of the key 
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pronouncements of Western institutional democracy firmly 
rooted in a Judaeo-Christian religious insight, but the 
"people" turns out to be not just any political unit 
irrespective of the state of its culture, but specific- 
ally that community which remembers and celebrates its 
freedom under God (Voegelin, 1959: 294). -7 
To cut what we would now call politics from its roots 
prevents one's understanding even politics itself. 
Vaegelin explains what such roots might be, again-in the 
context of the modern attack on Plato: 
Plato and Aristotle did not create "ideal states" 
(the very word "ideal" has no equivalent in Greek), 
but developed imaginative paradigms, models of the 
best polis, What is "best" again has nothing to do 
with "ideals", but will be, decided by the pragmatic 
suitability of the model to provide an environment 
for the "best" or "happiest" life; and the ý: riterion 
of the best or happiest life in italturn will be 
established by the science of philosophical 
anthropoloSy (1953: 109). a 
The deformationa which occur when institutions are 
regarded as absolute may be illust 'rated by two exa=. Dles 
given by Vcegelin in the "History of Political Ideas". 
In three sermons delivered in Lincoln's Inn in 1745-46, 
William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, argued'that the 
English State deserved divine protection because it 
represented-a realm of freedom and light amid the 
surrounding darkness. Its exemplary status was not 
forfeited by the "Infidelity" and "Luxury" that, as 
Warburton admitted, corroded the. entire life of the 
nation; nor by the fact (which he failed to mention), 
that the religious liberty of Nonconformists and Non- 
Jurors was restricted and that of Roman Catholics denied. 
Thus, notes Vaegelin, Warburton placidly separated the 
structure of the English constitution from the corrupt 
"moral and spiritual substance of the nýationll. (As one 
might say nowadays, he reified the state. ) The second 
instance is that of Gladstone's condemnation of the Roman 
Catholic Church as intransigent because, alone among 
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religious bodies in Britain, it would not agree to accept 
the civil order as beyond challenge in return for its- 
internal freedom of worship. Voegelin terms the attitude 
shared by Warburton and Gladstone "totalitarian constit- 
utionalismll. "3 
Since a political order can be evaluated only by 
discerning how far it embodies "order" itself, and since 
political ills'always manifest existential disorder, the 
exploration into "order" impelled all Vaegelin's writing 
and teaching. 110, 
He argues, in fact, that "there are no principles of 
political science, because there are no propositions". 
Rather there are common sense insights at many different 
levels. Power is known to be readily abused by its 
possessor, and therefore requires some provision for 
"advisory, controlling or vetoing instances"'. Cabinets 
must be of manageable size. Especially in'areas peri- 
pheral to the person, such as administrative organization, 
such insights may have a lasting validity, so that 
studies such as that on bureaucracy by Max Weber may 
become "classical'. But particular institutions "contain 
too many historical variables to admit typification". 
Voegelin's examples are illuminating: ', 
The - present Basic Law of the Federal Republic of 
. Germany,. ... has weakened the presidential exec- 
utive power as compared with the stronger position 
of the president in the Weimar Constitution because 
that, stronger position made possible the rise of 
Hitler. The constitution of the Fifth Republic of 
France, however, has'strengthened the position of 
the president as compared with the constitutions of 
the Third and Fourth Republic in order to avoid the 
frequent crises of government. Proportional 
representation is considered unfavourably by a 
number of German political scientists, again because 
it was a factor in the rise of Hitler; in America, 
-however, it is looked upon with favour because it has often helped to break the power of a political 
machine at the municipal level (An-E: 210-11). 
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As soon as one goes beyond"Icommonsense insights" (the 
very. elevated "co=ansense" of a Weber! ) one arrives not 
at propositions-b6yond which there lurk "principles", but 
at "the order of consciousness, by which co=onsense 
insights receive their direction" (Ibid: 211). 
His friend Gregor Sebba has suggested that Voegelin is 
better regarded as a political philosopher than as a 
political scientist (Sandoz, 1982: 24-25). This comment 
rightly interprets Voegelin's focus an noetic conscious- 
ness; though the instances I have cited (and the very 
title Vaegelin gave to the Munich Institute) show that he 
considers even "political science" to be properly a 
theoretical and critical discipline rather than one that 
is merely empirical. As he insists (distancing himself 
sharply from traditionalist conservatism), "the 
contraction of political science to a (jescription of 
existing institutions and the apology of their 
principles" constitutes "the degradation of political 
science to a handmaid of the powers that be" (NaE: 2). 
"Justteýell and-"Order" as Political Symbols 
If there is no separable realm of the, politiCal,., 
neither is there a separable realm of the non-political, 
least of all in the dimension of personal consciousness. 
Voegelin demonstrates this familiar point experientially, 
by showing how the symbols of 
, 
"order" and "Justice" do 
not emerge as attributes of the individual consciousness, 
only applied subsequently to the public realm, but. emerge 
precisely as political'symbols. 
Vaegelin does not maintain that the public realm is 
ontologically prior to the private realm. On the 
contrary, "man's bodily existence is the basis for his 
social existence". 
, 
Society expands from-the, family to 
that size in which the "material basis for the unfolding 
of the eu ze&I can be, met (An-E: 200). But he adapts the 
129 
methodological suggestion, proposed by Socrates in the 
Republic: since justice in political society is written 
"in larger lettering" than in private affairs, it is 
easier to recognize there. Once it is recognized in 
political life, one can also find it more easily in the 
individual, "the smaller entity" (Plato, 1955: 101-02). 
This is why Socrates argues consistently from the 
communal to the individual. 
So, in the Odysse7, the interventions of the goddess 
Athena do not favour ordinary people going about their 
business but beroes. "the, hero in the Homeric sense can 
be defined as the man in whose actions a more-than-human 
order of being becomes manifest" (OH IT: 104). In the 
Suppliants of Aeschylus, action qualifies as heroic when 
it embodies "the decision for Dike against demonic 
disorder"; and such action has the public purpose of 
enabling the polis to represent the order of Zeus (rbid). 
By definition, then, heroic virtue is concerned with the 
restoration of societal good, not with the sheer stubborn 
retention of a person's individual integrity. " 
Ila society, therefore, can do without its "heroes". 12 
The very understanding of existence as metaxic, always in 
tension between perfection and imperfection, implies that 
society must never be regarded as irreparably evil 
(Vaegelin, 1967a: 265). And because of this tension it 
also follows that work for social transformation is not 
to be polarized (as "disruptive") over against a 
"conservative" ideal of "attunement" to divine order, but 
can itself be an act of attunement. For attunement "is 
more than a docile conformity to the exigencies of 
existence"; 
_it 
expresses active and passive partic- 
ipation, partnership in, being (OH 1: 4). 
Vaegelin never lost this sense that virtue and vice 
are inherently social. In the late essay "Quod Deus 
Dicitur", speaking again of "the fool", he writes, 
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In Psalm 13 (14), the, nabal, signifies the mass 
phenomenon of men who do evil rather than good 
because they do not "seek after God" and his 
justice, who "eat my people as they eat bread" 
because they do not believe in divine sanction for 
acts of unrighteousness., The personal contempt of 
God will manifest itself in ruthless conduct towards 
the weaker man and create general disorder in 
society (1986: 577). 
This latter sentence makes it clear that the symbol 
"order" is cognate to the symbol "Justice"; for the, 
opposite to justice is pleonexia, the will-to-power, or 
the will to have more than others (OH 111: 33-35,207; 
cf. Cassirer, 1946: 75). Any moder n reader who took the 
word "order" to have overtones of stasis, or to be best 
ser ved by the maintenance of existing institutions and 
practices, would fatally distort Voegelin's thought. 'a 
The word "order" (taxis) and its opposite "disorder" 
(ataxia) are for him, as for the Hellenic philosophers,, 
terms of great weight and scope, applying equally to the 
coamos, the pysche and the social order. In the creation 
myth of the Timaeus, the Demiurge brings matter from 
ata. xia- to- taxis. To bring about social order is to act 
politically with the very authority of the Demiurge (Q1i 
LU: 196-99). For Plato and Aristotle, an unjust "order" 
is no order at all, for the absence of order signifies 
the utter failure of a society to attain its end. To be 
attuned, such a society must be transformed. "4 
Now divine order is not to be regarded as some 
immutable structure of ethical norms capable of univer- 
sal application. The notion of "the order of Zeus" must 
be seen in the mythical context of the "evolution" of 
Zeus himself as an ethical personality. In sections 71 
to 74 of Hesiod's Theogony, 
the predominance of ethical forces becomes the 
raison d'etre of the reign of Zeus. The other gods 
-are "earlier", gods because of their savage lusts, 
_, 
their tyrannical, cruelties, and, especially, because 
of the-uncivilized habit of swallowing their 
131 
children in order to avoid an aristocratic sharing 
of rule among the immortals (OH 11: 132-33). 
Zeus, to be sure, overcomes the other gods by force, but 
his victory is fulfilled through "the just distribution 
of his honourable share (time) to each of the imrn rtals". 
The "predominance of ethical forces" is ratified by an 
image of equity within the very divinity. 
Therefore, in order to appreciate how the classical 
philosophers understand that "Justice" which represents 
divine order, it would be inappropriate to attempt a 
definition of justice. Instead, one must trace the 
development of its symbolic articulation. Firstly, the 
philosophers come to see that human excellences, aretai, 
must be ranked in some order. The seventh century 
Lacedaemonian poet Tyrtaeus, for example, praises "savage 
valour" (thouris alke) as the specific virtue of the 
polis. As Voegelin notes, a perennial political problem 
is enunciated here: the polis "engenders the will to 
fight for the community regardless of the justice of its 
cause. ... No questions must be asked (OH 11: I'DO). 
The continued existence of Lacedaemania depends an such 
"savage valour" moving the citi-zens. But in the Laws, 
Plato's Athenian says that those of "savage valour", 
though a polis needs them-for defence against its 
enemies, may also be "reckless and insolent rogues, and 
Just about the most witless. people you could find" 
(Plato, 1970: 53). So valour is ranked fourth among the 
virt, ues, after wisdom, Justi 
- 
ce and temperance (OH IT: , 
193-94)! Once the whole range of aretai is understood as 
a. 11transparency of life for the realissimuzW', the single 
a. retai are relativized and revalued. 
Vaegelin goes an (OH 11: 194-99) to, discuss the elegy 
written by Solon, the sixth century reformer of Athens. 
The dike attributed by Hesiodto Zeus is, ineluctable, so 
Solon prays, "Wealth I desire to possess - but I would 
not have it unrighteously; for Dike always catches up". 
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Vaegelin notes that Solon here intends a theodicy. To 
think the world is senseless because "honest endeavour 
may fail, and the wicked ones may succeed" is a doxa, an 
illusion. Solon's positive principle of "righteousness", 
or "right order" (eunamla) rests on the renunciation of 
illusions such as the view that striving for, wealth can 
be a sufficient human aim. At the core of eunomia, as 
its animating experience, 
-we 
find the religiousness of a life in tension 
between the passionate, human desire for the goods 
of exuberant existence and the measure imposed on 
such desire by the ultimately inscrutable will of 
the gods. ... Solon is neither a middle class 
type 
who finds virtue in'a medium situation because it 
fits his medium stature; nor is he a broken Titan, 
resigned to the frustration of his desires by fate. 
Through openness toward transcendence, the 
passion of life is revealed as the Doxa that mustIbe 
curbed for the sake of order (Ibid: 197). 
Again, there-fore, Voegelin shows that , order" is 
dynamic, always requiring strenuous resistance to doxa. 
The Hellenic literary development of the symbol 
"Justice" culminates in the Judgment scene at the close 
of the Republic. The justice which is decisive for the 
quality of one's entire life is both formidably demanding 
and elusive. It is never less than the urgent resistance 
to inJuatice, and it can be recognized only existent- 
tally, not as an-abstraction. Thus, those who are only 
conventionally upright, without a positive "love of 
wisdom! ', are deficient in justice because they will fail 
in a crisis: but "Plato does not offer recipes for moral 
conduct; and with regard to, a right paradigm of life he 
does not go beyond ahint that in such matters the mean 
(to meson) is preferable" (OH TIT: 56-57). 
Since justice is resistance to injustice-one must 
naturally be able to identify injustice. As we have 
seen, the Gorgias characterizes injustice as pleonexia, 
the will to gain power over others. More elaborately, 
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the Republic represents injustice as a synthesis of three 
elements: polypraSmosyne, "the readiness to engage in 
multifarious activIties, which are not a man's proper 
business"; metabole, "change or shift of 'occupation"; and 
allotz-iqpz-a, Tmosyne, '"meddlesome, officious interference". 
When taken together and applied to the psyche, suggests 
Voegelin, these terms refer to "the inclination of 
desires and appetites to'-direct the course of human 
action'and to claim the rulership ofýthe soul-which 
properly belongs to wisdom" (Ibid: '64). 
The account in this last'paragraph is incomplete in 
two ways. Firstlyi justice cannot simply be an idea 
derived from its negation. Indeed, Voegelin elsewhere 
criticizes D'Alembert for inferring the nature of justice 
from a particular form of injustice (social oppression), 
which is envisaged as a prior experience (ER: 77-73). 'r- 
Secondly, it seems unavailing to appeal to Wisdom 44-f the 
content of wisdom is as resistant to schematiz-ation as is 
that of justice. These two difficulties, however, are 
for'Voegelin both resolved in the'-same way, by recog- 
nizing that wisdom and justice are apprehended only 
meditatively, in the vision of the "mystic philosopher": 
In Plato's immediate environment the sophist is the 
,, 
enemy and the philosopher rises. in opposition to 
him; in the wider range of Hellenic history, the 
philosopher comes first and the sophist follows him 
as the destroyer of his work through immanentization 
of the symbols of transcendence. The Platonic pairs 
of concepts, therefore [i. e. justice/injustice, 
truth/falsehood, philosopher/philadoxerl, hearken 
back to the mystic-philosophers, and at the same 
time have a new weight'and precision in order to 
match the weight and precision that untruth has 
gained through the sophists (OH ITT: 63). 
Thus "wisdom! ' and "Justice" are each symbolic 
articulations engendered by a positive experience that 
must be called "mystical". Their content must not be 
frozen in definitions deemed valid in the absence of such 
experience: that is the method of the "philodoxers". 
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Vhen Glaucon and Adeimantus plead with Socrates to show 
them what is the inherent character of justice, for 
example, the entire zetema of the Republic begins, for 
what is offered by Socrates is not a formula but "lines 
of meaning winding their intricate way through the whole 
work" (OH 111; 51). 1-7 
For Aristotle, too, what is "right by nature" (physei 
dIA-alon) is not capable of definition. Rather, the 
phrase explicates a tension between the divinely 
A. mmutable essence and "human existentially conditioned 
mutability". Applied to the political order, justice 
is 
, 
not positive law in the modern sense, but rather 
essential law within which there rises the tension 
between physei d1kaion and a possible derailment 
into the making of laws by arbitrary human will 
(An-E: 59,60). 
This tension "can never be resolved theoretically but 
only in the practice of the man who experiences it" 
(Ibid: 62). 
Aristotle, indeed, does give empirical content to his 
notion of political Justice in 'Blook V of the Nicomachean, 
Ethics: "the just in political matters is found among men 
who share a common life in order that their association 
bring them self-sufficiency and who are free and equal, 
either proportionally or arithmetically" (An-R: 57; cf. 
_ 
Aristotle, 1955: 188). But it is clear that Aristotle's 
position, that rights may be either (a) absolute. or 
(b) relative to one's value as a citizen, means that hi-s 
own account will start as many debates as it settles. 
Mature discernment can never be rendered superfluous. 
The whole of Voegelin's volume, Plato and Aristotle 
centres on the nature of the Just political society. One 
further example will establish our main point. Voegelin 
cites from The Laws a surprisingly explicit list of the 
"axioms of rulership", posited as equally valid "for the 
great poleis and the small households": 
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1. Parents must rule children 
2. The wellborn must rule the vulgar 
3. The old must rule the young 
4. Masters must rule slaves 
5. The better must rule the worse 
6. The thinking (or knowing, or wiseý must rule the 
ignorant 
7. The man chosen by lot must rule the man who is 
not so chosen (Ibid 318) 
Voegelin does not comment an the obvious fact that some 
of these axioms may well be mutually contradictory, even 
though Plata's Athenian himself goes on to remark that 
the axioms could themselves constitute, a source of civil 
strife (Plato, 1970: 138). The conflicts they imply can 
only be resolved at a higher level of existence: and so 
it always is. The social order, ultimately, is that, 
which, is created by the common participation in nous and 
in philia, in that community of spirit which Aristotle 
calls homonoia, (OH 111: 321). 1 
clitical Societies: Structure anci spiril 
The foregoing analysis has shown why Voegelin takes as 
his primary focus neither the pragmatic, exercise of power 
and the stratagems that go with it, nor, the merits and 
demerits of-specific institutions 
,. 
He wishes to invest- 
igate the self-understanding of political societies. It 
was this choice of focus which impelled his early break 
with his 
, 
mentor Hans Kelsen,. even though Kelsen's "Pure 
Theory of Law", Voegelin later agreed, "was so good it 
could hardly be improved upon" and "still stands as the 
core of any analytical theory of law" (AX: 21). What 
Vqegelin rejected was "its claim to be a substitute for a 
theory of politics" (Ibid: 54). 
As so often, the roots of Voegelin's position can be 
found in Plato. jake the discussion of the problem of 
law in Plato's Statesman (OH 111: 161-64; cf. Plato, 
1953: 508-18). According to the Eleatic Stranger,, law 
can never be more than a "technical expedient as_a. rough 
136 
11 
approach to a majority of-cases";, it-offers, only general 
rules, whereas human action is personal and concrete. - It 
is, indeed, "an inevitable appurtenance of'social order", 
but only-"becauselit is beyond the powers of even a 
perfect ruler to exhaust the vicissitudes of human life 
by individual decisions". The value of a corpus of law, 
therefore, dependsýentirely on the wisdom of the 
legislators. Further, just as good physicians discer'n 
their patients' condition, rather than act according to 
inflexible rules of diagnosis-and-prescription, it would 
be absurd'if wise legislators were bound by their own 
rules. 110- 
The Stranger claims, however, that the ancient laws 
and-'customs deserve adherence, as the "second best" form 
of government, after that of the "true royal ruler". 
For, in-practice, wise'rulers (those who possess the 
logos basilike) are rare, 'and the worst condition of all 
is for the polis to be governed without knowledge, by 
tyrants or unwise rulers. The conservativeýcounsel 
prevails in the Staýesman, 'not on principle, nor because 
one particular group of pol'iticians'is adjudged stupid or 
venal, but on'the basis of'a grim judgement that it is 
normally'imprudent to'expect wise political leadership. 
In the'case of law, ' as'with-Platals "axioms of 
rulership", I conflicts are irre-solvable except at'a higher 
level. A rigid constitution can have no status superior 
to that of its framers''wisdom, and it will be regarded 
with contempt"as its ossification renders it increasingly 
irrelevant. On the-other hand, there is a lower level, of 
wisdom than-'that embodied in the'law, namely that of 
those rulers (the kind the Stranger expects a polis to 
have) who would, if they had power to revise the law, 
corrupt it not reform"it. 1s 
Vhat is decisive, thent is the quality of a society's 
legislators; more generally, of its political leadership. 
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But since leaders cannot lead unless their role is 
accepted by others, one is again pushed a stage further 
back, to the quality of a society's self-understanding: 
Human society is not merely a fact, or an event, in 
the external world to be studied by an observer like 
a natural phenomenon. Though it has externality as 
one of its important components, it is as a whole a 
little world, a cosmion, illuminated with meaning 
from within by the human beings who continuously 
create and bear it as the made and condition of 
their self-realization <=: 27). 
This "illumination" occurs through symbolisms which are 
themselves prior to and independent of political science; 
in fact, political science itself begins with the 
"critical clarification of socially pre-existent symbols" 
( Ibid. 28). 
To explain this remark, let us return to the s7mbal- 
isms we sketched in Chapter Two, by which society was 
envisaged as either a m1cr-ocasmos or a mac. -canthropos. 
"All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as 17-ar 
Eastern, understood themselves as representativ-=-ýs of a 
transcendent order, of the order of the cosmos" (MEZ: 
54). Voegelin recalls that Gerhard von Rad "declarad 
himself puzzled by the universal claims of the Imperial 
Paalms" . Was not such symbolism, "some-what ridl:: ulaus 
under the conditions of the small Kingdom of Judah"? 
(Other scholars, says Vaegelin, had not even adverted to 
the anomaly. ) Voegelin attributes von Rad's puzzlement 
to "the absence of a philosophy of symbolic forms": the 
imperial symbolism does not express aspirations to world 
domination, and therefore "has nothing to do with the 
siZe-or success of the social unit which uses the 
language". Instead, the Imperial Psalms. show how Israel 
saw itself as representative of the divine order of the, 
cosmos (OH 1: 290-91). 
In his earlier book, Die politiscbe4Religionen, 
Voegelin had insisted that "man lives in the political 
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community with all aspects of his being from the 
corporeal to the spiritual and the religious" (1986: 77; 
first published, 1938). It follows that power is never 
"naked", but must be rendered legitimate, and this is 
done symbolically. In a microcosmic culture, political 
leadership will need to legitimate itself by constructing 
symbolisms which (among other things) "achieve the union 
of the human-political sphere with the divine" (Ibid: 
29). In the imperial religion of Akhenaton, for 
instance, the pharaoh himself constituted the people's 
only access to the will of the d ývinity. This "rigid 
system for the emanation of the divine will" was loosened 
by the Christian belief that everyone is i diately 
subject to God. But Voegelin showed how the sun- 
symbolism of Louis XIV ana the theory of the National 
Sacialist FUhrer each sought to annul the macroanthropic 
differentiation by reinstating the notion that the will 
of God is mediated to the people only throu3h the leader 
(Ibid: 30-31, f57-70). mO 
The macroanthropic principle that the polis is the 
human person writ large (Republic, section 368) is both 
an heuristic principle for the interpretation of society 
and an instrument of social critique. Firstly, it is 
because a polis "reflects theýtype of men of whom it is 
composed" that Plato can interpret the successive changes 
of political order as the fruit of corresponding changes 
in psyche. Secondly, because the leadership of a 
macroanthropic society will have to legitimate itself in 
a way different to that of a microcosmic society (e. g. by 
its guarantee of human rights or freedoms) the principle 
ttself can underpin the critique of any society whose 
order i's actually "at 'the price of man". Its subversive 
potential is exemplified in the practice and the fate of 
Socrates QjaE: 61-63). 
Finally, because "God and man, world and society form 
a primordial community of being" in the "quaternarian 
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structure" of the metaxy (OH 1: 1), neither the 
microcosmic nor the macroanthropic principle can operate 
absolutely, to the exclusion of the other. Liberalism 
and totalitarianism give an unequivocal priority to the 
individual and to the political community respectively. ý 
But in order to sustain their plausibility both these 
ideologies must refuse to ask what the individual or the 
polis tbemselves represent; one or other is deemed 
absolute,, representing itself alone. 
In the "History of Political Ideas" Voegelin traces 
the process by which this spurious sense of absoluteness 
developed. After the Reformation,, the major religious 
Sroups sought control of the temporal power, to win its 
support against other groups. "By the end of the 
sixteenth century the religious wars and the mutualý 
intolerance of the churches had produced a new Western 
principle, of politics, the ralson d16tat, subordinating 
the churches to the peace of the community. Thus govern- 
ment ceased to become "a charismatic function within the 
Christian corpus mysticurd', and temporality metamorphosed 
into secularity, In the modern conventional approach to 
politics, VoeSelin argues, 
the 
, results of 
the Reformation are accepted as 
unquestioned premises of discussion; a passing 
historical phase is endowed with the dignity of a 
natural order of things. ... In the sixteenth 
century does not begin, as is conventionally 
, phrased, - a separation or differentiation of politics 
from, a religious context;, what actually begins is 
the elimination of the life of the spirit from 
public representation and the corresponding 
contraction of politics to a secular nucleus (HooM). 
Voegelin thinks that from the narrow perspective of 
such secularity, one can understand neither any politics 
before, 1600, nor the "political religions" of our own 
century which have restored a disto. -ted spiritual content 
to the secular fragment: 
The separation of life into a political and-a non 
political realm is however only possible when the 
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members of society are prepared not to make a 
political issue of questions of reason-and the 
spirit; only when there are no groups in society who 
wish to use state power to force their beliefs and 
ideas on their fellow citizens (Vaegelin,, 1959:. 295, 
my translation). ý' 
In such a despiritualiZed environment, competent thinkers 
settle for "institutional descriptivism! ', or take the 
pretensions of their own societies at face value. 2-: 2 
Voegelin's contrary procedure, as we have seen, is to 
probe the consciousness expressed in the structures of a 
society. It is important to notice the force of his 
position here. -The ideologically based fetishism of - 
external structures is not only theoretically inadequate. 
It has destructive practical-consequences. His own 
position is well illustrated in a memorandum entitled, 
"The Change in the Ideas on Government. and Constitution 
in'Austria since 1918". which he wrote for the "General 
Study Conference on Peaceful Change" which took place in 
paris in 1937 (Hoov). The Austrian Constitution, he 
claims, was being manipulated as a technical instrument 
by groups, (both Nazi and Communist) whoýai, -_ed to destroy 
the Constitution itself. During 1933 and 1934, faced 
with-such opposition, the government of Dollfuss invoked 
a'distinction between the "authoritarianism! ' of Austria 
and the "totalitarianism! ' of Nazi-Germany, prohibited the 
activities of the Communist and National, Socialist 
parties (together with those of the Social Democrat 
party) and disarmed their members. Voegelin-argues, that 
the measures taken by Dollfuss ought not to be damned - 
by the use of the term "authoritarian", without, consid- 
ering both their intentionality and the alternatives 
available in that specifiý context. Otherwise the term 
"authoritarian" is not a theoretical category, but an 
abusive ideological slogan. ýýa 
Conversely,, National Socialist tactics exemplified 
the "abuse of a formalized democratic structure". In 
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his paper of 1940, "Extended'Strategy: a New Technique of 
Dynamic Relations", Voegelin adopts his favoured method 
of locating the aberration in the words of the protagon- 
ists'themselves. He-quotes the-testimony of Hitler, - 
given at a trial in 1930 in Ulm:, 
The National Socialist movement will-, try to achieve 
its purpose in this state by constitutional means. 
The constitution limits our methods, not our 
purpose. We shall try to win by constitutional' 
, means 
the decisive majorities in the legislative 
bodies in order, as soon as we have got that far, to 
remould the state according to-our ideas (Vaegelin, 
1940a: 194). 
Even when in power, the National Socialists made frequent 
use of plebiscites to ratify their key political decis- 
ions. Here Vaegelin's argument sharpens. This practice 
succeeded in mollifying the West only because the Vest 
itself held a shallow, formalized conception of 
democracy. For Voegelin, the practice of voting, whether 
for representatives or about specific issues, is "the 
last and relatively least important phase of the' 
democratic process. The decisive question is, who shapes 
the issues and-who presents the men? " (Ibid; 194). 
His own conception of democracy is explained in the 
English version of Anamnesls,, in the section subtitled 
"What is Political Reality? ", written in 1ID66. Democracy, 
is best understood according to its intentionality, not 
its specific institutions. Any society is sustained by a 
"social field of consciousness": in other words, it can 
only survive if its members recognize certain obligations 
of conformity, and allegiance. But besides the political 
society as a, whole, there exist such other 
, 
social fields 
as family, -church,, trade union, 'and 
political party, all 
with their own legitimate , and 
disparate purposes. 
Pluralistic democracy,, thereforeg is a "precarious 
compromise by means of which one hopes to maintain a 
balance between,, the potentially disruptive fields and the 
sustaining, field of an organized society" (An-'F: 202). 11, 
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Political Rejarp--Antaticln 
To the external institutional structure of a political 
society, Voegelin applies the term "elemental represent- 
ation". Thus, one might define a "representative 
democracy" as any society in which "the members of the 
legislative assembly hold their membership by virtue of 
popular election" (XEP-: 32). -Such a definition would 
allow for the variant forms, by which, for-example,. -the 
chief executive of the U. S. A. is elected directly,, 
whereas the British chief executive is a nominee of the 
parliamentary majority. -The definition might also 
ident- 
ify the Soviet government, say, as unrepresentative, 
because popular choice of the party of government is 
excluded: to which communists might retort that only 
through the exclusion of parties which -serve special, 
interests can government be made, truly "representative" 
of the people as a whole. (Thus, the dispute would hinge 
"on the mediatory function of the party in t1he,, process of 
representation"., ) But the initial definition veils some 
confusing ironies: 
at the time of the American Republic eminent states- 
men were of the opinion that true representation was 
possible only where there were no parties at all. 
Other thinkers, furthermore, will attribute the 
functioning of the English two-party system to the 
fact that originally the two parties were, indeed, 
two factions of the English aristocracy; and still 
others will find in the, American two-party system an 
ulterior homogeneousness that lets the two parties 
appear as factions of one party (Ibid: 34-35). 
The study of institutions is indispensable,, "because the 
external existence of a society isýpart of its onto- 
l*ogical structure" (Ibid: 33). But it needs always to be 
placed'in-the wider context of what Voegelin calls 
"existential representation". For (as he estimated in 
1951) there-can be no doubt that "the legislative and 
administrative acts-of the Soviet Government are 
domestically effective .... making allowance for the 
politically irrelevant margin of failure" (Ibid: 36), and 
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therefore that it is "existentially representative" of 
the Soviet people. But by virtue of what? As he later 
put the matter: 
That the government is tolerated is the result of 
its fulfilling more or less adequately the funda- 
mental purposes for which a government is estab- 
lished, i. e., the securing of domestic peace, the 
defence of the realm, the administration of justice, 
and the welfare of the people (Ali: 65-66). 
Every society has some method and process (which 
Voegelin terms "articulation") of producing represent- 
atives, people "whose acts are not imputed to their own 
persons but to the society as a whole" (NýEE: 37). A 
fully articulated society is one in which "the membership 
of the society has become articulate down to the last 
individual" (Ibid: 40). In such a society, in other 
words, every citizen contributes in some positive way 
(not merely, and not even necessarily, by voting, which 
is an event at the elemental level) to the process by 
which the representives are continuously empowered to act 
on behalf of the society. Not every society, of course, 
is fully articulated. In many societies the people as a 
whole are not involved in the choosing of their leaders, 
and scarcely regard such leaders as representing them- 
selves. Voegelin thinks, in fact, that full articulation 
occurs only in Western societies: 
Symbolically this limit is reached with the 
masterful, dialectical concentration of Lincoln's 
"government of the people, by the people, for the 
people". The symbol "people" in this formula means 
successively the articulated political society, its 
representative, and the membership that is bound by 
the acts of the representative (Ibid: 40). 
To consider what this conception of representation' 
achieves, we must prescind '(at least for the moment) 
from the question of whether Voegelin's estimate that 
Vestern society is "fully articulated" commands assent. ý' 
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Three conclusions, all of them consistent with 
Vaegelin's general philosophical positions, emerge from 
the discussion. The first concerns the criteria for a 
truly "existential democracy". Since Voegelin's pithiest 
account of these occurs in an unpublished paper of 1939, 
"Democracy and the Individual" (Hoov), it may be 
permissible to quote him at length: 
The problem of a working democracy can be stated in 




individuals. capable and willing to take an 
interest in political issues, -to form well reasoned 
opinions on them, to take the pains to acquire the 
necessary information, and to make their, opinions 
and will effective by choosing representatives; 
there must be furthermore always a sufficient number 
of individuals who are willing to enter the business 
of government itself and to perform in such a way 
that regenerative contact with the opinion-forming 
multitude remains undisturbed. 
When "the great mass of the people shirk their democratic 
duties", the reservoir from which leaders iw., an be drawn 
dries up, and leaders became isolated from those they 
represent. 
, 
The second and complementory, conclusion concerns t1he 
futility of attempting to transform a social order by 
recasting its institutions. The lack of such awareness, 
thinks Vaegelin, led the West to aggravate international 
disorder. t1hrough its "sincere but naive endeavour of 
curing the evils of the world by spreading representative 
institutions in the-elemental sense to areas where the 
existential conditions for their functioning were not 
given (NIZZ: 51). ýI`Ir- 
But thirdly, the first two conclusions taken together 
by no means Justify politi'cal apathy., " On the contrary, 
the concept of the fully articulated community makes 
demands an every individual; demands which include, but 
are not limited to, the fulfilment of a defined proced- 
ural role. Everyone is responsible for political life in 
general and the operation of government in particular. 
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The collapse of democracy in Germany led Vaegelin to a 
diagnosis which exemplifies one of his central themes: 
"The majority of German citizens had given up, or never 
obtained, the status of individuals with well-reasoned 
opinions, but preferred to have instead convictions" 
("Democracy and the Individual", Hoov). 
The circumstances of his escape from Vienna in 1938 
made clear to Voegelin that "there was a stratum of 
stupidity as a relevant social factor .... and that 
the quest for truth, the philosophical investigation, was 
a very thin upper stratum in any civilization or society, 
an any occasion always distinct from massive reactions an 
the part of the 
" 
maas. of stupid people who surround us" 
(Vaegelin, in Lawrence, 1984:. 114-15). This "stupidity" 
is unrelated to clas: s or to formal educational attain- 
ment: the two people whom `Vloegelln had especially in mind 
were a professor of Germanic law and a Harvard-educated 
American ViCe-ConSUl. a7 
The polar category to the stupid (Aristotle's plethas, 
the "mass of passionately directed people .... who do 
not know what they are doing") is that of the spoudaioi, 
"the'very-few mature people who maintain the civilization 
(Ibid). Without them, any society will break down 
inevitably and-rapidly. -'210 One is therefore'brought back 
to'-qu6stions of conscience: 
Does ignorance cause us to hold certain beliefs with 
-a-good conscience, or does our will. to hold, certain 
beliefs cause us to remain ignorant with regard to 
certain facts? And if the latter should be the 
case, does the end of holding a certain belief 
Justify the means of ignorance (Lawrence, 1984: 112% 
Any philosophical theory of conscience, he concludes, 
must be rooted in "a theory of the nature of man", since 
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"conscience can only be as good as the man who has it". 
Where an impoverished understanding of human nature 
prevails, intellectual and moral confusion will abound 
"which paves the way for the best of all consciences, 
that, of the totalitarian killers". Enough of them are 
rampant, and "this is no time to pat the viciously 
ignorant on the back for being 'sincere"' (Ibid: 114). 
Some of Voegelin's most pungent historicallcritiques 
focus on "folly" in this sense: more precisely, on the 
social enforcement of folly. With Vaegelin's charge 
against the "Oxford Political Philosophers" in mind, I 
quote one of his examples from English history. In the 
"History of Political Ideas", he describes the measures 
which disbarred from their ministry the most cOnscient- 
ious clerics, whether among dissenting churches or among 
the non-jurors in the Church of England, For example: 
the Five Mile Act of 1665 forbade expelled clergy- 
men to come within five miles of any incorporated 
town or of any place where they had been ministers 
.... The occasion was the Great Plague of 1665 
which reduced the population of London by twenty per 
cent. Along with the more affluent part of the 
population a good number of clergymen fled London 
and deserted their flocks. Their places in the care 
of the sick, in burials and services, were taken by 
volunteering Nonconformists. This outrage which 
illuminated somewhat too glaringly where the common 
man in distress found bodily and spiritual help, and 
where not, was answered by the Five Mile Act (Hoov). 
By such enactments, the Church of England was stripped of 
its clerical spoudaioi, its reformers of right and left. 
As VoeSelin adds pointedly, "It is hardly necessary to 
elaborate the parallel with more recent technical 
pprfections in the political art of destroying the 
substance of a people by removing its intellectual and 
spiritual leadership" (Ibid). 
According to Voegelin, therefore, two conditions must 
be fulfilled if society is to achieve "order". Firstlyt 
the populace must seek to be represented by mature 
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leaders, not ideologues. Secondly, the rulers themselves 
must be sufficiently wise for their task. Now any polit- 
ical theory needs to give some account of the principles 
by which the ruling group represents the society as a 
whole and the criteria by which the ruling group can 
itself be judged. ' Voegelin does the service of placing 
these matters at the heart of political philosophy. By 
the same token, it follows that much of his political 
theory will stand or fall according to the adequacy of 
his conception of such "political maturity". ' That theme 
will occupy us in'Chapter Ten. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BIBLICAL SPIRITUALITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 
, This-chapter will serve as a conclusion to the first, 
primarily expositoryf part of the thesis, and as a bridge 
to the second part, in which Voegel-in's significance for 
political theology will be discussed by way of the 
consideration of certain key-theoretical problems. Since 
the political theology refer, to is Christian, and since 
such theology typically relies heavily on the Hebrew 
Scriptures, Vaegelin's treatment of the Jewish and 
Christian literature is of'fundamental imiDartance for us. 
In Chapter Four, theology was discussed as one among 
other modes of symbolic discourse. Both Voegelin and the 
political theologians, however, hold that religious 
experience and its primary symbolic articulations 
(mainly, but not only, literary) are prior to theology 
and constitutive of it (e. g. Gutio-rrez, 1973: 11). ' 
A preliminary digression is necessary in order to 
explain the discrepancy between Vaegelin's systematic 
account of virtually the whole of the Hebrew Scriptures 
and his widely scattered, rather piecemeal, discussions 
of the Christian Scriptures and later Christian 
literature. ý 
Voegelin gave one explanation as early as 1953, when 
he wrote to Alfred Schutz, 
essentially my concern with Christianity-has no 
religious grounds at all. It is simply that the 
traditional treatment of the history of philosophy 
and particularly of political ideas recognizes 
antiquity and modernity, while the 1500 years of, 
Christian thought and Christian politics are treated 
as a kind of hole in the evolution of mankind (Opitz 
& Sebba, 1981: 449). 
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In other words, Vaegelin insisted that he was a philo- 
sopher of politics'and of history, not a Christian 
apologist. Whereas the Hebrew Scriptures both inspire 
and reflect an intelligibly evolving political society, 
and therefore merit comprehensive consideration within 
Voegelin's terms of reference, the Christian Scriptures 
emerge apart from any single coherent political order. 
Voegelin's discussion of the Christian Scriptures 
accordingly concentrates on those points where he 
considers it to be maximally differentiated, notably in 
the Gospel of John and the Pauline letters. , 
"Christandora", of course, did later come to constitute 
a unique kind of polity. But two factors together cons- 
titute the second reason why Voegelin did not undertake 
a sequel to rsraei and Revelation based on Christendom. 
Firstly, as Vaegelin himself explained to those who 
critt,: 'A. =ed him on this -score (Sandoz, A. 1932: 201), the 
virtually infinite body of source -materials is quite 
beyond the. power of any one per. son to analyze. 
The second factor is more complex. Voegelin origin- 
ally intended the first three volumes of Order and 
History (aa they now -stand) to be followed by three 
further volumes (OH T: x): 
IV. Empire and Christianity 
V. The Protestant Centuries 
VI. The Crisis of Western Civilization. 
But, as he later explained-<OH IV: 1 seq. ), this project 
broke down. When conscientiously studied, the materials 
exploded his original conception of history as "a 
meaningful course of events an a straight 1' ine of times'. 
Such a unilinear history itself turned out to be a 
cosmological symbol of the type that tends to legitimate 
some existing order: it was "a millenial constant in 
continuity from its origins in the Sumerian and Egyptian 
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societies, through its cultivation by Israelites'and 
Christians, right into the 'philosophies of history' of 
the nineteenth century A. D. " (Ibid: 7). 
, Vaegelin's "failure" to consider Christianity more 
comprehensively, therefore, signifies no depreciation of 
Its intrinsic truth or historical importance, but only 
manifests his scholarly single-mindedness. 
"The Nature of Scripture 
In his important, though so far unpublished' , essay 
"The Beginning and the Beyond", Voegelin offers two 
complementary descriptions of the nature of "Scripture". 
Scripture is a'stratum of meaning superimposed an a' 
body of Israelite and Judaic literature by the 
organizers of the Book of the Torah, the Prophets, 
and the Writings. ... (Later], a : ollection of 
early Christian writings is canonized as the New 
Testament, complementing as the new E'Scripture the 
older one that now becomes the Old Testament, with 
, all the attendant problems of verbal inspiration and 
literalist deformation. The organization of the 
second -1--cripture had the same pragmatic motives as 
that of the first one: it was a protective device 
against the competing wisdoms in the surrounding 
ecumenic-imperial society, especially against the 
Gnostic movements within Christianity (HOOD. 
The point of understanding "Scripture" as such a 
"stratum of meaning" is seen' in a distinction VCegelin 
draws between "pragmatic" and "paradigmatic" narrative 
(OH T: 121-26). There is "no reason to doubt" that 
scriptural narrative has a pragmatic care: nevertheless, 
the events are not experienced in a pragmatic 
context of means and ends, as actions leading to 
results in the intramundane realm of political 
power, but as acts of obedience to, or defection 
from, a revealed will of God. ... When experienced in this manner, the course of events becomes sacred 
history, while the single events become, paradigms of 
God's way with man in this world (Ibid: 121). 
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The two_kinds, of narrative have different criteria of 
truth. Original accounts can be reworked, dramatically 
shaped, to reveal-their paradigmatic essence: "a prag- 
matic historian, to be sure, would regret any such, 
transformations as a falsification of sources, but the 
writer of sacred history will understand them as an 
increase of truth". If the sources resist ready 
reshaping, whole bodies of tradition, nay be recast: so, 
f or example, Deuteronomy " is not a'f if thl back of Moses, 
but a huge paraenesis appended to the Tetrateuch", 
summarizing "the paradigmatic-lesson of Exodus, Desert, 
and Covenant as it was understood shortly before the end 
of the 
I 
Kingdom of Judah" (Ibid: 122). 
Pragmatic and paradigmatic history, are not conflicting 
, tten "in arder to genres, as if Israelite history were wr 4 
confuse pragmatic historians who wryly assign a date to 
Koses while suspending judgment with regard to his 
existence". In fact, it is precisely the sacred history 
which constitutes Israel as a people even on the prag- 
matic plane: for "the order of history emerges f-, om the 
history of order" (OH 1: ix). Those who 
lived the symbolism of Sheol, Desert, and Canaan. 
who understood their wanderings as the fulfilm. ent of 
a divine plan, were formed by this experience into a 
Chosen People. 
, 
Through the leap in being, that is, 
through the discovery of transcendent being as the 
source of order in man and society, Israel constit- 
uted itself as the carrier of a new truth in history 
(Ibid: 123). 
It was this I'leap", this imbuing of experience 
, 
withl a new 
and special meaning, which distinguished Israel from the 
surrounding "cosmological" empires; and it is this 
a wareness of special meaning which produces a "Scripture" 
that is richer than the sum of its source materials. In 
other words, Israel's raith is constitutive of both its 
very existence and its historical self-articulation. 
If one understands Scripture in this way, it follows 
that the interpreter's primary duty is to take seriously 
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the text as the redactor's lealve it. Voegelin does this 
in three main ways. 
Firstly, and not surprisingly, he-criticizes the 
methodology of the Wellhausen school, according to which 
"whatever meaning is found in the narrative had to be 
found on the level of the 'sources' distinguished by 
literary criticism! ': so that Martin Noth,, for example, 
can suggest that the integration of the discernible 
sources into the Pentateuch is "a purely literary labaur, 
adding nothing by way of new materials" (OH 1: 151-52, 
citing Noth). According to Vcegelin, source analysis 
becomes destructive where it implies that the integral 
text contains no units of meaning which cut across the 
3 is "added", on sources (Ibid: 122,154,29-90). , What 
the contrary, is decisive: the "symbolism which 
articulates the experience of a people's order - of the 
ontologically real order of Israel's existence In 
historical for&l (Ibld: 156). -3 
to determine Secondly, Vaegelin disallows any attempt 
the intention of the text on the basis of factors extrin- 
sic to it. Thus, he deprecates the scholarly tendency 
(e. g. in the work of Xowinckel) to invoke the "New Year 
'Festival" as a phenomenon which explains the "Imperial 
Psalms" (OH 1: 282-303), even though'the content (indeed, 
the very existence) of the cult had to be inferred from 
the Psalms it purported to explain. 
This circle cannot be broken through reference to 
'other 
sources that would unequivocally attest the 
existence of the festival, since the silence of the 
sources made the circular assumption necessary in 
the first place (Ibid: 287-88). 
Vhat concerns VoeSelin is that resort to the cult is a 
mere positivist device unless one also penetrates into 
the order of which the cult is a function. At best, the 
hypothesis offers only a classification, not a theor- 
etical explanation. 
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Thirdly, and predictably, Voegelin dismisses all 
positivist reductions of the narrative. For example, he 
points out that Moses is little heard of in sources 
pre-dating the end of the Davidic Empire. The Moses 
traditions, though never lost, "entered the foreground of 
symbolism only through the prophetic revolt in the crisis 
of the ninth century" when what Vcegelin calls the 
Imitatio, Mosis required legitimation. So, 
the picture of a Pharaoh negotiating with the lead- 
ers of workers an a building project'about their 
release is too improbable to be accepted as hist- 
orical. The story makes good sense, however, if we 
ascribe it to the prophetic legend. Far in Moses 
facing the Pharaoh and calling on him to obey the 
will of Yahweh, we can recognize the paradigm of the 
prophet -facing the king of Israel (Ibid: 384-85). 
Although the face-to-face negotiations are presumably 
legendary, the substance behind the imagery is indis- 
pensable. The Israelites could not have emigrated 
without some negotiation between their leaders and the 
Egyptian officials. The legend testifies to the most 
important point, that the emigration manifests a conflict 
between Yahwism and the principles of Pharaonic order. 
This explanation is different from positivist 
explanations in that it attempts to do interpretative 
justice to the text itself: as Voegelin sums up, "ill 
search of the substance we must beware of the positiv- 
istic trap to substitute more probable pragmatic events 
for the legendary ones" (Ibid: 385). To fall Into that 
trap would abandon the text without gaining substantial 
meaning in return. 
The above account by no means implies that there is 
same single "meaning" of Scripture. On the contrary, 
"that meaning did not appear at a definite point of time 
to be preserved once for all, but emerged gradually and 
was frequently revised under the pressure of pragmatic 
events" (Ibld: 134). The various sources contain 
stratified meanings and traditions, which are overlaid by 
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the meaning embodied in the final redaction but which 
also retain a relative autonomy, such as the "memoirs of 
an unknown author on the reign of David and the accession 
of Solomon" (Ibid: 146)i Different centres of meaning 
cc-exist'and illumine each other. For, example, only with 
the-constitution of Israel through the Covenant and the 
settlement in Canaan, is the full meaningýof, the-Genesis 
narrative made clear; but conversely, Genesis contains a 
universalist strand which ought to inhibit Israel's 
degeneration into a society devoted onlyýto its own 
expansion (Ibid: 140-41, citing Genesis 18: 18). 
Likewise, according to "The Gospel and Culture"-, a 
"Gospel" does not have a single meaning. It is "neither 
a poet's work of dramatic art Epace R. M. Frye. 14 nor a 
historian's biography of Jesus, but the symbolization of 
a-divine movement that went through the person of. lesus 
into society and history". The Gospels, revelatory 
movement runs on three planes. Firstly, there is the 
personal drama of Jesus, especially the drama of his 
consciousness of his identity and mission; Becondly, 
there is the social drama in which he is variously 
acknowledged, followed, and resisted; and thirdly, there 
is the historical drama in, which a "millenial movement" 
responds to his life, articulating its meaning in symbols 
which were more or less at hand - Son of God, Messiah, 
the Kingdom of God, and so forth (Voegelin, 1971a: 92- 
93). To understand the event of Jesus properly, one must 
appropriate all three planes of meaning. 
Now that Voegelin's approach to the Bible has been 
outlined, we shall discuss in this chapter three topics 
(of which the third will be. given the fullest treatment) 
to represent his interpretations. They are: 
-. the Exodus, as event and as symbol 
the notions of kingship and kingdom in Israel 
prophetic radicalism and its relationship to 
civilizational order. 
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These topics are selected with a threefold purpose., 
They show how Vaegelin supports his general philosophical 
position with textual analysis; they are all themes at 
the heart of contemporary political theology, and will 
therefore illustrate his significance for such theology; 
they will exemplify his account of how "pneumatic differ- 
entiations" are-relevant-to problems of social-order., 4 
Exodus as-Event and as SymbOl 
Vaegelin sees the Exodus as the central one of the 
three acts of divine creation by which meaning is wrested 
from meaninglessness: "the world emerges from Nothing, 
Israel from the Sheol of Egypt, and the promised land 
from the Desert" (CH 1: 135). The Exodus is zhe 
"experiential nucleus" from which other his"tcr, 10--al 
meanings ramify. For example, the patriarchal history is 
constructed largely to show how Israel origirially (--. are to 
be enslaved in Egypt (ý rbld: 136-37). 
By the "Exodus event", Voegelin means the action 
which begins "when God hears the cry of his people 3Lnd 
reveals himself to Moses" and is completed with the 
revelation from Sinai, a revelation which "is not a moral 
catechism but the body of fundamental rules which 
constitute a people under God" (Ibid: 415,414). 1- 
The Exodus narrative is a highly organized literary 
unit. Thus, the encounter in which God overcomes the 
resistance of Moses is balanced by the scenes in which 
Moses breaks down the resistance of Pharaoh: and the 
mutual presence of God and Moses in the thornbush 
dialogue (E. Yodus: 3: 11-14; 4: 10-12) expands into the 
mutual presence of God and the people in the Covenant 
(Ibid: 407): 
The divine presence assures man that he can fulfil a 
command he feels beyond his human powers, and the 
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fulfilment is the "token" of the presence. 
There is no revelation to Moses as a historical 
event unless through the experience of revelation 
Moses becomes the servant of Yahweh; and no people 
will be brought forth from Egypt, unless in the act 
of leaving Egypt it enters the service of Yahweh at 
the mountain (IbId: 417). 
The Covenant, however, is not simply a "happy ending". 
It begins a "perpetual rhythm of defection from, and 
return to, the order of human existence in the present 
under God". Even after the apparent denouement of the 
"Exodus as event", - 1ý 
the resistance to the order. -continues in the new historical form. History, in the sense of the 
perpetual task to regain the order under God from 
the pressure of mundane existence, has only begun 
(Ibid: 418). 
In Vaegelin's view, the Exodus_event is a paradigm of 
the perennial spiritual drama. It is structured by the 
divine call and the human response of acceptance or 
resistance. The drama which unfolds within the 
consciousness of Moses is priorto, and quite as 
essential as, the public drama of the people's release. 
A In turn, the people's release from oppression takes its 
primary significance from the establishment of the 
Farltb, 
-l 
the Covenant, to which it leads; for it is in 
order to illuminate the meaning of the Covenant that the 
"unknown1master" has composed the drama in the light of 
the historical sources (Ibid: 418-27). 
For VoeSelin, therefore, the term "exodus", as well as 
denoting a specific event in Israel's history, becomes a 
technical term for a category of events: 
When a society gains a new insight into. the true 
order of personal and social existence, and when it 
will abandon the larger society of which it is a 
, 
part when it gains this insight, this constitutes an 
exodus. ... Whenever a new insight into order is 
gained, there is always the question whether to 
emigrate from the present order into-a situation in 
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which the new order can become socially dominant and 
relevant for the society that has gained the insight 
(Voegelin, 1968b: 32). 
On this view, Abraham's departure from Ur is the first 
exodus, Israel's deliverance from Egypt is the second 
(Ibid). But they are the first and second of many. -7 
Israel's-exodus from Egypt originates in the soul of 
Moses, for to be such a. person as can hear the divine 
command is to become at once the servant of Yahweh not of 
Pharaoh, and the representative of a peqple which belongs 
not Yahweh, not Pharaoh. The theophany to Moses 
therefore provokes the clash between Israel and the 
Pharaonic cosmological order. The clash drives the 
entire subsequent action: "the emigration of Israel means 
more than the loss of a working force: the Egyptian ruler 
has been spiritually demoted and must surrender his 
3 position as Son of Grod to Israel" (Ibid: 1-1, ý1-92)- 
Now, according to Voegelin, the prcceiss teginnlng with 
Israel's "exodus from cosmological civilization" cannot 
be fulfilled until there is a further "exodus of Israel 
from itself". -Israel was not to become merely one 
independent nation among others, but was to be 'Ithe 
transformer of all nations into herself", was to "carry 
the good news of salvation to the ends of the earth", 
because the "creator-god has been transformed, into the 
Redeemer (gael) for all mankind" (CH IV: 26-27). 
Unfortunately, though, one aspect of the Exodus from 
Egypt, the achievement of political autonomy, imposed a 
11mortgage" on'this transcendent insight. Far the 
political gain, "Itraumatically aggravated by the stresses 
and strains of pragmatic existence", locked Israel into 
its own sense of separateness so that "the universalist 
implications of the experience were never successfully 
explicated within Israelite history". 
The spiritual meaning of the exodus from civil- 
ization was well understood but nevertheless 
remained inseparable from the concrete Exodus from 
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Egypt; the Kingdom of God could never quite separate 
from Canaan; the great original revelation remained 
so overwhelmingly concrete that its spiritual ren- 
ewals had to assume the form of additions to the 
Instructions; and the word of God to mankind through 
Israel became the sacred scripture of a particular 
ethnica-religious community (OH 1: 164, cf. also 
491). 
Our concern in quoting this passage is with the 
meaning of "exodus", not with the justice of, Voegelin's 
severe estimate of the spiritual limitations of ancient 
. Judaism. Nevertheless, it must be noted that he finds 
the fulfilment of "exodus" only-in Christian univers- 
alism, which was free of the "mortgage" of separatist 
national consciousness (OH 1: 164; OH TV: 27). 1 , 
To -identify the nature of this fulfilment, 
Vcegelin 
quotes from St. Augustine: "They begin to depart who 
begin to love. Many there are who depart and do not know 
it. For their walk of departure is a movement of the 
heart. And yet they depart from Babylon". Voagelin 
deduces from this smaying that 
the existential tension of departure, the walk of 
departure, is a movement of the heart - this is the 
definition of exodus. The problem is reduced to 
what today we would call a philosophy of existencez 
(Vaegelin, 1968b: 33-34). "' 
Voegelin's understanding of exodus symbolism is 
coherent and enlightening, but open to criticism., He, 
writes,. "There was something of the liberator in the man 
who led his people from servitude to political independ- 
ence; but he was not an Israelite Garibaldi, for the 
People, in order to be freed by him from the bondage of 
Pharaoh, had to enter the service of Yahweh" (OH 1: 389). 
Now, it is true that the biblical narrative envisages no 
political liberation apart from religious conversion. 
But Vaegelin never states what is equal, ly fundamental: 
that Israel's spiritual allegiance to Yahweh forbids its 
Continued tolerance-of Egyptian oppression. Voegel'in'. 
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splits the symbolic unity of the Exodus narrative in one 
manner, while rightly refusing to split it in another. 
The narrative itself, however, ýrules out either mode 
of the split. According to Myodus 1, Egypt's oppression 
of Israel is fundamentally economic and social. Even the 
denial of Israel's right to worship is portrayed not as 
"religious"-intolerance but as a mode of economic 
oppression: worship is forbidden in order that Israel 
might have no respite from -labour (E. vodus 5: 3-9). Any 
liberation, therefore, must itself embrace the socio- 
economic realm. - In Mxodus 6: 2-3, for example, we are 
told that Yahweh had appeared to Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob, but had not revealed his name to them. Verses 6-7 
are then constructed as an Inclusio in which two 
complementary statements, of God's identity and Israel's 
knowledge of it, are linked with the liberating action: 
Say therefore to the people of Israel, 111 am Yahweh, 
and I will bring you out of the people of Iarael, 
and I will deliver you from bondage, and I will 
redeem you with an outstretched arm and with great 
acts of judgment, and I will take you for my people, 
and I will be your God; and you shall know that I am 
Yahweh your God, who has brought you out from under 
the burdens of the Egyptians". (cf. also, E. vodus 
20: 2, in which the identity of God as liberator is 
said to underpin the Decalogue itself). " 
It would, one might say, have been a different god 
that took the side, of Egypt. Nor can Israel "know" ,, - 
Yahweh apart from, the recognition of his favour in this 
concrete act. God-is enigmatically revealed to Moses 
from the thornbush (OH 1: 405-12): what is clearly 
revealed is the mission entrusted to Moses: Moses is a 
paradigmatic-figure precisely by fulfilling the mission 
given him - not just any mission, but that of confronting 
the oppressor. " 
In writing "the spiritual meaning of the exodus was 
well understood but nevertheless remained, inseparable 
from the concrete Exodus from Egypt", Vaegelin seems to 
160 
regard the unified nature of the, symbol as regrettable. 
To use his characteristic term, the symbol is "compact", 
in that it does not distinguish the spiritual essence of 
the event from the political fate of Israel. Israel's 
insistence an the specificity of the historical action 
carried out in its favour inhibited recognition of the 
symbol's universal applicability. Any attempt to-reserve 
God's favour to a particular tribal group would certainly 
misappropriate the symbol; and one sees that it is, 
possible for the Exodus narrative to serve as an aetio- 
logy of anti-Egyptian prejudice. But the unity of the 
symbol is also its very point. Other peoples than Israel 
are oppressed: but the necessary universalizing of the 
symbol must always refuse to disengage spiritual from 
historically immanent liberation. 
But Voegelin makes exactly this diaengagement. He 
describes Augustine's formulation not as a legitimate 
internal ization, but as the "definition" of t1he symbol. 
though the formulation itself embodies no such claim to 
be exhaustive. In fact, it is remarkable that Vc-3gelin 
should speak of "definition" in this way, since he gave 
so much of his whole scholarly endeavour to r-2sisting 
such petrifications of a living symbols. Suddenly, faced 
with a symbol which is archetypal for the entire Hebrew 
and Christian Scripture, he abstracts from its actual 
usage and the richness of its c-onnotations: for to define 
"exodus" as a movement of the heart implies that it adds 
nothing'to the symbol "conversion". It is striking that 
Voegelin is least' convincing at the point where he drifts 
from the mooring of his own best theoretical insights. 
And the further question arises, why his failure occu I rs 
in this specific instance. "ý 
Similarly, to use the phrase "emigration from the 
p resent order" as an I equivalent to "exodus" emasculates 
the biblical symbol. The prior "inner emigration", to be 
sure, may (or may not) lead to an external departure from 
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the deficient society. But emigration, doesýnot of itself 
challenge the society-one abandons, -whereas'it is essent- 
ial to-the biblical event that, by the divine power, 
Israel confronts and thwarts (without of course, 
overthrowing) Egypt. 
'It is instructive to compare Voegelin's'approach'at 
this point with that of Walter BruegSemann (1978: 11-27). 
BrueSSemann shows that the two experiential-strands of' , 
religious conversion and political liberation are inextr- 
icable. For what must be challenged, the "imperial 
reality", is itself a unity forged between "the religion 
of static triumphalism! l and"the politics of oppression 
and explottation". 
The programme of Moses is not the freeing of a 
little band of slaves as an escape from the empire, 
t. hough that is important enough, especially if you 
happen to be in that little band. kather, his work 
is nothing less than an assault on the consciousness 
of the empire, aimed at .... the dismantling of 
the empire both in its social practices and in its 
mythic pretensions <Ibid: 113-19). 
Brueggemann here does justice to the Voegelinian 
insight (that. the Exodus symbolizes I. srael's "leap in 
being"), while being mcre. faithful to the'viclent drama 
of Egypt's discomfiture. Thus, for Voegelin the plague 
sequence,, embcdying as it does the struggle of Moses and 
Aaron with Pharaoh's ineffectual magicians, represents 
the, struggle between the symbolic complexes of darkness 
and light (OH 1: 385-87). But Brueggemann contrasts the 
complaint of-Israel, which when heard by God (E. vodus 2: 
23-25) sets the whole liberation in motion, with the 
futile cry of lamentation at the death of the firstborn 
(the ones barn to rule) uttered by Pharaoh and the 
Egyptians-in R. vodus 12: 30ý By a grim,, irony, "the self- 
sufficient. and impervious regime is reduced to the role 
of a, helpless suppliant" (Brueggemann, 1978: 22). 
Similarly, Voegelin refers only in passing (OH 1: 205, 




demonstrates that the doxology of the song is inseparable 
from its'polemic, as the elated repetition of the name of 
the Lord also redefines social perceptions;, Yahweh,, (and 
emphatically not Pharaoh) "will reign for ever and ever". 
Vhat divides Brueggemann from Vaegelin is not simply'a 
matter of emphasis, To Voegelin, the substance of the 
Exodus is specifically not its socia-political-aspect, 
bult. is the leap in being by which the people come to live 
"in the present under Gad" (OH 1; 389,417). Life under 
God is contrasted with life within the cosmological 
world-view, just as it will later be contrasted-with life 
under an over-dogmatized interpretation of Torah (Ibid: 
364-65). 1ý3 
, 
One can avoid either splitting or conflatinS the 
substance and the circumstances of the narrative by 
following Jacques Maritain in recognizing the sociO- 
political liberation of Israel as an infi-avalent end. As 
Maritain explains, the "good of civil life" is both an 
ultimate end in a given order and is subordinated to an 
absolute end (so, "infravalent"). The infravalent end 
has a, relative autonomy-(Maritain,, 1973: 
1134.176). 
It 
must not be bypassed or neglected in a search for the 
unmedia, ted absolute end, since the first Great, Command- 
ment is, -not separable from the, second. To accept social 
practices-which, deny human freedom and dignity, practices 
-summed up as "bondage" (E. xodus 20: -2), -is itself-a- 
failure to "live in the present under God", (The, 
people's protest to Moses in, the desert, which.,, incident, 
is also "paradigmatic history", dramatizes just-this 
failure:, cf. E. Yodus 14: 10-13; 17: _2-7. 
In terms of the typology sketched i. n-"The_Gqspe1 and 
Culture", Voegelin, by stressing,, the interior dimension 
of the Exodus over against its historical'specificity (as 
understood by the biblical community), does justice only 
to the third of its "planes of meaning". 
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Kingship and Kingdom in Israel. 3-4 
The conquest of Canaan is the third act of "the drama 
of divine creation"', which "wrests meaning from the 
meaningless": "the world emerges from Nothing, Israel 
from the Sheol of Egypt, and the promised land from the 
Desert" (OH 1: 134). The establishment of the Israelites 
in Canaan, and especially the subsequent foundation of 
the Kingdom of Israel, may therefore be considered a 
fulfilment of the Exodus. But in-military t erms the 
infiltration (rather than the "conquest") of Canaan was 
precarious, constantly under threat from Philistine 
attack, especially because of the lack of coherence among 
the tribes. The conquest was completed, "or rather it 
became an effective conquest at all, only through the 
acceptance of kingship and the successful conclusion of 
the Philistine wars" (Ibid: 177). Irm Not surprisingly, 
then, the foundation of the kingdom is "the motivating 
centre of Israelite historiography", just as the concern 
with political history ceases abruptly at the point where 
the two, kingdoms disappear from the scene (rbid: 178-79). 
However, though the political narrative 
breaks off at the fall of Jerusalem the work of redaction 
(notably, that of the Deuteronomist) continued for more 
than two centuries (Ibid: 177-79). In the final- 
structure of the Hebrew Testament, the foundationýof the 
kingdom is "completely overlaid by the motivations of the 
Mosaic Covenant". The kings' pragmatic achievement, for 
example, came to be minimized as stress was laid on their 
fidelity or infidelity to the Covenant (in terms, of their 
personal morality, their temptations to syncretism, their 
practice of social injustice). Conversely, theýpre- 
monarchical "so-called conquest" of Canaan was inflated 
to heroic proportions. Voegelin's summary is neat: - 
ýIn the, sequence of historical events the Covenant 
precedes the Kingdom; in the sequence of motivations 
of the narrative the Kingdom precedes the Covenant; 
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in the content of the narrative itself the Covenant 
dominates the kingdom (Ibid: 179). 
Voegelin accounts for this complexity: 
Under the threat of extinction at the hands of the 
Philistines, the-organization of the people under a 
monarchy was understood as the fulfilment of the 
task imposed by the Covenant. But as soon as the 
monarchy was established, and had adjusted itself to 
the internal and external exigencies of politics, it 
became obvious that the new social order did not 
correspond to the intentions of the Covenant at all. 
Hence, only with the [adverse] reaction to the 
monarchy began the intense interest in Moses and the 
Instructions which ultimately caused the Kingdom to 
appear as a great aberration (OH 1: 180). 
In Voegelin's view, therefore, the, scriptural, ambi- 
valence towards the monarchy is not to be explained 
principally in terms1of conflicting royal, ist and anti- 
royalist sources (though of course, he recognizes these), 
but by the self-defeatinS nature of the monarchy itself 
(Ibid: 215-18). If kingship failed in its pragmati'c 
purpose because of its futile and catastrophic opposition 
to stronger empires, the prophets stood vindicated. But 
if military success and political consolidation seemed to 
fulfil the promise of Canaan, such necessary concomitant 
measures as conscription or royal marriage alliances with 
pagans compromised the Covenant order, 'so that Israel 
"re-entered the Sheol of'civilizations" (Ibid: 142). For 
instance, the imperial ambitions of Solomon's Kingdom led 
it to adopt some of the institutional forms'af Egypt and 
Babylon (Ibld: 258,3130 316-22). 
1 It, was gradually realized, ' then, that the kingship was 
tn'principle a recession from Covenant order, "while the 
carriership of meaning' running parallel with it, Ewas] 
being transferred to the prophets" (Ibid: 142). What is 
more$'even the worldly achievement carried within'itself 
the seeds of its own dissolution. The united kingdom 
seemed to represent Israel's glorious destiny. -But the' 
fact that Israel regained its independence from Judah 
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after the death of Solomon demonstrates that the unifi- 
cation was not experienced as the fulfilment of Israelite 
history. Yet worse, the Exodus itself was annulled, as 
it were, as Solomon impressed slave labour from conquered 
tribes, and even put the Chosen People itself to forced 
labour "for the unproductive purpose of building the 
Temple" (Ibld: 259). 'I's Finally, "in a symbolic counter- 
movement to the Exodus under the leadership of Moses, the 
last defenders of Jerusalem, carrying Jeremiah with them 
against his, will, returned to the Sheol of Egypt to die" 
(Ibld: 114). 
VoeSeliný draws an uncompromising and significant 
inference from the poignant story. What is'revealed in 
history is, 
mankind striving for its order of existence'within 
the world while attuning itself with the truth of 
being beyond the world, and gaining in the process 
not a substantially better order within the world 
but an increased understanding of the gulf that lies 
between immanent existence and the transcendent 
truth of being. Canaan is as far away today as it 
has always been in the past (Ibid: 129). 
It was only the "the crisis of mundane existence"@ 
"when the raison d'etz-e of Israel was at stake" which 
enabled, the biblical historians, prophets and codemakers 
to clarify the true meaning of Israel's existence (Ibid: 
328); and it is this clarification, this "leap of being", 
which leaves "a paradigmatic trail, of symbols through 
history" and constitutes Israel's significance. As. 
Voegelin sums up, "it looks as if it had been the destiny 
of Israel, during the short five centuries of its prag- 
matic existence, to create an offspring of living symbols 
and then to die" (Ibid: 314-15). 
This discussion explains why Voegelin attached so 
little weight to the external liberation accomplished by 
the Exodus. The fruit of liberation, Canaan, was itself 
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an ambiguous reality as there occurred the "translation 
of a transcendent' aim into a historical fait accompli" 
(Ibid: 143-44). 
To understand Voegelin's emphasis, however, is not to 
Justify it. No transcendent aim can be unequivocally 
consummated within history, no new social order can be 
immune from subsequent decay. But the'achievement of 
liberation does not-thereby count for nothing. It is 
true, as Bernhard Anderson notes, (McKnight, 1978- 74), 
that "Israel" is primarily a sacral term, designating not 
a nation but a people; and the pe . ople's destiny is not 
merely the preservation of its "national sovereignty". 
But Anderson does not suggest that the "people"is 
discontinuous with the "nation". When Voegelin separates 
Israel's destiny and "meaning" from the course of its 
political existence (by saying that the carrying Of 
-meaning is entirely transferred from kings to prophets), 
he condemns the pragmatic history to futility. Histor- 
ical events are then, at best, an occasion for the 
gaining of spiritual insight. The tension between 
spiritual and temporal has hardened into an opposition 
(McKnight, 1978: 74-76). 
In fact, as will be seen in the next section, Vaegelin 
criticizes the prophets precisely for dissolving the same 
tension, by their failure to acknowledge the exigencies 
of political'lead6rship. -By the same token, political 
achievement deserves his own respect: the "historical' 
fait accomplill of the Exodus ought to be valued for its 
inherently emancipatory character, as well as for its 
embodiment, however imperfectly, of a transcendent aim. 
Vaegelin has clarified the' acutetension between the 
demands df Israells political life an Id of its trans- 
cendent orientation (a tension which is fully'articulate 
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only in the most spiritually sensitive, the prophets and 
the biblical redactors).., If, however, he holds that 
political leadership couldý, not conceivably be conformed, 
even imperfectly, to Covenant order, so that the Covenant 
had no. possible point of intersection with politics but 
was effective only as a principle. of Judgment an all - 
politics indiscriminately, he has decisively split the 
two realms. Our examination of his treatment of the 
Exodus and the Israelite monarchy. has indicated the 
problem: what scope is there for the social enactment of 
transcendentally inspired insight? It will now be 
further discussed, with reference firstly, to the Hebrew 
prophets and secondly to, subsequent expressions of 
prophetic consciousness, especially the dominical 
"sermons" in the, Gospels of, Matthew and Luke. 
, -From. Jeremiah's "Temple Sermon", Vaegelin infers that 
there exist "two Israels" in conflict. - that which was 
identical with the political community "arganized. under 
the Torah as interpreted by the King, his officers and, 
priests", and the "entirely different community that 
lived under'the Decalogue as interpreted by Jeremiah". 
But the court and ruling class "while rejecting the word 
of the prophet, did not dare to attack'on principle'an 
authority an which they depended for their own legit- 
imacy"; and the prophets, even while pronouncing 
judgment, "hope for a miracle of conversion" to avert 
disaster. The conflict, though it is so fundamental as 
to allow no compromise, is therefore contained within a 
single community (Ibid: 434). 
The Civilizational Rejection of Prophetic Truth 
, The first principle-of order is that of the Deuter- 
onomic. Torah (Ibid: 372-79). , Moses, "the author of a 
people", "had to become the author of a book". Voegelin 
acknowledges that the Torah, the "magnificent sum of the 
Sinaitic tradition", -is a "spiritual treasure", But as 
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there occurs "the contraction of the universal-patential- 
ities, of the'Sinaitic revelation into the law of an 
ethnic-religious comminity", the Torah itself serves a 
diminished-function; as "the-instrument used by the sages 
to suppress prophetism". Voegelin cites DeuteronoM y 30: 
11-14, which insists that the commandment given to Israel 
is not "hidden" or "far off", but is "in your mouth and 
in Your heart that you may do it". OneLmight expect 
Voegelin to acclaim this saying as an authentic articu- 
lation of the leap in being, by which Israel recognizes 
that every person lives in immediacy under God and is 
therefore capable of receiving and'discerning-divine 
truth. But Vaegelin accepts G. von Rad's alternative 
interpretation, that the text presumes the divine 
commandment to be manifest to all, to require no 
spiritual sensitivity for its discernment, and therefore 
that-human searcb for the will of God is superfluous. On 
the basis of this exegesis, Voegelin writes, 
No longer will there be a soul in anguish like 
Saul's when God is silent; no longer will there be a 
trembling in fear that existence in truth might be 
missed. ... The word as communicated is now within 
history, and the eternity of. the divine will has 
become the everlasting presence of the Torah. The 
Law, thus, far from being the burden it is 
frequently imagined to be on the part of Christian 
thinkers, is on the contrary the great liberation 
from the tension of existence in the presence of God 
(Ibid; 374). 
This, last sentence is obviously ironical: Voegelin could 
not-think release from the-tension a true liberation. 
Once again, he insists that he does not wish to deprec- 
iate-the Deuteranamic Torah: though it has its, dubious 
aspects, it is a,, "remarkable recovery of Yahwist-order- 
when held against the practice of Judah under Manasseh" 
(Ibid: 377), and-it preserves the Jewish post-exilic 
community against the complete destruction which might, 
otherwise have followed the people's dispersion. But it 
constitutes, however excusably, a regression-fromý 
spiritual truth., (One might say he considers it to be. 
"theology". ) If we assume that he expresses himself with 
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care, weýmust accept that he-thinks the Torah to be 
ItselY a false liberation from metaxic tension and not 
merely the occasion for such a liberation. 
The prophets, philosophers, and saints who can 
translate the order of the spirit into the practice 
of conduct without institutional support and 
pressure, are rare. For its survival in the world, 
therefore, the order of the spirit, has to rely on a 
fanatical belief in the symbols of a creed more 
of ten that on the fi des cari ta te forma ta - though 
such reliance, if it becomes socially predominant,, 
is apt to kill the order it is supposed to preserve 
(Ibid: 376-77). 
. -To speak, as does Vaegelin, of "fanatical belief" 
clearly constitutes depreciation even--if he disclaims any 
such intention. The attempt to temper his criticism , 
seems to be a concession to Israel's precarious political 
standing, because of which Israel's very survival, -its 
capacity to transmit any of its experience of the divine 
required "a fierce adherence to, the collective identity, 
however much damaged pragmatically and flattened 
spiritually" (Ibid: 378). 1-7 
What Voegelin stresses (drawing especially on the 
career of Jeremiah) is the vehemence with which adherents 
of the Deuteronomic Torah reject the superior prophetic 
truth, because their reliance on the "back" stands 
Opposed to the prophet's arduous experience of, faith. 
kartin Buber points out, however, in a discussion of 
Deuteronomy'30, that the opposition to any such 
degeneration-not only came from the prophets, but is also 
expressed in the written Torah itself, and by the 
rabbinic interpreters: (Buber, 1951: 51-55). The Torah 
is not "a separate, objectivunfl: ' the divine voice "is, """ 
always present or at least its sound is heard fading 
away". Therefore one cannot reduce Torah to a'law "which 
a person had merely to adhere to as such, 'rather than to' 
cOmprehend'its truth with every effort of the soul and, '' 
then to realize it". The Pharisees' doctrine of lisbmab 
itself constitutes a rejection of verbal fundamentalism: 
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for the Torah is not something'-independent of God, but 
bestows life "only to one who receives itýfor its own 
sake'in its living actual'ity, that isj' in its association 
with its Giver'and for His sake" (Ibid: 57-58,92-93). ' 
Thus'the conflict is-one between two views, of 
spiritual order, ' not between a "spiritual" party and a 
party of pragmatists. But Voegelin compares the conflict 
between Jeremiah and'Jehoiakim (Jeremiab 36: 1-24)', with 
that between Socrates and the Athenian authoritiess 
writing of "the mutual 'death sentences when- the or*der, of 
God is about to disengage itself from"the or-der of nazt' 
(OH T: '436, -emphasis added ). - It is true that in the 
scriptural narrative the "order of man" (here the court, 
the priests and the false prophets) is by definition'-, 
corrupt, opposed to the'truth which Jeremiah, represents. 
But Vaegelin takesýthe incident to express "essential 
processes of experience and symbolization", to,, be aý 
paradigm of "the conflict between the historical order of 
society and the divinely revealed order". 
- To speak here of "Conflict" rather thanýhis favourite 
word "tension" is, to deny that divine and civilizational 
order can (even provisionally) cohere, and postulates the 
"order of manll, ý the "historical order of society", as 
wholly a realm, of evil, of resistance to divine-'order, 
rather, than as the sphere of the, metaxic struggle of good 
against evil. Even-the possibility of "miraculous -, 
conversion" is-foregane-in-favour of the paradigmatic 
"mutual death sentences'l. "10 
Tpe Propbets'. Abandonment of Practical Political Reason 
-Turning now to the second principle of orderi we shall 
find that-Vaegelin does not straightforwardly, endorse, the 
perspective-of prophetic consciousness. If, in-his view, 
reality, is split in such a way that pragmatic politics 
inevitably embodies a rejection of the spiritual, one 
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might expect him also to consign the prophets to polit- 
ical irrelevance, however reluctantly. To test this 
hypothesis, we shall consider two representative clashes 
of principle which emerge from the. prophets' challenge to 
a wider-society: the first concerns their attack on 
social injustice,. the second their demand that military 
leaders trust in the Lord. 
The prophets had a double task. They had to recall 
Israel from any adherence to foreign gods (OH 1: 366-22), 
and they had to guard against Yahwist obedience being 
reduced from a communal spiritual fidelity to a mere 
external observance (Ibid: 429). 
Voegelin argues that their task was hampered by the 
character. of the Decalogue itself (Ibid:, 431-47). 
Because this is spoken by God its specific, injunctions 
are, implicitly concentrated in the single command to 
"Listen to my voice, and I will be your God, and you 
shall be my people; and walk consistently in the way that 
I command you". Even otherwise petty infringements of 
the Decalogue reveal the people's self-assertive 
stubbornness Ueremlab 7: 23-24). 
In particular, the Decalogue makes no distinction 
between "existential" and "normative" issues., "A 
positive articulation of the existential issue would have 
required the experience of the soul and its right, order 
through orientation towards the invisible God", 
' 
What are 
stated are only positive and negative commands. 
Therefore the spiritual meaning of a command, to, which 
the prophets were sensitive but the people scarcely'soý'.. 
remained inarticulate, and the verbal form became 
absolute (rbid: 439). Voegelin concludes that the 
"normative component of the decalogic constitution" was 
a source of evil in as much as it endowed the 
institutions and conduct of the people, which 
derived through interpretation from the Decalogue,, 
ý III I 
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with the authority of divinely willed order, however 
much the actual institutions perverted the will of 
God (Ibid: 440). 
On Vaegelin's account, then, the ground shared-between 
the comminities in'tension, -what E. P. Sanders calls the 
fundamental thought-form of "covenantal nomis&* (1977), 
turned out to impede rather than effectuate the prophets' 
mission. The great achievement of the prophets was their 
insight that "existence under God means love, humility, 
and righteousness of action rather than legality of 
conduct". They recognized that "any letter, as it 
externalized the spirit, was in danger of becoming a dead 
letter" (OH 1: -440). -(As we have seen-from Buber, 1951: 
51-55, this insight-is itself shared ground! ) But, in 
their very faithfulness to the Decalogue, the prophets 
were "handicapped by their inability to break through to 
philosophy" (OH 1: 446). The failure to distinguish the 
normative fromn the existential rendered r-easoned 
criticism impossible, so that the prophets could do no 
more than oppose their own-intransigent conception of the 
Decalogue and its obligations to the conception-of their 
opponents. This is why confrontation inevitably led to 
hostility and mutual rejection (cf. Ibid. 434-36, an the 
career of Jeremiah). "9 
. 
Any absolutism prevents discrimination between 
fundamental and secondary issues. Accordingly, the 
prophets, wield the Decalogue "ruthlessly". in order 
to tear the web of institutions and customs, of, the 
convenient distances which social stratification, 
vested interests, professional habits, and inherited 
positions put, in a complex, society between actions 
and their human effects, and to make visible the 
direct attack of man on man in situations which more 
laxly may, be viewed as regrettable but inevitable 
social evils. Amos, for instance, in a magnificent 
short circuit of cause and effect speaks of the rich 
(3: 10): 
For they do not know how to do right, 
who store up robbery and violence in their 
palaces. (rbid: 432) 
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Since Voegelin would not care to be regarded as an 
apologist for complacent materialism, he presumably 
regards as a spiritual gain the prophets' penetration in 
discerning the factor of oppression in what is "laxly" 
taken for granted. Yet he thinks the "magntficent" 
insight to be a "short-circuit": the clever oxymoron 
suggests that, in his view, storing up riches does not 
amount to robbery and violence. He thereby rejects the 
precise charge levelled by Amos, at 
, 
the rich of his 
society (a kind of pre-echo of the. dictumassociated with 
Proudhon, "Property is theft. 11). 
1 
Are the social evils in 
truth "inevitable", or are they culpable and the fruit of 
corruption? Is Amos cl, ear-sighted, or a little hyster- 
ical? For once., Voegelin's verdict is obscure. 
His intention seems to be clarified when he later 
comments on Micah 2: 1-2, where the acquisition of wealth 
is equated with covetousness: 
One might even say the prophets weakened their case, 
when they involved themselves in arguments about 
offences against decalogic injunctions, for a man 
could well plead that he had not committed murder or 
theft when he used his business acumen to increase 
his property at the expense, of an unwise peasant who 
had gone into debt too easily (Ibid: 438). 
Voegelin does not endorse the businessman's protest. He 
simply remarks that the prophetic jwtbod, of appeal to 
the compact Decalogue, obscures_the grounds of an effec- 
tive critique,, namely that such actions are incompatible 
not with a "fundamental law" but with the existential 
"right order of the soul" (Ibid: 438-39). Vaegelin-is 
: 5ure that the right order of the soul_is, indeed, 
incompatible with carefree exploitation of the poor. in 
the name of commerce. Such exploitation is wrong, and is 
rightly to be condemned, though not by the name of theft. 
But if the prophets are justified in their attack an 
social injustice, Voegelin holds that elsewhere their 
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rejection of the mundane order is "an oddity" (rbid: 446, 
443-44). He cites, for example, Isaiah's attack on 
"phenomena of rebellious pride against Yahweh": the lofty 
cedars of Lebanon, the high mountains, the fashion- 
conscious women (2: 12-17; 3: 16,24). 
One is inclined to wonder what the servants of 
Yahweh wanted. ... should the cedars of Lebanon 
grow only half size? and should the daughters of 
Zion be dowdy? It is important to realize that no 
prophet has ever answered a question of this kind 
(rbid: 444). 
He adds that a counter-charge would have been justified, 
"if the people had been able to articulate such charges 
at all": namely, that the prophets "had no respect for 
the beauty of God's creation, that they did not permit 
man to unfold his God-given faculties of mind and body, 
and that they could not distinguish between pride and Joy 
of life" (Ibid). Because the prophets had not differ- 
entiated the autbentic "tension of temporal and spiritual 
order", their rightful rejection of the people's mythical 
order involved them in mistakenly "rejecting the order of 
mundane existence altogether" (Ibid). Thev were. as 
Voegelin concludes, apparently 
not only unable to see, but not even interested in 
finding, a way from the formation of the soul to 
institutions and customs they could consider 
compatible with the knowledge and fear of God. The 
attitude of the prophets is tantalizing in that it 
seem to violate common sense ( Ibid: 446-47). 
I. make two remarks about this argument. Firstly, his 
notion of compactness and differentiation is of real help 
in locating the clash of interpretations over the 
Decalogue, and in accounting for its virulence. Failing 
to make the distinction between the existential and the 
normative will tend to make positions non-negotiable and 
differences irresolvable. 2EO 
. Secondly, however, Voegelin's criticism of the 
prophets is surprisingly literalist. Whenj in the text 
quoted (3: 16), Isaiah condemns the daughters of Zion who 
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are "haughty and walk'with-outstretched necks, glancing 
wantonly with their'eyes, mincing along as'they go", his 
intention is not to"commend dowdiness-or, condemn'"'' - 
elegance. Voegelinmakesýno mention of the contextýof' 
Isaiah's condemnation, Yahweh's judgment on the-rich 
because "the spoil of the poor is in your houses. ' ýWhat_ 
do you mean by crushing my people, by grinding the-face 
of the poor? " (3: 14-15). The luxury and affectation are 
precisely the symptom and symbol of social disorder, over 
which maýter Voegelin. has endorsed the prophetic, stance. 
The prophet rejects not the mundane order as such, but a 
particular unjust social order: andin Voegelin's own 
terms (following Aristotle) an unjust order is to be 
regarded as no "order" at all. It seems that Voegelin's 
distinction between the existential and the normative has 
here led him to misrepresent Isaiah as morbidly indignant 
over trivia and to ov 
, 
erlook the genuinely existential 
character of the prophetic charge. 21 
The case may seem petty. It has been discussed here 
because Vaegelin's, seeming failure of interpretation is 
carried into the immediate continuation of his argument, 
where he deals-with our second representative clash of 
principle, the prophets' critique of royal militarism. 
This is a crux in the. whole corpus of Vaegelin's work. 
. -, The background of this clash must be outlined. In 
Voegelin's estimation, the prophets' most serious problem 
arose from their need, to clarify the historical status of 
Israel itself. For the universalist implications of the 
thornbush, episode and, the covenant, drama, "which-could, be 
suppressed on the,, popular level by-the fierceness of 
collective existence, -had to loom, large in the souls of. 
solitary spiritualists tortured by the, sorrow about the 
destiny of the Chosen People" (OH 1: 430). The endless 
sequence of defections raised the question how far Israel 
could still be regarded as "My People", especially as the 
neighbouring empires themelves came to be seen as 
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instruments of Israel's chastening. The appearance of 
prophets "succeeding one another through the generations 
in opposition to the people" suggested that the problem 
of personal existence under Yahweh might be independent 
of the continued existence of the historicalIsrael: 
Had the Kingdom of God, of necessity, to assume the 
form of a political Israel; and if that question 
should be answered in the negative, had it, of 
necessity, to assume the form of a politically 





The force of this last question needs to be carefully 
considered. The plight of Israel is paradigmatic: 
when the prophets were successful to a certain 
degree, as they were in the revolt of Jehu, they 
endangered the diplomatic relations on which the 
survival of the country depended; and when on the 
other hand, the existence of'the people as an 
organized community was threatened with annihil- 
ation, the value of a covenant with Yahweh, which 
included the promise of a glorious future in Canaan, 
became doubtful (Ibid: 356). 
Voegelin concludes that it is "suicidal" to conceive of 
the "present under God" as necessarily expressed in "the 
institution of a small people in opposition to empires" 
(rbid), because the political existence of such a people 
is so precarious. In any case, as he earlier remarks, 
"spiritually it became obvious that the existence or 
nonexistence of a Kingdom of Israel was irrelevant for 
the fundamental problems of a life in righteousness 
before the Lord" (rbid: 182). And yet, the prophets 
insist that the divine promises can be fulfilled within 
the life of this small people. 
In order to penetrate theoretically the difficulties 
inherent in this expectation, Voegelin analyses Ubid: 
447-57) a case where "the question what to do concretely 
in a situation affecting public orderwas not evaded"., - 
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rsaiabos -metastatic Faith" 
Isaiah insists to King Ahaz (7: 9) that Israel's 
strength lies in its trust in the Lord: "If you do not 
trust, you will not last". More revealing still, in 
Voegelin's view, is 31: 1: "Woe to those who go down to 
Egypt for help and rely on horses .... but do not look 
to the Holy One of Israel and do not consult Yahweh",, . 
which Voegelin interprets ("incredible as it may sound at 
first hearing") as "advice to replace the armyýby the 
r, uach of God living in the prophet" (Ibid: 449). ý21 
Vcegelin's crucial interpretation of Isaiah's appeal 
to Ahaz must be given in his own words: 
the'severe repression of human synergism, the reduc- 
tion of man's role in the drama of history to a 
trusting abnegation of action, is definitely not 
magic in the sense of human action that intends to 
compel favorable action of divine forces. On the 
other hand, the formula "If you do not trust you 
will not last" carries the implication that you will 
last, if you trust. Isaiah's counsel does not 
originate in an ethic of non-violence; it is not' 
calculated to lose the war in order to gain some- 
thing more important than earthly victory but on the 
contrary to win the war by means more certain than 
an army. ... An aura of magic undeniably surrounds 
the counsel: it is due to the act that the divine 
plan itself has been brought within the knowledge of 
man, in as much as Isaiah knows that God wants the 
survival of Judah as an organized people in prag- 
matic history. With that knowledge is given the 
trust, not in the inscrutable will of God that must 
be accepted however bitter it tastes .... but in 
the knowable will of God that-conforms with the pol- 
icies of Isaiah and the Chosen people (Ibld: 451). 
Isaiah, thus, has "tried the, impossible: to make the leap 
in being a leap out of existence into a divinely trans- 
f igured'world beyond the-the'laws of mundane existence", 
without this transfigured world ceasing to be the world 
in which we live concretely. Voegelin calls this "change 
in the constitution of being envisaged by the prophets" 
metastasis. ' Things are as they are, and "the will to 
transform reality into something which by essence it is 
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not is the rebellion against the nature of things as 
ordained by God" (Ibid: 452,453). 
Vaegelin also regards Isaiab 11: 1-9 and 2: 2-4 as 
metastatic prophecies. The wolf shall dwell with the 
lamb, nations will beat swords into ploughshares and 
cease to learn the art of war. The order of society and 
history will become substantively the order of the divine 
glory: "government institutions and their human incumb- 
ents are no longer mentioned" (Ibid: 
The Preface to Isz-ael and Revelation shows how much 
weight Voegelin attached to his argument: 
the prophetic conception of a change in the 
constitution of being lies at the root of our- 
contemporary beliefs in the perfection of society, 
either through progress or through a communist 
revolution. ... the apparent antagonists Earel 
revealed as brothers under the skin, as the late 
Gnostic descendents of the prophetic faith in a 
transfiguration of the world (OH 1: xiii). 
And he concludes, "Metastatic faith is one of the great 
sources of disorder, if not the principal one, in the 
contemporary world; and it'is a matter of life and death 
for all of us to understand the phenomemon and to find 
r emedies against it before it destroys us" (Ibid). 
Here, then, is the second representative clash between 
the prophetic mind and the civil and military order. Our 
discussion will be restricted to the case of Isaiah. 214 
The discussion has three possible outcomes. It might 
be that Isaiah is guilty as charged, of a positive and 
influential deformation of faith. Secondly, the 
prophetic utterances might represent not a positive 
deformation or derailment, but only, a relatively compact 
articulation of the nature of human dependence on divine 
power. Voegelin would in this case be correct to point 
out the undeveloped understanding embodied in the texts, 
but would not be justified in his use of the term 
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metastasis, which implies a definite loss of truth,, :ý 
rather-than an incomplete advanceAn truth.: 2r, I shall, 
argue for the third possibility, that Voegelin has 
radically misconceived the prophetic intention. 
Vaegelin-recognizes that the conception of dependency 
which he criticizes in the prophets is not-idiasyncratic. 
It pervades the Hebrew Scriptures. ý'6 De Vaux points out 
(1961: 264) that the Deuteronomist envisages the whole 
history of Israel as a Holy War, fought with God at their 
head (cf. Deuteronomy 1: 30). Voegelin traces how this 
symbolism of God's leadership developed as the tribal 
society evolved into the kingdom <OH 1 208-12). The "war 
spirit of the, -tribes" required an active readiness-to 
fight when mobilized by the prophetic, mouthpiece of God. 
This was. the "Holy War", concerned only with defence, not 
territorial expansion. The coming of a professional ' 
soldiery meant that military, policy could no longer be 
determined by or delegated to the charismatic spiritual 
leader, that military projects might well transgress the 
limits of the Holy War, and, most important of all, that 
non-soldiers became passive. 
Vaegelin illustrates this development by "the post- 
Solomonic account of the miraculous rescue of Israel from 
the Egyptians" <Hxodus 14; 13-14), where the Israelites 
are assured, "Yahweh will fight for you and, you have only 
to keep still". - The Egyptians are indeed drowned; "and 
the people feared Yahweh, and they believed in Yahweh and 
his servant Moses" (14: 31). Voegelin comments, - 
only when Yahweh has shown his might are they 
willing to believe in him. This strange', passivity 
. ýwas certainly not a civic virtue an which a 
government could build (Arbid: 211). 
He adds a significant footnote. - The passages', which when 
"discussed under the aspect of mundane existence" reflect 
a "dubious civic virtue", are spiritually. "a compact 
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expression of the insight that faith has its origin not 
in human initiative but in a divine gratia praeveniend4 
(lbid). 
Raw it is Vaegelin, and not the biblical writer, who 
implies that trust in divine grace will inevitably run 
counter to "civic virtue". He does this in two ways. 
He assumes, rather than argues, that "civic virtue" (and 
not merely the "national interest" proclaimed by-the 
rulers) requires the readiness for military action, and 
so he precludes any ethical challenge to the rulers' 
militaristic conception-of "civic virtue" itself. Even 
more important, he assumes that the "spiritual" and the 
"mundane" levels of the narrative are of equal weight, so 
that Exodus 14 is concerned with military strategy no 
less than with God's gracious care for the people. 
, His interpretation of rsaiah 30: 15 and 31: 1-3 also 
manifests both these dubious assumptions. The "Holy One 
of Israel" enjoins the people to "quietness and trust". 
Vaegelin takes this phrase to mean "a trusting abnegation 
of action", since any human action would reveal distrust 
of God's power. Therefore, "knowledge of the divine 
plan casts its paralyzing spell an'the necessity of 
action in the world" <rbld: 451). 
Buber, however, explains the biblical notion'of God's 
"holiness" to mean that God is distinct from the world 
but not withdrawn from it. Israel must imitate God, be 
holy as God is holy (Buber, 1949: 128-29)., Assertions of 
God's holiness doýnot commit Israel to passivity, "but 
d etermine the nature ot its activity. Thus the command 
to "keep still", says Buber, 
is not merely a negative programme, if we take it in 
connection with all the prophetic teaching about the 
right order of community life; if this order is 
established, keeping still lends the people a 
downright, magnetic power (rbid: 135-36, emphasis in 
original). ' 
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Keeping'still'has nothing to do with political passivity, 
but is an imitation of Yahweh who "keeps still" and looks 
an Israel (Isaiah*: 18: 4, in Buber's rendering, cf. also 
4: 5). Vhen we recall that, according to the Hebr(ivi 
Testament, Yahweh's stillness is compatible with p'assion- 
ate intervention, it becomes clear that it is faithless 
action that is prohibited, not action as such. 
As to the alliances with Egypt or Assyiia, the 
prophet's rejection of'the them is by no means intended 
as a repudiation of all civic order. Kaiser notes that 
Isaiah 30: 15-17, by means of its allusion to 31: 1 seq., 
contrasts the purpose and the result of the proposed 
alliance, "revealing that the policy of strength which 
failed to consult the will of Yahweh was in fact a policy 
of weakness" (Kaiser, 1974: 296-97). Isaiah 31: 3 
has a double antithesis which supposes a unity between 
spiritual and military levels of discourse, but firmly 
subordinatiBs the military level: "the'Egyptians are men 
and not God", and "their horses are flesh and not 
spirit". It is God's ruacb that constitutes life, and it 
is because a reliance on "men" and "flesh" would 
inherently reject "God" and "spirit" that Isaiah's urgent 
counsel is given. Contrary to Voegelin's claim, the 
prophet does not assume that the' divine ruach can replace 
the army (OH T: 449), but warns against the opposite 
destruction of synergy, any pretence that the army can 
replace the ruacb. For'any covenant with Assyria or 
Egypt would be a repudiation of the Covenant. In the 
name of "security"' it would bring only subservience. 
Still worse, Israel would-again be obliged to accept 
foreign gods and cults (that is, in Voegelinian terms, to 
accept an overt regression to cosmological religion), as 
well as to support the monstrous military ventures of the 
empires (Heschel, 1969: 71-75. ý117 
For the prophets', therefore, any "civic virtue" which 
repudiated Yahwist order (which is at once spiritual and 
182 
political) would be futile. Vaegelin'siharsh, -Judgment on 
Isaiah's counsel is rooted in bis own polarization of 
"mundane existence"' and "spiritual existence". Existence 
in the world, including confrontation with the grimmest 
pragmatic necessities, is not inherently unspiritual. 
Conversely, the prophets' determination to introduce the 
level of spirit into pragmatic decisions is not a "leap 
out of existence". Ruacb must govern the army, or God 
ceases to be Lord of the army: but the claim that it can 
r, eplace the army is Voegelin's interpretation of the 
prophet and not the authentic prophetic word. 
Vaegelin is also unreasonable in accusing Isaiah of 
trusting in a divine plan that merely ratifies the 
prophet's own preferred policies, expecting to "win the 
war by means more certain than an army" MH 1: 451). 
When Isaiah is originally called to, prophecy, the 
narrative immediately passes to a vision of Israel's 
desolation (6: 1-8,11-12); and the prophet does not 
cease to warn that the people will be given "the bread of 
adversity and the water of affliction" (30: 119). The 
recurrence of such symbols as the "remnant" and the 
"stump" (e. g. 11: 16; 6: 13) show that Isaiah is far from 
specific about "the survival of Judah as an organized 
people in pragmatic history" (Ibid: 451): "he who 
believes will not be in haste" (28: 16). 
Certainly, there is a sense in which the prophet 
claims to know the "plan" of God. But there is no "aura 
of magic" about this "knowledge". It is, firstly, as we 
shall-shortly see that Voegelin is himself aware, 
knowledge in the mode of-faith: the fundamental Israelite 
faith that God., the faithful one, will not, abandon-his, 
people. Secondly, Isaiah's-knowledge is that which. is 
inherent, to, the prophetic vocation,. without which,, it 
seems, one cannot, be called a "prophet" at all, The 
prophets have "stood in the council of the Lord" as the 
false prophets have not (Jeremiah 23: 18-22; cf. -also the 
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reference to Moses in' Yumber-s 12: 6-8. and Amos 3: -- 7). 
Such knowledge by no means purports'to penetrate the' 
divine mystery. Isaiah never loses an awed sense of the 
holiness ofýGod, of the discrepancy between imagination 
and expression (as Heschel puts it), and he knows his, 
articulations to fall far short of the divine reality 
(Heshel, -1971: 50,137). If-the Egyptians, "are "men and 
not God" (Isalab 31: 3), soýis the prophet himself. ý' 
The final aspect of what Voegelin holds to be Isaiah's 
metastatic faith is the depiction of the transfigured 
universe in 2: 2-4, which Vaegelin calls "a vision*of 
metastatic world peace" (OH 1: 480). The scope and the 
proper limits of the human hope for historical transform- 
ation will be considered in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
But two remarks may now be made about the case of Isaiah. 
Voegelin's sarcasm, "governmental institutions and 
their human incumbents are no longer required", is 
unwarranted. The vision represents the peoples'(their 
rulers not excluded! ) streaming to Zion'to be taught by 
God. It is implied not that governments are superfluous 
but that they will learn to act so as to promote peace. 
It is interesting that Vaegelin chooses'to delimit the 
passage as 2: 2-4, rather than as 2: 2-5, since verse 5 
00 house of Jacob, come, let us walk in the light of the 
Lord"), makes clear that the substance of the vision is 
an etbical appeal to the people as presently constituted, 
with its political leadership still in place. 
The vision, secondly, As an explicitly hyperbolic 
attempt, to'symbolize what it might mean for the whole 
earth to manifest God's glory in such a way-that even the 
spiritually dull might sense it'(6: 3). If it reflected 
the pragmatic expectation of a society in which govern- 
ments and armies were redundant, the prophet would surely 
show more literary tact than to employ images of a 
transfigured natural world so'bathed in fantasy as to 
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erode their plausibility (11: 6-9). But, of course, he 
glories in them. We are to understand, it seems, that- 
human yearnings are to be fulfilled: and that one's - 
imagining of the possibilities of transformation is not 
to be restricted to what "comm n sense" suggests to be 
realistic, because that restriction would itself dissolve 
the mystery of God's providence. The vision is eschatol- 
ogical, in that it- will "come to pass in the latter days" 
(2: 2). ý In other words, the consummation of history is 
not co-terminous with the ending of1history. 
, 
The vision is eschatological in the broad, sense 
described by Jenni (1962: 126): 
111a 
future in which the 
circumstances of history are changed to such an extent 
that one can speak of a new,, entirely different, state of 
things without, in so doing, leaving the framework of 
history" <see also, Barton, 1986: 214-19). For Voegelin, 
though, history is eschatological only in the restricted 
sense that it moves towards an end. His guiding image of 
the metaxy, derived from Plato, implies that the consumm- 
ation and the ending of history coincide, and, therefore, 
that the Judaic eschatological expectation of a histor- 
ical "Messianic Age" involves a contradiction in terms. 
If Voegelin does misread the Isaian prophecy, it is - 
probably because he approaches the Hebrew prophets from 
the perspective (in this sensealien) of Plato. 
This surmise seems to be confirmed by a reading of 
some of Voegelin's most brilliant but also most puzzling 
pages (OH 1: 460-65). They are puzzling because Voegelin 
shows, 'in a series of subtle formulations, that he is - 
fully aware of the true nature of the prophetic message 
(and, indeed, the prophets' "knowledge" of God), while 
neverýretracting his, charge of metastasis. 
The contractual symbolism of the Covenant might 
suggest that-Israel's defections released God-from the 
Covenant promise. - But "the abyss of revelation and faith 
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proved incommensurable with the logic of, contract". For 
the substance of the Covenant is not an agreement between 
equal partners, but the revelation of God as the source 
of all order: 
the prophets penetrated what in modern terminology 
may be called the dialectics of divine foreknowledge 
and human decision. ... since God did not use the 
method of trial and error, the " 
revealed order had to 
be realized; whatever Israel did, it had to remain 
the Chosen People. On the side of human decision 
they knew: the empirical Israel did not realize the 
revealed order; and a terrible disaster, amounting 
to extinction, was impending in pragmatic politics 
, 
(Ibid: 461-62). 
Thus there arises the structure of the double prophecies 
of punishment and salvation. Here-we arrive at the core 
of-Voegelin's argument: - 
The prophecies will become senseless if they are 
understood as flat predictions of future events, 
without any bearing on the attunement of human to 
divine order through the change of heart. This 
proposition .... is valid, however, only on the 
level of prophetic existence. The literal, or 
fundamentalist, understanding of prophecy as flat 
information about the future acquires a sinister and 
even deadly sense if it is the deliberate misunder- 
standing by the people of whom the change of heart 
is demanded. ... The stubborn of heart are clever dialecticians themselves; they know quite as well as 
the prophets that the will of God, 'expressed in his 
choice, cannot be stultified by the people (Ilbid). 
Now this argument shows that the metastatic, faith lies 
with Isaiah's hearers, not with Isaiah. The prophets-are 
obliged to speak from their own insight, even. if they 
will "inevitably" be misheard. Their knowledge, too, is 
authentic, and any "aura of magic" is supplied by those 
who interpret the sayings as "flat information about the 
future". 
What is surprising, in the light of this insight, is 
that Vaegelin treats Isaiah's demand. that Ahaz cease. to 
put1his security. in alliances not-as a call for "attune- 
Ment to divine order", properlymade by, the prophet 
though susceptible to misunderstanding, but as a 
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pragmatic directive. In so doing, he himself makes it 
metastatic, by (as it were) himself taking the 
"fundamentalist" perspective of Ahaz- Isaiah's apparent 
lack of military realism appears to fuse in Voegelin's 
mind with the visionary imagery of 2: 2-4 and 11: 6-9, so 
constituting a compensatory dream born of'the prophet's 
despair over Israel; a dream "in which the tension of" 
historical order was abolished by a divine act of grace" 
(Ibid: 465). 
The Authoritative Consciousness of Jeremiah 
Voegelin's criticism of Isaiah may usefully be 
compared with his eulogy of Jeremiah. After Isaiah,, he 
argues, prophecy had reached an impasse: one could only 
"sit down and wait for the miracle to happen". Gener- 
ations would. pass before "the validity of what had become 
an article of faith" could be re-examined (Ibid: 481).: 20 
According to Voegelin QH 1: 481-84), Jeremiah 
succeeded in this re-examination. He "advances beyond, 
the metastatic visions of Isaiah" because he abstains 
from "gazing into a future which never became present" 
and returns to "the experience of the untransfigured 
present". This constitutes an advance because "the 
fundamental concern of man is with the attunement of his 
existence, in the present tense, to the order of being". 
Isaiah had rightly seen that the true order of society 
was present in those "who challenge the disorder of the 
surrounding society with the order they experience as 
living in themselves" But he had demanded as a sign of 
conversion a metastatic sign of trust from Ahaz, and when 
the king had had the "good sense" to refuse, Isaiah saw 
no recourse other than to, posit the future appearance of 
a messianic ruler who would transcend such faithlessness. 
Jeremiah reverses this "futuristic projection" by 
"transferring the royal symbolism to himself". 20 
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As Jeremiah meets crisis, rejection and vindication, 
therefore, he embodies the fate of the entire people: 
"the, holy omphalos of history had contracted from the 
Chosen People into his personal existence*$:, 
He was the sole representative of divine order; and 
whatever the inscrutable will of God might hold for 
the future, the meaning of the present was deter--ý 
mined by the Word that was spoken from the divine- 
human omphalos in 
' 
Jeremiah. The Chosen People had 
been replaced by the chosen man '(Ibid: 466 67). 
As evidence for, this claim Voegelin cites the narrative 
of Jeremiah's call. The language of his consecration in 
1: 5 is "borrowed from the royal symbolism of the cosmo- 
logical empires"; the oracle of vv. 7-8, in which the 
prophet's hesitation is overridden by Yahweh's promise to 
be with him has the same structure as the commissioning 
of Moses from the thornbush; and in v, 10 the prophet is 
given authority over the nations and the kingdoms, "to 
root up and, to pull down, to destroy and'to plant" (rbid: 
469). Symbolically, therefore, Jeremiah is invested 
with the authority at once of the king, of Moses, and 
even of God. It is true that Jeremiah still addresses an 
appeal to the people but when this is decisively rejected 
(18: 12) he becomes "the sale vicar of God" (Ibid: 470). 
The pressure imposed on the prophet by this role, 
notes_Voegelin, "must have been enormous". Jeremiah,, 
retained the compact, "essentially metastatic" form of 
prophetic experience, by which the tension of order "had 
dissolved into the successive periods of disaster and 
salvation" (Ibid: 484). But the "lamentations" dramatize 
his renewed awareness both of the tension of order itself 
and'of its primary location in his, own consciousness. 
His own personality, 
_is 
at once "the battlefield of. order 
and disorder in history" and "the authoritative source of 
order in. society" (Ibid: 485). 
, 
Now, the juxtaposition of these last_two phrases 
suggests a possible incoherence in Vaegelin's argument., 
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To the extent that disorder is present in the psyche of 
Jeremiah he fails, by definition, to be an authoritative 
source of order in society. If, as is claimed, he'w6re 
the single authoritative source of order'in society his 
own consciousness would have to transcend the condition 
of all consciousness in the metaxy, that it embodies a 
tension between perfection and imperfection. Voegelin 
seems to be smuggling Into Jeremiab's own psycbe the 
eschatological idyll that he has repudiated in Isaiah's 
vision ofthe future. 
I shall argue that Voegelin makes an ingenious'but 
'unsuccessful attempt 
to resolve this problem. He cites 
the lurid curses levelled by Jeremiah at his enemies 
(18: 21-23; 11: 20; 22: 19). But this vengefulness 
must not be covered with charitable silence, as if 
it were a weakness unbecoming a distinguished public 
figure. For it is precious evidence of the spirit- 
, ual 
fire that burned in him. ... [He] was not the 
ma n to make exceptions for personal enemies. On the 
contrary, since he was the representative of divine 
order, forgiveness for an attack on his life would 
have"been a presumptuous attribution of importance 
to his private sentiments and a betrayal of his 
status. The prophet of Israel could not condone an 
attack on the life that served Yahweh (Ibid: 486). 
This argument invites criticism in two. ways. 
Firstly, this passage, virtual, ly, dlismisses the moral 
relevance of Jeremiah', 
's 
vengefulness. In fact, Voegelin 
argues that Jeremiah ceases to be a moral agent precisely 
in so far as he is the oracle of God. When Voegelin 
, speaks of Jeremiah's personality as the "battleground of 
. order and. -disorder", 
he seems to-be referring not to a 
moral tension within himself, but, to his struggle against 
t7tbersl disbelief and hostility. But a prophet, even 
more than others, has the duty, of attuning himself to 
divine order: and as that orderi, s ultimately one of 
-mercy, and loving-kindness,, it is strange for Voegelin to 
claim that forgiveness by the prophet would be a mere 
personal indulgence. His attempt to reconcile Jeremiah's 
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authority with his vulnerability, in order to acknowledge 
a metaxic tension within what I have termed the "eschato- 
logical idyll" of Jeremiah's consciousness, only succeeds 
in confirming that he posits in Jeremiah a kind of 
"metastasis" of moral life. *1111ý' 
Secondly, it is true that the narrative of Jeremiah 
focuses on the prophet's own psyche more than does that 
of First Isaiah. But the difference is one of emphasis 
only. To complement the "internal conversion" promised 
in 31: 31-34, for example, Jeremiah prophesies a trans- 
figured future for the people (24: 4-7, and-particularly 
31: 1-20). Are we to regard these prophecies as meta- 
static? If so, the authority of Jeremiah's consciousness 
is immediately discredited. 
Christian Prophetic Radiaalism 
The Sermon on the Mount 
To complete this chapter we shall consider how 
Voegelin's analysis of prophetic consciousness, and 
especially of its alleged tendency to metastasis, applies 
to Christian articulations of prophetic radicalism, in 
particular to the Sermon an the Mount. 01 
Voegelin once suggested that the relationship between 
the Republic and the Laws parallels that between the 
Sermon an the Mount and the discourse of the early Church 
(QIL-I-U: 226-28). Thia Republic is a "prophetic" call for 
Per, iagpge, "a call which presupposes that man is capable 
of following it", whereas in the Laws Plato "has arrived 
at the Pauline, ecclesiastic compromise with the frailty 
of man". In the Laws, therefore, Plato proposes 
"theocratic institutions that will be bearable to men as 
they are'll though they will necessarily fall short of the 
spirit of the Republic. Similarly, 
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The counsels of-the Sermon originate-in a spirit of 
eschatological heroism. If they were followed by 
the Christian layman to the letter among men as they 
are, they would be suicidal .... While the 
counsels of the Sermon cannot become rules of social 
conduct in the world as it is, they are nevertheless 
the substance of Christian doctrine.. If they and 
their guidance were removed from Christianity, the 
power centre that makes it an effective historical 
reality would be destroyed. Since the Sermon is 
unbearable in its purity, the Church infuses as much 
of its substance as men are capable of absorbing 
while living in the world (QH TTT:, 226). 
Therefore, "the mediation of the stark reality of Jesus 
to the level of human expediency, with'a minimum loss of 
substance, is one of the functions'of the Church". 
Vaegelin wishes to establish two points. Firstly, 
the authoritative prophetic source of order is not 
powerless to effect social transformation, as long as it 
is tempered by a mediating institution (Church, or-Law) 
to accommodate human frailty. (Unless so mediated, the 
counsels would be metastatic, and inapplicable'to actual 
historical circumstances. ) Therefore the Laws does not 
betr-ay the Republic, nor the Church the spirit of the 
Beatitudes. Secondly, and uncontentiously, the counsels 
are distorted it regarded as rigid rules. They'are a 
horizon which always recedes as it'is approached. 
But this position has serious difficulties. There is, 
firstly, some obscurity in the notion of "counsels"-which 
are taken to be authoritative. Are they commands, or 
recommendations? - As far as Voegelin is concerned, it 
seems, they are intrinsically impracticable, and their 
effective authority is to be determined by some agency 
extrinsic to the source itself. It is presumed by 
Voegelin`formulation that this agency possesses the' 
substance-of the counsels, yet also possesses the 
practical wisdom to discern the extent to which they can 
be filtered through to the world.,, But, such an exemplary 
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and improbable hybrid would rightly supplant the 
prophetic discourse as the final-authority. ý3ýý 
Secondly, as it, turns out, Voegelin also wishes to 
delimit the manner in. which the Sermon offers "guidance" 
at all. He admits its validity only an the "spiritual" 
level,, not as it might, refer to social and economic life. 
In the "History of Political Ideas" he explains that 
according to the Beatitudes, the poor are blessed because 
riches 
, 
entangle their possessors in the "manifold - 
'interests of 
the world" and so impede them from directing 
their lives towards the, impending Kingdom Of God. It 
follows logically from this insight of the Beatitudes, 
Voegel. in writes, 
lthat 
the. rich should be the object of 
compassion and special missionary. endeavour. On the 
contrary, even in Jesus. himself "a hostile attitude 
against members of the'upper class can be felt. ... 
Love is the law of the new community, but. not much"love 
is lost with the hardened who will not turn" (Hoovo 
quoting Luke 12: 49-53). In Voegelin's view this 
lieschatolo, gical hardness'l, of, Jesus-tends to be misund- 
erstood by his followers, and ý. he evangelist Luke has 
perhaps contributed to this misunderstanding', even if he 
does not share it. "The Sermon in the Plain shows a 
strong tendency to see the blessings of the heavenly 
Kingdom. as, rewards and consolations for those who have 
suffered more than their due share in this world":, quite 
apart, that is, from their own metanola. ", 
If one compares Matthew's and Luke's versions of the 
Sermon, Matthew' s 
shows the characteristics which are, usually called 
"spiritualization". A careful analysis .... would show-that the "spiritualization" does not 
import,, 
Ia 
new meaning to the Sayings, but that 
Matthew tries elaborately to find formulae which, by 
their wording, prevent misunderstandings to which 
the text of Luke might be exposed if it falls into 
the hands of simple souls (Hoov). 
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Correctly understood, firstly, "the question of property 
and wealth is not considered a social problem at all, but 
a personal": and secondly, "the eschatological character 
of the Gospel is incompatible with any idea of social or 
economic reorganization of society". 
There follows 
, 
the. passage which has been quoted above 
in the sliShtly modified form it takes in OH III: "It is 
not a doctrine which can be followed by men who live in a 
less intense environment, who expect to live out their 
lives and who wish to make the world livable for_their 
families", nor can it be a "system of social ethics". 
There is an inherent tension between the inspiration, the 
"permanent. regulative force", of. the Sermon and "accepted 
standards" of civilization: therefore, there will be 
waves of reformation and reorientation towards the 
radical demands and, conversely, "when the swinS towards 
the eschatological demands Soes too far, the civiliZ- 
ational structure, which is based an a compromise with 
the natural Sifts of man, is imperilled": 
Parallel with the waves of reformations, we witness, 
therefore, the series of strugSies between the 
conservative civilizational and the radical anti- 
civilizational forces. The eschatological character 
of the Sermon is not only a source of spiritual and 
-ethical reformation, but also of civilizational 
destruction (Ibid). 
Voegelin therefore confines the "spiritual" to the 
realm of the "personal", and opposes it to the "social" 
and "economic". The Beatitudes, he contends, offer an 
authentic spirituality, and can transform the soul: but 
any attempt to make them socially effective is notIonly 
doomed to fail in, part (which one might accept),, it is an 
aberration, a kind of category mistake, by which civil- 
ization is "imperilled", and against which civilizational 
, forces are presumably. justified in protecting themselves. 
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,, Of course, Voegelin might agree that the "personal" 
appeal of Jesus is not addressed to individuals only. He 
calls whole communities to repentance (cf. Matthew 11: 21, 
Luke 10: 13). But Voegelin's argulnent depends on the 
view that "spiritualization" embodies the "substance" if 
the Gospel, so that an unqualified primacy may be given 
to the "spiritualized" version of the Beatitudes: hence 
his suggestion that Matthew's Beatitudes rectify the 
dangerously concrete formulations of Luke, which 
th emselves invite misunderstanding. But this is a 
disconcerting. simplification, possible only to someone 
who has the prior notion that the spiritual and the 
socio-econamic are discrete realms. If the Matthaean 
Beatitudes remind us that no societal circumstances are 
canonized by the Gospel, the Lukan Beatitudes make it 
clear, by associating the poor with other groups who 
suffer concretely, that God's "preference" for the poor 
is because they are poor, not because they are virtuous 
or intrinsically open to conversion. As J. de Santa Ana 
expresses it (1977: 17), "the happiness of the poor Inas 
its theological basis in God hims-elf". All people, to be 
sure, are called to metanoia, are invited to recognize 
their essential "poverty" and need of God; but God's 
promise of the Kingdom will not bypass those whose 
poverty needs no special sensitivity to discern. and God 
will not be found wanting by those who have no hope 
except in him (cf. also, Pannenberg, 1968: 273). 
Conversely, to regard the "Woes" which complement the 
Lukan Beatitudes as an expression of resentment and 
hostility,,, as does Voegelin, resolves the existential 
i*ssue only. by declining to engage with it. The Woes 
express a theme which lies at the heart of Luke, that the 
Kingdom. of God which is at hand is to reverse worldly 
states (cf. the "Magnificat" of 1: 46-55, and the parable 
of the rich man and Lazarus, 16: 119-31). The truth of 
the "Woes" is that those who "are rich now", who "are 
full now", who "laugh now", stand under judgment. Yo 
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explanation of these-texts can be adequate which presumes 
that only "simple souls" will take them seriously. ým4 
Voegelin has succeeded only in explaining away the Lukan 
Beatitudes, not explaining them. 
Vhat Voegelin implicitly repudiates, in his treatment 
of the Beatitudes as in that of Isaiah, is the truth 
that the Kingdom of God (the eschatological realm of the 
Beatitudes) is related to civilizational order not Only 
as a counter-principle, but also as a fulfilment; 
1and 
as 
a fulfilment which is not to be denied a foothold in the 
present. The Gospel would be "anti-civilizational" only 
if "civilization" were itself defined by its impermeab- 
ility to the Kingdom: in that case, indeed, movements 
based on the Gospel could at best succeed in reaching an 
accommodation with civilization. ýIla 
Gospel -Influenced, Radical! sm 
Voegelin's other appeal to the "Sermon on the Mount" 
occurs in the context of a discussion of the anarchism of 
Tolstoy (Fa: 219-21). Tolstoy believed he was returning 
to the purity of a "Christian ethics based directIly on 
the Gospel", but, in Vaegelin's view, he was anti- 
Christian in that he accepted Christian ethics while 
rejecting the "spiritual substance", and, thus ended in a 
self-righteous purism. Against Tolstoy Voegelin, asserts 
once again that the Sermon is "not a code for the life 
in the 'world'; it is addressed to men who live between 




In historical existence, entangled'in the network of 
so6ial obligations, man has to pay his debt to 
nature and is obliged to commit acts in violation of 
the 
, 
Sermon. If struck on the right cheek, he will 
not turn his left, but hit back in defence of his 
life, his family and his community. But in, hitting 
back, he will do good, as a Christian, to remember 
the Sermon, and to be aware that in defence he is 
involved-in guilt and that the man who struck him 
may have quite as excellent "worldly" reasons for 
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the attack as he has for'the defence. Both are 
involved in a-common guilt, both are engulfed in the 
inscrutable mystery of evillin the world, and in 
their enmity both have to respect in each other the 
secret of the heart known only to God (Ibid;, -220). 
This formulation implies that the spiritual substance 
of the Sermon an the Mount is not only irreducible to 
ethics, but is so radically anti-ethical as to offer no 
basis for ethical discrimination either in personal or 
collective life. The Sermon on the Mount, ironically, 
takes for Voegelin the role which classical Lutheranism 
has attributed to the Mosaic Law --to convict humankind 
of sin. To live in the world, one must act pragmatically 
and acknowledge one's failure; one can scarcely even 
"repent", since Voegelin offers no basis for any 
effective intention to act otherwise in future. 
Let us consider one further case. An intriguing 
section of the "History of Political Ideas" (HOOD 
represents St. Francis of Assisi as a saintly radical of 
"unworldly naivet6l' - whose witness is unwittingly at 
odds with the Gospel. According to Voegelin's inter- 
pretation of Francis, "Man is not called to repent 
because the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand (Matthew 3: 2), 
but the life in poverty and obedience is counselled 
rather as the permanent constitution of the world in 
conformance with the life of the Saviour". Francis is 
"superbly sensitive to God's creation where it is-most 
creaturely and least self-assertive", and this is his 
greatness. But his "Joyful preoccupation with the new 
discovery resulted in a distinct limitation of Christian 
experience", in that "he conformed his life to the 
suffering of Christ, not to Christ the king in his 
glary". The Christ of Francis is "an inner-worldly 
Christ of the poor", and not either the "priestly-royal 
hierarch" or "the head of the whole corpus mysticum of 
mankind". But by neglecting the "Christ of the hier- 
archy". Francis jeopardized the civilizational work of 
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the Church. His saintliness was crucial, because it 
allowed his revolutionary consciousness to be, integrated 
into the Church, so that the great schism was delayed and 
the Church was enriched (Voegelin is far from thinking 
saintliness of no social consequence. ); but the political 
wisdom of Cardinal Ugolino (later Pope Gregory IX) was no 
less heroic and momentous, since it led him to protect 
rather than repulse the Franciscan movement. 
Voegelin's position with regard to St. Francis, is 
consistent with his view of the Sermon on the Mount, and 
is open to similar objections. Francis's way of life 
would represent a reJection of the hierarchic principle 
of the Church only if his own life purported to expr-2ss 
the entirety of the Gospel. As Voegelin -says, "no human 
being can conform his life [entirely] to the Messiah"; 
but we may presume Francis to have known this. His life 
calls rulers to conversion., If Cardinal Ugalina's 
patronage was aimed only at retaining ecclesiastical 
control over the Franciscan movement, it manifests no 
more than diplomatic shrewdness. His receptiveness was 
"heroic" only if he recognized that the movement was 4n 
authentic evangelical call for repent. -ance addressed, not 
least, to the hierarchical Church 
,: 
if he recogni=ed, in 
other words that the "civili=ational work" of the Church 
fell under the concrete challenge of the Gospel. 
Voegelin's own view of the relationship between 
spiritual truth and ethical responsibility may be 
taken to contrast with t, he triple fallacy he attributes 
to Tolstoy. Tolstoy does not accept that evil emanates 
from human nature and is therefore "to be remedied as far 
as possible in concrete instances but not to be abolished 
an principle". Secondly, from the experience of concrete 
evil he posits, a generalized, abstract evil that attaches 
to. institutions. Thirdly, personal guilt is attached to 
those who "happen to be the bearers of the institutions" 
(ER: 221). ý3115 
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Ve may sum up. Vaegelin does not deny that the 
"spiritual substance" of prophetic consciousness will 
affect society indirectly, through the personal influence 
of the converted. In his view, however, any attempt to 
modify the structures of "civilization" so that they 
reflect such a spiritual consciousness is metastatic and 
self-defeating. Whether it challenges the civilizational 
obligations of rulers (as did Isaiah), or the accommod- 
ations practised by ecclesiastical statesmen (like St. 
Francis), its purism and intolerance renders it marginal, 
sectarian and divisive. As in the case of Jeremiah, 
therefore, spiritual substance always stands over against 
society. 
The unsought consequence of Vaegelin's position, is 
that civilizational structures (whether of state or 
church) must, in their turn, be inherently closed to 
spirit.: 37 The "regulative function" and the "guidance" 
of spiritual insight is, in fact, repudiated, except 
nominally: for the infusion of spiritual considerations 
into political or economic life is deemed potentially 
effective only in proportion as any confrontation with 
civilizational order is minimized, trim? n d to fit some 
mediating body's idea of what is tolerable. Voegelin's 
care that metaxic structure remain inviolate (expressed 
in his insistence that metastasis is a fall from truth) 
paradoxically leads him to a practical repudiation of the 
truth of metaxy. For if there is only "tension" between 
the prophetic and the civilizational orders, one must 
infer that harmony as well as conflict can., to an 
indefinite extent, obtain between them. His polariz- 
ation, further, means that it is idle to hope for 
pragmatic action that is consistently principled, and, 
therefore, that Voegelin is no better able than is (on 
his account) Isaiah himself to explore how one might 
negotiate the tension between the demands of pragmatic 
existence and attunement to Being. 
t 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INDIVIDUAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 
The problems of human order in society and history 
originate in the order of consciousness. Hence the 
philosophy of consciousness is the centrepiece of a 
philosophy of politics. ... As the consciousness is the centre that radiates the concrete order of 
human existence into society and history, so the 
empiricism of social and historical phenomena of 
order reaches into the empiricism of consciousness 
and its experiences of participation (Voegelin, in 
Lawrence, 1984: 35,36)1 
At the heart of Voegelin's political philosophy is the 
belief that politics is a mode of discourse which struct- 
ures the world in a certain way, and therefore is rooted 
in consciousness. 
For Plato, it is true both that society is an "order 
of the soul" and that the soul is "a social order of 
forces" (OH TTT: 11). Spirit and social structures 
therefore reciprocally affect each other. Social struct- 
ures can, indeed, "destroy a man's soul" (OH 111: 69). 
But Vaegelin has no doubt that there is a hierarchy among 
the levels of reality which must not be subverted, 
according to which consciousness, must always be given the 
primacy over social structures. -- 
To be consistent, therefore, Voegelin must envisage 
a'society's transformation as the reflection-of a 
logically prior change in the consciousness of its 
members. Writing of Hellas,, which he takes toýbe para- 
digmatic, he says that there was necessarily a tension 
between the polis and "the spiritual adventure of the 
poets and philosophers". But unless these enlightened 
individuals were to be mere irritants to the polis, 
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something, like'a Great Awakening was required to 
create a society in wakeful response to the depth of 
the soul, to the new humanity in love of the sopbon, 
discovered by the philosophers. 
The Great Awakening was the feat of the Athenian 
people in the fifth century B. C. - with consequences 
for the history of mankind which have not been 
exhausted to this day (OH 11: 241). 
The "Great Awakening" was manifest in the capacity of 
the Athenian audience to share in the tragic action of 
Aeschylus's Suppliants. That play enacts the search on 
the part of King and Chorus alike for a true justice 
(dike) which far transcends both utilitarian calculation 
and the observance of positive law (Ibid; 247-53; see 
also NZE: 70-73). Voegelin thinks that this illustration 
can bear the weight he puts an it because the Athenian 
audience does not merely watch the play as an entertain- 
ment, but unites itself with the characters' descent into 
the depths of their soul. In this way, therefore, the 
people of Athens are more mature than the people who 
reduced the Judaic Torah to a code of norma-ý ' 
In Vaegelin's view, therefore, it is its "awakening", 
its spiritual stature, which marks the just society. The 
specific institutional order of fifth century Athens is 
almost immaterial: in any case, it is short-lived, soon 
to decay. 4 In keeping with this view, the instrument of 
true social change is also noetic, namely peitho 
(persuasion): just as in the Suppliants, the Chorus 
effectively "persuades" the King to act in accordance 
with dike an their behalf. Once peitho ceases to 
determine policy, the Athenian order "will disintegrate 
and give way to the nightmarish disorder that we find 
described by Thucy'dides" <rbid: 252): the attempt to 
restore it then has to be one of the major themes of 
Plato's work. 
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This instance of personal and of social transform- 
ation embodies a stark assym try, which furnishes the 
theme for this chapter. Personal consciousness can be 
said to advance in truth as "compactness" gives way to 
"differentiation". Such an advance might constitute a 
"leap in being" and so be irreversible, in the sense that 
one is not permitted to forego it. But within the metaxy 
no achievement can be decisive, As Voegelin writes, "The 
discovery of truth by the mystic-philosophers, and still 
more the Christian revelation, can become a source of 
serious disorder if it is misunderstood as an ordering 
force that effectively governs society and history". He 
goes on to identify the "speculative fallacy that the 
transcendental order, which is sensed in the orienting 
movements of the soul, is a world-immanent order, 
realizing itself in society independent of the life of 
the soul". Such a fallacy "lets man forget that the 
world is what it is" (OH 11: 255). This is why. in 
Voegelin's opinion, Isaiah's faith in God's care for 
Israel becomes "metastatic" (and why Isaiah himself 
r, igbtly becomes socially ineffectual) precisely at the 
point where he appeals to King Ahaz to allow transcendent 
faith to determine military policy. 
Now Voegelin's argument may be stated in two forms, of 
which the weaker is admissible. One'can, indeed, 
envisage no social transformation "independent of the 
life of the soul": nor does the transcendent "effectively 
govern" society and history in any straightforward way, 
because it is necessarily always present in tension with 
other causative factors. In this weaker form of the 
a rgument, one may add without inconsistency that the 
psyche itself is always subject to causes other than 
divine revelation, and cannot be transformed independent 
of society. But Voegelin seems to adopt the stronger 
position, that there is no transforAntion at all except 
that of the soul: that as soon as, a single or a collect- 
ive consciousness seeks to be embodied in determinate 
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policies or institutions$ it defeats itself, because "the 
world is what it is" - the world being defined by its 
resistance to transcendence. 
It might immediately be objected against this stronger 
interpretation that Voegelin presents the Suppliants 
precisely as the paradigm case where an enlightened 
consciousness successfully expresses itself in action. 
But such an objection appears to fail, because the 
situation of the drama is posited in such an extreme 
manner as to defeat its paradigmatic function. 
Firstly, the Argives' search for justice leads to a 
decision, but scarcely to a policy. A policy commits its 
adopters to a certain consistency of conduct, whereas the 
decision over the Danaides clearly implies no general 
undertaking to offer hospitality to refugees in future. 
In order to partake of transcendent dike, every 
significant political decision must (unimaginably) be 
enacted with an equivalent rigour, in a process by which 
ruler and people share a profound moral cleansing, in 
which a "leap of being" occurs. As Voegelin explains, 
Not every type of conduct, therefore, is action. 
We can speak of action only when the decision was 
reached through the Dionysiac descent into the 
divine depth. ... A negative decision, an evasion through utilitarian calculus, or a mere insensit- 
Iveness towards the issue would not be considered 
action '(Ibid: 251). 
Secondly, resolution of the dile? nTnA of the Suppliants 
requires "a citizenry that willingly opens its soul to 
the tragic conflict" (Ibld). In the event, since the 
Argives' adversaries are open to no such "persuasion" the 
Hellenic polis must, after all, go to war, and appears 
"through its combination of Dike and Valour in the body 
of the military citizenry, as a shining bulwark of order 
in a very disorderly world" (Ibid: 253). In the tragedy, 
then, the moral discernment of political action supposes 
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a community of saints, ýand is is impracticable beyond the 
bounds of such a community. Again. this is unimaginable. 
It-seems,, therefore, that enlightened consciousness 
can prevail only under conditions that can never in fact 
be operative. When the-unconverted exert any influence 
on political decisions (as they always and inevitably do, 
since "the world is what it is") the enlightened discover 
that "persuasion" is ineffectual. But coercion would 
taint their moral authority at, its source and any 
institutionalizing of the decision-making, process would 
abandon the spirit. 
With the threat of such an impasse in view, this 
chapter will consider two distinct but related issues. 
The first is how consciousness as such (both individual 
and corporate) is related to "social structures". The 
second is how the formation and transformation'of the 
individual self is related to "society", where "society" 
is experienced by individuals as a milieu of shared 
consciousness. 
Eocial Structurps and Consciousnesý 
By "social structures" we mean those features of social 
reality which operate relatively independently of human 
volition, whether individual or collective. It is useful 
to distinguish two levels of such structures. 
The influential historian of the Annales schools' , 
Fernand Braudel, applies the term "structures" specif- 
ically'to phenomena of the longue dur6e, to impersonal 
and intractable forces which far exceed the span of a 
single human'life but provide the framework for all 
lives. Biographical narratives and particular historical 
events are superficial and evanescent, mere waves borne 
an the tides of the longue durde: to take the perspective 
of the individual life (what Jacques Le Goff calls the 
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temps v6cu) is to condemn oneself to illusion, because , 
one has no way of discriminating between the trivial and 
the important,. so that "'real history" escapes one's view 
(Skinner, 1985: 179-98: cf. ýLe Goff, 1989). 
Such structures may be geo-physical, (for instance, 
those of climate and vegetation), or cultural '(those of 
economic or class relationships, agricultural practices, 
etc. ). One will assign to the realm of the longue dur6e 
such cultural shifts as those which are described by the 
sociologist Robert Nisbet as "irreversible": 
Ve axe urban, democratic, industrial, bureaucratic, 
rationalized, large scale, formal, secular and 
technological. The fact that many of us are - 
uncomfortable .... does not affect the matter, - (1966: 317). 
The word "irreversible, 'however, is here ambiguous. 
It is obvious by definition that we cannot'simply undo 
history: and the changes Nisbet refers to are of such 
range and cumulative force that no single group of 
people, and perhaps no single I generation, could volunt- 
arily affect their course. So much is implied by the 
category, of the longue dur6e. But it does not follow 
that we are simply condemned to be governed by an ever.. 
more powerful technology or bureaucracy. Trends are 
reversible, though events are not. ' 
Politics andpolitical theology tend to conceive of 
"structures" differently. A structure here is any 
institution, any procedure, any convention or assumption, 
which-patterns human behavio ur (Blondel, 1 1976: 20-25). 
It might 'be enduring (like a class structure), or potent- 
ially ephemeral (like an Actýof Parliament). Like the 
forces of the longue dur6e such a structure reaches into 
human can I sciousness. Unlike them, it might reflect 
identifiable human choices. 
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To-appreciate the importance of-distinguishing between 
the two levels of structure, let us consider an argument 
given by Tocqueville in Democracy in America: 
When inequality of conditions is the common law of 
, society, 
the most marked inequalities do not strike 
the eye; when everything is nearly on the same 
the slightest are marked enough to hurt, it. 
Hence the desire for equality always becomes more 
insatiable in proportion as equality is more comp- 
lete (quoted Nisbet, 1966: 188). 
De Tocqueville here-identifies, rightly or not, a 
"structure" of social psychology: that the tolerance of 
social inequalities varies in direct proportion to the 
persistence of, those-very inequalities. It follows that 
any egalitarian movement which overlooks such a "law" 
will doom itself to-frustration. ý- But it does not, follow 
that the search-for economic equality is futile: only 
that the approach to it might exacerbate social conflict. 
And conflict may be a lesser evil than rampant inequal- 
ity, Just as one ought to feed the hungry even if one 
thereby lends them strength to oppose one's wishes. 'In 
other words, the "objective" structural facts about, say, 
the societal disposition of wealth cannot determine the 
proper human response to them. 0 
By definition, phenomena of the longue duree'will tend to 
be experienced as, givens, as "dispensation" (Habermas, ý 
1987: 318). - But to invest "institutions" with a similar 
absoluteness (and therefore with immunity from challenge) 
might well be a renunciation of human responsibil'ity. 
,- Now for, Voegelin the primary "structure" is that of 
the metaxy itself, the fact that the world exists in a 
tension between perfection and imperfection. In his 
view, then, there is a-range of phenomena that underlies 
even those of the longue durde,, phenomena that-apply 
universally, though always in a, contingent way. One of 
these phenomena is what one might termýthe necessary 
ubiquity of discontent: 
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At the basis of the experienced-dissatisfaction, lie 
the general miseries that afflict human existence, - 
enumerated by Hesiod as hunger, hard work, disease, 
early death, and the injuries the weaker must suffer 
at the hands of the stronger (OH V: 35-36). 
One'must recognize the inescapability of theseaffli ' 
ct- 
ions, without, of course, resigning oneself to their,,, _ 
specific manifestati. ans. Voegelin continues: 
This general potential of dissatisfaction can then 
be exponentially aggravated by the disturbances of 
personal and social existence through events with 
historical mass effect (Ibid; 36). 
He lists such factorsýas the disruption worked by, violent 
or peaceful population movements through migration or 
conquest, sudden, changes in population size brought about 
by disease and famine or by technological progress, "the 
vast destruction of ethnic cultures by the imperial 
entrepreneurs of the Ecumenic Age",, and the "creation of 
the power differential between the Western and all other 
civilizations through the intellectual, scientif, ict - 
commercial, and industrial revolutions, in the West, as- 
well as the exploitation of the differential to. its 
global limits" -(, Ibid). I 
, But central to Vaegelin's entire, life's work is the 
belief that noesis (or its absence) itself affects the 
course of structural change. This belief separates him 
from the Annales school, It also entails the rejection 
of any straightforward opposition between "dispensation" 
and "institution". 16 For one who affirms the metaxy, . 
neither, fatalism, nor the sense of omnicompetence. is ever 
permissible. 
This position is clarified in Vaegelin's essay of 
1968, "Configurations of History": 
-"Configuration-refers to more than the patterns that 
are observable in history, such as sequences of 
institutions. conceptions of-order in a 
civilization are always, accompanied by the self- 
interpretation of that order as. meaningful, that is, 
the I persons living in an order have particular 
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opinions about the particular meaning that order 
has. In this sense, self-interpretation is-always 
part of the reality in which we live (Voegelin, 
1968b: 25). 
In other words, even structures of the longue'dur, 6e are 
not merely givens. For example, the effect of climate an 
human life is by no means determined in advance of human 
freedom: climate, though in a sense "beyond human 
control", can also be modified by human activities such 
as afforestation and deforestation. 
Nevertheless, as we began this chapter by saying, 
_ structures profoundly affect human experience. In fact, 
as Voegelin recognizes, we need to be aware of the 
structural factors which characterize any historical 
epoch even to understand its philaSophy. 7 So Vcegelin, 
the philosopher of consciousness, also strives to under- 
stand how specific historical structures reach into the 
psyche. His unpublished paper of 1939, "Democracy and 
the Individual" (Hoov), for example, describes the 
, 
vast 
social changes that have occurred since the idea of 
democracy was formulated in the eighteenth century. " He 
points to the immense class of industrial workers whose 
lot depends neither on their own competence nor on 
circumstances apparently beyond human control (i. e. on 
"dispensation"), but on human decisions taken by a small 
group of people over whom the workers have almost no 
influence. This "specifically totalitarian" structure 
affects not only individuals' jobs, but most details of 
their material lives the supply of fuel, water, and so 
on: "The great modern organizations require less of 
personal responsibility and initiative, and more of 
discipline and exactness in obeying orders". 0 
At thehub of his argument is the claim that the 
conditions which make for collective and submissive 
discipline undermine that responsible participation an 
which democracy relies. The era of "the Russian 5-year 
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plan, the German 4-year plan, the French 3-year plan", he 
remarks, may be styled "a period of plan-mysticisme"*. ' 
The "plan" has become in the minds of millions of 
people the solution of their existential problems. 
Not a plan made by themselves, but a plan made by 
somebody else (Hoov). 
The purpose of Voegelin's paper is to identify the 
European social groups which, at the time of writing, are 
respectively the most and the least likely to succumb to 
a totalitarian politics. The most vulnerable groups, he 
suggests, are the lower-ranking officials of large 
organizations; those applied scientists who are trained 
in technique-but not in critical thought and believe that 
any messy situation can be solved-by "doing something 
about it"; those, such as'army officers, -who "are 
democratically indifferent because they lead a life of' 
discipline"; and victims of economic crisis, whether the 
unemployed or the, otherwise disaffectedý(especially 
middle-class victims of the steep inflation). The 
centres of resist, %nce will be found especially in the 
peasant population "insofar as they can still make a- 
comparatively-independent living and don't like too much 
regimentation"; in many church groups (he finds countries 
of strong religious--culture, such as Holland and 
Switzerland, to be less amenable to anti-democratic 
movements); and among industrial workers (who, he-, 
reckons, believe in a different brand of collectivism). 
A. 
The remedies Voegelin proposes demonstrate that$ in 
order to restore the scope of what he awkwardly terms 
"personality--power"-, he by no means disdains action at- 
t he level of institutional reorganization:, 
the social institutions have to be changed'in such a 
way that a modicum of security, is restored to the 
individual. The details need not concern us heret 
the general type of measures are well known: insur- 
. ance against 
disease, temporary unemployment, old 
age, infirmity, etc; relative Job security; safe- 
guards against abuse of Job-security; governmental 
interference in the economic system (Ibid). 
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Because he thinks security of status is a greater prior- 
ity for most people than their "standard of living" he is 
willing to entrust technical economic decisions (which 
most people "could not understand anyway") to experts 
,. 
I do not think that the experts will do a perfect 
Job. They will make mistakes which will cost the 
nation billions. But private enterprise is not 
wholly constructive either but wastes billions of 
social wealth by bad or speculative investment, bad 
financing techniques, bad management. And I do not 
see why the destruction of social wealth should be 
the privilege of private individuals; let government 
experts have a hand in it too (Ibid). 
This analysis is striking for its cheerfully flippant 
disrespect for "private enterprise", which, as we shall 
see in Chapter Nine, would disconcert some of those who 
appeal to Voegelin's work for support. It also helps to 
clarify the implications of what we have identified as 
the stronger interpretation of his position. 
Certain social arrangements affect the quality of 
human experience and significantly influence the communal 
capacity to construct a tolerable political order. The 
institutions which mediate this influence may well need 
to be remodelled and rationalized: further, this remodel- 
ling is passible. The institutions, however, do not 
themselves constitute the political order, which can only 
be discerned at the level of spirit. To change the 
institutions, though necessary, is not to "transford' the 
social order itself. Secondly, even within the realm of 
what can be changed, some social decisions and procedures 
are of central political concern, others (including the 
management of the economy) have such a subordinate status 
that they can legitimately be delegated to technical 
experts. These latter affairs are not negligible: but if 
they bec ame the focus of a society's political passion 
one has the-index of that society's loss of substance. 
For his part, Voegelin treats of such matters only in his 
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occasional papers and his letterst' and never con I sidered 
them the heart of a political philosopher's concern. 
ItI 
In case this detachment be thought unduly aloof for a 
political philosopher, it is worth remarking that the 
"Charter 77" theorists in Czechoslovakia, who ae far from 
disengaged, strikingly echo Voegelin at this point. 
Rudolf Battek, for example, contrasts two ways of life: 
first, "the spiz-itual which includes ethical postulates, 
sensitive creation .... learning and self-discovery in 
openness and progress, and the relevant concepts are: 
feeling, knowing, giving, learning, loving, believing. 
Second, by contrast, the consumez- values_(those having to 
do with .... maintaining one's physical existence) 
include a preference for comfort, surplus, material 
wealth, and the. relevant cbncepts are: having, getting, 
receiving and using" (Keane, 1985: 97-98) According to 
BattA-k, "consumer" considerations cannot be neglected, 
but only the "spiritual" orientation can satisfy human 
aspirations. 
I 
In his sense of proportion, Voegelin once again 
follows Plato. In the Republic, Plato thinks it worth 
assembling at least some institutional characteristics of 
the good pýolis: for example, those concerning the commun- 
ity of wives and children, and the selection, education 
and payment of the "Guardians". At the same time, he is 
indifferent-whether the polis of the philosophers takes 
the form of a monarchy or an aristocracy. Socrates will 
not discuss details of civil or criminal law: 
such, legislative matters. will, take care of them- 
selves if only the souls''of the legislating ruler IS 
are in good order. ... He considers it, on the 
contrary, a symptom of disease in a polis when the 
citizens are feverishly active with patching up this 
'or that gap in the law, but do not dare to touch the 
well-known source of the multitude of minor evils 
(OH TTT: 87). 
,! C 
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Vhat Voegelin holds most influential about. the 
"specifically totalitarian" model of industrial society 
is the primacy falsely attributed to it by intellectuals 
who have lost their sense of the. spirit.. Such false 
consciousness can nourish two opposite but similarly 
destructive errors which a sense of the metaxy would 
preclude: the belief that society can be transformed. by 
means of the reform of institutions; and fatalism 
of the supposed "dispensation" those same, institutions 
represent. 
Individual' and slqncietal c nsciousnes-s"I 
The Reciprocity between Individual and Society 
Voegelin acknowledges such a phenomenon as collective 
consciousness: he speaks of "the self-interpretation of 
an early [cosmological] empire", and of the conversion 
which can "befall a society" (OH 1: 7,10). In Ana=esls 
he explains carefully that such locutions are 
an abbreviated way of talking about the process by 
which concrete persons create a social field, i. e., 
a field in which their experiences of order are 
understood by other concrete men who accept them as 
their own and make them the motive of their habitual 
actions. Fields of this kind are called societies 
if their size and relative stability in time allows 
, us to identify them. Since such fields are processes and not objects given once and for all, 
they manifest not only the processual character- 
istics of their founding and preservation but also 
those of res istance and mutation, of tradition and 
differentiati'ng development, of ensuing rigidity and 
revolt, and so on, until their final decomposition 
and disappearance (An-R: 202). 
". The social fields of-concrete consciousness are not to 
be identified with organized societies", for the "civil 
theology" which-sustains an organized society is only one 
among a plurality of social, fields, which are not 
Ispersonally and mutually exclusive". A fourth century 
Greek, for example, could be simultaneously "an Athenian 
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and a Hellene, a Sophist or philosopher, and a member of 
a mystery cult" (Ibid) -- 
Now if "concrete, persons create a social field", it is 
also the case that the social field forms concrete 
persons. For as was seen-in Chapter Two. Voegelin holds 
that the individual psyche is related to the-whole of 
reality both by"intentionality and by "luminosity": that 
is, -it is both creative and receptive (OH V: 14-16): 
Reality, it is true, can move into the position of 
an object-of-thought intended by a subject-of- 
cognition, but before this can happen there must be 
a reality in which human beings with a consciousness 
occur. ... man's consciousness is quite conscious 
of being constituted by the reality of which it is 
conscious (An-E: 10-11). 
Although, in this text, Voegelin fails to mention society 
as a dimension of "comprehensive reality'., the omission 
cannot be intended as significant. For when he later 
coins the term the "It-reality" (reality considered as 
all-embracing "subject", as against the "thing-reality", 
the world of objects), he writes that the It-reality 
"comprehends the partners in being, i. e. God and the 
world, man and society" (OH V: 16). Since society, like 
God, "the world" (the cosmic order), and "man" (the 
individual as a centre of consciousness), is a "partner 
in being" within comprehensive reality, it follows that 
luminosity of consciousness is, not least, receptivity 
towards society; that consciousness is thoroughly (though 
not unreciprocally or exclusively) constituted by 
society. " 
Societal consciousness is expressed in language, in 
shared assumptions and conventions, in legal and polit- 
ical structures, and so forth. As individuals, we are 
both formed and constrained by-the culture surrounding 
us as well as acting. on it. In so far as we resist some .j 
aspects of the culture, we have the resources to do so 
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only through the strength that comes to usýq in part at 
least, through other aspects. 112 
The Metaxic Tension in Society 
All cultures exist within the various metaxic 
tensions, including that between perfection and 
imperfection. As Voegelin explains in "Immortality: 
Experience'and Symbol", 
It is true, the balance of the tension can shift - 
personally, socially and historically - towards one 
or other of the poles .... Our present age, for 
instance, must be characterized as an age in which 
deficient existence, as well as its symbolic 
expression, is socially predominant. But social 
predominance of one pole does not abolish'the other 
pole and together with it the tension. To speak of 
periods characterized by one of the poles to the 
exclusion of the other would be equivalent to saying 
that there are periods in the history of mankind 
characterized by the nonexistence of Man - though 
sometimes one is tempted to indulge in this fancy 
(1967a: 257). 
It follows that the-psyche is creatively formed'by the 
best in its cultural environment, as well as deformed by 
the worst. 
Naturally, the individual and collective Judgments 
made of the wider society may swing towards towards 
either evaluative pole. So, for example, Andr6 Dumas 
suggests that ancient Greece and the biblical people had 
contrasting experiences ofýsociety. The ancient Greek is 
aware of dependence on the polls; but 
his ideal is'personal autonomy. Barn in bonds' 
he looks for independence. Old Testament man has 
just the opposite characteristics: menaced by 
isolation, he realizes his full vocation in the 
rediscovery, recognition and confession. of-his 
dependence on others (Dumas. 1978: 26). 
Dumas-regards the Hebrew. Testament as the history of a 
"fratriarchy": that is, it concerns the forging, 
-of a 
shared relationship, of equals under, God, continually 
threatened by. isolation on the one hand, and by 
ýI 
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relationships of domination-submission on the other 
(Ibid: 24-46). To stand over against the comminity, even 
once personal consciousness had differentiated, was never 
seen by the Israelites, as an ideal. 
This contrast between the Greek and the biblical ' 
experience of "community" might be seen, as paradigmatic. 
Raymond Plant notes the conflicting assessments of 
"community" made by different contemporary social 
theorists. It is-frequently taken to connote a rich 
matrix of fulfilling relationships by which persons are 
respected in their wholeness rather than fragmented and 
identified with their social or economic functions. Its 
loss is lamented. Others, though, regard "community" as 
implying a stifling, coercive, illiberal environment from 
which individuals urgently need emancipation to attain 
personal autonomy (Plant: 1974: 13-36). 
Though the respective weight given to positive and 
negative societal influence is infinitely variable, 
according to historical circumstances and individuals' 
own pei3pectives, the concept of the metaxy implies that 
"Community" must always be at once both positively and 
negatively influential. In this way, the concept of the 
metaxy is a valuable critical tool, which can highlight 
false dissolutions of a necessarily perennial tansion. 
Dissolving the Metaxic Tension 
In a famous passage of Moral Man and Immoral SocietY, 
Reinhold Niebuhr proposed that every individual, has the 
capacity to be superior to. any possible society: "In 
every human group; there is less reason to guide and 
check impulse, less capacity for self7transcendence, less 
ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore 
more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who 
compose'the group, reveal in their personal relation- 
ships" (Niebuhr, -1936: ix-x). 
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low the metaxic principle we have quoted allows in 
principle that other relationships between society and 
the individual might obtain. And, indeed, one school of 
thought directly contradicts Niebuhr at this point., 
Anthony Quinton claims that "the fundamental principles 
of conservatismý' express "a conviction of the radical 
intellectual imperfection of the human individua4 as 
contrasted with the historically accumulated political 
wisdom of the community, as embodied in customs and 
institutions" (Quinton, 1978: 11)., As Quinton puts it, 
"A radical innovation will have no instinctive emotional 
roots in the nature of those on whom it is imposed"' 
(Ibid: 18). Such conservatives therefore regard laws and 
customs as the fruit of communal wisdom, and individuals 
who challenge the consensus as destructive. Indeed. 
Quinton calls the conservative attitude to traditional 
customs "quasi-religious" (rbid: 19), -'and therefore 
accords them a numinous, "sacred" absoluteness. The 
individual's role is to respect and imbibe the culturer 
the intellectual must respect, imbibe and explicate it. 
Human activities (at least once they achieve the status 
of custom) are immune to rational criticism. 
/i 
But Quinton's argument for conservatism dissolves the 
metaxic tension in precisely the opposite way as Niebuhr-, 
does. Indeed, the argument seems incoherent for a reason 
that is germane to our discussion. As Voegelin-has shown 
(An-E: 202, quoted above), social fields of consciousness 
do not coincide with the politically organized community. 
They and the traditions they preserve are plural. They 
both overlap and conflict with each other. One therefore 
requires some principle to discriminate among various 
traditions one inherits, and this principle obviously 
cannot itself be a "quasi-religious" respect for trad- 
ition. Otherwise, for instance, conservatives would have 
no right to criticize'traditions uncongenial to them such 
as labour militancy, -The individual, simply by virtue of 
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being a centre of consciousness, is' inalienably in the 
position of passing Judgment on society. "* 
Though Voegelin articulates a theory which helps to 
identify such oversimplifications, I wish to argue that 
in practice he himself also dissolves'the metaxic 
tension. For when he comes to explain how the individual 
experiences society, he does so in terms of pr-essure not 
support. He writes that in Plato's Republic, "society is 
experienced as a psychic aggregate, exerting a pressure 
on the individual psyche, which man finds hard to resist" 
(OH 111: 84). "Man is essentially social; to live in 
truth against appearance when the power of society is 
thrown on the side of appearance is a burden on the soul 
that is impossible to bear for the many, and hard to bear 
f or the' f ew. 11 ( Ibi d: 79). 1 1- 
- In-one way, such formulations are admirable. They 
give due weight to the power of social structures, while 
precluding any mechanistic conception of social reality. 
The constraints society undoubtedly imposes an us derive 
not from structures as sucb, but from the collective 
expectations (sometimes appoaching the point of coercion) 
which are expressed through them. They derive, equally, 
from individuals' own predisposition to tolerate these 
constraints and to surrender all personal autonomy to the 
authority of groups and their leaders. And yet this 
predisposition is not fated. As Voegelin elsewhere 
insists,, civilizational crisis "does not by, any means 
have to be borne as an inevitable fate; an the contrary, 
everyone possesses the means of overcoming it in his own 
life". Everyone "is obliged to avoid this folly and live 
his life in order" (=: 22-23). 11 
But though they successfully avoid the trap of a 
determinist pyschologyj such formulations, at least when 
not balanced by others, contradict Voegelin's sense of, 
_ society's embodiment of the metaxic tension between 
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perfection and imperfection, by consistently representing 
society at large as a threat to, not an enrichment of, 
the individual psyche. "To live one's life in order" 
virtually defines for him the philosopher's social 
relevance. But what is meant by the phrase is a dual 
attitude of openness to the transcendent order and 
resistance to the disorder of society, as in the case of 
Plato. Since evil cannot be extirpated from the 
historical polis, the existential search for Justice by a 
philosopher (or by such a prophet as Jeremiah) shifts to 
a concern with "the trans-political politeia that is set 
up in heaven and will be realized in the soul of the 
beholder" (OH: 111: 92). 
Thus the philosopher is formed by participation in the 
transcendent, the "eminent reality", "the unlimited 
ar, cbe, the origin and ground of things" (OH IY: 216), and 
this participation, this response "to the theophanic 
event is personal,, not collective" (Ibid: 217). One's 
immediate environment is always likely to be dominated by 
"folly". The classic philosophers 
had no illusions about their role in the process of 
reality. They knew their range of participatory 
action to be limited to a sensitive alertness to 
disorder in personal and social existence, to their 
preparedness to respond to the theophanic event, and 
to their actual response (Ibid: 218). 
And the situation of these classic philosophers remains 
paradigmatic for Voegelin: 
One of the typical phenomena of the twentieth 
century is the event of spiritually energetic people 
breaking out of the dominant intellectual group in 
order to find the reality that has been lost 
(Ali: 98). 
As examples he gives Orwell, ' Camus and Thomas Mann, all 
of whom broke out from their ideologically tainted 
environments: he thinks their primary social resource was 
the comini nity of great thinkers of the past who had not 
yet lost reality, or who were engaged in the effort of 
retaining it (Ibid). A polarity is therefore established 
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by which order emerges from the transcendent realm and 
disorder from the social environment. Otherwise, why 
should not the philosopher be required also to be 
sensitively alert to or-der-in social existence? 
One-might ask whether society does not reflect in some 
measure the achievment or previous philosophers. Even in 
this respect, Voegelin is not sanguine. ý Of course, the 
philosopher's solitary insight is not without a certain 
social effect. "the evocation of right order and its 
reconstitution in his own soul, becomes the substantive 
centre of a new cammunity which, by its existence, 
relieves the pressure of the surrounding corrupt society" 
(OH 111: 68, discussing Plato). However, the phrase 
"relieveythe pressure', indicates that Voegelin scarcely 
expects such a community to cballenge the dominant 
society. Elsewhere, writing that the response to-theo- 
phany is "personal, not collective", he insists that the 
response creates "a-new social field in history .... 
wherever it spreads, it forms a cultural stratum within 
an ethnic society, though this stratum may be desperately 
thin and ineffective": Aristotle "observed plaintively 
that there, was no-polis in which as many-as one hundred 
mature men could be found" <OH TV: 217). 17 
'0 
Philosophy, therefore, does-create its own social 
field of consciousness. 'a But this field may be so 
marginal as to have no effect on the main course of 
political life. Voegelin ends his essay "On Readiness to 
Rational Discussion" as follows: ý 
Rational discussion an questions of social-order is 
possible; and in a complicated modern society it is 
an essential condition of the social order.,. .. The decisive manifestations of this loss Eof the 
ability to reason] have been the mass and intel- 
lectual movements of our age. In this jungle of 
irrationality, rational discussion is confined to 
important but comparatively ineffe ctual enclaves. 
After centuries of systematic confusion of reason, 
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it will not be easy to render these enclaves once 
more effective. But that is the task which lies 
before us (Vaegelin, 1961c: 283-84)"" 
It seems, then, that Vaegelin is imaginatively 
preocc6pied'with the sort of civilizational crisis in 
which any attempt to carry on a public debate about the 
crisis itself is vitiated by the prevalent irrationality, 
the "systematic confusion of reason": in short, with what 
might be termed the "worst-case" situation, in which 
social viciousness can be resisted only by spiritual 
heroism. He says of the trilogy of Platonic dialogues 
Thaeatetus-Sopbist-Statesman that "the hope for the 
regeneration of the polis through the spirit is gone, and 
the gulf between the condemned public order and the 
representatives of the spirit has become unbridgeable" 
(Ibld: 143). So "the great theme of Tbe -Dtatesman is 
formulated: the royal ruler in his struggle with an 
obstreperous society". In his wisdom such a ruler may 
seek the good of the polis unhampered by constitutional 
restraints (Ibid: 160,159). Spiritual truth, and with 
it social authority, is removed from society at large. 
But if the plurality of traditions and communities 
(which implies that the spiritual standing of tradition 
and comirinity as sucb is indeterminate) counts against 
Quinton's brand of conservatism, it also counts against 
Vaegelin; against his practical emphasis, if not against, 
his formal theory. He might well be justified in writing 
from the experience (both Plato's experience, and his 
own) of struggling for reason in a vicious society. But 
such situations are not paradigms of the intr-insic 
relationship between the "psychic aggregate" of political 
society and the enclaves of spirit. 
"God and man, world and society form a primordial 
community of being" (OH 1: 1). With respect to this 
community of being, and therefore with respect to society 
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which is one of its partners, human consciousness is both 
intentional and luminous. -Voegelin analyses many 
instances of the active, intentional, influence of the 
pysche on society, both for better-and for-worse. -He-. 
also gives a full account of society's threatening 
pressure-on the individual consciousness,,. which is one 
aspect of the luminosity of consciousness towards , 
society, But he virtually disregards a relationship 
which is equally integral to the grid he postulates: that 
by which consciousness, including the philosopher's -, 
consciousness, is luminous towards society-specifically 
in so far as society partakes of perfection as weýl as 
imperfection. 
In fact, it is only by excluding from consideration 
actively beneficent societal influences that Vaegelin's 
prescription for social betterment acquires any 
plausibility. He calls for 
the restoration of spiritual substance in the ruling 
groups of a society, with the consequent restoration 
of the moral strength in creating a just social 
order (BR: 180). 
This proposal is somewhat despairing, since he adds 
ruefully, that "the pragmatic value of this alternative, 
as-experience has shown, is not very high". Plato, 
Nietzsche and Dostoievsky all failed to change their 
respective social orders. Nevertheless, "this is the 
true alternative" (Ibld). But it is an alternative which 
rests on a false opposition between individual wisdom and 
societal llfolly". 2ý10 
The present argument, then, hinges on the claim that 
Voegelin wrongly posits noesis as the decisive cause of 
social order. This argument accepts that noesis is one 
indispensable cause of social order, but states two 
additional propositions, which Voegelin does not deny in 
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principle but'which, lie' neglects in practice. ' The"ref ore, 
these propositions in principle'only complement' Voegelin, 
but in effect correct him. It has already been argued, 
firstly, that'social order u nderpins noesis, as'well as" 
rests on it. ' The second proposition will now be-defended 
through two illustrative cases: that social order (as 
opposed to disorder) also rests on other foundations than 
noesis. In the first case Voegelin fails to follow 
through the implications of a Christian differentiation 
which he acknowledges to-be genuine; in the second he, 
diminishes the scope of concepts (Bergson's concepts of 
the "open society" and the "open soul")-which he 
endorses. 
Reason and Love 
Voegelin quotes Aristotle's Politics to the effect 
that "friendship (philla) is the greatest good of the 
polts", and explains that, in order to be stable, a polis 
must be organized in such a manner that it becomes a 
network of diversified relations of friendship. 
Every human being is a centre, radiating relations 
of friendship in all directions in which community, 
however ephemeral, is possible with other human 
beings (OH 111: 321). 
For Aristotle, however, friendship consists in homonoia, 
in spiritual agreement, and can exist only between those 
who live in the nous. It follows, a fortiori, that 
friendship cannot exist between God and human beings,, -, 
(Ibid: 320-21; NSP: 77; cf. Aristotle, 1976: 258-74). 
Now in The Yew Science of politics Voegelin states 
firmly that Aristotle's position falls short of the 
Christian differentiation (though, he, adds, "in reading 
Plato, one has the feeling of moving continuously on the 
verge of a breakthrough into this new dimension'l): for 
Aquinas insists that there is a mutual amicitia between 
God and humankind (Ibid: 78). By a pleasing reversal of 
the order of Aristotle's reasoning, therefore, one may 
221 
infer that amicitia is possible between "unequal"'human 
beings. And, indeed, in the "History of Political, Ideas" 
Voegelin noticed Aquinas's description of humankind (in 
the Summ contra Gentiles, 111,117) as the naturaliter 
animal sociale, "naturally inclined'to mutual l'ove'and 
helpfulness" (Hoov). 
In principle, therefore, Voegelin recognizes the 
implications of the Christian llbreakthrough"-ý" In the 
important essay, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme"t 
he explains that "the dominant symbol expressing the 
revelatory force in the Christian visions is not the nous 
but the pneuma tou theou": pneuma, "the full meaning of 
the divine saving presence in history", had not been 
sufficiently articulated in classical philosophy. 
Now St. Paul writes that as Christians we can even 
64 rejoice in our sufferings" for "God's love has been 
poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has 
been given to us" (Romans, 5: 5). Fneuma, in other 
words, is the source of love as well as of revelation. 
Equally, love is itself revelatory. Voegelin, however, 
continues to regard nous as the ground of love, not love 
as the ground of nous. As he said in a lecture given in 
Toronto in 1965, 
Since every man participates in love of the 
transcendent Being and is aware of such a ground - 
ground, reason or nous - out of which he exists, 
every man can, by virtue of this noetic self, have 
love forýother men. In theory, this is the second- 
ary phenomenon - in theory, not in practice. In 
practice, we love others right away without having a 
theory for it'(Conv: 10). 
"In theory", then (if, that is, we adverted fully to the 
matter), we would not love others unless we were aware 
that they, like us, have a noetic self which shares in 
the divine nous. 
The more radical Christian perception is that, because 
the "Holy Spirit has been given to us", love is the 
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foundation for noesis, not only its corollary. The 
perception is classically expressed by St.. Augustine 
when, in one of his treatises on St. -John, he refers to 
the double command to love God and neighbour:, 
The love of God comes first in the order of command, 
but the love of neighbour comes first in the order 
of action. ... You do not yet see God, but by 
loving your neighbour, you purify your eye, for 
seeing God. ... Love your neighbour, therefore, 
and observe the source of that love in you; there, 
as best you can, you will see God. ... We have not 
yet reached the Lord, but we have our neighbour with 
us (cf. Augustine, 1954: 174-75, for Latin text). 
Further, Augustine decisively distinguishes this love 
from that Aristotelian philla which is rooted in the 
homonola of "equals". For he glosses the phrase "love 
your neighbour" in terms ofIthe fifty-eighth chapter of 
Isalab: "Share your bread with the hungry, and bring the 
homeless poor into your house 
Two conclusions follow from Augustine's exposition of 
what Voegelin agrees to be the "Christian different- 
iation". Firstly, anyone (including a philosopher) who 
restricts the reception of divine revelation to the . 
direct experience of the transcendent is not wholly open 
to revelation: for the love of neighbour is itself a 
prime source-of tbeopbany. Even speaking noetically, 
one's primary gift to others is not "pointing out the 
right way" to them, but loving them., Conversely, and, 
decisively for our purpose, all of us (including the 
philosopher) are formed spiritually by those who do not 
necessarily enlighten us noetically. We receive as well 
as give love, and other people's love for us is theo- 
p hanic, a constitutive source of our knowledge of God. 
The Open Soul and The Open Society 
Vaegelin appeals to Henri Bergson in support of his 
own understanding of the symbol of the "open soul": 
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The reality expressed by the nous symbols is the 
structure in the psyche of a man who is attuned to 
the divine order in the cosmos, not of a man who 
exists in revolt against it; reason has the definite 
existential content of openness towards reality in 
the sense in which Bergson speaks of 1 "Ame ouverte 
(An-R: 97-98). 
In his last book Vaegelin again cites Bergson, through 
whom 1 'ame auverte and 1 laftie close "allow us to speak 
unequivocally of the existential states of remembrance 
and oblivion" (OH V:, 47; cf. also, Conv: 
For Voegelin, the "open society" means the noetically 
open society. In "Immortality: Experience and Symbol" he 
notes that both scepticism and doctrinal literalism 
derive (in the manner of a falling-away) from truth 
previously experienced, and that spiritual outbursts 
occur as a response to "previous truth and its decline". 
"The history of mankind, thus, is an open society - 
Bergsons's, not Popper's - comprehending both truth and 
untruth, in tension" (Voegelin, 1967a: 256-57). " 
Bergson, though, uses the terms "open" and "closed" 
society with a quite different intention. The closed 
society is any social group, however extensive, which 
invokes. partisan loyalties in order to enhance its own 
cohesion, and which is therefore not inspired by, the, 
attraction of a universal unity or a universal morality. 
The open society is one that refuses to exclude any human 
group from its care and its moral horizon. It is 
mistaken to imagine that our sympathies tend to broaden 
out progressively towards universality, for "between the 
nation, however big, and humanity, there lies the whole 
distance from the finite to the infinite, from the closed 
to the open" (Bergson, 1935: 32). The open soul, by 
analogy, is the one which "embraces all humanity", even, 
perhaps, the whole of created reality, without its 
charity being thereby exhausted (Ibid: 38). 
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It is true that Bergson thinks this openness requires 
an orientation to transcendent'reality. Love for family 
and "fellow-countrymen" is natural and direct, says 
Bergson, "whereas love of mankind is indirect and 
acquired" and we come to it "by roundabout ways; for it 
is only through God, in God, that religion bids man love 
mankind". But this "religion" is donstituted not'by. 
noesis, but by the Spirit's being poured into our hearts., 
Philosophical reason can also reveal "the right of all to 
command respect", but only given what Aristotle and Plato 
would hardly allow, that we can speak of "reason in whose 
communion we are all partakers". It is'only as we exper- 
ience reason in atber people that we discover it to be 
the essential attribute 'of humanity (Ibld: 33,68) 
It is true, also, that Bergson has a place for "the 
select", for mystics. Buitergson's account of them 
differs sharply from Vaegelin's. Whereas the morality of 
a closed society is inculcated by pressure and the force 
of obligation, and is reducible to "impersonal formulae", 
locamplete and perfect morality" is embodied in great 
moril personalities and "has the elfect of an appeal" 
(Ibld: 34). Once again, -such mystics will inevitably be 
open to the transcendent. But they are defined not by 
their contemplative orientation, but by 
the bent for action, the faculty of adapting and 
re-adapting oneself to circumstances, in firmness 
combined with suppleness, in the prophetic discern- 
ment of what is possible and what is not, in the 
spirit of simplicity which triumphs over complic- 
ations, in a word, supreme good sense (Ibid: 228). 
It is clear that Bergson's conception of "openness" is 
far broader than Voegelin 
'As 
long as the focus 
remains fixed on nous,, one may, envisage the philosopher 
as mediating truth to the wider society - to the limited 
extent to which that society can bear it. But to focus 
on the human "bent for action" and, especially, on the 
human capacity for unrestricted love gives different 
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results. Firstly, the "select" are not confined to an 
enclave of philosophers (in ideal circumstances, socially 
dominant), but are indefinitely and anonymously diffused 
throughout society at large: secondly, as I have already 
argued independently, even the authentic philosopher is 
in no way separate from society. 
As a matter of fact, the individual and society are 
implied in each other: individuals make up society 
by their grouping together; society shapes an entire 
side of individuals by being prefigured in each of 
them (Bergson, 1935: 199). 
In particular, philosophers receive from society quite as 
much as they contribute to it. As Bergson asks, "Would 
the philosophers themselves have laid down so confidently 
the principle, so little in keeping with everyday exper- 
ience, of an equal participation of all men in a higher 
essence, if there had not been mystics to embrace all 
humanity in one simple, indivisible love? " (Ibid: 234). " 
Having considered the relationship of social struc- 
tures to consciousness, and of individual consciouseness 
to the "psychic aggregate" of society, we now consider 
the implications of our argument for political theology 
and for the evaluation of Voegelin's own thought, 
Political Theology 
According to Segundo, as we saw in Chapter One, - 
liberation theology characteristically begins from the 
standpoint of "suspicion", and in particular from the 
suspicion that "everything involving ideas, including 
theology" is bound up, consciously or unconsciously, with 
the "existing social situation" (1977: 8). From her , 
European perspective, similarly, Sblle regards political 
theology as a corrective to that privatized theology 
which, it is suspected, has the latent function of 
promoting the churches' accommodation to existing social 
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practices (e. g. 1974: 33-39) 
,-, 
Such a function would be 
no less culpable for being unconscious:, "Before the bar 
of nature and fate, unconsciousness is never accepted as 
an excuse; on the contrary there are very severe 
penalties for it" (Jung, 1971: 31). 
Both schools of political theology are "not concerned 
with conferring an aura of sanctity on politics as much 
as with questioning and demystifying the. political 
sphere": for the "subversive memory" of'Jesus "challenges 
all established order and disturbs complacency" 
(Forrester, 1988: 59; cf. also Fierro, 1977: 23-28). 
I do not argue that this position is false. Political 
theology so conceived has a close affinity with what 
Voegelin regards as philosophy's character of resistance 
to the disorder which threatens to invade or corrupt the 
individual psyche. Vhat is more, it takes up central 
aspects of the prophetic tradition and of the witness of 
JeSUS.. -27 
In particular, theological reflection might properly 
start from the 
, 
experience of crisis or destruction, or 
from one's perception that some social group was being 
victimized. In fact, given such experiences. theology 
had better start there, for no theology is permitted to 
overlook the evil of which it is poignantly aware . 20 
But our account of social reality, while recognizing 
the disorder which is present there (e. g. the I'specif- 
ically totalitarian" characteristics which Voegelin 
attributes to industrial society), has insisted that 
societyand social institutions can also embody love, 
grace and excellence, and mediate them to individuals. 
This experience must. also generate its political - 
theology; for theology can flow from any experience. 
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If political theology allows itself to become ', * 
dominated by the task of "unmasking" societal evil, if it 
is not also able to root itself in some experience of 
society's vitality and nourishment-of individual life, -it 
will become itself an expression of alienation, not a "' 
critique of it. In particular, the rhetoric of "radical 
change" could manifest a destructive oblivion'to the 
"psychic aggregate" which social institutions express. 12`21' 
To caution against a possible exaggeration is not to 
suggest that it is endemic to political theology. For 
example, Guti6rrez (1973: 6-11), roots theology, as a 
"critical reflection an praxis", in certain positive 
insights and experiences: those of charity as the centre 
of Chri-stian life, of "spirituality" as a less restricted 
realm than had been supposed, and of an increased open-. 
ness to the anthropological and historical aspects of 
revelation. 0'0 
Voegelln's Thcught 
I have accepted Voegelin's argument that in so far as 
societal institutions constrain us, they do so not 
through their intrinsic facticity but through their 
channelling of human purposes, decisions and aspirations. 
But I have drawn an his own writings to argue against the 
negative index he attaches to society at large, maint- 
aining that society embodies the same metaxic tensions 
and potentialities as does the individual psyche, 
Now, Vaegelin's emphasis an what we have called the 
44worst-case" situation is readily understandable. We - 
be gan this study by noting that'it was his experience of 
"overwhelming political reality"'that first drove him to 
philosophy (An-R: 3). The continuing intense experience 
of a drastically "closed" society (in bothýhis own and 
Bergson's sense), especially as a young but established 
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scholar in the 1930s, seems to have been so intense as to 
dominate his lifelong political perceptions. 
A vivid example is furnished byýhis three-page'pape'r 
entitled "The Totalitarian Climate" (Hoov).: 31 He wishes 
to explain that Nazi persecution is more sys tematic and 
even more brutal than is indicated by the lurid reports 
reaching the U. S. A. It is designed to create terror even 
among those not immediately the victims of the atrocit- 
ies. As he recalls, 
After the Germans had invaded my country in March, 
1938, I-had to stay in Vienna-still for several 
Mont 
, 
hs. I remember very well that every time the 
door-bell sounded, I looked around my desk for the 
mail which had come in the morning, for notes which 
I had taken, for an address which I had put down, in 
order to shove everything dangerous quickly in the 
stove and burn it, because the caller might be a 
Gestapo man - and once it was a Gestapo man who had 
come to search my home. I am perfectly healthy, but 
in those weeks I developed insomnia because of - 
nervous heart-attacks; they ceased as soon as I was 
in Switzerland. 
Of course, matters were much worse for Jews. Voegelin 
mentions a few of "the hundreds of cases which are known 
to me personally". To cite only one: 
A Jewish physician who knew that he would lose his 
Job within a few weeks was iucky enough to find a 
position abroad. Vhen-he secured it, he resigned 
his job in the hospital. As soon as he had resigned 
he was put in'jail for sabotage. Vhen he came out 
half a year later the position abroad was gone. 
Vaegelin comme nts: "Behind the individual cases there is 
a state'of mind which produces them". It was manifestly 
pointl ess or impossible to challenge details of the 
system which inspired the terror. So Nazi tyranny became 
for him the exemplary instance of his belief that in an 
e vil time, institutional reform is secondary to the 
recovery of order in the 1 soul.: 3ý 
While respecting Vaegelin's own intense experience, 
one can still criticize his manner of 
' 
making it normative 
for political philosophy. Our argument has brought into 
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question what was called his''Isense of proportion"ý, 
derived from Plato. '"His suggestions for the reorganiz- 
ation of political institutions, as we saw, smacked of 
what became''the policies of the post-war British Labour 
Government', so must have looked distinctly radical when 
voiced in 1939 in the U. S. A. But he made them almost in 
passing, and clearly thought that they should not be the 
primary focus of politicians' preoccupations or the 
public' solicitude. -30 
The truth in this contention is that immediate acts of 
insti'tutional reform of themselves and in the absence of 
changed'attitudes, can have little lasting effect, and 
might even rebound on themselves. For example, the' 
attempt to reserve all economic decisions to government 
in the name of "the common good" seems i-nevitably to 
spawn a black-market economy: similarly, the apparent 
institutional gains of a political movement might only 
precipitate a swing towards its opponents. Thus we 
accepted the weaker of the two'possible interpretati'ans 
of Voegelin's position which were outl'ined'at the 
beginning of this chapter: there; is'no'social ý 
transformation "in"dependent of the"life of the soull''. 
Perhaps, indeed, ''this contention would attract dissent 
only from thorough-Soing materialists. 
But we have'argued that Voegelin adopted a stronger 
position, -that there is no social transformation other' 
than that'of the psyche (individual or collective), that 
transformation is a word which applies without remainder 
to the level of spirit. In the concluding chapter of The 
Ecumenic Age he wr I ites that the discovery of the Ground 
does not condemn the field of existing things to 
irrelevance but, on the contrary, establishes it as 
the reality that derives the meaning of its, exist- 
ence from the ground'(OH IV: 324). 
In other words, the created order, including the polit- 
ical order, is meaningful, because it is created and so 
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points beyond itself. Unfortunately, he does not also 
assert its meaning as creation, as something to be seen 
for itself as well as seen through, so that "living one's 
life'in order" requires the effort of "co-creation" as 
well as that of contemplative attention. 
But on his own principle that social structures 
express a "psychic aggregate", any act of institutional 
reform itself has both pragmatic and "spiritual" 
dimensions. If institutions bear meanings (as Voegelin 
allows), then the strenuous effort to change them for the 
better also bears meaning: further, it follows that 
psyche must find expression in either sustaining or 
altering structures. The very search for meaning is 
enfeebled when the effort of shaping societal instit- 
utions is simply delegated to "technicians". 
Vcegelin asserts that concrete injustices can be 
righted only as a consequence of the prior restoration of 
spiritual substance to ruling groups is restored. One 
must also insist that the spiritual substance of ruling 
groups cannot be restored, nor deficient existence 
remedied, without a concrete commitment to the removal of 
actual injustices. This corrective principle is 
illustrated in Martin Buber's account of the "utopian 
socialist", Gustav Landauer. Landauer asks how one can 
invoke the spirit in an unspiritual time, and replies 
that it is the very attempt at the realization of new and 
appropriate social structures that makes room for the 
spirit (Buber, 1958: 53-54). It follows that the spirit 
i. S emphatically not reserved to those who withdraw from 
the struggle to contemplate, and to point out the right 
way from that perspective of disengagement. 
The practical consequence of orientation to the 
transcendent may be expressed through Paul Halmos's 
concept of "equilibration" (1978: 12-13,38-45). Halmos 
is concerned with the practice of social work, and the 
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need to attend both to the personal care of sufferers and 
to the political factors which exacerbate suffering or 
inhibit healing. It is wrong, he argues, to define 
either task in terms of the other; and equally wrong to 
seek some stable synthesis of the'two tasks. One must 
attempt strenuously to maintain the tension between the 
two poles. Equally the tension between action and noetic 
contemplation must not be dissolved by making contemp- 
lation intrinsically prior. It has to be "equilibrated". 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HISTORICAL HOPE AND ESCHATOLOGICAL HOPE 
John Macquarrie (1978: 86-105) offers a typology of 
thedifferent tensions which are felt within the Christ- 
ian experience of hope: (1) between individual and'social 
conceptions of eschatological hope; (2) between hope- 
directed within and hope directed beyond historical 
experience: (3) between evolutionary and revolutionary 
understandings of hope; (4) between appeals to the 
present and to the future as the eschatological moment. 
In order to explore what Voegelin and political theology 
might offer to each other, this chapter will, consider, the 
second of these tensions, though the other tensions will 
also be glimpsed incidentally. 
The question of what can be hoped for, of course, has 
preoccupied thinkers throughout the ages: though one can 
reasonably look to such a philosopher as Voegelin for 
illumination, one will hardly demand a breakthrough or a 
decisive insight. ' On his account, firstly, historical 
existence is neither random nor futile but shares, in the 
eschatological direction of reality. It-follows that in 
so far as the eschaton is a realm of fulfilment, history 
somehow shares in that fulfilment, and therefore that 
hope is not misplaced when directed-towards history. But 
secondly, he offers a rigorous analysis of certain 
dubious articulations of experience of hope which, he 
thinks, have tainted Christian life: one is an emphasis 
on the 
, 
directional movement of history-so strong as to 
obscure the necessary sense of its metaxic structure; the 
other is the secular ideology of progress. 
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But"it will be'argued that', ' compared with political 
theology, Voegelin unduly restricts the - range of'-an 
appropriate historically directed hope, in particular by 
limiting it to one dimension of human experience, 'the 
noetiC and not the political. 
Vaegelin explains that classical philosophy and 
Christian thought both discern that the flux of histor- 
ical reality is neither random nor cyclical, but has a- 
directional, structure. Following Anaximanderi he posits 
two modes of being in reality. There-is "eminent reality" 
(which is symbolized in two ways, as the Arcbe, "the 
origin and ground of things", and the Apeiron, the 
"Beyond" or the "Boundless"): and there is a "limited 
thinghood" which both originates in and returns to the 
"eminent reality" (OH IV: 216). "There is a difference 
of rank between the two modes of being, with the Apeiron 
being 'more reall. than the things. " - 
The Apeiron and the. things are not, two different 
realities in a static relationship one toward, the 
other; they are experienced-as modes of being, or as 
poles of a tension within the one, comprehensive 
reality. Reality in this comprehensive sense is 
experienced as engaged in a movement of transcending 
itself in the direction of eminent reality (Ibid). 
Reality is moving, in other words, "toward a state 
undisturbed by forces of disorder; and the imagination, 
following the directional movement, will express its goal 
by such symbols of transfigured reality as 'a new heaven 
and a new earth" (Ibid: 239). Further it'is only s'uch a 
revelation of directional movement which can constitute 
meaning in history. 
Direc'tionality implies some goal, , some point I or 
state of consummation. The directional movement, 
however, is necessarily a mystery to us: as Voegelin 
writes, the event of consummation, "as it can happen at 
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any time, hangs as a threat or hope over every-present. ý 
In fact, nothing happens; ýand yet it might happen" 
(Ibid). Anxiety over present disorders and onels,, own 
vulnerability to them, however, -can cause one's sense of 
the mystez-y of consummation to be repressed, and 
can engender the vision of a, -divine intervention 
that will put an end to disorder in time for all 
time. ... The aura of possibility surrounding the 
mystery can be condensed into an expectationt. with 
certainty, of a-transfiguring event in a not too 
distant future (Ibid: 239,240). 
Now Voegelin considers that St. Paul advanced beyond 
Plato in his keen awareness of the goal and-of the 
directional dynamic of reality. Correspondingly, the 
Pauline writings concentrate less on the structure of 
metaxic reality itself than "on the divine irruption- 
which constitutes the new existential consciousness" 
(Ibid: 246). When Paul articulates the tension of 
historical existence it is-precisely in terms of the 
expectation of deliverance from the fate of "perishing" 
(phthora) into the freedom and glory of the children of 
God (Romans 8: 18-25). Like all differentiations, 
however, this-Pauline one introduces new possibilities of 
intellectual distortion. Specifically, the sense, that 
reality has an eschatological direction may contract into 
a confidence that, an historically immanent deliverance 
might be progressively experienced, 
Paul himself does, not take this false step., -Though 
his expectation is expressed in "hope" (elpis), this hope 
is not separable from a readiness to wait with hypomone 
("Patience" or "endurance"), because "our salvationlis 
not in sight'l.: 2 But'Voegelin thinks that, the Christian 
movement as a whole lacked Paul's restraint, -and that, as 
was seen in Chapter Four, it compares badly with-18classic 
philosophy" in thatAtAs "more unbalanced through its 
apocalyptic ferocity, which. leads to conflicts with the 
conditions of man's existence in society" (1971a: 77). 
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Much earlier, in his letter of 1953 to Alfred Schutz, he 
went so far as to distinguish within historic Christ- 
ianity "two main components", which he called-"the gnosis 
of, histarical eschatology" and "essential Christianity" 
respectively: 
a historical society can indeed derive little hope 
of survival from 
,a 
religious , 
attitude based on the 
assumption that the world will end tomorrow and that 
social order is entirely irrelevant. If there were 
no more , 
to Christianity than this radical eschato- 
logical expectation, it would never have become a 
power in history; the Christian communities would 
have remained obscure sects which could always be 
wiped out in the event that their foolishness 
seriously threatened the order of the state. But 
precisely because this evaluation is correct, I 
consider it fantastic to see the essence of 
Christianity in thj5destructive component, while 
dismissing as unessential the Church's factual 
evolution into an historical power <Opitz & Sebba, 
1981: 452-53). 
This passage moves from rightly distinguishing two 
components to tendentiously condemning one of them. In 
this way the "Pauline compromises" become not simply 
consonant with Christianity but its "essence": the 
recognition of the legitimacy of the imperfect social 
order, and "the transformation of the faithful living in 
eschatological expectation into the historical corpus 
Christl mysticum (Ibid). Vaegelin's description of this 
second "compomisell is revealing, for it suggests that he 
wrongly polarizes what are complementary strands of 
Christian consciousness. The mystical body must also 
live in eschatological expectation, and one must not 
posit some "essence" of Christianity from which eschato- 
logical expectation is excised. Similarly, the necessity 
for patience and endurance in the face of the social 
order does not simply entail accommodation to it. 
Voegelin's endorsement of "essential Christianity" oveir 
against "eschatological gnosis" actually forfeits the 
Pauline''differentiation. It does so because it repres- 
ents expectation as a matter of gncRsi4s not faith. 
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Paul's "awareness" of reality belongs to faith not 
"knowledge" (gnosls). But, as we have observed in this 
study, Vaegelin holds that faith (and not Snosis) is also 
the true medium of philosophical reason.: 3 In-fact; 
reason itself is grounded in faith. That is, `, reason is 
grounded in a search to escape "ignorance": "Since'the 
search is not a blind desire but rather contains the 
component of insight, we may characterize it as knowing 
questioning and questioning'knowledge" (An-E: 148). ' *As 
Eugene-Webb explains, "One could'not'seek'the truth of 
anything in particular unlessýone already had, as a 
primary source of orientation, a sense of what truth as 
such is" (1983: 359-60). 
When explaining what he means by faith, Voegelin 
commonly appeals to'Hebrews, 11: 1: "Faith is the 
substance of things hoped for, and the proof of things 
unseen" (e. g. 1967a: 235,1968b: 34). At the beginning 
of "Deformations of Faith", an unpublished lecture of 
1977, he explains that the Greek word for "proof" in this 
verse, -'elenchos, lacks any'connotation of formal logic, 
but is'a stronger term than, say, "conviction": ' accord- 
ingly, Voegelin understands faith as a "persuasive force" 
in the experience of reality. Faith discerns that the 
truest reality is not that of phenomena, 
l 
but lies 
precisely in what is unseen (Hoov): therefore, in what 
cannot be the object of Tnosis. 
Such faith is not a merely I'subje 
, 
ctivell experience, 
but is 7the entering of the soul into divine'reality 
through-the entering of divine reality into the soul" 
(OH T: 130). Further, as Voegelin later writes, faith'is 
always marked by a "reflective distance" from its own 
articulations: anyone engaged in the quest for truth can 
become conscious of the structur-e of the quest, 
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can be conscious of his state of ignorance concern- 
ing true order and-be aware that a consciousness of 
ignorance presupposes the apprehension of something 
knowable beyond his present state of knowledge 
(OH V: 40)., 4 
It is important for the argument of this chapter to 
note that, as the verse from Hebrews suggests, faith and 
hope always intersect: for example, endurance in the 
quest is itself both the sign and the fruit of hope. In 
words which Moltmann quotes from Calvin's Institutes, 
hope is "the inseparable companion of faith", - and hope 
"is nothing else than the expectation of those things 
which faith has believed to be truly promised by God" 
(1967: 20)., Karl Rahner, likewise, speaking of "hoping 
belief", implies that neither hope nor faith can stand 
without the other (1975: 84-93, especially p. 88). 
There is, however, one integral dimension of faith, 
expounded by Martin Buber (1951: 24-29,36-42), which 
Voegelin fails to discuss. Taking Jesus's injunction to 
"turn and believe in the message" (Maz-k 1: 15), Buber 
comments that faith is associated with Teshuvab, the 
turning of the whole person: I 
It must further be noticed that the conception [of 
faith] includes the two aspects of a reciprocity of 
permanence: the active, "fidelity", and the 
receptive, "trust" ( rbid:, 29). 
Accordingly, when Buber considers Hebrews he insists that 
the "conviction of things unseen" is not a mere belief in 
the existence of God (which was a truism to the Israel- 
ites), but is a realization of the presence of God to 
oneself and of one's own proper relationship to God: 
For Israel - according to its made of faith - 
everything is dependent upon making its faith 
effective as actual trust in God. One can "believe 
that God is" and live at His back; the man who 
trusts him lives in His face. Trusting can only 
exist at all in * 
the complete actuali_ty of the vita 
humana Ubid: 40). 15 
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If hope and faith are inseparable, it seems likely 
that any conception of faith which neglects the aspect of 
fidelity <faithful action, therefore, as well as belief) 
will lead to a conception of what can be boped, ror- which 
excludes the fruits of faithful action and is limited to 
the fruits of the noetic quest. 
To be conscious of the directional dynamic of reality 
is to accept that one's consciousness, too, has an 
orientation to the future. There is, indeed, a dimension 
of consciousness which focuses contemplatively on the . 
present, but it remains true that decisions and actions, 
because they are not merely haphazard thrusts into a 
void, always express positive or negative expectations of 
the future. In other words, there arises the question of 
hope or its lack; and to speak of a "lack" is to posit 
not only an absence, but the absence of something that 
had better be present. 
The Case of Ernst Bloch 
Now it is possible that a person's sense of the 
"directionality" of reality may be wholly immanent in 
character, in which case hope will have to take the 
form of meliorism, of a confidence (however carefully 
qualified), in "-progress": progress not merely up to the 
present, but also onward from the present. To illustrate 
this point, we shall consider the Marxist thinker, Ernst 
Bloch, whose influence on political theologians has been 
far-reaching. 16 
Part Two of Bloch's vast' work, The Principle of Hope, 
is entitled "Anticipatory Consciousness": by this phrase 
Bloch means a consciousness of the "Not-Yet" which, as he 
contends, drives all human endeavour. Much of his crit- 
iciam is directed against what he regards as failures'to 
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recognize that consciousness is e-ssentially future- 
directed. -7 
Though it is beyond the scope of this study to offer a 
thorough critique of Bloch, it is necessary to reject his 
identification of "future-consciousness" as'the "essence" 
of consciousness. For Christian faith, at least, cannot 
forget its past without forfeiting even its future 
identity. *' 
Mow, "anticipatory consciousness"', as was seen in 
Chapter One, might well be dominated by fear or fore- 
boding, not by hope. But in Bloch's case the character 
of such consciousness is determined by two convictions: 
that an historical fulfilment can be achieved by human 
effort, and that there is no fulfilment which transcends 
history. Recalling the contrast between "this age and 
the age to come" (Matthew 12: 32; 24: 3) he states, 
What is intended by these contrasting terms is not a 
geographical division between this world and the 
other world, but a chronologically successive one in 
the same arena, situated down here (1986: 500, 
author's emphasis; cf. also, -1265-74,1283-98). 
It is true that Bloch attacks "the banal, automatic 
belief in progress as such", but what he opposes to it is 
"militant optimism! ', which refuses to dissociate the 
anticipated future from work towards it: 
It is the revolutionary decision of the proletariat 
which today commits itself to the final struggle of 
liberation, a decision of the subjective factor in 
alliance with the objective factors of economic- 
material tendency (Ibid: 199). 
- Bloch recognizes that there is a'question how far this 
"iii'litant optimism" is even conceivable'. 's So he offers a 
typology of historical possibility (Ibid: 224-41), of 
whichý the fourth and most substantial type-is 'the one 
most relevant to our enquiry. This, the objectively-real 
Possible, refers to "the future-laden definiteness in the 
real itself". "The Real Possible begins''with the'seed ' 
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in which what is coming is inherent". ' This'future- '' 
remains a, possibility, not a necessity, since, present 
reality does not determine any single future: but it*, is a 
"concrete" possibility. Bloch then illustrates what he 
means by "concrete". - 
-According to the, most concrete-of-all Marx's 
anticipations, the essence of, the perfectible is, 
"the naturalization of man, the humanization of 
nature" (Ibid: 240). 
--Vhat is concretely possible, thent''As "the abolition 
of alienation in man and nature, between man and nature". 
Vhen Bloch returns to the subject, he-, arguesýthat Marx's 
anticipation is concrete precisely'because "actual 
descriptions of the future are deliberately missing", so 
that the future is not "pictured in a utopian-abstract 
way" but is "comprehended" (Ibid: 621). - In Marx, 
the "categarical, imperativell first became and 
becomes accomplishable: namely to "overturn all 
circumstances in which man is a degraded, a subjug- 
ated, a forsaken, a contemptible creature"; what is 
best in utopia is given a firm, practical f, ooting 
(Ibld: 622). 
To turn "lack of specificity" into a synonym for (and 
virtually a guarantee of) "concreteness" is a remarkable 
and impudent step. The book's final chapter is replete 
with similar rhetoric: Marx is "unsurpassable", 'the 
unadulterated Marx is "humanity actively comprehending 
ItselP, Marxism "is absolutely nothing but the struggle 
against the dehumanization which culminates in capitalism 
until it is completely wiped out" (Ibid: 1357,1358, 
author's emphasis). 
Now, Bloch is quite aware that "anticipatory 
consciousness" can be, fulfilled only subject, to what heý, 
calls the "aporias of realization"., In other words, as 
soon as any conceivable historical future'becomes, the 
present, it is logically bound to share in the defect- 
iveness of all conceivable experiences of the present. 
Such a logical necessity, however, might be obscured from 
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the imagination by the future's intrinsic indeterminacy 
as future. As Bloch writes, there is always a "still 
unattained aspect in the realizing element which prizrr- 
arily also overshadows the, Here and Now of something 
realized" (1986: 189,193). Yet, realizing this, he 
offers no argument for exempting the Marxist realization 
f ram such an aporia - except by rhetorically categorizing 
the "objectively-real Possible" as concrete, universal, 
firm and practical. Bloch's view. of the Marxist future, 
then, is itself characterized by a kind, of "quasi-faith", 
inthat it goes beyond what is logically entailed by 
historical evidence: true faith, though is not wilfully 
blind to its own character as faitb. 
This discussion is relevant to our purpose, because of 
Bloch's influence on certain political theologians., Most 
obvious is the acceptance of that exclusive future- 
mindedness, which has just been criticized. Metz writes, 
"The modern man's understanding of the world is fund- 
amentally oriented toward the future. His mentality 
tbereft2r, e is not primarily contemplative but operative" 
(1969: 83; emphasis added to draw attention to the 
logical oddity of the "therefore"). Again, 
The golden age lies not behind us, but before us: it 
is not re-created in the memories of our dreams, but 
created in the desires of our imagination and heart. 
Man's relationship to the past becomes increasingly 
a mere aesthetic, romantic and archaic interest, and 
by his archival curiosity for the past he acknowled- 
ges the past as something antiquated (Ibid: 83-84; 
see also the continuation to p. 87). 
Secondly, in Chapter One we noted the contrast drawn 
by Xetz's between God's "future" and human "goals" and 
that drawn by Moltmann between the divine avenir and the 
human futur. These contrasts suggest (wrongly as it was 
argued) that the divine future was not, in history, 
Subject to the aporias of realization. 
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A third, instance is that of the Ileschatological 
proviso", also mentioned in Chapter One, by which a 
theologian will take up a critical (though not neces- 
sarily a,, negative) position with regard to the societal 
present by affirming a transcendent horizon. Now Fierro 
considers this proviso to be a mere device by which theo- 
logians project into the minds of non-believers their own 
absolutizing tendencies. Secular political movements are 
"well aware of their awn relativity and finiteness". 
Given the frequency with which Fierro refers to Bloch's 
writings in The Militant Gospel this is a curious 
assessment, for Fierro must know that Bloch exhibits no 
such restraint. What is more, Fierro's own judgment an 
political movements expresses an unmitigated confidence 
which eschews all qualification: 
The modern versions of utopia are part of social 
theory, entailing a critical theory of -society and 
knowledge of different historical alternatives. 
They are part of a rational and scientific 
discourse, .... land are a] methodical invention 
of new societal forms (1977: 283-84). 
Not only does this assessment fail to be Ilcritical": - 
since Fierro proposes a theology which depends on the 
hypothesis of historical materialism <1977: 364). it is 
odd to find him here assuming that societal forms can be 
"invented". " 
The Ideology of Progress 
To consider Voegelin's critique of the doctrine of 
progress as it was developed by the philosophers of the 
French Enlightenment will offer us an avenue of approach 
to the question of what is a theologically sound hope 
for the historical future. His fullest consideration of 
the matter occurs in From Enlightenment to Revolution, a 
book noteworthy for his incisive use of the source 
materials. 12 
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As Christopher Dawson says of the French, Enlighten- 
ment, "while the new philosophy had no place for the 
supernaturalism of the Christian eschatology, it could 
not divest itself of the Christian teleological concept- 
ion of life": and he cites the Abb6 de St. Pierre's 
confidence that the "perpetual and unlimited augmentation 
of the universal human reason" would quite soon produce, a 
golden age, paradise on earth (1931; 190-91). It may be 
seen, then, that the doctrine of progress in its most 
explicit form reveals the same combination of ideas that 
we have found in Bloch: an explicitly immanentist 
"future-mindedness", plus a willingness to exempt some 
given historical development from the "aparias of 
realization". 
In VoeSelin's view, such expectations presume that the 
constitution of being itself can'be altered. His 
discussion in E2, seekito show that every intellectual who 
aspires to change the world will inevitably "construct a 
world picture from which'those essential features of the 
constitution of being that would make the programme 
appear hopeless and foolish have been eliminated" (Sla: 
100). The "faith" of such thinkers relies on their 
closing themselves to whole realms of truth and exper- 
ience, just*as those ChrisUans who were lured into the 
lignosis of historical eschatology" neglected the rrp-taxic 
structure of the world. The intellectual and political 
consequences are equally catastrophic. 
-In the case of Helvetius (1715-71), for example, 
confidence in progress is the fruit of a pyschological 
iheory according to which persons are dominated by the 
passion of amour de soi, the "guarantee that pleasures 
are procured and pain avoided" (ER: 46-47). Voegelin 
argues that this pyschology is cruidely'reductionist. For 
Augustine, amor sui cannot be understood except as a 
passion which must be subjected (by grace) to amor'DeL 
It is amor Dei which leads to human fulfilment. 
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Helv6tius treats the amour de sol as autonomous, as the 
decisive component of human nature. Persons are morally 
neutral, they invariably follow their interest and are 
not to be blamed for this. 
It follows that social order can only come about as 
legislators subordinate private interests to the utilit6 
publique (Ibld: 47-48,61). Hel v6ti us Is conf ident 
expectation of social progress derives from his belief 
that the public interest can be (indeed, in the long run, 
must be) decisive: 
If we consider that the power essentially resides 
in the greatest number, and that Justice, consists in 
the practice of actions useful to the greatest 
number, then it is evident that Justice, by nature, 
is always equipped with the necessary power to sup- 
press vice and to compel men to be virtuous (F. R: 61). 
"Under a good legislation", therefore, "only the fools 
would be vicious" (Ibid: 49). Thus as Voegelin remarks, 
"the analyst-legislator arrogates to himself the poss- 
ession of the substance of the good society while denying 
it to the' rest of mankind" (Ibid: 51)., As Vcegelin's 
reader is left-to, infer, any advance in the utilit6 
publique will exact a high price. 10 
The objective arrogance of the "analyst-legislator" 
hardened further (Ibid: 75-88). According to the 
Encyclopddie, the Enlightenment was itself the goal of 
all Previous human progress. only now that''prejudice was 
overcome could philosophy be systematized: and no one 
need subsequently consult the philosophers supplanted by 
the Encyclop6die. Diderot, in hi's prospectus for the 
Encyclop6die, claimed yet more. Even future discoveries 
could only supplement, never falsify, the new insights. 
The Encyclop6die is consecrated as the authoritative 
point of reference, for the future, as well as the past. 
-With'his discussion of Turgot, we reach, the heart of 
Vaegelin's argument. To his'crediti- Turgot (1727-81) is, 
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willing to define what he means byIntel'lectual progress, 
namely the "critical purification of science from 
anthropamorphisms". But, Voegelin goes on, "taken in 
itself, the emergence of mathematized science has no 
connection with the problem of meaning in history" (Ibid: 
91). What occurs in the emergence of'science is not an 
unqualified advance, but only a transfer of intellectual 
energy "from speculation on substance to the science of 
phenomena" (Ibid: 115). The concept of progress becomes 
an ideology as soon as "purification from anthropo- , 
morphisms" is taken as the criterion of value in other 
fields than those based on mathematical physics; or when 
"the evolution of mathematical physics, however, valuable 
and progressive in itself, is uncritically used as the 
criterion ofýthe value or progress of a civilization" 
(Ibid: 91). "1 
In addition to-the "critical purification of anthropo- 
morphisms"', - however, Turgot posited a general process of 
progress ofýthe kind we have called I'meliorism", marked 
by "the softening of--the mores, the enlightenment of the 
mind, and the intensified commerce between formerly iso- 
lated nations to the point of global intercourse". 'The 
advance. is frequently interrupted, and many people do not 
participate in it: nevertheless, 'Ila masse totale", moves 
towards ever-increasing perfection" (Ibid: 92,93). 11 
The notion of an advancing I'masse totale" is a 
difficult one. By definition it cannot refer exclusively 
to those few people who, in Turgot's view, are the 
carriers of the human advance. Nor, since Turgot 
excludes some people from the advance, can it refer to 
the human race as-such. Accordinglys Voegelin suggests 
that the, symbol "is the tentative evocation of a'new 
worldly divinity" (Ibid: 94). -That is, -the phrase 
embodies not an empirical idea, but a "political ideal' of 
the kind which we discussed in Chapter Three: it artic- 
ulates the desire for a wholly immanent salvation and, by 
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so doing, seeks to forge the the very collectivity it 
might be taken to designate. "O 
Some of Voegelin's mast impassioned pages (ER: 125-35) 
are given to the analysis of the posthumously published 
Esquisse d1un Tableau Historique des Proffrds de 1 'Esprit 
Humain of Condorcet (1743-94). It is "consciously a work 
of the progressivist apostolate", "an authoritative 
summary of the creed of the community", written when 
Condarcet was in hiding under threat of-the guillotine. 
Candarcet was a, mathematician and wished to apply the 
recently developed calculus of probability to social 
phenomena. Society is "a mathematical mass with ' 
calculable and predictable features", and it follaws'that 
an adequately skilled "Directorate" will be competent to 
devise and direct a programme of human advancement. 
The Esquisse epitomizes the doctrine of progress. It 
illegitimately imports the methodology of mathematized 
science into socio-political discourse: it fixes the 
dogma of progress for mass consumption: 'and even as it 
assumes (following Helv6tius) that wisely altruistic 
legislators will be at hand, it unwittingly manifests how 
grotesque are the consequences of such an assumption. 
For the Esquisse licenses the-Directorate, animated by 
its "universal philanthropy" and adopting the "war cry: 
reason,, tolerance and bumanityl, to use any method, -' 
however ruthless or dishonest, of extirpating "all crimes 
of fanaticism and tyranny" (Ibid: 128,129; Voegelin's 
emphasis). 1-7 -I 
.. Vaegelin's forceful attack an Condorcet is of special 
importance, for its implications extend far beyond the' 
particular case. By reversing its-terms we can identify 
his own most profound convictions. Condorcet has unwitt- 
insly indicted himself as one who 
can make the innocent believe that they enter into 
the truth if they accept faithfully as dogma a 
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prop . osition which no conscientious thinker would 
accept without far-reaching qualifications, who 
create in their victims the belief that instruction 
is education, who destroy intellectual honesty 
through their separation of results from the 
critical processes which lead up to them, who build 
up in the masses the unshakeable brutality of 
ignorant conviction .... (Ibid: 126-27). 
From his examination of the 'French "progressivist" 
thinkers, therefore,, Voegelin concludes that progress is 
an intelligible concept only within a specific field of 
enquiry or endeavour, where definite criteria can be 
given to assess it. The same social process can be 
beneficent from one perspective but destructive from 
another. Technological advances, for example, might, 
without ceasing to be advances, allow trained human 
sensitivities to atrophy, and also exacerbate social 
inequality as power is concentrated in fewer hands. 
Finite lines of meaning (of growth, decay, recovery) can 
still be traced in history. But the idea of pz-c7gr-e--. s as 
sucb is incoherent. The incoherent idea, unfortunately, 
is also effective as a destructive ideological folly 
which threatens dire consequences, especially when it is 
pursued with what Bloch calls "militant optimism! '-` 
Historical Pessimism and Anti-Optimism 
Two different positions oppose historical-optimism. 
Firstly one might share "anticipatory consciousness"t 
but anticipate deterioration., This position can be 
called historical pessimism. It is advocated in "Prepare 
to, Meet. th Doone', a brief, slightly bizarre essay by the y 
philosopher Ernest Gellner which he calls "a sermon an 
the ambivalences of progress, reason, liberty, equality 
and fraternity" (1974: 1-7). Against the "sloppy , 
indulgence" of those "who, though no longer sure, at 
least think that the world might turn out well", Gellner 
contends that "any future counts as disastroust in. terms 
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of our present visions-of the alternatives". He will 
"positively prove that there can be no Justified hope". 
On the contrary, 11 wbatevez, happens is bound to be no 
good" (Ibid: 1, author's emphasis). - By pointing to'a 
simple tautology, he will demonstrate that "pessimistic 
dogmatism! * is not a specific prediction about the future, 
but a claim covering all possibilities. 
Consider, again, the belief in progress. Essent- 
ially it was the conjunction of two ideas: one, 
man's control over his own fate will increase: two, 
this increased power will be used benevolently, for 
good ends (Ibid: 2). 
These two ideas may be'combined in four ways. Dismissing 
from consideration the combination of benevolence and 
power insufficient to secure a happy outcome (since he 
thinks that to be "really our present condition"), he 
cites three literary, works to show the horror of all the 
other three possibilities. "' 
Gellner's argument, if it is taken seriously (this 
seems not quite certain), is a remarkable example of 
"faith" masked as logic. Firstly, he takes the negations 
of power and benevolence at face value, but rhetorically 
subverts the positive qualities-themselves: for example, 
the benevolence invoked by Gellner is of that kind which 
Condorcet claimed for-the Directorate, laced with 
manipulative ruthlessness. Secondly, the argument relies 
an equating incomplete achievement with utter failure. 
Thirdly, the argument is too strong: for on Gellner's 
account, since power and"Ibenevolencell are alike self- 
defeating, no, public good cz)uld ever- have been 
accomplished, and our present state would be quite as 
horrific as any, of his futures. 
Historical pessimism, when it modulates from a 
critique of historical meliari sm into an autonomous 
position, is no less reductionist than the mentality it 
opposes. This is unsurprising: but what is important is 
that nothing less than such an absolute pessimism would 
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suffice to dismiss historically-oriented hope as 
"unreal ist ic". 
The second position may be called "anti-optimism! *, 
rather than pessimism, because it rejects the notion of 
"anticipatory consciousness" as such. Thus, in The Myth 
of Sisyphus, Albert Camus argues that anticipatory 
consciousness is merely a psychologically necessary 
illusion: 
Everything that makes man work and, get excited 
utilizes hope. The sole thought, that is not 
mendacious is therefore a sterile thought. In the 
absurd world the value of a notion or of a life is 
measured by its sterility (1975: 66). 
According to Camus, on the contrary, "The important 
thing, as Abb6 Galiani said to Mme d'Epinay, is'not to be 
cured, but to live wth one's ailments". By refusing the 
recourse to hope, Sisyphus becomes-"superior to his 
fate", "stronger'than his rack": the world without a 
=aster is now neither sterile nor futile, because the 
struggle is "enough to fill a man's heart. One must 
Imagine Sisyphus happy" (Ibid: 41,109,111). With this 
conclusion, paradoxically, Camus himself offers his 
reader a kind of hope, that "happiness" can be found 
entirely in the quality of one's own obduracy, without 
regard to the state of the external world-ý' 
This sense of the futility of history is sometimes 
directed specifically at politics. The narrator of 
Julian Barnes! s novel, Starin8, at the Sun writes, 
Gregory had little interest in politics. To him the 
history of his country consisted of a neurotic 
shuffle between repression and anarchy, and the 
periods praised for their stability were merely'' 
chance instants of balance, points at which both 
anarchy and repression had their appetites grat- 
ified. When the state was being 'nasty it called 
itself decisive; when sloppy, it called itself 
democratic (Barnesý 1986: 168). 
Naturally, if "the state" is thus hypastatized, if it is 
depicted as intrinsically and equally corrupt whatever 
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its specific-structures and pracedures, all ethically 
inspired engagement in the political realm becomes 
pointless. =: 2 
The optimistic "future-mindedness" we, have, so far 
discussed is entirely immanentist. Of itself, though, 
theism is naturally no proof against a failure to engage 
seriously with the negative potential of the future. 
Perhaps the most plausible Christian reduction of "hope 
against hope" into optimism stems from the imaginative 
construct by which God's Kingdom is envisaged as'being in 
continuity with some given set of social circumstances. 
Accordingly, we noted in Chapter One Leander Keck's 
insistence that the Kingdom of God "is not the fulfilment 
of the present but a rectifying alternative to it" (1972: 
222). As he explains, 
Jesus's career exemplifies the words, "My ways are 
not your ways". This is why the Kingdom of God is 
not simply the extension of anyone's present into 
the future where it is consummated, but is rather 
the future's claim to restructure everyone's 
present, including present understandings of God 
(Ibid: 225). 
To restructure. however, is not to reverse. If God 
is truthfully revealed and apprehended in history, 'this 
must occur not least through our present experiences of 
goodness, beauty and truth. Any attempt to understand 
"God's Kingdom! ' must assume that these experiences are 
not delusions, that they will'be deepened and purified in 
the Kingdom but will not simply be "rectified". As Keck 
says, "the effectuation of God's rule means overturning 
those aspects of the present which defy God's godhood and 
fulfilling those aspects of the present which affirm it 
and reflect it in anticipation grounded in trust" 
(Ibid: 221, cf . also Brabant, 1937: 164-88). 
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It is from a similar perspective'that Moltmann offers 
Prometheus and Sisyphus as respective symbols of two 
alternative sins against hope., presumption and despairý 
Presumption is a premature selfwilled anticipation 
of the fulfilment of what we hope for from Gad. 
Despair is the premature, arbitrary anticipation of 
the non-fulfilment of what we hope for from God. .. 
Prometheus, who stale fire from the gods, stood in 
contrast to the figure of the obedient servant of 
God. ... Sisyphus certainly knows the pilgrim way, 
, and 
is fully acquainted with struggle and decision 
and with patient toil, yet without any prospect of 
fulfilment (Moltmann, 1967: 23,24). 
If Prometheanism is, the assumption that transcendent 
fulfilment is the extrapolation of finite achievementt 
one might adopt the term Sisy . phism to indicate the 
contrary conviction, that transcendent fulfilment is 
altogether discontinuous with (and therefore, absent 
from). history. The term is adopted from Camus. A theist 
Sisyphist will accept that history has an eschatological 
telos,, but only in the restricted, sense that the 
eschaton, by definition, closes history. Transfigured 
reality postdates history, so to say, but scarcely 
consummates it; the Kingdom can be awaited but not 
anticipated. Sisyphism therefore postulates eternity as 
a separate order of existence to that of history. Like 
Prometheanism, Sisyphism claims knowledge of the 
transcendent significance of-historical events - namely 
that it is nil! 2ý3 
There is a sense in which Moltmann's account of 
Prometheanism and Sisyphism begs an important question. 
To align them with presumption and despair respectively 
is to-characterize them as sinful falsehoods. But it is 
not self-evidently false to discern in historical events 
anticipations of the fulfilment promised for the Kingdom; 
nor it is self-evidently false, on the contrary, to 
experience history as-subject to futility, as an arena in 
which hopes are inevitably frustrated, so that it is at 
beat the training-ground for individuals' virtue (which 
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will be rewarded eschatologically). ý16- As emphases, 
Prometheanism and'Sisyphism both elucidate human exper- 
iences. By the same token neither can claim validity to 
the exclusion of the other. 
How formidable is the problem of relating historical 
to eschatological hope, may be seen in the work of Paul 
Tillich and John Macquarrie. In accepting the notion of 
the future as horizon, both of them presume that the 
horizon is a transcendent one. As Tillich writes, 
In every creative act progress is implied, namely, a 
step (Sressus) beyond the given. In this sense the 
whole movement of history is progressive. It prog- 
resses to the particularly new and tries to reach 
the ultimately new (1968,111: 354). 
Macquarrie speaks similarly of a "tacit hopefulness which 
seems to be diffused through all human existing and 
acting", and which is the condition of any "investment in 
the future" (1978: 4). Rather as Tillich apeaks of a 
drive which reaches out both to the "particularly new" 
and the "ultimately new", Macquarrie affirms the 
possibility of "a full Christian hope -a total hope" 
which embraces both history and a re alm which transcends 
history (Ibid: 106-07). Such formulations, of course, do 
n ot themse lves clarify the x-elationsbip between those 
achievements which are feasible in history and those 
which must await the eschaton, though it is clear that 
for Tillich and Macquarrie history cannot be the theatre 
of any absolute fulfilme'nt. 
Tillich seems to envisage the relationship between the 
"particularly new" and the "ultimately new" primarily in 
terms of discontinuity. The "ultimately new" connotes 
for him the summum bonum. But the "particularly new", 
since it is defined only as a "step beyond the given", 
might represent regress and degeneration, taking one away 
from, not towards, the telos. 
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In the moral realm, he distinguishes between what 
progress is possible for an individual and what is 
possible for a culture (1968,111: 354-61). Cultures 
offer more or less support to the exercize of individual 
creative freedom, and can contribute to moral education, 
because "moral education belongs to culture and. not to 
the moral act itself" (Ibid: 355): but a moral act is in 
every case the discrete exercise of an individual's free 
decision. Tillich therefore argues that a culture's 
moral "progress" towards "the principle of humanity" 
(that is, towards "creating the formed personality" and 
towards social justice) can only be "quantitative",. not 
"qualitative". A culture might progress "in breadth and 
ref 
I 
inement", for instance, but cannot progress, in 
intrinsic moral status. It follows that, speaking in 
terms of morality, the "movement of history" cannot 
contribute to the "ultimately new", even though the 
unavailingattempt to do so is built into the logic of 
all human action, into the Sressus beyond the given. 2s 
In using the phrase "total hope", Macquarrie, clearly 
posits a continuity between history and eschatology. But 
his argument introduces a fundamental problem. Following 
A. E. Taylor, he allows that any historical gain will 
entail some corresponding loss; unsought of course, 
perhaps unforseeable. If historical gains are to be more 
than apparent, therefore, one needs-criteria by which 
gains in communal welfare can be weighed against lasses. 
But it is difficult to see where such criteria could be 
discovered. 2MI 
An impasse threatens. If. historical gains always . 
bring with them correlative losses, then "total hope" is 
split, since only the transcendent zu=um bonum can be 
worthy of hope. One cannot resolve the impasse by 
insisting that historical gains, though never absolute, 
are at least substantial. For the very question at issue 
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is whether they count for anything at all, whether they 
are only incomplete (which we should expect) or are 
systematically self-cancelling. If the latter were the 
truth, then even though anticipations of the Kingdom 
might still be glimpsed within history, they would have 
no worth other than as pointers to a future state that 
would, when effectuated, abrogate history. Sisyphism. 
would be the only position compatible with a Christian 
eschatology. 
After drawing an the work of Tillich and Macquarrie to 
set out the problematic of the relationship of history to 
eschatology, we now return to VoeSelin's discussion o. f 
St. Paul. He finds the Pauline writings to be dominated, 
by "the assurance of immortalizing transfiguration 
through the vision of the Resurrected". This "vision of 
the Resurrected" "assured Paul that the transfiguration 
of reality had actually begun and would soon be completed 
by the Second Coming" (OH IV: 256,268). The Pauline 
assurance is subject to a potential distortion, namely 
the assumption that one has discerned not merely meaning 
In history, but the meaning of history. Such an 
assumption, in turn, might well lead one 
to abolish the tension between the eschatological 
telos of reality and the mystery of the transfig- 
uration that is actually going on within historical 
reality. The Pauline myth .... validly expres- 
ses the telos of the movement that is experienced in 
reality, but it becomes invalid when it is used to 
anticipate the concrete process of transfiguration 
within history (Ibid: 270, cf. also, 248-49). 
Now it would be wrong, on the basis of this text, to 
i. nterpret Vaegelin as denying to eschatology any histor- 
ical reference. In fact, one critic does make such a 
charge, namely that Voegelin virtually prescinds from the 
Christian notion that "God is actively present in the 
world transforming it in anticipation of the consummation 
of His Kingdom! ' (Douglass, 1978: 149). But as Voegelin 
writes elsewhere. "With the appearance of Jesus, God- 
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himself entered into the eternal present of history. The 
Kingdom of God was now within history, though not of it" 
(OH 1: 345). Of course, the eschatological present, no 
less than the future, remains a mystery. It cannot be 
confidently recognized, still less be associated with 
one's own civilizational action. Thus in a letter of 
1953 to Alfred 
, 
Schutz, he wrote that eschatology 
- 
islunderstood. by all important Christian thinkers as 
a symbolism, as an eternal presence of the Judgment. 
Yet, remarks constantly recur indicating that the end 
of the world and the transfiguration of creation are 
taken to be sense-perceived real phenomena (Opitz & 
Sebba, 1981: 456). 
History, 




f uture" (CUj 
then, acquires 
the end itself 
the end cannot 




a meaning under the shadow of 
reaches into history. But the 
be identified as one pheno- 
in say only that "the history 
unknowably into an indefinite 
Now as long as one moves, like Paul, in "an open field 
of theophany" (Ibid: 259), the experience of-eschato- 
logical process complements rather than contradicts the 
awareness (so fundamental to Plato) of the structure of 
metaxic existence. As we have seen, however, Voegelin 
argues that Paul's very advance beyond Plato becomes, 
when torn out of its experiential context, the catalyst 
for new noetic deformations, as consciousness of the 
movement towards the beyond threatens to become an 
"obsessive illumination", -blinding one 
to-"the contextual 
structure of reality" (Ibid: 20; OH IV: 20). a7 
Vaegelin-elsewhere', (Sla: 88-92), offers-a concise- -` 
account-of the structure of, such noetic deformations. He 
distinguishes-two components in "the Christian idea of 
perfection": the-teleological component in which, through 
"sanctification of life", one can move towards the goal 
of perfection (so participating-in the goal, -at least by 
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one's, being attractedýto it); and the axiological - 
component, the telos of perfection itself, the-state of 
highest value. S a, for example, "progressivism! ', by 
which it is imagined that society can smoothly approach 
some ideal state of the thinker's own choice, immanent- 
izes the teleological component: and any articulation of 
a fully achieved social "ideal state" (or of a fully 
achieved negation of societal evil), innianentizes the 
axiological component: a-third deformation, which 
Voege1in calls "activist mysticism! ' is the, type of 
speculative construction which both describes the ideal 
society and prescribes the means to bring it about. 
Thus, in Voegelin's view, the French thinkers referred 
to earlier in this chapter immanentize the Christian 
teleology: 213 Thomas More's Utopia (to which I shall 
refer in Chapter Ten) immanentizes the axiological 
component: and the "activist mystics" Voegelin has in 
mind are Comte and Marx (whose case will be considered in 
Chapter Nine) (SZa 88-92). The political theology we are 
considering would probably be classed by Voegelin as 
activist mysticism, since it unites "future-mindedness" 
with'a concern for praxis. 
From his reading of St. Paul, therefore, Voegelin- 
concludes that one cannot specify which facets of history 
are genuine anticipations of transfigured reality: for 
their identification must always be subject to the 
metaxic tension between ignorance and knowledge. 2-'O 
Nevertheless, since the eschaton is present in history, 
history--must contain'anticipations of transfigured 
reality, even though they cannot be securely'identified 
from onel's, own perspective within history. It is at this 
point-that Vaegelin's central concept of the'metaxy 
illuminates-our theoretical problem about the status of 
history. For whereas the Sisyphist holds that historical 
anticipations-have value only as'signs of the trans- 
cendent consummation, for Voegelin the anticipations 
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themselves are subject to the tension between fulfilment 
and non-fulfilment: they participate in the transcendent 
reality they point to. 
Voegelin's Restricted Conception of Hmpe 
According to Voegelin's discussion of Pauline 
thought, ' therefore, fulfilment as well as non-fulfilment 
is experienced within history. Therefore, even though 
one can never predict the future occurrences which would 
vindicate one's present hopes, it is reasonable to 
believe that the historical future will somebow validate 
them, though never without qualification. In this way, 
the impasse we have identified is resolved: since the 
eschaton reaches into the present there is no event or 
act which is "merely" historical, or which is open to 
exclusively "quantitative" assessment. 
This position offers ample ground for a historically 
based hope that is quite distinct from vulgar optimism. " 
But Vaegelin does not choose to develop this insight. 
More unfortunately, certain of his emphases undermine it. 
I shall identify two such instances briefly, and consider 
a third more fully. Firstly, we have just cited his 
recognition that eschatological thought symbolizes the 
"eternal presence of the Judgment" within history. But 
this is a partial formulation: for if the eschaton 
reaches into history, the "whole eschaton", so to speak, 
must reach into the whole of history. ý31 The eschaton 
must, therefore, be present not only as judgment but also 
as blessing. and fulfilment, not least in human capacities 
a nd actions. In fact, as we saw at the beginning of1this 
chapter, Voegelin recognizes that the event of transfig- 
uration "hangs as a threat or hope over every present", 
(OH IV: 239). 
It is significant that he metaphorically locates 
eschatological judgment "within" history, but eschato- 
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logical transfiguration "over" it. We may look to 
Moltmann for a corrective: I 
History and eschatology cannot be metaphysically 
divided, as this world and the next, in the world 
and out of the world. Nor can the two merely be 
brought to paradoxical identity in the single point 
of the eschatological moment. Through his mission 
and his resurrection Jesus has brought the kingdom 
of God into history. As the eschatological future 
the kingdom has become the power that determines the 
present (1977: 192). 
Voegelin never stresses this truth, though it is implicit 
in the Pauline experience of theophany an which he 
meditates that the divine blessing possesses historical 
efficacy. What is more, if Moltmann's statement is 
correct, it is also reversible and one must say, with 
Rahner, that our history is definitive in the presence of 
God (1975: 89). 
A second instance pertains to Voegelin's critique, 
considered above, of the ideology of progress. Thus, he 
sums up the thought of d'Alembert as follows: 
the deceptive picture of a, progressive civilization 
arose in which the advancement of science seemed to 
compensate amply for the atrophy of other civilizat- 
ional values (ER: 79). 
There is no need to dissent from this summary. But 
Voegelin makes his critique from a position which itself 
embodies a dubious myth of decline. Thus, over against 
Turgot's detection of a general advance of the masse 
totale, a "softeninS of mores", VoeSelin identifies an 
overall decline in sensibility through the same modern 
epoch. In Machiavelli's tension between virtt) and 
fortuna, for instance, there remains alive a sense of 
t ragedy, "the Polybian shudder in the face of hi story" 
(for an explanation of the phrase, cf. OH TV: 131-32). 
Such awareness has given way "first to the hypocritical 
optimism of competitive society which ignored the victims 
of progress, and later to the frank brutality of the 
collective era which acknowledged with a_shrug that 
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shavings will fly when planing is going on" (Voegelin, 
1951 1 a: 158). Voegelin would endorse Berdyaev's moral 
condemnation of any optimism which regards the sufferings 
of one generation primarily as means to some future 
consummation: such a future would "devour its past" 
(1936: 187,190). -*I= Though the compassion inherent in 
this position does him credit, it also leads him to the 
kind of generalization (e. g. "the frank brutality of the 
collective era") which he would criticize ruthlessly in 
other thinkers. 
He stresses that Plato's account of the progressive 
disintegration of the good society is told as a story 
and is not meant as a history of decline (CH 111: 117). 
But elsewhere-, in discussing Hesiod's fable of "The Ages 
of the World", he claims that the notion that the 
successive ages are getting worse "has ita independent 
source in the experIence of decline in the course of 
history" (CH 11: 150, emphasis added):, or again, that 
The symbolism of better, preceding ages, and in 
particular the happy innocence of the Golden Age, 
originates in the experience of historical deterior- 
ation of society (Ibid. - 156). ý3: 3 
Now, it has been noted throughout this study that 
slexperience" is for Voegelin a weighty term. But a 
process of historical deterioration which covers a 
succession of generations, can hardly be experienced. A 
sense of decline has no higher epistemological status 
than a sense of progress, and is symmetrical to it. Both 
decline and progress are second-order interpretations of 
experience rather than experiences themselves, and each 
requires one to select for attention certain particular 
phenomena from the entire social flux. Yet Voegelin 
characterizes decline as an "experience" and progress as 
a "deceptive picture". 
The third instance of Voegelin's restriction of the 
range of hope is especially important. It concerns his 
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account of the potentialities of`humari natUrell-its-elf. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, his claim that "the'nature of 
man is constant" (OH Ii 60) by no means posits-a rigid 
framework of human characteristics and possibilities, 'but 
means that every human being has the same constitutive 
experience of metaxic participation (both active and 
receptive, by creation as well as by response) in a 
fuller reality (cf. also An-E: 71-88,172). For him, 
therefore, it is tautologous to assert that human nature 
cannot change within history. 0-4 
But in the transcript of'what reads as'a somewhat 
acrimonious conversation with the Marxist theorist Lucien 
Goldmann, VoeSelin, invoking the Thomist distinction 
between the transcendent and immanent domains of being, 
locates 'Illid6e chr6tienne de vie parfaite" in the v1sio 
beatifica, and condemns the "r6gression" by which this 
telos of human life (namely, "une humanit6 r6ellement 
nouvelle") is sought within historical existence (1961a: 
136). Voegelin therefore implies that human beings, 
though unchanging, can perversely seek to change. 
At this point we must identify our precise criticism 
of Vaegelin. To dissent from him, clearly, does not 
commit one to endorsing Goldmann's own scepticism about 
transcendence. Rather, our criticism concerns the 
dissimilar capacity for "development" which Voegelin 
attributes (whether to individuals and to groups), 
according as they are considered as embodiments of the 
zoon noetikon or of the zoon politikon. ý3r- 
Thus, he expresses a robust hope in the possibility of 
a renewal of noetic life. He finds it, naturally, in 
individuals: notably in such "spiritually energetic 
people" as Orwell, Camus and Thomas Mann, who proved able 
to break out from their respective ideological environ-' 
ments (Ali: 98-99), but also in the students who were 
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helped by such thinkers to an intellectual catharsis 
(An-R: 171-72). And, with somewhat, mare ambivalence, he 
suggests that the present time is propitious for this 
renewal to be socially efficacious Conv: 16-20),. There 
remains the problem, he admits, that even the most cogent 
critics of-ideology might be at a loss as to what 
positive positions are tenable, as well as the different 
problem of the power still exerted (for example, in 
governments and academic institutions) by the ideolog- 
ists. Nevertheless, he argues that the major ideologies 
(of indefinite progress, of "Hegelian historicism! ', of 
psychoanalysis) are "exhausted", having each been 
criticized so effectively and so fundamentally as to lose 
all claim to respect. ý34-- 
But the possibility of this renewal is confined to the 
zoon noetikon: in the process of history, 
man's nature does no more than become luminous for 
its eschatological destiny. The process of its 
becoming luminous, however, though it adds to the 
, understanding of human nature and its problems, does 
not transmute human nature in the here and now of 
spatto-temporal existence (Al: '126). 
Such an advance constitutes an experience of the teleo- 
logical component of perfection in the realm of noesis. 
However, Vaegelin does not envisage any analogous 
political advance. In Science, Politics and Gnosticism, 
though allowing that we all have good cause to be dissat- 
isfied with our situation in the world, he attacked the 
"Snostic" belief that, 
the order of being will have to be changed in an historical process. From a wretched world a good 
one must evolve historically. This assumption is 
not altogether self-evident, because the Christian 
solution might also be considered - namely that the 
-world throughout history will remain as it is and that man's salvational fulfilment is brought about through grace in death. ... Since, therefore, there is no fulfilment in this world, Christian life 
on earth takes its special form from the life to 
come in the next (SM: 87,88)'. 
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One would have expected him simply to suggest that one of 
the-metaxic tensions is that between fulfilment and non- 
fulfilment. ' In that case the zoon politikon would 
rightly be equivalent to the zoon noetikon. In both 
realms, one can experience advance: but, within the 
metaxy, one can experience perfection teleologically, but 
not axiologically. But he here implies that "fulfilment" 
is a state, present or absent in its entirety - and 
therefore, as far as history is concerned --absent. He 
never retracted this point, though in his later writings 
he refrained from making it. 
Political action, then, is for Vaegelin at best a 
matter of secondary importance, because it cannot accomp- 
lish any result in a given social matrix analogous to the 
per'la8-pge of the individual: namely, a significant shift 
to the pole of truth over untruth, justice, over exploit- 
ation. love over collective self-seeking. At worst, it 
compounds human misery by systematically distracting one 
from the only proper response, the noetic search for 
enlightenment. Similarly, he thinks that any seeming 
experience--of political or historical fulfilment cannot 
be a genuine though partial anticipation of the Kingdom. 
It must be an illusion. Simultaneously, he supplies what 
he regards as the "Christian solution", defining Christ- 
ian life not by the present following of Jesus (empowered 
by a grace given within one's concrete life), but by'a 
salvation which can be received-only by "grace in death". 
Such a split surely betrays Voegelin's account of a 
"human nature" which is unified, at once noetic, 
political-and historical. C37 
The implications for politics, considered as the 
form of life in which continuous societal flux is made 
the matter of individual or communal deliberation, are' 
plain. To speak of "deliberation" signifies that 
reflection is oriented towards appropriate action. And 
Iscivilizational action" (which category must logically 
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include "political-action") is a concept which Voegelin 
deeply distrusts, as we saw in Chapter Two when 
discussing Pascal: 
Gnostic speculation overcame the uncertainty of 
faith by receding from transcendence and endowing 
man and his intramundane range of action with the 
meaning of eschatological fulfilment. In the 
measure in which this immanentization progressed 
experientially, civilizational activity became a 
mystical work of self-salvation. The spiritual 
strength of the soul which in Christianity was 
devoted to the sanctification of life could now be 
diverted into the more appealing, -more 
tangible, 
and, above all, so much easier creation of the 
'terrestrial paradise. Civilizational action became 
a divertissement, in the sense of Pascal, but a 
divertissement which demonically absorbed into 
itself the eternal destiny of man and substituted 
for the life of the spirit <NIjE: 129). 
our criticism of this lurid passage will aum UP 
our discussion of the third instance of Vaegelin's, 
restriction of the proper content of Christian hope. 
Speaking axiologically, the noetic sanctification of life 
is quite as unattainable within history as is the trans- 
formation of society. Speaking teleogically, since the 
eschaton reaches into the present it follows that 
"intramundane action" can indeed, have "the meaning of 
eschatological fulfilment". Therefore, it is possible 
(though not, of course, certain) that civilizational 
action might be undertaken with no expectation that it 
will achieve either "self-salvation" or a" terrestrial 
paradise". In that case, civilizational action can be 
gr, aced action, an expression of the sanctification of , 
life, rather than a divertissment from it. As Reinhold 
Niebuhr writes, 
The struggle for justice is as profound a revelation 
of the possibilities and limits of historical 
existence as the quest for truth. In some respects 
it is even more revealing because it engages all human vitalities and powers more obviously than the 
intellectual quest (1943: 253). 
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In-representing civilizational action as intrinsically 
a divertissement Vaegelin gives plausibility (at least in 
this instance) to Fierro's observation that eschatology 
tends to serve as an ideological escape from political 
responsibility. The logic of Voegelin's position renders 
one's life eschatologically resonant in its noetic and 
its individual-ethical aspects, but not in its political 
aspect. This dichotomy restricts the impact of what he 
himself acknowledges to be the genuine Christian 
differentiation by which agape takes priority over 
noesis, and also banishes the concept of hope from the 
world of politics. a4l' 
In a characteristic essay (No. 69 of The Adventurer), 
Samuel Johnson writes of hope as "a pleasure borrowed 
from futurity". True, those who recollect their past 
hopes will probably confess their subsequent disappoint- 
ments. Nevertheless, "Of every great and complicated 
event, part depends upon causes out of our power, and 
part must be effected by vigour and perseverance". 
Johnson concludes that our hopes "like all other cor- 
dials, though they'may invigorate in a small quantity, 
intoxicate in a greater" (Johnson 1963: 389-95). 
To classify hope as a "virtue", ' however, is'to claim 
that it is not merely a matter of personal disposition 
or temperament, and not merely a psychological fiction 
necessary to one's survival, but that it is an authentic 
response to the structure of reality. 0s 
If hope is, indeed, a virtue, then any false restrict- 
ion of its range is an impediment to virtue. Political 
theology, by its terms of reference, must direct its hope 
indivisibly (but not indistinguishably) to the eschato- 
logical Kingdom itself and to its anticipations within 
history: in other words it must'accept the challenge of 
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living from Macquarrie's "total hope". Thus, for 
example, Rosemary, Ruether, discussing the clause in the 
Matthaean version of the Lord's Prayer, that God's will 
be done on earth as in heaven, writes: "Heaven, here, 
stands as the mandate for what must be done on earth, not 
as a place of flight beyond the earth to an 'other place' 
beyond earthly potentials" (1972: 235). 11,11 It follows 
that the legitimate critique of historical optimism must 
not be allowed to engender a scepticism about the future, 
which could only disable those who are disabled enough 
already. 
Nevertheless, the poignant problematic set out in 
Chapter One is not yet dispelled. For if Voegelin's 
critique of "progressivisiel has demonstrated the 
implausibility of a belief in historical meliorismt then 
might it not be the case that any hope oriented towards 
history is doomed to be systematically frustrated, 
betrayed in one manner even as it is validated in 
another? 
In the final chapter of her book an the "Western 
experience of messianic hope", Ruether offers a partial 
but insufficient answer (1970: 283-88). She suggests 
that the language of radical social change is better 
regarded as a "salvation drama" than as an appraisal of 
what social change is actually practicable. Movements of 
"revolutionary elan" are likely either to provoke 
successful (and brutal) counter-action, or subsequently 
to be co-opted by "carrier forces" which corrupt their 
energies., 41 
If this caution sounds'Voegelinian, her'affirmative 
remarks ard less so, and also less persuasive. Vithout 
the radical vision, she argues, even modest social gains 
would be unlikely, for any challenge to a dominant-and 
apparently unchangeable social order requires a visionary 
impetus and an intensity of commitment that pragmatists 
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cannot. encompass. Human beings need more than realism: 
"within the bounds of present life, the struggle itself 
is its own reward" (Ibid: 288). 
There are two objections to these twin propositions. 
Firstly, once one assesses "revolutionary elan" in 
consequentialist terms, as she does, then the admittedly 
modest gains she identifies seem to count for much less 
than the suffering likely to attend them. One recalls 
Berdyaev's concepý of the future, that "devours its past". 
Secondly, to say that the struggle is its own reward is 
to settle for a benefit that is entirely interior to the 
psyche of-the. revolutionary. - 
For a more adequate position, we may return to 
Voegelin's insistence that history has a direction, that 
it moves towards the "threat or hope" of a consummation. 
He draws on the fifth chapter of Paul's letter to the 
Romans to assert that the foundations of hope are 
endurance (hypomone) and "character-forming perseverence" 
(dokime) (OH IV: 239-41). To invoke such qualities is 
sufficient to guard against the two ersatz forms of hope: 
on the one hand, historical meliorism; on the other, a 
crude, externally directed longing that some congenial 
set of circumstances will occur, or some happy event 
befallus, of which disposition Rahner correctly observes 
that one "wishes not, to hope but to enjoy now what is 
hoped for", (1975. --92). 
Discussion of Camus led us to the conclusion that the 
capacity to endure and persevere does not of itself 
f ulfil our hopesý External and internal indices of 
fulfilment must somehow be integrated. That this is 
possible, however, is the weighty conclusion of 
, 
the, very 
Pauline argument to which Voegelin appeals. Vaegelin 
remarks on the "scurrilityll, of critical,,, attempts to 
explain away Paul's theophanic faith-experience. 
, 
But it 
is a part of that faith-experience that "Where sin 
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increased, grace abounded all the more so that, as sin 
reigned in death, grace also might rei gn through 
righteousness to eternal life through Jesus Christ'our 
Lord" (Romans 5: 20-ý'21, R. S. V. trans. ). 'These verses, I 
when taken together with Vaegelin's own insistence that 
the direction of the cosmos is towards salvation', that 
"reality" is moving towards "eminent reality", imply that 
hope deserves to be given the primacy over threat. 
Therefore, Vaegelin is false to his awn insight when 
he either accords parity of emphasis to threat and to 
hope, or speaks of the presence within history of 
eshatological'judgment, without also stressing the 
presence of eschatological empowerment. 
One thinker who drew out these twofold implications 
of Paul's argument 'more fully than Vaegelin was Teilhard 
de Chardin: 
Because we love, and in order to love more, we find 
ourselves happily reduced to sharing .... in all the struggles, all the anxieties, all the aspirat- 
ions, and also all the affections, of the earth 
in so far as all these contain within tbein a 
prInciple of ascension and synthesis ("Pensdes'19 
1970: 88, author's emphasis). 
For if reality moves towards eminent reality, this is a task 
as well as a fact. The directional movement is not to be 
distorted into the "pitiful millenarianisms" of "an era 
of abundance and euphoria -a Golden Age": "it is but 
right that our hearts should sink at the thought of so 
'bourgeois' an ideal". On the contrary, we must cultivate 
not well-being, but "a taste for gr-eater being' (rbid: 
99,100, author's emphasis). 42 
Dr. Johnson implied that future reality is in part, 
though unknowably, the result of present human effort: by 
the same token, contrary to Camus, hope is not mendac- 
ious, though a lack of hope can be self-fulfilling. And 
whereas meliorism asseumes an objectively progressive 
trend in history, the position for which we here argue 
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unites a faith-stance with a moral commitment; it is 
marked by a refusal to split one's trust in future good 
from one's fideli . ty in the present. As Buber writes, 
For eschatology the decisive act happens from above, 
even when .... it gives man a significant and 
active share in the coming redemption; for Utopia 
everything is subordinated to conscious human will 
.... But they are neither of them mere cloud 
castles: if they seek to stimulate or intensify in 
the reader'-or listener his critical relationship to 
the present, they also seek to show him perfection - 
in the light of the. Absolute, but at the same time 
as something towards which an active path leads from 
the present (1958: 8). 
Such a formulation unites a critical power equal to 
Voegelin's with a more profound hope than Voegelin ever 
articulates. It is not only the case that the divine 
avenir must, in history, always be subject to the 
I'aporias of realization": conversely the utcpian futur is 
capable of being caught up into the divine avenir. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
RESPONSIBLE POLITICS: VOEGELIN'S CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGIES 
The Case of Marx and Marxism' 
In a characteristic reminiscence Voegelin tells in his 
Autobiographical Memoir how, stimulated by the recent 
Russian Revolution, he read Marx's Capital in the 
vacation before beginning his university studies: 
Being a complete innocent in such matters I was of 
course convinced by what I read, and I must say that 
from August 1919 to about December of that year I 
was a Marxist. By Christmas the matter had worn 
off, because .... I had attended courses in both 
economic theory and the history of economic theory 
and knew what was wrong with Marx (AM: 9-10). 
One cannot help but sense Voegelin's disdain for those 
who are less quickly disenchanted. 
Voegelin's fundamental objection to Marx is one he 
scarcely troubles to argue explicitly, since it is so 
clearly implicit in his own philosophy: if consciousness 
is prior to political structures, then "historical mater- 
ialism" is disallowed. He came to this position very 
early, as soon as he had followed his courses in 
economics by reading Max Weber's writings on Marxism, 
which date from 1904-05 (AX: 11).. 2 
Voegelin's criticisms tend to focus on four aspects of 
Marxl-s thought, which in different ways transgress the 
metaxic principle: (1) his "Promethean" conviction that 
humanity can mould its own destiny; 
, 
(2) his banishing 
from socialist discourse of all philosophical quest- 
ioning, in particular about transcendent reality; (3) his 
eschatology, according to which the "realm of freedone' is 
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free from tragedy and constraint, but also historically 
immanent; (4) the abdication from ethical responsibility 
within the "realm of necessity" (specifically in the 
course of the revolutionary struggle), because of which 
Marx, regardless of his own intentions, is the' true 
parent of "Marxist-Leninism! '. 
But we must first note the ground which Voegelin 
shares with Marx. Voegelin criticizes the apologists of 
progress for reducing history to some preferred single 
strand-of historical meaning. Similarly, Marx, though he 
acknowledges the fact of progress, will not subscribe to 
any ideology of progress (such as the advance of the 
masse totale) which obscures the truth that its benefits 
and costs are unequally distributed. What underlies that 
inequality might be as important a line of meaning in 
history as is progress itself. He writes in the Preface 
to Capital, we "suffer not only from the development of 
Capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness 
of that development", (Marx, 1977: 416; cf. ER: 243). -3 
Vcegelin also endorses, at least in part, Marx's 
central accusation against capitalism, one already fully 
articulated in the "Paris Xanuscripts", and one against 
which capitalism has scarcely troubled to defend itself: 
that it dehumanizes. Because I'labour" is simply a factor 
of production, like land and capital, workers are reduced 
to "labour power", and the more they put into their 
products (which belong to others) the less humanity they 
retain. Conversely, owners are alienated by becoming a 
mere expression of, the power of money (Ibid: 77-87, 
109-11). As Voegelin writes, 
Marx has laid his finger on the sore spot of modern 
industrial society .... that is the growth of 
economic institutions into a power of such over- 
whelming influence an the life of every single man, 
that in the face of such power all talk about human 
freedom becomes futile. ... Marx is the only thinker of stature in the nineteenth century (and 
none has followed him) who attempted a philosophy of 
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human labour as well as a critical analysis of the 
institutions of industrial society (ER: 299-300). -1 
By acknowledging the force of this critique, Voegelin 
distances himself from that kind of anti-Marxism which 
merely serves as an apologia for capitalism. But though 
he partially accepts Marx's critique, Voegelin is much 
more concerned with Marx's own philosophy and'its 
persistent influence. In this respect, his verdict is 
damning. In order to secure its success, Marx's idea 
not only had to rest on a substantially sound 
analysis of the actual state of Western society; it 
also had to be a part of the crisis itself. Only 
because the idea was the manifestation of a profound 
spiritual disease, only because it carried the 
disease to a new extreme, could it fascinate the 
masses of a diseased society. (ER: 255). 
Marx's Prometbeanism, 
Using a phrase he takes from Pascal (cf. Fens6es 696 & 
698; Pascal, 1961: 243-44), Voegelin frequently writes of 
certain thinkers' libido dominandi. As he explains in an 
unpublished essay, "Nietzsche and Pascal" (Hoov), Pascal 
coined this phrase by modifying the Vulgate translation 
of the First Letter of Jobn 2:. 16. - "All that is in the 
world, the lust of the f1lesh and the lust of the eyes and 
the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the 
world" (R. S. V. ). Where the Vulgate has concupiscentia 
carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, and suPerbia vitae, 
Pascal substitutes libido sentiendi, libido sciendi, and 
libido dominandi. On the basis of his own semantic 
parallelism, Pascal constructs a character typology 
consisting of those who sin principally in the flesh 
(through appeýite), in the intellect (through curiosity), 
and in the will (through pride). 
a 
Vaegelin finds the libido dominandi to be the root of 
Xarx's errors (of. e. g. SZa: 44-49). Explaining his 
position in a letter of 1953 to Alfred Schutz (Opitz & 
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Sebba, 1981: 449-57), Vaegelin argues that Marx refused 
the sacrificium Intellectus. This sacrifice is not, as 
nineteenth century liberals thought, "an abdication of 
reason through the acceptance of dogma". It is required 
by reason itself, - for it simply recognizes "the oblig- 
ation not to operate with the human intellect, in regions 
inaccessible to it, i. e. in the regions of faith". 
If we assume, as Marx for one did, that man can 
somehow be transformed into a superman free of 
passions and therefore no longer in need of the 
means of institutional pressure that keep him on the 
right path, we have thrown out the classical as well 
as the Jewish and the Christian insight into the 
essence of human nature as opposed to divine nature 
(Opitz & Sebba, 451-52). 
Marx, however, "proposed speculative intellectual. theses 
that can be proposed only, when the abyss separating the 
divine from the human has not been experienced" ( Ibid: 
452). His "Prometheanism! ' is a failure in "attunement". 
Now inasmuch as religious faith embodiea the awareness 
of human insufficiency, it is true that its perspective 
on existence systematically excludes the Promethean 
perspective as a reductionism (cf. Kolakowski, 1982: 
1199-204,. 214-15). But from the Promethean perspective, 
religious faith must, in turn, inevitably appear as a 
"mystification". Vaegelin's attack on Marx, therefore, 
seems-to express his own perspective without thereby 
demonstrating its correctness, In this way, ascribing 
the sin of libido dominandi to Marx begs the question. 
To support his claim, Voegelin cites the eleventh of 
the Theses on Feuerbacb: "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to'change it" (Marx, 1977: 158). Naturallys 
Voegelin is not making the facile charge that Marx is 
anti-intellectual. Marx knows very well that one can 
never escape from interpreting the world, and therefore 
had better do it consciously and honestly. He also knows 
that philosophers cannot do alone what (he thinks) is 
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possible for the human species as a whole, "change the 
world". But the thesis makes two other claims, which 
Voegelin does contest. 
Firstly, the point of even philosophers' work is not 
interpretation itself, but the change it serves. The 
"rule of thought" thus gives way to "material ism! ', in 
line with the, claim, Marx makes in The German Ideology: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which 
descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from 
earth to heaven. ... Where speculation ends - in 
real life - there real positive science begins: the 
representation of the practical activity, of the 
practical process of development of men (Marx, 1977: 
164-65). 
The service of human "development", ("practical" develop- 
ment and not merely, for example, the deliverance from 
religious illusion which Feuerbach claimed to achieve) is 
in Marx's view the overriding obligation of everyone, 
including philosophers. 
Secondly, the thesis claims that the world canj 
indeed, be changed, that one cannot appeal to certain 
"abstract" laws of nature which set bounds to what is 
changeable (cf. Levy, 1981: 78-79). 
In response, Voegelin writes that it would be sense- 
less to depreciate the philosopher's blos theoretike by 
pointing to the need for action, "for nobody maintains 
that contemplation is a substitute for practice, or vice 
versa" (ER: 277). This claim is odd, because that is 
exactly what Marx insists, not only in the eleventh but 
also in the eighth of the Tbeses: 
_All social 
life is essentially practical. All 
mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their 
rational solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice" (Marx, 1977: 157). 
4 
Marx approves of interpretation and analysis, but only in 
so far as they belong to practice. He would depreciate 
the contemplative blos tbeoretike, as it is understood by 
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Plato and Aristotle; namely, as the goal'to which action 
tends, and as something which lips "beyond the fulfilment 
of one's existence as citizen" (An-E: 207). If Voegelin 
does miss the point here, however, it merely relieves lAm 
from the need to launch an additional attack on Marx, as 
he certainly would, in defence of the blos theoretike: 
and once acquainted with Voegel in's 'position, the reader 
can take such a disagreement for granted. 
More importantly, Voegelin argues against Marx that, 
"one cannot 'change the world' as one can 'interpret the 
world'; one can only act within the world" (E. R* 277). 
One might reply that the "practical process of develop- 
ment" which The German Ideology commends refers to a 
continuous process and not an absolute change. But this 
reply would fail to meet Vaegelin's case, for two 
reasons. Firstly, as we shall see in discussing Marx's 
eschatology, Marx is interested not in the process of 
development as such, but in the qualitative change in 
which all development is to culminate: in this respect I 
shall suggest that Voegelin's attack is justified. But 
secondly, Voegelin argues that, in order to sustain the 
idea that "changing the world" is even conceivable, Marx 
has to carry out an intellectual "swindle". This 
contention leads us to our next section. 
Marx's Frobibition of Questions: the "Swindle" 
In the third of the "Economic and Philosophical Manu- 
scripts" (1977: 94-95), Marx argues as follows: 
A being only counts itself as independent when it 
stands on its own feet and it stands on its own feet 
as long as it owes its existence to itself. 
As Marx admits, it is very hard to "drive out of the 
minds of people"'their sense that they owe life to a 
source beyond themselves: "They find it impossible to 
conceive of nature and man existing through themselves 
since it contradicts all the evidences of social life"s 
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It also, seems natural, Marx agrees, to'extend the series 
backwards and. ask who created the tirst human being. 
However, one must distinguish what everyone sees, that 
every individual life is engendered by a "human species- 
act" of the parents, from the question "Who created the 
first man and the-world as a whole? ". This further 
question is illegitimate, because "Vhen you inquire about 
the creation of the world and man,, then you abstract from 
man and-the world. " In otýer words, one must make the 
counterfactual supposition that the cosmos and the human 
species are. non-existent in order to conceive of their 
then being created. Decline to make that supposition, 
and one has no standpoint from which to ask the question: 
or, as Marx says, "give up your abstraction and you will 
give up your question". In contrast, Marx asserts, 
since for socialist man what is called world history 
is nothing but the creation of man by human labour 
and the development of nature for man, he has the 
observable and irrefutable proof of his self- 
creation and the process of his origin (1977: -D5). 
This is a bad argument. Even if one allowed history 
to be entirely the product of human actions, that is not 
"irrefutable proof" of humanity's or-iginal self-creation. 
Marx does nothing to show that the "socialist" stance is 
other than arbitrary. 
But the closing section of Voegelin's critique of 
this argument (Ua: 24-26) is equally unsatisfactory. 
If the questioner were consistent, says Marx, he 
would have to think of himself as not existing - 
even while, in the very act of questioning, he is. 
... The "individual man" , however. is not obliged to be taken in by Marx's syllogism and think of 
-himself as not existing 
because he does not exist of 
himself. Indeed, Marx concedes this very point - 
without, however, choosing to go into it. Instead 
he breaks off the debate by declaring that "for 
socialist man" - that is, for the man who has 
accepted Marx's construct of the process of being 
and history, -, such a question "becomes a practical 
impossibility" .... When "socialist man" speaks, 
man has to be silent (SM: 25-26). 
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This argument neglects the fact that Marx distinguishes 
between two different types of question. We all exper- 
ience that we do 'not individually exist of ourselves. No 
one has an analogous exper-ience that the entire human 
species owes its existence to some power outside itself. 
As Vaegelin has remarked (Sla: 24) the question of 
infinite regress-led in Ionian philosophy to the 
assertion of the-arche: 'Marx, he argues, knew this, but 
simply dismissed it as an "abstraction". But I Vaegelin 
does not show wby Marx should feel obliged to take issue 
with the'Ionians. It is clear that the origin (arche) of 
the entire species must be an entirely different kind of 
event than the reproduction of any individual person: 
otherwise the Creator would simply be the first parent. 
Marx is consistent in denying that the first kind of 
experience, universally shared though it is, Justifies 
asking the second, empirically unanswerable, question. 
Ilevertheless Vaegelin considers (aE. _QL: 27-28) that 
his 
argument has shown Marx to be "an intellectual swindler" 
who knows that his entire untenable intellectual 
construct will collapse as soon as basic philosophical 
questions are asked (such as that of'the aetiology of the 
race), and who, even so, does not abandon his construct 
but prohibits the questions. a 
In fact, though, Marx's refusal to ask aetiological 
questions is an essential component of his theoretical 
position. As Kolakoswki interprets Marx, "A man cannot 
consider'the world as though he were outside it, or 
isolate a purely cognitive act from the totality of human 
ýehaviour, since the cognizing subject is an aspect of 
the integral subject which is 
, 
an active participant in 
nature" (1978: 137; cf. also 175-76). For Marx, in 
Levy's neat formulation, ' "ontology is swallowed up in 
history and epistemology in a critical sociology of 
knowledge" (1981: 72). 
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I agree that this position is inadequate 
-. 
One does 
not become a disembodied consciousness simply by asking 
non-empirical questions about the origins of humanity, 
any more than by making non-empirical assertions about 
its future, as Marx does so freely (e. g. Marx, 1977: 
168-71). Further, the question of Creation is not an 
abstractly epistemological question, but emerges from an 
experience of one's pr-esent, not merely one's original or 
genetic, 
l 
dependency. Marx begs the question at issue; 
for the illusory nature of such a transcendent experience 
must properly be his conclusion. not his premiss. Again, 
one might observe that responses to. the question of human 
origins are capable of affecting one's practical life. 
But, of course, Marx did not believe that it was his 
business to argue the case for philosophical atheism, as 
did Feuerbach. Even if his theory is deficient, it is 
not iPso facto dishonest. 
VoeSelin also accuses Marx of swindling in a second 
instance. In his doctoral dissertation of 1840-41, the 
young Marx makes his own the bitter cry of Prometheus in 
Aeschylus's Prometheus Bound: "In a word, I hate all the 
gods". This cry is directed at Hermes, the messenger of 
the gods, who replies, "It appears you have been stricken 
with no small madness". According to Voegelin, Marx 
suppresses Hermes's speech in order to imply that the 
"confession" of Prometheus epitomizes the, meaning of the 
tragedy. Voegelin thinks "that Aeschylus wished to 
represent hatred of the gods as madness" (aM: 35-37, and 
the unpublished essay of 1977 "Deformations of Faith"): 
In the distortion of- the intended meaning into its 
opposite the suppression of questions can be seen 
again on all its levels: the deception of the reader 
by isolating the text, the awareness of the 
swindle (for we assume that Marx had read the' 
tragedy), and the demonic persistence in the revolt 
against better judgment (EM: 37). 
If Marx's argument here is, indeed, a swindle, so is 
Voegelin's, for it is structured in exactly the same way. 
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Vhereas, according to Voegelin, Marx takes Prometheus's 
revolt to sum up "the meaning of the tragedy", Voegelin 
himself takes Hermes's rebuke as doing so - without in 
any way trying to demonstrate why Hermes is more 
trustworthy than Prometheus; or, indeed, why "Aeschylus" 
should be taken as supporting eitber- character, since the 
dramatist might well be interested in dramatically 
articulating the conflict itself, rather than endorsing 
either party'to it. As the gods are by no means without 
fault in this play, it is arbitrary to assume that-Hermes 
is the spokesman for spiritual order. Indeed, if one 
seeks internal evidence to weigh the respective reliab- 
ility of the disputants,, one finds that the divine 
Hephaestus laments Prometheus's fate and is reluctant to 
obey Zeus and forge Prometheus's fetters (Aeschylus, 
1922: 221,215-16), and that'the verdicts of the human 
Charbs are ambivalent'. They say (in Smyth's . mannered 
translation), "Thou hast no fear of Zeus, Prometheus, but 
in self-will dost reverence mortals overmuch": but they 
also say, "Zeus, holding direful away by self-appointed 
laws, displayeth towards'the gods of eld an overweening 
spirit" (Ibid; 263,253). 
In, asserting that Marx is a swindler, Voegelin allows 
that "this is certainly not the last word on Marx. ... 
But it must unrelentingly be the first word if we do not 
want to obstruct our understanding of the prohibition of 
questions" (3Za; 28). If our argument is correct, 
Voegelin could scarcely complain if his accusation 
against Marx were applied to himself. As a competent 
philosopher he constructs a blatantly leaky argument; and 
as a skilled, reader he suddenly becomes naive, attrib- 
uting (without supporting argument) the utterances of a 
character to the dramatist himself 
Of course, by suggesting that Marx is not the swindler 
that Vaegelin thinks him to be,, we are likewise free, to 
exonerate Voegelin. But Vaegelin goes on to explain 
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Marx's aberration in terms of the will to power, the 
libido dominandi (Ibid: 28-34). This explanation, I 
suggest, does have to be turned back on Vaegelin. At the 
very point at which he thinks himself to have exposed 
Marx's bad faith, Vaegelin is arguing as a polemicist (a 
philodoxer), rather than as a philosopher. This is the 
libido dominandi under another guise. r- 
In case my conclusion seems harsh, I shall shortly 
give one further example of Voegelin's conduct of this 
debate, concerning Marx's Address of 1850 to the 
Communist League. However, I have suggested that 
Voegelin is correct to identify in Marx "a fear of' 
critical concepts and of philosophy in general" (ER: 
259), even if he is mistaken in diagnosing the cause of 
that fear. And Marx's prohibition of critical quest- 
ioning to "socialist man" proved highly signficant for 
the subsequent history of Marxist states: 
When the Marxian idea becomes a public creed, 
obviously such dilettantism and downright stupidity 
can be protected against ridicule only by a radical 
prohibition of philosophy. ... We cannot exclude it as a possibility that a society in which Marxism 
is enforced as the official creed will coramit 
suicide through intellectual dishonesty (ER: 301). 
This speculation of the 1940s looks prescient from the 
vantage point of 1990. However, since Vaegelin holds 
that any public creed tends to betray its engendering 
experiences by ossifying them, it remains an open 
question how far Marx is to be blamed for the crimes 
committed by the mass movements which have laid claim to 
his heritage. 7 
Marx's Eschatological Consciousness 
In order to end human alienation, in Marx's view, 
capitalism must be superseded. But in the "Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts" he distinguishes between two 
modes of the necessary overthrow, "crude communise and 
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"true communism! ' (FR: 2190-91). In its original form, 
universal communism is "only a generalization and 
completion of private property", by which "the category 
of worker is not abolished but extended to all" (Marx,, 
1977: 87-89). The domination of property likewise 
persists,, though expressed in a different mode,, and, as 
before, all are degraded by its spirit: "envious desire 
is precisely the essence of competition. Crude communism 
is only the completion of this envy", . 
(Ibld: 88). 
But crude communism is only "the first. positive 
abolition of private property". True communism, is 
claimed to be no less than "the genuine solution of the 
antagonism between man and nature and between man and 
man. ... It is the solution to the riddle of history 
and knows itself to be this solution" (Ibid: 89; see also 
168-71). As Kolakowski surnmarizes Marx's thought of this 
period, "Man under communism is not a prey to chance but 
is the captain of his fate, the conscious moulder of his 
own destiny" (1978: 180). Marx clearly envisages a 
progression by which capitalism gives way to crude 
communism, which then leads to true communism; and true 
communism is the fruition of historical development. 
A second distinction, with different implications, is 
articulated in Volume III of Capital, the distinction 
between the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of 
freedom! ' (ER: 242-45; cf. Kolakowski, 1978: 308-09). The 
revolution will not abolish the realm of necessity, for 
material wants will always have to be satisfied. Granted 
the abolition of private property, however, as well as 
the more efficient production techniques introduced 
through industrial capitalism, necessary drudgery will be 
so far diminished that all will have the scope and energy 
to develop their capacities. As Voegelin says, "The 
realm of necessity would be an industrial society without 
the bourgeoisie" (ER: 245). Two points are clear from 
this description. The realm of freedom will coexist with 
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the realm of necessity and not postdate it: and the 
activities proper to the realm of freedom are not limited 
to what is economically productive or politically 
effective; for economic well-being is possible without 
strain, and political struggles have been resolved. In 
the, realm of freedom, , 
it seems, Marx allows the bios 
theoretike to be re-introduced. 14 
The eschatological element in both "true communism! ' 
and the "realm of freedom! ' is clear. Vaegelin thus calls 
Marx a "parousiastic thinker", by which he means that 
Marx "expects deliverance from the evils of the , 
time 
through the advent, the coming in all its fulness, of 
being construed as- immanent". As Eugene Webb explains, 
if one wishes to escape from the tensions of 
existence in the Between, there are only two ways of 
doing so. One is to seek escape from the world into 
the beyond - as was the case with the ancient 
Gnostic movement - and the other is to draw the 
beyond in some manner into the world (1981: 201). " 
ITaturally the eschatological character of Marx's 
thought raises serious questions, to which other 
commentators, both Marxist, and non-Marxist, are as fully 
alive as is Vaegelin. Kolakowski (1978: 413-14) notes 
Marx's lack of interest in such natural (as opposed to the 
economic) conditions of human existence as death and - 
sickness. In Lash's view, any anthropology which omits 
to take such factors into account is "intolerably 
abstract" (1981: 268). Lash also criticizes Marx's 
"social messianism! ', his contention that the revolution 
Of Which the proletariat is the agent will be the final 
revolution. This contention relies on the belief that 
the proletariat has no particular interest of the kind 
that provokes others' antagonism: but, as Lash suggestst 
11any revolution-which supposes its agency to be thus 
'pure, is the victim of an exceedingly dangerous 
illusion" (Ibid: 258, cf. also p. 261). From a different 
perspective, such theorists of the "Frankfurt School" as 
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Adarno and Horkheimer, drawing on Freud's Civilization 
and its Discontents, have pointed out that human domin- 
ation over natureý must by definition include domination 
over the "nature" within onese1r, so that any liberation 
inexorably forges new bonds of repression. ", And even if 
the capitalist system is as "inherently unstable and 
self-contradictory" as Marx thought (Lichtheim: 1970: 
115-16, quoting Joseph Schumpeter, an economist otherwise 
unsympathetic to Marx), it by no means follows that 
capitalism will give way to a super-ior- form of social 
organization (Dunn, 1979: 80-117). 10 
Vaegelin's own main criticism, while consistent with 
all these and no less telling, is somewhat different. He 
argues that Marx, blinded by the real i ttitsverl ust 
expressed in his prohibition of questioning, wilfully 
misrepresented the status of his own theories. " As 
early as 1936, in the essay "VolksbildunE, Vissenschaft 
und Politikl, Voegelin argued that Marxism is quite wrong 
to describe itself as a system of "scientific socialism! '. 
Instead, it is a salvational mythology sealed off from 
God, though possessing a range of quasi-religious symbols 
'e. g. Capital as its Bible, Marx and Lenin as its Prophet 
and Redeemer, the Revolution as its Day of Judg=ent, the 
classless society as its paradise). The very claim to be 
scientific is incoherent, for the conviction that life- 
stances can be scientifically grounded itself falls under 
the "rule of faith" (1936: 598,596). "2 
In Die politischen RellS-Ionen (1938), Voegelin 
therefore identifies Marxism as one of a series of 
secular apocalyptic symbolisms (1986: 61-64). Sciences 
can only thrive an self-critical questioning and openness 
to correction. But the "attitude of temporal relig- 
iosity" is so strong in these symbolisms that their 
advocates meet criticism simply by modifying their 
concept of truth. In other words, truth becomes a 
"political idea" (see Chapter Five, above), a myth 
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consciously exploited to unite the masses. Writing in 
Austria in 1938, Vaegelin boldly gives as an illustration 
Rosenberg's "concept of so-called organic truth"; but "'we 
already find the beginnings in Hobbes' thesis that a 
teaching which disturbs the- unity and the peace of the 
Commonwealth cannot be true". In this way, by the Nazis 
as by Marx, "myth formation is withdrawn from rational 
discussion". 
Marx's Abdication of Historical Responsibility 
Voegelin-re-states his position an Marx in the essay 
"Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme" (1981: 238-41). in 
the face of "the well-known evils enumerated by Hesiod" 
(hard work, disease, injuries inflicted by the powerful 
on the weak, etc. ), one must, indeed, fight for survival 
and resist injustice. But activists filled with libido 
dominandi "pretend to overcome the imperfection of man's 
existence". Marx, for his part, 
insists energetically that the transfer of the 
means of production to public property, i. e. the 
"communism" of today's vulgarian Marxism, will 
exponentially aggravate the evils of capitalism in 
the form of private property unless, under the 
influence of other than economic and legal reforms, 
the consciousness of man's existence is transfigured 
(Ibid: 238). , 
Marx is concerned not to tackle specific and remediable 
injustices I but to offer a comprehensive account of 
reality, covering the historical social and personal 
dimensions of human life. The new reality is related to 
existing reality only by negating it according to "the 
logic of transfiguration". 
This interpretation is less than fair to Marx's 
intention. Marx's opposition to piecemeal reform is 
based an his conviction that as long as the means of 
production are in bourgeois control, fairer distribution 
of resources is inconceivable (1977: 569-70); further, 
that even to seek such gains would entail a corrupting 
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accommodation'an the part of the proletariat to the 
bourgeois Spirit. We have also seen that "crude 
coMMUnism! ', whatever its defects, is not to be judged as 
if it were an autonomous political order. It is the 
necessary but transitory first phase of an integral 
process (Marx, 1977: 87-89). Marx's position may be 
clarified with the aid of the later Critique of the Gotha 
Programme. 
Between capitalist and communist society lies the 
period of the revolutionary transformation of the 
one into the other, Corresponding to this is also a 
political transition period in which the state can be 
nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
proletariat (Marx, 1977: 565). 
This transitional communist society has not "developed on 
its own foundations" and Marx admits that it will be "in 
every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, 
still stamped with the birth marks of the old society 
from whose womb it amerges" (Ibid: 568). 
But even allowing for these qualifications about 
Vcegelin's interpretat ion of Marx, Marx's own account is 
implausible. The present, an Marx's own logic, can never 
escape the past. If crude communism is scarred by the 
marks of its origin, Marx is obliged, to explain (but does 
not) why trwe conmnisA or indeed any conceivable 
society, is exempt from being so: without such explan- 
ation, true communism might be no more than a fantasy. 
As Vaegelin goes on, "One might be inclined to let the 
dreamers dream and, for one's own part, go on with the 
business of living our imperfect reality". But dreamers 
act in the real world., and on the basis of "a superior 
insight into the truth, of reality" can "inflict their 
m urderous, nonsense on real human beings" (1981: 240-411). 
As Martin Buber carefully explains, Marx recognized, 
"the elements of the new society which have already 
developed in the womb of the collapsing bourgeois 
society" (Buber has in mind such structures as Workers' 
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Cc-operatives), but "he could not make up his mind to 
promote them and sponsor them", because he regarded his 
prior task as the specific preparation of the revolution. 
So his practical attitudes to such structures were guided 
only by political expediency. He claimed to value, them, 
and encouraged labour movements to demand such reforms as 
would promote them. But his demands had a "tactical- 
propaSandist character"; he did not take the structures 
seriously (Buber, 1958: 06-97). This assessment, though 
more-3ently expressed than Voegelin's Judgment that Marx 
abandons responsible politics in favour of the pursuit of 
total social transformation,, substantially coincides with 
it. In Buber's view, as-in Vae3elin's, there is a 
"Yawning chasm" between the future true cc=unism Ono 
one knows how '. 1ong, aft 1 1,4 a "er the final victory of t 
Revolution"), and the road to and beyond the Revoluticn 
"characterized by a far-reaching centrali=atian that 
permits .... no individual initiative": 
Uniform. 41., ty as a means is to clhan3e mira.. -ulou-sly into 
multiplicity as an end; compulsion into freedom. As 
-against this, the "utopian" or non--=rxist socialist desires a means commensurate with his ends; ha 
refuses to believe that in our reliance an t4ia 
future "leap" we have to do now the dirmct opposite 
of what we are, striving for ... Ibi d: 1 0) 
On the contrary, writes Buber, "we must create '&. Are and 
now the space nowpossible for the thing for whi-: h we are 
atriving, so that it may come to fulfilment then. 
To use the terminology of Max Weber, Marx rejo-cted the 
"ethic of responsibility" for-the "ethic of ultimate 
ends" (Weber 1947: 120-21). He presumed, as Vaegelin 
puts it, that a creed "contained its own justification, 
t hat the consequences did not matter if the intention was 
right" <NEE: 16-17). Voegelin insists, as would Buber, 
that "no'excuse for the evil'consequences of moralistic 
action could be found in the morality or nobility of your 
intentions. ... Ideologies are not science and ideals, 
are' no substitute for ethics" - (AX: 11). '1 cO 
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According to Voegelin, then., Marx was "derailed" by 
being diverted from a thorough philosophical exploration 
of his ideal (his vision of true communism and the 
spiritual transformation it presupposed), into prepar- 
ation for the revolution. "If [Marx] had been obliged to 
produce a revolutionary renovatio in his fellowmen 
through his spiritual authority, not much would have 
followed except his personal tragedy" (BR: 245). - Instead 
he decided that freedom would follow the overthrowing of 
the bourgeoisie, and that such a revolution itself had to 
be prepared and enacted entirely within the realm of 
necessity. He therefore had, firstly, to expose'the 
contradictions latent in the moribund bourgeois society 
and, secondly, "to forge the proletarian organization 
that in the decisive hour would strike the decisive 
blow". From the 1840s on "the emphasis of, his life and 
work shifts increasingly to the midwifery of the 
revolution" (E. R: 245-46). 
The attack on Marx's ethical irresponsibility constit- 
utes the third instance in which I shall try to show that 
Vaegelin falls from philosophy into polemics. He directs 
his criticism at an address, given in 1850 to the 
Communist League, in which Marx recommends the shrewdest 
tactics to implement the revolutionary ideology set out 
two years before in the Communist Manifesto. Voegelin 
suggests that the idea of gnostic socialism was substant- 
ially completed with the Manifesto, and that the Address 
marks the point at which "the eschatological excitement 
of the Manifesto subsided and the problems of revolut- 
i. onary tactics came to the fare" QIR: 291,295). 
His method is straightforward. He collates those 
phrases from the Address which most chillingly convey 
Marx's zeal to foment "permanent revolution", and allows 
the reader to share his own revulsion at Marx's tactical 
ruthlessness. '-4, Marx writes, -1 1 
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For us, the issue cannot be the alteration of 
private property but only its annihilation, not ' 
the 
smoothing over of class antagonisms but the abol- 
ition of classes, not the improvement of existing 
society but the foundation of a new one (IbId: 280). 
If an alliance between workers and other democrats should 
succeed in overthrowing the present oppressive govern- 
ment, the workers' actions must preserve the atmosphere 
of revolutionary fever: 
Far from opposing so-called excesses, instances of 
popular revenge against hated individuals or public 
buildings .... such instances must not only be tolerated but the leadership of them taken in hand 
(Ibid: 282). 
If the democrats propose proportional taxes, the 
workers must propose progressive taxes; if the 
democrats themselves put forward a moderately 
progressive tax, the workers must insist an a tax 
with rates that rise so steeply that big capital 
will be ruined by it .... Thus the demands of the 
workers must everywhere be governed by the measures 
and concessions of the democrats (rbid: 235). 
-Voegelin concludes, "The details of the advice will 
change with the situation. The pattern is clear and 
well-known to all of us: it is the systematic disruption 
of society in the hope of creating such disorder that the 
Communist minorityýcan rise to victory" (ER: 297-98). 
The reader may be as appalled as Voegelin, could wish 
by Marx's notion of a "permanent revolution". -But 
Voegelin, nowhere discusses the place that the Address has 
in the body of Marx's thought. We are to presume that- 
whereas, Marx's analysis of bourgeois society was later 
extended and refined (e. g. in Capital), the Address 
represents his definitive position'on revolutionary 
iactics. But the work of other, Marx scholars shows that 
this-supposition is unsafe. 
The fact that the Address is not discussed in the 
extended-treatments of Marx and ethics written by Kain, ' 
Kamenka and Lukes already suggests that^its centrality 
should not be taken for granted. Kamenka maintains that 
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at the time of the Communist Manifesto and The German 
Ideolqgy, Marx linked morality with law and religion as 
"so many bourgeois prejudices each concealing bourgeois 
interests" (1969: 39). Not surprisingly, perhaps, he 
finds Marx's ethical theory to be incoherent: "In 
Marxists, and, to a lesser extent in Marx himself, we 
find an uncritical conflation of ethical relativism, 
revolutionary ethics, the ethic of self-determination and 
self-realization, utilitarian strains .... all assumed 
or proclaimed rather than argued for" (Ibid: 1-2). 
Kamenka perhaps implies that Marx (at least, the young 
Marx) used etbics itself in a "tact ical-propagandist" 
way, - naturally enough, since he regarded ethics as 
inherently nothing other than propaganda. 
Lukes (1985: 27-47) argues that Marx condemns the 
morality of Recht (i. e. of human rights individual- 
istically considered) but affirms a morality of 
emancipation. This distinction, though present in Marx's 
own work, is expressed most concisely by Trotsky: one 
'he should not "apply the self-same moral norms to 4W 
oppressors and the oppressed", and the appeal to such 
norms is "not a disinterested philosophical mistake but a 
necessary element in the mechanics of class deception". 
This distinction, as Lukes points out, merely raises 
further questions: what are the ends of socialism, and 
what means do tbeyjustify? ' When pushed, Trotsky answers 
that anything is permissible "which really leads to the 
emancipation of mankind"; in other words, any actions 
which unite the proletariat and "teach them contempt for 
official morality and its democratic echoers". There can 
b. e no criterion for what is permissible to revolution- 
aries other than "the living experience of the movement 
under the clarification of theory" (Ibid: 118-20). Lukes 
concludes that "Marxism has from its beginning exhibited 
a certain approach to moral questions that has disabled 
it from offering moral resistance to measures taken in 
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its name" (Ibld: 141). In this, of course, it is not 
alone among political movements. 
Kain, however, points out that the later Marx does not 
reject Recbt so simply: for example in the Cz-Itique of 
the Gotha Programme, Marx 
aims to realize rights in the socialist stage, the 
first stage of communist society, but to transcend 
rights in the second and, higher, stage of communist 
society, and to transcend them in a way which, I 
think, would preserve them in custom and tradition 
(1988: 12). 
On-this account, Marx moved from a position of revolut- 
ionary pragmatism according to which ethics are a mere 
ideological fiction towards an ethical humanism in which 
the theory of historical materialism holds a more central 
place than the theory of revolution. 
These'glimpses of a complex debate at least reveal the 
nature of the problem from which Vaegelin entirely 
prescinds. Further, those scholars, Marxist or not, who 
do discuss the Address place it in quite a different 
perspect ive than does Voegelin. Voegelin notes that the 
Manifesto was published'in February, 1848, the month that 
revolution broke out in Paris, but by 1850 "it was clear 
that the time for a proletarian world-revolution had not 
yet come" (Fjj: 296). Writing in 1933, Nicolaievsky and 
Maenchen-Helfen regard these circumstances as decisive 
for the character of the Address: 
Ethe fact] that Marx accepted the kind of revolut- 
ionism which he condemned so violently both before 
and afterwards .... proves better than anything, 
else the extent to which his judgment had been 
affected by the breakdown of his immeasurable hopes 
(1973: 223). 
As. Bertram Wolfe writesi. in 1850-Marx was still "under 
the-spell of the barricade and-conspiracy traditions of 
Paris". Marx's fraught state of mind appears in a letter 
of November, 1848: "There- is only one way to shorten the 
murderous death agonies of the old society, only one way 
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to shorten the bloody birth-pangs of the new society - 
revolutionary terrorism! ' (1967: 151-52). 
Lichtheim says that Marx and Engels soon broke with 
conspiratorial politics in general and the Communist 
League in particular. For the remainder of his life, 
Marx " adamantly refused to engage in revolutionary 
conspiracy" (1964: 123,127). In fact, at another 
meeting of the League as early as September 1850, Marx 
already separated himself from the Blanquists who were, 
he thought, stupidly trying to force the pace of 
revolution: 
I have always opposed the ephemeral notion of the 
proletariat. We devote ourselves to a party which 
is precisely far from achieving power. Would the 
proletariat have achieved power, then it would have 
enacted not proletarian but petty-bourgeois 
legislation. Our party can achieve power only if 
and when conditions permit it to realize its own 
'views (quoted Avineri, 1968: 195-96; an Blanquism, 
cf. Kolakowski, 1978: 214-16). 
If the Address's recommendations as to the manner in 
which the proletariat might exploit a tactical alliance 
with the democrat party seem cynical, it is because they 
reflect a double desperation. The workers' party itself 
was almost non-existent: but Marx could scarcely advocate 
that the group abandon the whole struggle; and he was 
also convinced, not without reason, that "the liberals 
would not advance one step unless driven on by a popular 
movement" (Lichtheim, 1964: 75Y. 
I Yone of the, foregoing explanations Justify the 
Address, and, Vaegelin is entirely-correct in using it to 
point up the horrifying consequences of a naked prag- 
m. atism put to the service of revolution. As Wolfe 
remarks,, even though Marx did virtually repudiate the 
Address only six months afterwards and never returned to 
its position, i-t would lie 
like an undetonated time bomb an the Marxist road to 
be Joyously dug up by Lenin .... and used with 
f 
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explosive force as a Marxian manual of Leninist 
strategy and tactics (1967: 152). 
Lenin would have been inconceivable without Marx: and 
Avineri judges that -Marx' s "major intellectual blunder" 
was to overlook the possibility of the possible dialect- 
ical development by which there emerged "the combination 
of his philosophical and historical theory with the 
Jacobin tradition of merely political, subjectivist 
revolutionary action" (1968: 258). ' 
But it counts for something that Marx withdrew and 
corrected his least controlled rhetoric. That is not the 
behaviour of a spiritually diseased-ideologist, or a 
moral thug. In treating the Address as the paradigm case 
of the consequences which follow from real i tsAtsverlust, 
Voegelin himaself -seems impelled by an animus against Marx. 
which amounts to the libido dominandi. 
Claiming Voegelin for Conservatism 
We have noted critiques of Marx'from a broadly 
socialist position, by Buber and by the theorists of the 
"Frankfurt School". It, is clear that to attack Marx is 
not thereby to defend capitalism. Nevertheless, Vaegelin 
has tended to be neglected by thinkers of the'Left and to 
be regarded with favour by those of the Right. 10 He 
figures prominently, for example, in George H. Nash's 
comprehensive -and sympathetic survey, The Conservative 
. 
Intellectual Xovement in America Since 1945. Nash also 
frequently mentions others in Voegelin's circle, such as 
his sometime publisher Henry Regnery, -his translator 
Gerhart Niemayer ("a hard-line anti-Communist scholar" 
who became "a leading cold-war strategist"), Russell 
Kirk, whose book of 1953, The Conservative Mind, is 
thought by Nash to have "dramatically catalyzed the 
emergence of the conservative intellectual movement", and 
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Thomas Molnar (Nash, 1976: ill, 90,69,78-80 respect- 
ively). These men undoubtedly thought of Vaegelin as a 
supporter. Molnar, for example, wrote to Voegelin in 
October 1969 that he had lectured on Voegelin's political 
philosophy in the Universities of South Africa and 
Pretoria, "Afrikaans-language institutions where, in 
contrast to anglophone ones, philosophical and political 
ideas are sufficiently 'conservative' for professors to 
listen to your ideas sympathetically" (Hoov). 
Certain institutions with which Vaegelin was connected 
also figure in Nash's book: the Hoover Institution of 
which he became a Senior Research Fellow ("among the 
outposts of scholarly, respectable, conservative cold-war 
analysis"), and the Relm Foundation from which he 
received financial support (whose role "in financing 
intellectual conservative causes was unobtrusive but 
frequently crucial". ) (Nash, 1976: 272,354, ). 
Voe-Selin is little known in Britain: but Ian Crowther 
wrote an essay an him in the very first issue of the 
Salisbur, v Review (1982), '' launching a series on 
"Conservative Thinkers". That same issue also contained 
an article, "On Being Right", by David Levy, whose books 
of 1981 and 1937 rely heavily an Voegelin. 
The term "conservative" needs to be further specified. 
Both Nash, writing of "Conservatismel in the U. S. A., and 
Barry (1987), writing of the "New Right" in Britain, 
include within their scope two divergent streams of 
thought, the libertarian and the traditionalist. 10 
Though the two streams are in several respects opposed to 
each oiher'(cf., for example, F. A. Hayek's essay, "Vhy I 
Am Not a Conservative" in Hayek, 1980: 397-411), they 
naturally coincide in rejecting all forms of socialism. 
They might also converge in practice, if, for example, an 
authoritarian-conservative government were to enforce 
free-market economics. 
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It is mainly neo-conservatives who claim Voegelin's 
philosophical patronage. Neo-liberals might relish his 
attacks an Marxism, but could hardly overlook his no less 
trenchant critiques of nineteenth century liberalism. 
According to John Gray, liberalism's "distinctively 
modern conception of man and society" is: 
individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy 
of the person against the claims of any social 
collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on 
all men the same moral status and denies the relev- 
ance to legal or political order of differences in 
moral worth among human beings; universalist, 
affirming the moral unity of the human species and 
according a secondary importance to specific historic 
associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in 
its affirmation of the corrigibility of all social 
institutions and political arrangements (1986: x). 
Compare Gray's description with Voegelin's comments on 
the advocacy, 'by French liberals Of the nineteenth 
century, of a revolution which is "permanent. but slow 
and progressive, so that it follows without jolts the 
progress of reason" (ER: 179): 
We see here developing an attitude towards the 
crisis which remains typical in later liberalism 
and we can observe in its origins the growth of an 
escapist clichg. The rhythm of Revolution and 
Restoration is considered a stupid exaggeration of 
the process of social reform, the violent swings of 
the pendulum ought to be toned down - under the 
title of "permanent revolution" - to the gentle 
process that today is called "peaceful change" 
(Ibld: 180). 
Voegelin thinks the notion of progress guided by reason 
to be "escapist" because the very fact of a'social crisis 
shows that society's 
remedial forces, while perhaps present, are socially 
_ineffective. 
The social problems which urgently 
require a solution cannot be solved because the 
spiritual and moral strength for the task is lacking 
in the ruling group (Ibid). 
Therefore, Voegelin says Of t, he "liberal" option of 
"intelligent gradual reform! ' that "it does not exist 
concretely". To counsel it distracts attention from the 
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only true alternative, "the restoration of spiritual 
substance in the ruling groups of a society". 'One might 
think that Vaegelin, in admitting that the "pragmatic 
value of this-alternative .... is not very high" 
(Ibid), virtually acknowledges that his own option also 
"does not exist concretely". But his position is starkly 
opposed to Gray's liberalism. In particular, it attrib- 
utes what Gray calls "moral primacy" not to individuals 
as such, but to those rulersýpossessed of "spiritual 
substance". Far from being irrelevant to political. - 
order, spiritual stature is decisive for it. Conversely 
the notion of meliorism is deemed escapist. 
The moral egalitarianism and, meliarism which Gray 
thinks to belong to liberalism-were also criticized in 
Voegelin's essay of, 1944, "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the 
War": 
Democracy, as well as any other form of government, 
could be good or bad according to, the spirit which 
prevailed. Consent of the people might be given to 
bad laws, and the bad laws would not be experienced 
'as 
an infringement of individual rights because , 
the 
individuals themselves could possibly be dubious 
figures who liked bad laws (1944a: 187-88). 
In-, the 1960 essay, "Liberalism and its History", 
Voegelin goes further. He argues that liberalism has no 
independent character, but merely evolves as a reflection 
of other movements. Thus, where classical liberalism has 
been overtaken by more radical revolutionary movements, 
liberals may in practice be "conservative". Conversely, 
where the adjective "liberal" carries connotations of ,, 
"pink", as in the-U. S. A., it is simply because there is 
ho, effective socialist party to its left (Ibid: 507-08). 
, According to this theory, the political-aspect of 
liberalism-was defined by its opposition to, certain 
abuses, especially to-the police state, and clerical, and 
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aristocratic -privilege: it required the executive state 
to'be separate from the -legislative, judicial 'and eccles- 
iastical domains. Economic liberalism sought to 
dismantle existing checks on free economic activity on 
the presumption that a harmonious social order would 
thereby emerge. Religious liberalism rejected revelation 
and 'dogma as sources of truth. Scientific liberalism, 
posited'the autonomy of immanent human reason as'the 
source of knowledge, over against the classical and 
mediaeval contention that theology and philosophy were 
the final arbitrators of scientific truth. 17 
Voegelin goes on to argue (Ibid: 515-19) that all 
these four aspects of liberalism have run into difficult- 
ies. Political liberalism, far example, accepts "the 
redemptive value" of certain constitutional models, such 
as the separation of powers. But such models are always 
historically contingent: "we know today that societies do 
not become free through liberal constitutions, but that 
free societies produce liberal constitutions and can 
function in their framework". The theory of economic 
liberalism, as developed by Locke, presupposed a low 
concentration of population, a predominantly agrarian 
economy, and a multiplicity of citizens of equal economic 
potential. "When society differentiated into capitalist 
and worker, the model of the society of free, equal 
citizens was overtaken'by a reality which pressed towards 
the crisis of'class s. truggle". -IO 
The character of Voegelin's objections to liberalism 
explains his appeal'to neo-conservative thinkers. This 
appeal, however, is partly based on the circumstance that 
the works in which he offers most comfort to such 
conservatives'are, his best known ones. The New Science 
of Politics and Science, Politics and Gnosticism both 
formed'Voegýlinls constituency and disproportionately 
affected the"manner in which he has been interpreted. 
For these two books are more accessible, in a double 
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sense, than either his huge Order and History, or his 
many other scholarly essays. They-are less abstruse and 
more plainly argued, being each based an a course of 
lectures; and since they were re-issued in paperback, 
they are more readily available. This availability, of 
course, is not an accident, but is the result of conserv- 
ative patronage. Thus, The New Science of Politics was 
the subject of a special article in 1953 to celebrate the 
thirtieth anniversary of Time Magazine; and Science, 
Politics and Gnosticism, with its fierce attack an Marx, 
was published by Henry Regnery's company, Gateway. In 
contrast, such essays as "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the 
War" (1944) and "The Oxford Political Philosophers" 
(1953), which sharply criticize Western assumptions, 
languish among their journals' back-numbers. " 
Voegelin's Conservative Reflexes 
It has to be recognized that some aspects of 
Voegelin's thought and conduct invited appropriation 
by, -conservatives. The case of the 1953 article in Time 
is instructive. 2111, 
The piece, written anonymously, summarizes the book's 
argument, stressing Vaegelin's account of "modern 
Gnosticism! ' and its political consequences. 21 Time says, 
"Gnosticism, even in earthly matters, substitutes dreams 
for reason, because it disregards the facts of the world 
that exists" (1953: 59): the model case is the rise of 
the National Socialist movement to power, "with the 
Gnostic chorus wailing its moral indignation at such 
barbarian and reactionary doings in a progressive'world 
- without, however raising a finger to repress the rising 
force by a minor political effort in proper time" (see 
X, 'M: 171-72). Equally, Gnosticism dominates Western 
post-war policy. Time now gives an extended quotation 
from the book, which runs, 'in part, 
297 
If a war has a purpose at all' it is the 
reduction of the unbalancing excess of force, not 
the destruction of force to the point of creating a 
new power vacuum. Instead the [Western] Gnostic 
politicians have put the Soviet army on the Elbe,, 
surrendered China to the Communists, at the same 
time demilitarized Germany and Japan, and in addition 
demobilized-our own army (1953; 59, cf. NER; '172). 
Because the West held the "Gnostic dream assumption" that 
a peaceful international order would peacefully evolve by 
the dismantling of armies, it-created a power'vacuum to 
its"awn disadvantage. 
What is especially significant is the inferences drawn 
by the rime article from this analysis. Firstly, the 
Cold War is merely a function of the West's proper 
practice of responsible politics. Gnostics accept "war 
to end war", or war "as a prelude to peace". But 
Cold war they shun because its objectives are leas 
than the salvation of mankind, aMd because cold war 
requires careful calculation of causes and effects, 
means and ends in the real world (1953: 59). 
Similarly, all opposition to the U. S. A. 's full-blooded 
at46empts "to win the Korean war" can be ascribed ta_, the 
Snostic belief that no war is permissible e Xcept total 
war, or "Armageddon". 
Secondly, Time simply assumes that the'United States 
represents human freedom. In order to gain worldwide 
influence, America has mistakenly boasted of its 
affluence,. rather than approaching the world "on the 
level of the great truths of Western culture, of the 
institutions of freedom that reflect those truths": on 
the contrary, it must newly grasp its own heritage, for 
"The World's way out of Gnostic, confusion depends very 
largely on the U. S. " (1953: 60,61),. 
Now Voegelin himself would never, even during the 
Stalinist epoch, have claimed that American institutions 
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simply "reflect the truth of freedom". That claim exemp- 
lifies what Karl-Mannheim describes as conservative 
utopianism, by which the "here and now" is experienced as 
embodying the highest values and meanings (1936: 229-39). 
Time's claim for Americanism is itself "Snostic", as 
Voegelin emphasizes (in a sentence not quoted by Time): 
"The Western Gnostic societies are in a state of'intel- 
lectual and emotional paralysis because no fundamental 
critique of left-wing gnosticism is possible without 
blowing up right-wing gnosticism in its turn" (MU; 178). 
Time has undoubtedly misrepresented Vaegelin's book by 
seizing for, its-own purposes on one of its lines of 
meaning at the expense of others. The matter acquires' 
its special interest because of Voegelin's two dissimilar 
responses to the article. Returning home after a spell 
in hospital, he wrote to the editor of Time on March 30. 
1953, complimenting him an giving space to the discussion 
of a "severely theoretical work". Moreover, he went on, 
your attempt has been splendidly successful. You 
, 
have seen, what probably not too many will see, that 
the theoretical propositions are applicable to the 
, concrete questions of our time. ... I am sure your 
article will help even professionals in the field of 
political science to understand the pragmatic value 
of my analysis (Hoov). 
I However, to a c'ertain Jos. Paul Morris, who sent him a 
lengthy telegram of dissent, he replied on March 31, 
I am afraid I must point out to you that (1) 1 am 
not connected with Time magazine, and (2) am not 
, responsible 
for what people write about me. 
If Mr. Morris is interested in what. Voegelin has to say, 
he should buy the book, for "less than the expense of 
'you r telegram! ': 
Finally, I inform you herewith that you have no 
business to molest a scholar with your opinion about 
his ideas without knowing what they are. In view of 
the fact that you have not read the book, your 
telegram is an impertinence <Hoov). 
This pardonable indignation does seem to be at adds with 
the enthusiasm he had expressed to Time itself. More 
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significantly, Voegelin did not demur from Time's use of 
his argument to buttress its recommended policy on Korea 
and the Cold War. 
I pass to another example of Voegelin's allowing 
himself to be co-opted into the fold of ideological 
conservatism. In 1959, he wrote a paper (translated in 
1ID61 as "On RL-adiness to Rational Discussion")$ which 
gives a shrewd account of the ploys which "philodoxers" 
typically use to avoid genuine discussion: verbosity and 
filibustering to preclude debate; avoiding the point at 
issue in favour of innuendos about the opponent's 
psychology or material interests; 11positionism! ', or 
classifying the opponent's argument as dependent on some 
position (e. g. Marxism, Catholicism, Platonism) which one 
has previously labelled as intellectually unrespectable; 
the dogmatic exemption of one's own presuppositions or 
"Valuer. " from discussion; and the appeal to "science" to 
disallow the dimension of spirit (1961c: 278-81). The 
paper is enlightening. Disconcertingly, however, it 
-appears in a book, Freedom and Sez-. fdom, which seems. 
intended as a'Cold War tract rather than a self-critical 
search for truth. Its editor declares that it is 
"dedicated to the moral and intellectual struggle against 
communism", "to instil a sense of urgency and vigilance, 
particularly in the younger generation, and to imbue them 
with courage and an eager readiness to fight for the 
ideals of the western world (Hunold, 1961: 9). Of the 
book's other contributors,, several belong to the conserv- 
ative Mont P61erin Society, and some combine a rabid view 
of the Soviet Union with a romanticized view of the West: 
cf. especially the essays of Hans Kohn, Russell Kirk and 
Helmut Schoek: (Hunold, 1961: 49-58; 95-106; 238-63). In 
particular, Schoeck's certitude that the Soviet Union 
will always see fit to disregard any international agree- 
ment for tact ical-revolutionary reasons is Itsel-f a form 
of "resistance to rational discussion": it projects 
political cynicism exclusively outward from the U. S. A. j 
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and is unfalsifiable in that no evidence of the Soviet 
Union's adherence to treaty obligations could c ause him 
to modify his assessment (Schoeck, 1961; 243.252). To 
be sure, Voegelin did not choose his co-contributors, but 
it is unlikely that he meant his description of irration- 
ality to discredit them. -ýýO 
These two examples make it difficult to imagine 
Voegelin as a philosopher who stands above the ideolog- 
ical f ray. To say this is not itself a criticism. But 
sometimes his analyses fail to advert to their own 
ideological aspects. Let us take an instance from the 
Autobiographical Memoir% He acknowledges his American 
sympathies frankly: "after all I had to run for my life 
from the political environment in Central Europe and I 
was received with kindness in America" (Ali: 119). But 
then, expressing the hope that his observations an the 
U. S. A. are not unduly coloured by this prejudice, he goes 
an (Ibid: 119-23) to argue that the American revolution, 
in contrast to other revolutions, "was able to create 
successfully an open society, with a minimum of violence 
required for its imposition", and was not animated by 
"anti-Christian animosity". -`* 
After describing the remaining "social problems which 
require solutions too long delayed", such as the status 
of the black population, he points to the major problem 
of the Vietnam war. Whether the national interest 
demanded entry into that war was open to question, but 
once involved "one cannot simply end a war by walking out 
of too. He blames the horrors of physical destruction in 
Vietnam entirely an Vietnam's "ruling group of totalit- 
arian Sectarians", who were "willing to sacrifice the, 
people to the bitter end for its domination", and he 
attributes the anti-war protest in America itself to 
ignorance worked by propaganda: 
That a war has two parties, and that the destruction 
was caused by the other party, who happened to be 
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the military victim of -the destruction, was simply 
not raised into consciousness. The bombing of 
German cities into vast fields of rubble, as well as 
the mass killings of the civilian population .... 
was taken with equanimity. Comparable destruction 
an a minor scale in an underdeveloped country 
aroused horror. That these horrors were caused by 
ideological sectarians and not by the American 
government was disregarded ( Ibid: 121-22). 
Voegelin's opinion in this matter could doubtless be 
defended. But his argument might just as readily demon- 
strate the mbral inadmissibility of Allied strategy in 
the Second World War as the legitimacy of American 
strategy in Vietnam. In fact, the structure of his 
argument suggests that he could not conceive of anyone's 
challenging the morality of the Allies' Second World War 
strategy of saturation bombing. In the case of Vietnam, 
similarly, what is striking is his refusal even to 
acknowledge that the American government has a moral case 
to answer (since any critics are labelled propagandists), 
and his refusal to consider, as a possibility, that 
America's military policy-makers might be ideologists 
themselves. The horrors, he says, are simply not caused 
by the American government, just as the foundation of the 
American "open society" on the dispossession and 
slaughter of the native Americans seems to count for him 
only as "minimal violence". In such passages Voegalin is 
seen as public relations officer, not philasopher. 20 
The above examples show that Voegelin must be 
considered to belong to one sub-section of American 
conservatism. It seems to be a matter of temperament and 
political instinct, however, rather than of theory. I 
have, in Chapter Eight, already discussed and rejected 
the suggestion that Voegelin conceives human nature as 
fixed. Were this true, it would certainly have conserv- 
ative. implications. In his view, the limits of human 
nature are such as to rule out the attainment of a 
society so totally transformed that further struggle is 
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superfluous: -but this" conviction naturally permits a wide 
range of political choices. 
There is one further aspect of his thought which seems 
to invite conservative appropriation; his attitude to 
rulership, and to authority in general. We have-cited 
his claim that the true political alternative to a: 
liberal faith in incremental institutional reform is "the 
restoration of spiritual substance in the ruling groups 
of a society" (E. R: 180). Naturally, this formulation 
does'not commit him to I supporting those' rulers now in 
power while they await conversion. It might equally 
require their overthrow in favour of'some group better 
fitted to govern. But the strong hierarchical assump- 
tions of the prescription are manifest. 
So, for example, he reports with approval Hooker's' 
opposition to the "Snostic Puritans" of his day (NZE 
137-44). They, argues Voegelin, closed themselves off 
from'rational discussion by formulating a standardized 
interpretation of Scripture (what Voegelin calls a 
"koran") which dispensed with the need for the believer's 
personal'openness to truth. Since, as we have noted, 
Vaegelin sees affi nities between the Puritan revolution- 
aries and the Marxists of his own day, his comment is 
significant: Hooker had to contemplate the possibility 
that a debate, which could not end with agreement 
through persuasion, would have to be closed by 
governmental authority .... [because] Gnostic 
propaganda is political action and not perhaps a 
search for truth in the theoretical sense. ... A democratic government is not supposed to become an 
accomplice in its own overthrow by letting Gnostic 
movements grow prodigiously in the shelter of a 
muddy interpretation of civil rights Ebut 
will have to] put down the danger by force and, if 
necessary, to break the letter of the constitution 
in order to save its spirit (Ibld: 143-44). 
One can accept that governments cannot wait till all 
disputes are settled before acting to preserve public 
order and yet find this argument ominous. It embodies 
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the instinctive assumption 'tha't'existi'ng governments 
represent truth, that rulers indeed strive to ýsave the 
spir, it of the constitution, rather than merely seek to 
maintain their own domination. It is that asssuivption, 
not necessarily the explicit arguments rooted in it, 
which is conservative. - 'ro the extent that the assumption 
guides political practice it amounts to an ideology of 
conservatism, by dissuading one from the responsible 
criticism of existing governments. 
Conservative Ideological, Readings of Voegelin 
I 
I hope to have shown that Vaegelin bears some respons- 
ibility for encouraging the, conservative interpretation 
of his work, rather as there are lines of meaning in 
Marx's own writings which lead to the Marxist-Leninism 
sequel. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that the conserv- 
ative appropriation of his work is wilfully selective. 
Crowther's brief exposition of Voegelin ahows why it 
is principally one grouping within the Right which finds 
Voegelin's thought congenial, namely "conservatives" over 
against economic, liberals or "anti-collectivists": 
An'uncritical reverence-for business is a mark of 
commercialism not conservatism. Business has its 
rightful place in society, but the true conservative 
will be aware that there is much worth conserving, 
community, craftsmanship, small firms, public 
manners and mares, towards which business is at best 
indifferent, at worst hostile (1982: 18). 
Crowther correctly contrasts two of Voegelin beliefso 
"that 'civilizational order' must be created and 
maintained by minorities", and that social order depends 
on cultivation, among rulers and ruled alike, of the 
"well-ordered soul", with theýbasic tenets of liberal 
individualism: that "order is spontaneously generated; 
that the public interest is merely the sum of private 
interests; that no authoritative conception of the good 
life can be set above the personal 'value-judgements' of 
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Individuals". But his summary of "Vaegelin's view" is 
seriously flawed: 
all the movements of the modern age, from the 
mildest forms of progressivism to the most virulent 
types of totalitarian ideology, are variants of the 
heresy known as Gnosticism (Ibid: 20). 
Not only had Voegelin moved well away from this position 
by 1982, but the argument is also self-defeating, since 
"conservatism! ' in Crowther's sense is not a ndive 
adherence to unquestioned traditions but is itself a 
"movement of the modern world". In fact, as we shall 
shortly see, Voegelin regards conservatism itself as a 
"secondary ideology". 
0 
David Levy, in proclaiming himself to be "a man of the 
Right's (1982: 4), denies that Conservatives revere 
antiquity as such. Rather, they seek to revive those 
lost social forms which best meet the essential human 
needs: so that, in the words Levy cites from Gustave 
Thibon, "the face of the past' has no attraction at all 
except in so far as it reflects the eternal" (Ibid; 6). 
For Levy, "Right-mindedness" denotes a belief in the 
primacy of nature over history, of being over becoming, 
of the fixed over the fluid. From this belief "derive 
such typical doctrines as the importance of tradition, 
the limitations of human nature, and the fragility of 
civilisation" (Ibid; 7). 
For Levy, therefore, conservatism follows from the 
stance he calls "Realism! ': 
Realism in the human sciences focuses upon the 
historically and archeologically warranted 
assumption that a relatively stable human nature 
exists which combines aggressive and cc-operative 
elements, and that political orders, in all. their 
variety, reflect the nature of the human animal who 
makes them up (1981: 102). 
Levy claims that Voegelin is in this sense a realist. 
The polar position to realism, he suggests, is the 
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phenomenology of Husserl, for whom reality is subject- 
ively constituted. Vhereas for-Husserl "the source. of 
order must always lie in the activity of a transcendental 
subject" (Ibid: 120-21), Voegelin considers that human 
creativity is itself a response to the objective 
structure of reality. : 24& 
In a later book, Levy praises Voegelin's achievement 
in clarifying, the relationship of-symbols-to experience. 
Such potent political symbols as "Justice", "State", 
"Race", and "Class" 
are neither arbitrary labels whose "true" meaning 
could be settled by a philosopher's definition nor 
simple linguistic reflections of substantial real- 
ities that exist apart from the dynamics of human 
action (1987: 87). 
According to a rea list theory of symbols, "Justice". Say, 
is both objective (it is an experienced reality of which 
the meaning is not to be arbitrarily settled by 
definition) and subjective (because it does not exist 
apart from the dynamics of human action). 
'ant So far, so good: but when Levy turns to another pot 
political symbol, "social justice", he appeals not to 
Voegelin but to F. A. von Hayek, whom he takes to have 
provided "an incomparable analysis of the amptinasa of 
such a notion, as well as of the harm to which its appar- 
ent plausibility leads. ... It is enough to note 
that 
the emergence of such a notion is inevitable once men 
, -, egin to conceive the world as subject 
to the demands of 
a subjectivity which recognizes no independent measure" 
. 
(Ibid: 168-69) . ý7 
low for Voegelin, -society is no less a reality than 
are the individual person and the cosmos. The very first 
sentence of Order and History states that reality has a 
"quaternarian structure" by which "God and man, world and 
society form a primordial community of being" (QH 1: 1). 
It follows that "social justice is a legitimate, indeed 
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necessary specification of justice itself; that like 
justice in general it is botb subjective and objective. 
In endorsing Hayek's character i zat i on- of "social ýJusticew 
as entirely subjective, -Levy precisely, z-ejects, Vaegelin's 
realism. 
Levy's criticism of JUrgen, Habermas <1987: -163-66, 
183-84) indicates how Levy's llrealism! ' differs from 
Voegelin's specifically in its conservative implications. 
Habermas offers a critique of those institutions which by 
fixing unequal power relations, impede free human 
communication. This critique, replies Levys dismisses 
"in an unjustifiably high-handed way" 
the, anthropological case for the necessity of a 
4- %. aken-for-granted reality as a precondition for the 
possibility of all human activity (rbid: 164). 
Habermas, says Levy, has an "ideologgically, founded 
, 
impatience with all existing and hence imperfect 
, 
orders" 
(Ibid: 184). By implication, therefore, Levy takes 
"realism", the priority of the fixed over the fluid, to 
require the taking-for-granted of institutions: that is, 
not merely the human need for institutions as such, but 
existing institutions. 
This implication becomes manifest when Levy concludes 
his "work of analysis and reflection" <rbld: 192-94) by 
remarking that mature individuals must accept a degree of 
reciprocity between themselves and the state and renounce 
the "chrysaline state of nonreciprocal dependence". But 
he then defines the citizens' duty as anintaining 
society's Institutions in being. The "so-called Peace 
Movement", for instance, ignores the "imperatives of 
[the] political condition" by assuming that 
expenditure on national defence, which remains the 
precondition for the preservation of a relatively 
. autonomous private sphere within an independent 
political whole, is .... somehow less valuable 
than the provision of noncanditional benefits in 
education and welfare (Ibid: 193). 
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Since the "Peace Movement" opposes not the need for 
defence as such, but certain specific defence policies, 
Levy's argument is empty unless he regards the existing 
military establishment and its spending patterns as part 
of the, "taken-for-granted reality". By virtue of his 
"realism! ', then, he must logically deny that defence 
expenditure must always be measured against other , 
priorities, and that its advocates are not immune from 
becoming ideologists themselves. ý'9 
According to Voegelin's account of the metaxy,, we 
always exist in the tension between perfection and 
imperfection. Therefore, life is permanently marked by 
struggle, and in all spheres of political and personal 
life the imperfect must not be taken for granted, even 
though it can never be decisively replaced by the 
perfect. In equating political maturity with selective 
political docility Levy dissolves the metaxic tension in 
a way that Habermas's own "ideologically founded 
impatience" does not. 
As a last example of the mi'suse of Voegelin's thought, 
I take the work of the American Roman Catholic, James V. 
Schall. He draws heavily on Voegelin in his academic 
writing (e. g. 1987: 182-240), but, also tends to under- 
write his own popular polemics with'Vaegelin's authority. 
In his 1988 article "University and Church", for example, 
, chall attacks those'Catholic universities in the U. S. A. 
which claim that "academic freedom! ' entitles them to 
dissent from "the, official Church's position an this or 
that view`. To support his argument he cites Voegelin's 
disparaging remarks an the power of ideologies within 
American colleges (1988: 30-31, of. Conv: 16-17). He 
fails to mention what he must be aware of, Voegelin's 
contention (explored in Chapter Three of this study), 
that ecclesiastical authority, itself has consistently 
obscured spiritual truth by its imposition of doctrinally 
orthodox f ormulae.: 3'111 
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Voegelin's RePudiation of Conservatism 
In order to conclude that Vaegelin is misrepresented 
by some of his conservative interpreters, one must show 
what effectively separates'him from conservatism. As we 
saw in Chapter Five, the symbol "Order" means to him 
nothing like "old prescriptions" and "sound prejudice". 
Order requires the unremitting resistance to disorder: 
The justice of the polis is not positive law in the 
modern sense but rather essential law within which 
alone there arises the tension between physel 
d1kalon and a possible derailment into the making of 
laws by arbitary human will (An-R: 59). 
In Chapter Seven, we contrasted Voegelin's view of trad- 
ition with that of Anthony Quinton, for whom it enshrines 
"the historically accumulated political wisdom of the 
'community". In Voegelin's view, Plato's Socrates and the 
prophet Jeremiah are paradigms of that individual 
consciousness which represents spiritual order over 
against society. For, as Lonergan explains, within'the 
"dialectic of community" a social order embodies "blas" 
as well as wisdom (1958: 222-44). 
Even in The New Science of Politics, Voegelin crit- 
icized Hobbes (though in milder , 
terms than, he attacked 
Habbes,, Is opponents), for committing the "Gnostic misdeed" 
of dissolving the tension between the truth sought, 
through consciousness and a civil order which purports to 
be absolute (NEE:, 152-61,186-87). Ol The tension Hobbes 
dissolves is permanent: in a decisively anti-conservative 
formulation, Vaegelin writes, 
Balances that work for a while can be found and have 
been found. But habituation, institutionalization, 
and ritualization inevitably, by their finiteness, 
degenerate sooner or later into a captivity of the 
spirit that is infinite; and then the time has come 
for the spirit to break a balance that has become 
demonic., imprisonment (OH I: 183). 
ý 
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In an important passage written ten years later (An-E: 
187-90), Vaegelin expanded this formulation, effectively 
repudiating some of those who'inv I oke his support. 
Ideologies "constitute a language of obsession designed 
to prevent the contact with reality". To regain that 
contact always requires perIaEoge. Rebellion against 
"theological and metaphysical dogmatisms" is not 
necessarily a conversion towards the ground, of'course, 
because one's own ideology might be even less adequate to 
reality than the dogmatisms themselves. 'But the dogma- 
tisms, too, "suffer from a kind of loss''of reality" which 
itself provoked the ideological rebellion; and the 
rebellion, even if not itself an act of noesis may have 
been "a historical accomplishment in the service of 
noesis". In any case it cannot be undone. Vaegelin 
concludes that "attempts of return, motivated by the 
totalitarian climax of the rebellion", 
could not go beyond the older dogmatism to the 
reality of knowledge itselfý They therefore have 
. 
produced a curious gray zone of thought about order 
that is as characteristic a phenomenon of the time 
as the ideologies themselves, to which it is 
opposed. One might speak of an area of secondary 
ideologies. ... Its most important linguistic 
symbols are the "traditions" and the "conaervatisms" 
(Ibid: 188-89). 
In his correspondence, though not in his published 
writings, Voegelin repeatedly and explicit rejected 
conservatism. Sometimes, admittedly, he adopte4a some- 
what. ambivalent stance of, sympathetic disaffiliation, as 
in his correspondence with David Collier, the editor of 
Modern Age (which calls itself "A Conservative Journal"). 
In 1960, as Executive Director of the Institute far 
Philosphical and Historical Studies, Collier secured 
Vaegelin's agreement to give a talk, phrasing his 
invitation in this way: "We, of course, are especially 
interested in the problem of the spiritual and moral 
values in the defence of the West and would hope that you 
would emphasize this aspect"., But in, 1961, Vaegelin 
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declined to be a, special "Academic Member" of the 
Institute, telling Collier that "it would impair the 
objectivity of my work if anybody could point to-such an 
affiliation". I speak of ambivalence because this reply 
could be taken to mean that Voegelin's knows his support 
of conservatism will be more effective if it is discreet. 
Later he seems to have lost much of his sympathy with 
conservatism. In a letter of June 1972 to Henry Regnery, 
he'wrote, "When I came here to the Hoover Institution, I 
was put under certain pressure to become a member of the 
Philadelphia Society". Voegelin at first knew only of 
its reputation for being conservative: but as he tells 
Regnery, his experience resulted in "serious misgivings" 
about the Society: partisan "conservatives", like 
"liberals" were simply out of touch with serious 
philosophy (Hoov). 
What Vaegelin means by this is axplained in a letter 
written as early as November 1955 to his close friend 
Robert Heilman. American conservatives have "no philo- 
. 3ophical understanding of political problems". "Probably 
not a single one of them has ever worried about the 
problem of unanalysed concepts". American "political 
intellectuals" of this kind (here Vcegelin refers 
explicitly to Russell Kirk) express "solid American 
evangelism and revivalism transposed into the secular 
key". Such conservatives, like their opponents, "have 
broken with the reality of existence in the present". 
But don't take too seriously what I say, for I have 
no well-founded knowledge of these things. I don't 
read this type of literature, because the authors 
are no partners in a discussion; these things are 
only an object of investigation, and at the moment I 
have not much time for them (Hoov). 
If this dismissal has an air of geniality, Vaegelin 
could be much more severe. I conclude this chapter with 
a stinging letter he wrote in October, 1964, to his 
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associate and translator Gerhart Niemayer, and which 
makes his position as plain as one could wish: 
At the Chicago meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, I have been told, there was a 
breakfast meeting conducted by you. ... the 
subject matter apparently was my work in political 
science, given a strong slant towards conservative 
politics. Among those present, apparently, were a 
number of persons who would hardly qualify as polit- 
ical scientists, but rather looked like adherents of 
some radical rightist group. 
Vaegelin adds "the following cautionary statement": 
Any move undertaken by whomsoever, apt to associate 
my work as a scholar with any politi, cal party, 
group, or movement whatsoever, but especially with 
Goldwater, conservatism, or rightist groups, is 
made, not only without my permission or tacit 
consent, but against my declared intention. I 
consider any such attempt at association as an 
attack an the intellectual integrity of my work. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
RESPONSIBLE POLITICS: VOEGELIN'S POSITIVE CONCEPTION 
Vaegelin has said that the satirist Karl Kraus was for 
him an "influence of the first magnitude", because Kraus, 
throughout his life, attacked the prevalent linguistic 
corruption of his age, focusing especially on its polit- 
ical ramifications. According to Voegelin, Kraus aimed 
"to restore reality through the restoration of language" 
In this study Voegelin himself has sometimes been 
accused of loose or tendentious rhetoric-' So it is 
important to appreciate that Vaegelin means by linguistic 
corruption something more significant than intemperate 
diction. As he says of Kraus, the concern with language 
"was part of-the resistance against ideologies", inasmuch 
as the ideologist, "has lost contact with reality and 
develops symbols for expressing, not reality but his 
state of alienation from it (AX: 17-18). In Kraus's 
view, corrupt language is a reliable indicator of the 
presence of ideology; and conversely, care in the use of 
language is a salutary exercise of philosophical, and 
even of political responsibility. ý 
In other words, language is to be Judged by the same 
criterion as that by which symbols are assessed for their 
adequacy, according to whether or not-it retains contact 
with human-experience or systematically excises whole 
realms of that experience. As Voegelin remarks in 
commending Solzhenitsyn. 
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In resistance to the dominance of idols, i. e. of 
language symbols that have lost their contact with 
reality, one has to rediscover the experiences of 
reality as well as the language that will adequately 
express them (&X: 96). ý2 - 
Linguistic corruption, therefore, both expresses and 
disseminates the loss of reality. In the unpublished 
section of his essay of 1970, "The Eclipse of Reality" 
(Hoov: only the first ten pages were published), Vaegelin 
speaks of, the "pneumopathological phenomenon" of a 
language that repudiates spirit, perhaps referring by 
this phrase to the nasos (the spiritual, not psychO- 
logical disease) of which he had elsewhere accused Comte 
and Marx.,,, 
The key political implication of linguistic cor- 
ruption is identified in Solzhenitsyn's Nobel Lecture: 
Violence does not and cannot flourish by itself; it 
is inevitably intertwined with lying. ... nothing 
screens violence except lies, and the only way lies 
can hold out is by violence. Whoever has once 
announced violence as his metbod must inexorably 
choose lying as his p-rinciple (1972: 32-33). 
Voegelin goes further than Solzhenitsyn, arguing that 
rhetorical extravagance is almost as politically sinister 
as-outright lying. In a lecture delivered in Munich in 
the year 1965-66, he alluded transparently to Heidegger, 
speaking of "the famous philosopher who had great 
linguistic and linguistic-philosophical ambitions, but in 
the matter of language had such little, sensitivity that 
he was taken in by the author of Mein Kampfl. O Voegelin 
substantiated his aspersion by quoting from a discussion 
in BeinT and Time about the nature of signs. The text 
11transposes factual relationships of our everyday world 
into a linguistic, medium that begins to take on an 
alliterative life of its own, and thus loses contact with 
the thing itself" (1985., 11). Vaegelin suggests that 
Heidegger's writing as a whole exhibits this estrange- 
ment: we might 
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construct something of a philosophical dictionary,, 
from A to Z; and proceeding through it, from - 
the 
Anwesen des Anwesenden, to the Dingen des Dings and 
the Nicbten des Nicbts, and on over f inally to the 
zeigenden Zeicben des Zeigzeugs, we could whip, 
ourselves up into a reality-withdrawing state of 
linguistic delirium (Ibid). Iff- 
By arguing that the "character of language stamps the 
character of the public scene", Voegelin was implying 
that the thousands who shouted the alliterative Heil 
Hitler! were kindred spirits of Heidegger (Ibid: 12), and 
that Heidegger had fostered a climate of coarseness of 
spirit in which a grotesque figure like Hitler could 
become politically effective, rather than be pushed to 
the margins of German life. It is in this way that 
Voegelin saw the critique of language as an act of 
spiritual and political responsibility. -7 
The question arises, of course, whether one can make 
such confident inferences about the state of individual 
or collective consciousness from the use of language. 
Language is clearly both a cause and an effect of states 
of mind: but it is also the effect of other causes than 
state of mind, such as one's level of education and the 
prevalent usage of one's surrounding linguistic ccmm- 
unity. In the words of Marx, "language itself is the 
product of a community, just as it is in another respect 
itself the presence of the community" (cited Lash, 1981: 
44). Voegelin would agree with Marx an this point. In 
his late work he wrote of "the complex of consciousness- 
reality-language" (OH V: 16-18), thereby denying to 
language any non-reciprocal causative status. 13 
ýConcern with language, therefore can only be a part of 
the resistance to ideologies. Such resistance presumes 
above all the will to retain contact with the primary 
realities of existence (AN: 96). Thus, in a lecturej 
"Moral Bases for Communication in a Free Society", given 
at Marquette University, Milwaukee, in 1956 (Hoov), 
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Vaegelin. distinguished between pragmatic and substantive 
communication. The former induces people to behave'in a 
certain way, "always with the proviso 'no questions - 
asked' about the morality and legitimacy of the purpose". 
Such purposes, even if intrinsically defensible "have 
already a shadow of the improper and immoral because 
clear articulation is part of moral action". %Substantive 
communication "has for its purpose the unfolding-and - 
building up of personality". 1" 
Yevertheless, the attempt to speak plainly and define 
one's terms is a mental hygiene which is also a politic- 
ally significant service of truth. As Kolakowski writes, 
"there is never a shortage of arguments to support any 
doctrine you, want to believe in for whatever reasons" 
(1982: 16). However, clearly articulalted arguments are 
not thereby barren. They promote the exercise, of 
conscience by elucidating the status quaestionis. 
Vcagelin tells, for instance (Conv 146-47), how in his 
seminars each person must "say what he means when he 
wants to use Ethe word] valuet He adds that he distrusts 
"the 'isms' we throw around as if we knew what we, were 
talking about"; 
Optimism, pessimism, nihilism, egotism and so on are 
all eighteenth century new language. The social 
"isms" - liberalism, conservatismo capillalism, 
communism - all appeared between 1810 and 1850. 
If one abstains from such terms and specifies the 
experiences one is talking about, "suddenly people become 
sane; they are not permitted to talk nonsense" (Ibid). 
But Voegelin knows that it is equally true that clear 
articulation presupposes the search for truth which it 
signifies. Substantive communication presumes good 
faith, of which linguistic probity is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. 
Good faith is the opposite of that attitude described 
in Book I of The Ring and the Book, which might nowadays 
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be called ideological consciousness: "The instinctive 
theorizing whence a fact/Looks to the eye as the eye 
likes the look". So Voegelin argued, in his Marquette 
lecture, that one major obstacle to substantive 
communication- is the substitution of "sincerity" or 
"conviction" for conscience. Whereas the "sincere" 
assume the right to make judgments without due knowledge 
or reflection, conscience makes rational moral judgments, 
which others are permitted to challenge-l'O 
Spirit, Power and Competence 
To set out the necessary context for Vaegelin's 
conception of practical politics will also serve to 
recapitulate the philosophical roots of his political 
theory. In "Industrial Society in Search of Reason" 
(1963: 34), he summarizes six "postulates of classical 
politica": U) every human person participates in the 
transcendent Nous, or Logos; (2) 
, 
the life of reason 
consists of actualizing this participation for the 
development of character; (3) human beings are equally 
capable of the life of reason, but (for whatever reason) 
are unequal in the application of their potentiality; 
(4) those who live, by reason are a minority in every 
society; <5) every society has a "de facto hierarchical 
structure in terms of actualizing the life of reason" 
(which implies that hierarchy is not to be postulated an 
any other basis); (6) "The 'quality' of society depends 
on the degree to which the life of reason, actively 
carried out by a minority of its members, becomes a 
creative force in that society". 
The purpose of politics, then, is to establish (always 
provisionally) the "good society", namely the one in which 
the life of reason becomes socially effective. To this 
end, responsible politics requires three elements to be 
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held together; power, spirit, and common sense. Plato's 
renunciation of ýhree extreme solutions to the problem of 
political order (CH 111: 224-28) is paradigmatic for 
Voegelin. Firstly, once the cosmological order had given 
way to an order in which "the problem of Espirituall 
regeneration had become personal", a shared spiritual 
understanding could not be izffposed an people. Nor could 
a second solution (later to be advocated by Machiavelli) 
be considered: that the realm of spirit be excluded from 
politics, so that a "Prince" might legitimately seek to 
unite the populace through the exercise of power alone, 
leaving the necessary spiritual order to be instilled 
from some other acurce: 
the violent, tyrannical solution, which at first 
sight might appear as a solution by power alone, 
involves in fact the corruption of the spirit, for 
the soul of the tyrant would have to close itself 
demonically against the law of the spirit that doing 
evil is worse than suffering evil. A Plato will be 
tempted, but he will not fall (rbid: 225). 
Thirdly, Plato declined the course of radical withdrawal 
from the sphere of power into a restricted cirý: le of 
those concerned with the spirit. " 
The classical postulates must be supplemented with 
others which classical philosophy did not articulate 
(1963: : 35,37-39). Two are relevant to our argument at 
this point. The classical concept assumes that a size- 
able percentage of people are "slaves by nature": and if 
they are incapable of responsible citizenship, it is 
pointless to consult them about society's affairs, so 
that their social function is merely to provide the 
economic basis of otber-sl life of reason. This 
assumption, says Voegelin, "can be dismissed out of hand. 
since it has been replaced by the Jewish-Christian 
concept of man as an image of God". 
Secondly, because the "psychic tension of the life of 
reason$$ is difficult for most people to bear, societies 
li 
18 li 
develop species of "mass belief" which may threaten the 
life of reason or marginalize its adherents. Mass belief 
and the life of reason co-exist in every society. But 
when the life of reason is marginalized, society has to 
find some alternative principle of common life, what 
Voegelin calls a "civil theology". Civil theologies 
seek to be useful, not true. Among them are "the 
. an communities to impose by force attempts of sectar4 
their immanentist beliefs on a society as a state cult" 
ideological movements); the attempt to (i. e. the 3reat 
preserve a neutral public realm, aeparate from the 
"private" life of reason and spirit, so that tolerance is 
extended to all groups which do not themselves make a 
political issue of their faith (the limited Lackean 
tolerance which excludes Catholics, Levellers, etc); and 
4. hat kind of constitutional democracy which allows free 
rein to intellectual and spiritual move-. ents only so lang 
as they award a quasi-sacred status to the cc-nstitul-tan 
itself (Ibid: 35-37). 
In Voegelin's view, civil theologies inevitably lead 
to irresponsible politics. We have already considered 
the impact of the great ideologies. But Vaegelin also 
criticizes the civil theology of constitutional : 1-amocracy 
(not, that is, democracy as such) by which a society's 
quality is ascribed to one specific form of social 
organization (Ibid: 41-43), Therefore, though Vaegelin 
passionately condemns the particular patterns of conduct 
inculcated, by such movements as Communism or National 
Socialism, he argues that movements which oppose them at 
the level of content may well be united with them in 
relying an the method he calls "artificiality in 
politics" (ER: 70-71). Politics becomes "artificial" 
when "the growth of the soul through an internal process 
which is nourished through communication with transcend- 
ental reality is replaced by the formation of conduct 
through external management". Such politics consists in 
"forming the useful member of society while neglecting or 
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even deliberately destroying the life of the soul", and 
attempting to determine "patterns of social conformance 
without raising the question of the morality of the 
pattern or of the morality of conformance". "- 
Political order is always informed by some spiritual 
vision. -- Voegelin argues that the "mass beliefs" of the 
modern world have displaced the classical vision of the 
"good society". He therefore believes his own purpose to 
be at once theoretical and practical: to recover the 
classical vision (for a far more complex society than the 
Greek polis), though in a form enriched by subsequent 
noetic differentiations, especially that of Christianity. 
The loss of the the classical vision, (indeed, of any 
conscious orientation to the transcendent good) has 
destructive practical consequences, which Voegelin 
discusses in "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War". The 
new spiritual situation discerned by Nietzsche is evoked 
in the symbol of the Last Man in Also Sprach Zarathustra. 
The Last Man is the one who is lost spiritually, who 
seeks only, warmth, neighbourliness, "not too much work, 
protection against disease, a sufficient measure of drugs 
to create pleasant dreams .... all want to be the same 
and want to be equal" (1944a: 179). But despiritualized 
existence is only a shortlived possibility, for when the 
organizing power of the spirit is weakened, 
the result is not a peacably happy despiritualized 
society, but a chaos of instincts and values. 
Despiritualized happiness is the twin brother of 
despiritualized brutality (Ibid: 180). 
Therefore, Nietý: sche predicted "wars as there have never 
been wars on earth". His predictions writes Voegelin. 
was intended as empirical descriptions not hyperbole. He 
envisaged the breakdown of the "framework of political 
ordinates" (e. g. the ambitions of dynasties and nations) 
which had determined the limited objectives of war: 
henceforth, wars would express the struggle of instinctst 
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of blind preservation of or attacks on the status quo: 
they would have motives but no purposes: 
Politics in the traditional sense of statesmanlike 
action within an accepted order of purposes comes to 
an end ... in the formulation of 
Nietzsche,,, 
"Politics is dissolved entirely in a war of the 
spirits" (Ibid: 180-81). 
"Statesmanlike action", in other words is action in which 
power, spirit and common sense are accorded their place. 
It presupposes, firstly, political leaders' access to 
power and capacity for co=on sense; and secondly, that 
the shared purposes which transcend specifically polit- 
ical acts nevertheless animate them. 
Of course, Voegelin does not mean that the earlier 
"framework of political ordinates" (such as dynastic 
consolidation or expansion) necessarily embodied the life 
of reason. Political actions and purposes often failed 
to distinguish between the order of political necessity 
and the higher order of moral action. 10 Even Thucydides, 
who rightly recognizes the exigencies both of the "order 
of necessity"-and the "order of morality", is mistaken in 
seeing them as two autonomous orders in tragic collision: 
the sphere of power and pragmatic rationalism is not 
autonomous but part of human existence which as a 
whole includes the rationality of spiritual and 
moral order. If the controlling order of spirit and 
morality breaks down, the formation of ends in the 
pragmatic order will be controlled by the irrat- 
ionality of passions; the co-ordination of means and 
ends may continue to be rational but action never- 
theless will become irrational (OH It: 363). 
If, on the one hand, Thucydides's history shows that 
power uncontrolled by spirit is destructive (and there- 
fore irresponsible), spirit (even uncorrupted spirit) 
will likewise be irresponsible unless it accepts the 
burden of power and is checked by common sense. This 
point may be illustrated from a typescript of about 19471 
entitled "Clericalism! ' (Hoov), in which VoeSelin traces 
the successes and failures of the Church in the face of 
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modern civilizati'an. Ir- He judges that the Church has 
succeeded in one sense. In"the general civilizational 
crisis, 
the Church emerges today as the one major social 
institution which has kept alive the flame of the 
spirit, which has preserved intact the order of the 
soul, and which at the same time, has continued 'to 
cultivate the critical-instruments of the philo- 
sophizing intellect. 
But it has failed in, the discharge of its proper societal 
role. That role is not, he thinks, to develop a positive 
social programme, because the Church's primary task is to 
enable its members to-live authentically in any social 
order. It ought rather to engage in "casuistry", dealing 
in the light of its spiritual vision with concrete social 
questions as they arise. Such questions might range from 
comparatively simple questions like the payment of 
taxes to such grave questions as murder under 
governmental orders in war; it extends to a recog- 
nition of trade-unions because they express human 
initiative in self-government, and to the rejection 
of Fascist corporations because they violate this 
initiative. 
ITaturally there will still arise .:: onf licts between the 
Church and civi'l authority over specific cases. But the 
Church has failed, Vaegelin ar - Sues, because its lack of 
common'sense has needlessly embroiled it in a general 
conflict with civilizational forces. 17 Thus, its early 
opposition to the nation-state and the'money A-co'nomy put 
it decisively at adds with secular governments; later, it 
failed to adjust in time to the advancement of critical 
science, so, making the de-Christianization of large 
sectors of society inevitable; and (especially relevant 
for our purpose) it "failed to grasp intellectually the 
problem of industrialized society and the position of the 
worker in it". -I 
Symptomatic of this third factor-is the failure of the 
Encyclical Rerum Novarum ("in many respects a laudable, 
document") to, understand the Marxian demand for the 
abolition of property. The Church's "rural hangover", 
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and its fear of Marxism, blinded it to Marx's crucial 
distinction between personal property and ownership of 
the instruments of, industrial production. As Vaegelin 
adds sardonically in a phrase that almost summarizes his 
view of practical politics, "History does not wait for 
those who do not catch an". Because of its intellectual 
failure, the Church was gradually, reduced "to the rank of 
a private organization", with the consequence that the 
public realm was deprived of a vitally necessary 
representation for the life of the spirit. '" Casuistry, 
it is clear, is a demanding discipline, which requires 
the combination of a profound spiritual vision and an 
eminent degree of intellectual openness and flexibility. 
Voegelin's positive political recommendations tend to 
be negatives in disguise, prophylactics against delusion 
or false generalization. It was once put to him that 
acting purposefully requires some sense of the future 
order towards which one aims: "Isn't it, therefore, 
desirable that there should be something like ideological 
commitment - but tentative and open to criticism and open 
to change? " (Conv: 33). Voegelin replied that he did not 
think such commitment feasible in practice. Insteadl he 
recommended a kind of secular equivalent to the casuistry 
he thinks proper to the Church (Ibid: 33-35): 
One of the rules would be: concrete cases - because 
the concrete cases usually explode the lovely 
clich6 jargon which we all use inadvertently. 
Concretely, a government that has a good tradition 
in operating politically (say, the British Foreign 
Office) knows that on the pragmatic level one can 
plan for ten years, 'and never more than that. 
He illustrates his maxim, "Know your business within the 
ten years" by citing a few cases where such competence 
was lacking. Enormous war reparations were levied on 
Germany, even though "every economist knew"' that they 
were senseless; even if they were paid, they would ruin 
the economies of the receptors. Again, Roosevelt refused 
to be persuaded by Churchill that one ought not to 
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surrender to the Soviet Union so many European capital 
cities. Thirdly, Voegelin himself was trapped in Austria 
in 1938 because he had wrongly thought it impossible that 
the allied governments would so incompetent as to permit 
Hitler to occupy Austria. In each case common sense 
would have made it clear what was to be done'. Such 
blunders derive either from ideologies (which "obfuscate 
the structure of reality") or from political passions 
which blind the judgment. "9 
Voegelin, therefore, consistently sought to prevent 
flight from the concrete. In a letter of-1953 to Alfred 
Schutz (given in Opitz & Sebba, 1981: 458-62), he agrees 
with Schutz that "historically every position has its 
countwer-positions". "Historically every truth -sets 
itself off against an already existing belief, which the 
new truth forces into the position of being untruell. ýO 
But he adds an important corollary: 
Everything ultimately depends an what one's position 
concretely entails. So, methodologically speaking, 
the generalization is carried too far if it makes 
the problems of concrete historical position dis- 
appear. Formally Socrates is in conflict with 
Athens; you can set up either side as the position 
and then call the other side the counter-position. 
But this, it seems to me, leads to historical , relativism. A case like this calls for a decision: 
Socrates is rightt Athens is wrong. (Or the modern 
liberals' decision: democracy is right, Socrates 
was a Fascist. ) < rbid: 461) 
"Theory" can be distinguished from ideology or "civil 
theology" precisely by its openness to the whole of 
concrete reality, both spiritual and pragmatic, but also 
by its refusal to collapse one order into the other. 
Political Analysis: An Example 
To illustrate Voegelin's conception of concrete and 
non-ideological political analysis, I shall summarize the 
argument of his essay of 1941, "Some Problems of German 
Hegemony". 
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German hegemony, he begins, has by 1941 been success- 
fully established over "the larger part of non-Russian 
Europe", though the legal forms vary from incorporation, 
as in the case of Austria, to the "alliance of formally 
equal partners" as in thecase of Italy. (In his very 
first paragraph, then. VoeSelin characteristically 
implies that formal political structures are an unsafe 
guide to deeper political reality. ) He refuses to 
predict the outcome of the war, and therefore the future 
stability of German hegemony: "All that a acholar can 
responsibly do" in 1941 is to identify -some of the, 
factors which will affect any future settlement, whatever 
the outcome of the armed struggle (1941b: 1154). 
He points out how inadequate it is to think in terms 
of a static pattern in which political units relate to 
each other as ready-formed national states. One Must 
think in terms of process. The great Western imperial 
drive had its core in the Austro-Hungarian empire. After 
the "seventeenth century catastrophe" this core became 
marginal to the conflicts (European or colonial) which 
attended the expansionist drives of the other imperial 
powers; Spain, France, Holland and England. But then 
came a central European revival as Prusaia (with it 's 
economic unificatA'. on,, industrialization, and rapid 
population increase) suddenly developed into the most 
powerful of the continental states. 
Squeezed as it. was into such a limited territory, 
Prussia embarked on a programme of expansion almost as 
soon as it-was founded. Its attempt to become a naval 
power with a "motley colonial empire" (thus challenging 
the supremacy of Britain) gave way after 1914 to an 
attempt to expand overland, expressed both in intensified 
relationships with Italy and Spain to the South and in 
the National Socialist policy of the drive to the East, 
the Drang nacb Osten (Ibld: 156). 
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Germany's central position in Europe'entailed either 
suffocation by the older imperial powers (if it remained 
passive), or an expansionism which would inev'itably 
threaten those powers: leaving France, for instance, as 
"a third-rate power an the brink of Europe". A European 
settlement would have to be either a compromise which 
would alter the relative power of the Western empires, or 
the decisive defeat of one or other power. Even after 
the First World War had led to the dissolution of the 
Austrian empire, 'the problem was only shelved. For the 
arrangement which established a number of minor nation 
states in Central Europe also created a power vacuum 
which could survive only as long as Germany was too weak 
to resume its power-drive in central Europe. 
Such factors, Vaegelin concludes, would operate 
whatever the character of the German Government it-self 
"A Western nation-state with the material momentum of a 
great power", auch as Prussia, cannot be expected to 
behave as if it were "a minor political unit like . 11orway" 
(Ibid: 156-58). -" 
Vaegelin then turns to the difference made by the 
National Socialist revolution in Germany. He suggests' 
that Western statesmen scarcely understood how deeply 
rooted was this revolution in the "peculiar German 
socio-political structure" (rbid: ' 161). The German 
national state-was founded only in 1870, and possessed 
neither a stable ruling class nor "a people which had 
acquired its democratic liberties in a struggle with the 
ruling class on a nation-wide scale". Whereas the 
liberal and democratic movements in Britain and Francel 
rooted in a religious or philosophical understandingt 
embodied a universalist conception of human dignity, the 
political formation of the "German masses" was mainly 
affected by such l9th century ideologies as Marxism and 
nationalism, which reinforce tendencies to "closure". 
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In these circumstances "a thorough democratization 
would have been a difficult task requiring several 
generations" (Ibid: 162). Unfortunately', though, 
such possibilities as there were for a democratic 
development have received a severe setback 
through the ill-considered introduction of formal 
democracy and the consequent rise of National 
Socialism (Ibid: 163). 
Vaegelin explains. Had the standards of--personal conduct 
associated with the Prussian court been maintained, a man 
such-as Hitler, could never have risen to power. Further, 
the abolition of the German army ironically led, through 
the loss of the ethos of military professionalism, to the 
"particularly repulsive atrocities" of the-Nazis. And 
the democratic constitution itself fostered the totalit- 
arian takeoveri since the Communists and Nazis, by the 
use of their "blocking majority" in the Reichstag, were 
able to make the constitution unworkable . 22 
The final, decisive element is the radical aspiration 
of the National Socialists to recast the entire civiliz- 
ational tradition of Germany. All key personnel, all 
bodies which might influence public opinion, all academic 
institutions, must share and propagate the new spirit. 
It is this radical ideological spirit which precipitates 
the catastrophe. 
Noegelin, as I have said, is not willing to predict 
the war's outcome, or to speculate beyond the war's end. 
If Germany is to win, "no one will care what we think 
about it". If Germany is defeated, 
in, arder to prevent a Russian expansion it [will] be 
necessary for the sea powers to occupy the continent 
and to organize the indescribable wreck themselves. 
Any conjecture as to this order is futile, it for no 
other reason than that we do not know what will be 
left to be organized (Ibid: 168). 
He does risk saying that he cannot, in 1941, envisage a 




retain sufficient striking power to retain any hope 
of ultimate victory. 
Voegelin makes one other significant point., Hegemony 
exacts a penalty also an its possessors. The super- 
imposition on smaller states of German officials, German 
courts and German secret police, and the German economic 
exploitation of its vassal states, ensures subsequent 
chaos whatever the War's outcome: eventual revolution and 
bloody suppre SS4 . &. On following a German Victory, or 
the 
massacre of Germans and their sympathizers after a German 
defeat. Any project of "world-empire" is futile because 
the organizational shell of empire must be devoid of 
spiritual substance (OH IV: 117). In other words, 
conquered peoples with a sense of their own heritage will 
continuously strain against their subject atatus, so that 
the cohesion of both, the conquered and their conauerors 
must be undermined. As a Polish officer is said to have 
remarked of the German attack an his country, "The fly 
has invaded the flypaper". 2`-ýý 
The coal tone of this essay does not disguise 
Voegelin's passionate opposition to the Nazis. But its 
force. derives strictly from the incisiveness of the 
analysis i, tself. This combines a powerful general theory 
of imperialism and its inevitable nemesis (which itself 
fits logically within Voegelin's overall theoretical 
framework) with a steady concentration on the specific 
histori, cal factors operative in the case of Germany. A 
partisan approach would scarcely yield such a combin- 
ation. Its lucidity is the more notable given that it 
was composed in the heat of world war. 
However,, the essay throws into question some of 
Vaegelin's other stances. Earlier in this chapter, I 
recorded his, astonishment that Hitler was allowed to 
annexe Austria., His, accusation of incompetenceo of 
course, is directed at the allied governments, not at his 
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own mistaken assessment. But one might think a thorough 
realism would have led him to anticipate such blunders, 
since, an his own account, Britain had itself been formed 
by the imperial mentality. Much more importantly, he 
never subsequently applied his analysis of hegemony to 
the policies of the United States itself. We have seen 
that he dismissed out of hand any criticism of the war in 
Vietnam. In the light of his criticism of Thucydides for 
failing to subordinate the "order of necessity" to the 
"order of morality", the domination exercized by the 
United States over, say, Central America, ought to raise 
questions for Voegelin that he seems to have been 
unwilling to consider. zl 
Responsiblllt7 as a Critical Per-, =-; pective 
As well as the crisp political analysis it makes 
possible, Vaegelin's work can sharpen an ela awareness of 
the pitfalls of a kind of rhetoric which Is character- 
istic of political theology, that of the "transformation 
of unjust structures". 2r- 
To illustrate this suggestion I shall consider the 
work of Holland and Henriot (1983: 31-45), which has been 
especially influential in Roman Catholic Circles. 
_, 
They 
discuss three interpretative models of the dynamics of 
change in society, and the governing metaphors of each 
model. In a "traditional" model of society. it is. 
imagined that the present social order incorporates such 
limited good as one may reasonably expect from the world. 
Change, therefore, primarily implies decay. A strenuous 
search for reform 
- 
willmerely put at risk the existing 
good. Challenges to the existing order are to be 
absorbed, orminimized, or rejected outright. Secondly. 
society is envisaged as an organic whole, and like the 
body,. its members' proper functioning is determined 
centrally: the "body" has a "head". 2411 
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In a "liberal" society changeis welcome because it 
connotes progress or evolution. Society tends to be 
represented not as an organism, but as a mechanism which 
can be made-to work efficiently. Society is pluralistic, 
so that the "common good" cannot, be the d, irect object of 
social concern, but results spontaneously from (or . 
perhaps even consists oD the spontaneous balancing of 
the different interests of individual. rational actors. 
Conflict <envisaged rather superficially as competition) 
needs, to be managed rather than arbitrated. No one, of 
course, speaks of. "managing" a war or a revolution, and 
liberalism is typically nonplussed by-convictions or 
social purposes which are too vigorous to be "managed". 
'According 
to the "radical" model of change, society is 
marked by interdependence, and by fluid patterns of 
participation which cannot be hierarchically orde 
, 
red., 
With such fluidity and indeterminacy,, there naturally 
arises the, possibility of conflict. To espouse the 
radical model is to recognize that such conflict can be 
creative, just, as a personal dialogue can enrich its 
participants even-when they continue to disagree. 27 
In. the radical model, suggest Holland and Henrict, 
, the-daminant image is that of the work of art or artistic 
creation: "as a work of art,. society is constructed out, 
of its members' dreams, myths and visions". When faced 
with conflict-in society, the radical response is to 
seek creative paths that lead to new and better forms of 
society - through fundamental structural transformation 
(Ibid: 39). The artisticinage signifies that society 
ltself, (and not merely the systems which occur within it) 
is "constructed" by the participation of its members, and 
society itself is''Itransformed" by the creative search of 
those who are willing to face conflict. 
In the radical model, basic transformations occur in 
-the-very social structures, as the events of history bring about fundamentally new stages. There is a 
time linkage between past, present, and futureo but 
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it is a dialectical linkage whereby one stage 
emerges from another through a process of creative 
conflict (Ibid: 38). 
To speak of "fundamentally new stages" is to suppose 
that change goes far deeper than the the re-ordering of 
institutions. To speak of a dialectical process is to 
posit change as intelligible and patterned. To speak of 
"creative paths" and "creative conflict" is to suppose 
that the changes are thoroughly intended, though not 
necessarily predictable in detail. Thus, Holland and 
Henriot remark, "It may be that we do not have any 
historical precedents for the transformation of advanced 
industrial capitalist societies. Hence our task is not 
to copy other models, but to unleash our creative 
imagination" (Ibid: 40). ý20 
An example clarifies what Holland and Henriot propose. 
Granted a situation of international economic injustice, 
"a traditionalist response would strengthen the police 
and military instruments to repress protesting social 
movements". Some affluent people may practise Phil- 
anthropy, making certain benefactions while reserving all 
power to themselves; but the international system will be 
regarded as inviolable. "A liberal model guides an 
acconnadationist response", so that certain adjustments 
will be effected. Aid programmes may be implemented, the 
repayment of debts deferred. But "a radical model guides 
a structuralist response"': 
No amount of "tinkering" with the current global 
order will remedy the situation. The rich/poor 
relationships need to be transformed through 
creative efforts to restructure the global social 
system. The call for a "New International Economic 
Order" is an instance of the structuralist response, 
though a more thorough response requires new 
national social orders as well (1bid: 41-42). 
This illustration threatens to discredit the entire 
argument. The "structuralist response" reads as a 
grandiose fantasy in which omnicompetence by radicals 
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conveniently meets with'their-apponents' acquiescence. 
Even if one agrees that the present economic order is 
systematically'biassed against less industrialized 
countries', so that only a radical analysis suffices, so 
comprehensive a "policy" abandons any notion of 
practicability. 
Our criticism is not that "global"'radicalism is 
mistaken about'the need for change, or even that it'is 
unduly sanguine about the possibilities of change', but 
that it expresses far too restricted a sense of how 
social change occurs. Radicalism of this kind imagines 
change to be brought about by the strenuous effort, the 
refusal to compromise, of the radicals themselves. ' 
Conversely, it does not envisage change as emerging 
gratuitously from the social'milieu (that is, as a 
function of what Moltmann calls avenlr, as opposed to 
futur), or as occurring gradually, in harmony with 
cultural and spiritual growth. Voegelin would hold that 
any such instant change must be superficial, and that 
institutional adjustments which are not rooted in the 
culture are futile. 2'11 It is, therefore, erroneous to 
suppose that a "radical response" necessarily follows 
from a radical' analysis. Holland and Henriot 'are less 
careful than the mature Marx who, as we saw in Chapter 
Nine, came to disavow immediate radical'activism without 
attenuating the force of his analysis. -"'* 
A second criticism is that Holland and Henriot's 
notion of "radicalism" lacks the critical penetration'6f 
their accounts oftraditionalism and liberalism. ' In 
particular, their image'of the conflict inherent in the' 
radical model is no less sanitized than the one they 
attribute to liberalism. The "fundamental transform- 
ation" effected by the common participation of opposed 
groups might, far from constructing a harmonious work of 
art, rip the canvas apart. Our consideration of language 
is relevant here. When used aver against the labels 
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"liberalism! ' and "conservatis&', "radicalism! ' conveys the 
impression of rigour. It is a misnomer when applied to 
the euphoric expectation that the institutional order can 
be, overturned in its entirety: in fact, its use might 
well nurture that very illusion. ml 
Holland and Henriot are, in fact. able to offer one 
convincing example of a change which may be called 
radical (in that dominant assumptions and institutions 
are fundamentally and effectively challenged), and yet is 
actually operative. This is the growth of ecclesial 
, communidades de base, (1983: 44). However I should-wish 
to argue that these communities are not radical in the 
precise sense meant by Holland and Henriot. They do not 
arise from some prior analysis of the defects of dominant 
ecclesial structures, and are not designed as a self- 
conscious alternative to those structures. On the 
contrary, they have emerged as expressions of the spirit- 
uality of certain communities (who, not by coincidence, 
were socially marginal). Their radicalism has 3radually 
become manifest, without its being deliberately sought. 
One misunderstanding must be averted. The radical 
response derives much of its plausibility from the 
rightful awareness that the weight of suffering caused 
by political and economic injustice demands urgent 
action. Voegelin's position must not be taken to imply 
that all one can do is await those cultural changes 
(taking place over generations) which will somehow 
dissolve concrete ills. It will suffice to quote from 
his important essay of 1981, "Wisdom and the Magic of the 
Extreme", in which he refers to the Hesiod's enumeration 
of the miseries of human life: 
As. long as our existence is undeformed by fantasies, 
these miseries are not experienced as senseless. We 
understand them as the lot of man, mysterious it is 
true, but as the lot he has to cope with in the 
organization and conduct of his life, in the fight 
for survival, the protection of his dependents. and 
the resistance to injustice$ and in his spiritual 
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and intellectual response toýthe mystery of 
existence (1981: 237-38). 
One is obliged, in other words, to struggle against 
perceived injustice. 
Further, as was seen in Chapter Seven, Vaegelin , 
readily grants that political institutions can, indeed, 
be-reorganized. So specific "radical" policies might 
in principle be appropriate at any-time. But to the 
extent that global radicalism only serves to discredit 
the pursuit of limited and attainable aims it ought 
itself to excite the "suspicion" advocated by Segundo. 
It is time to consider what has been illustrated by 
our recourse to the work of Holland and Henriot. We have 
seen how Voegelin is committed to a politics of 
"responsibility". This entails firstly the repudiaýtion 
of ideologies, and secondly the attempt to practiSe a 
"casuistry" of discernment, guided above all by the 
circums4tances of the concrete case. Such casuistry is 
not anti-theoretical. A pragmatism which disdains theory 
seems incoherent: one cannot renounce theory and simply 
judge individual cases on their merits, because one needs 
a theory as to what constitutes a merit. Vaegelin's 
theoretical framework has been characterized at length: 
about the'nature of the metaxy, about the primacy of 
consciousness over institutions, and about the nature of 
the'intellectual life as a search for truth - impelled by 
living questions, and derailed by the acceptance of 
formulaic solutions. 
He repudiates ideologies (liberalism, conservatism and 
Marxism alike) because each depends for its plausibility 
on a theory which falsifies reality, either by positive 
untruth or by the systematic exclusion from attention of 
whole'dimensions of reality itself. All are escapes from 
discernment, especially because each of them closes 
itself off from self-questioning. Therefore, none of 
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them can offer a safe guide for political decision- 
making. As Saul Bellow has remarked (in an interview 
printed in the Independent newspaper, 10/2/1990), 
"Systems fall away one by one, and you tick them off as 
you pass by". In the case of Holland and Henriot, 
Voegelin would endorse their rejection of the conserv- 
ative and liberal models. He shares some ground with 
their radical analysis, but would refuse the "radical 
response" at the precise point where it also becomes an 
ideology by its claim to global validity and by its 
espousal of'a goal of total transformation. 
For Voegelin, as for Holland and Henriot, existing 
social systems, no matter how formidable and entrenched, 
are never more than, provisional crystallizations of 
social practice. But this implies what they do not 
admit: that there can be no a priori principle which 
determines how far they ought to be preserved, and hcw 
far renegotiated. Oý 
Yceicelin-s- ronception of Politi, -al Ma-surity 
The Social Location of Maturity 
If one renounces ide-ologies and a priori prescriptions 
for action and at-the same time maintains that the reform 
of external institutions is necessary but secondary, one 
enthronesýinstead the principle of continuous political 
discernment. ' Not surprisingly, therefore, at many points 
in this study we have been brought back to the decisive 
importance'Voegelin attaches to the concept of maturity 
. (that is, 'the capacity to discern aright), in the people 
as a whole and especially in ruling groups. He insists 
that "the true alternative" to those two false ones is 
"the restoration of spiritual substance in the ruling 
groups of a society, with the consequent restoration of 
the moral strength'in creating a just social order" (ER: 
180): and he insists on it despite his admission that the 
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pragmatic value of this "true alternative" is not very 
high either. 
If his political theory is to command assent, he must 
naturally explain satisfactorily what constitutes this 
"spiritual substance", and how it bears on political 
life. Indeed, any political theory is obliged to 
explicate its conception of good leadership, formal and 
informal. In turn, any account of political leadership 
embodies, at least tacitly, some vision of how social 
change occurs. 
According to the Nichomachean Ethics, it is clear that 
people desire different things as goods. Therefore, 
either all goods are only relative, or there actually is 
some authentic good but most people's desires are 
deluded, Pleasure, for example, "appears to [most 
people] to be a good, although it is not". Aristotle 
defines the person of good character (or, as Voegelin 
would say, of spiritual substance), in such a way as to 
resolve this problematic: 
The man of good character Judges every situation 
rightly; i. e. in every situation what appears to him 
is the truth .... he is a sort of standard and 
yardstick of what is fine and pleasant (Aristotle, 
1976: 121-22 in section 1,113). 
The Greek word translated here as "the man of good 
character" is spoudaios. Vaegelin thinks the term better 
translated as "the serious, or weighty man", the one who 
has attained full human stature (OH TIT: 300). He 
comments, "These reflections of Aristotle are perhaps the 
most important contribution to an epistemology of ethics 
and politics that has ever been made". -0: 3 
II 
I Ethics, including political ethics, is a "science of 
mature people, by mature people. for mature people", and 
not either "a vain opining without verification" or "an 
intuition of 'values' in the abstract". Ethics arises 
only as the self-interpretation of a civilized society; 
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Ivor more precisely, in that stratum of a civilized 
society in which the excellences are cultivated and 
debated" (Ibid: 301). The spaudaics is the criterion for 
ethics, and not vice versa (An-E: 65). ý3,4 
Now Voegelin is speaking here of the science of 
ethics, not ethical practice. It is therefore important 
for him to make clear that zmturity itself does not 
I 
require the taste fdr debate: for works of pneuma, as 
opposed (conceivably) to works of intellect, have no 
natural home in the leisured classes. 
Ile offers one resource for this necessary clarific- 
ation in his account of the Aristotelian virtue of 
phronesis. Phronesis is the insight or the capacity 
which allows one to resolve existentially the netaxic 
tension (which can never be dissolved theoretically) 
between "a justice which is everywhere the same and yet, 
in its realization, changeable and everywhere different" 
(An-E: 61-62). Phronesis is not one virtue among others, 
but is the source of the specifically ethical virtues. 
As Voegelin elsewhere explains, "Justice as an ethical 
virtue is outranked by the dianoetic virtues, and 
especially by phronesid', Just as the Christian 
"cardinal" virtues are outranked by the "theological" 
virtues, which allow the soul to be decisively formed by 
its transcendental orientation, so that it is capable of 
practising the ethical virtues (011 111: 111). " 
Now Aristotle "attributes to concrete action a higher 
degree of truth than to general principles of ethics" 
(IbId: 62). This does not mean that the philosopher's 
role-is superfluous, because correct action normally 
requires deliberation, "and the premise for rational 
deliberation is ethical knowledge" (Ibid: 63). But 
Aristotle also allows for the, possibility that the 
eutyches (those "favoured by fortune") can attain truth 
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without the mediation of "ethical knowledge" (Ibid. - 63- 
64). It follows that those who practise phronesis may be 
different people than Voegelin habitually envisages, and 
may be far more numerous. ý3a 
Now political theology takes this possibility to be a 
practical certainty', and takes it as seriously as 
possible. Rqbecca Chopp quotes a saying of Outi6rrez, 
"Even the poor have a right to think" (1989: 187): that 
is, they can become reflectively aware of their exper- 
ience in such a way that insight is nourished, rather 
than prejudice entrenched. To put this in Voegelinian 
terms, the Christian insistence that pneuma is offered to 
all is a differentiated equivalent of the claim that 
phronesis is possessed by other than philosophers. 
But Voegelin himself takes no such step. Perhaps it 
is implicit in Aristotle's term eutycbes that such people 
are exceptional charismatic figures whose presence cannot 
readily be predicted or identified; and therefore, that 
they cannOt be nominated as leaders. Be that as it may, 
Vaegelin's own definition of phronesis, "the virtue of 
correct action and, at the same tine, the virtue of right 
speech about action" (AN-E: 65), has articulacy built 
into it. From his statement that ethics is a science for 
the mature, Voegelin infers that the "prudential science" 
of politics belongs to a limited and x-ecognizable group: 
When the predominance of such a group is endangered 
by the masses whose passions (patbos) are not 
restrained by reason UpTos), then the quality of 
the society will, decline. ... The validity of its [political science's] insights is not in question; 
but the validity will be socially accepted only 
under certain historical conditions (OH 111: 302) M7 
Ile ought, surely, to say, that what endangers society is 
less the denial of the science of ethics or of "the 
prudential science of politics" than the absence of 
pbronesis or maturity itself. By omitting to make this 
distinction, he does indeed imply that society depends an 
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those who have the leisure to cultivate and debate the 
science of ethics: noesis supplants pneuma as the 
decisive. political good. 
The dynamics of the Just political society as Voegelin 
conceives it are clear: certain people, formed by their 
openness to the transcendent, become the authoritative 
source of pol, itical order. It is these few who maintain 
any civilization, and if they are scattered or impotent, 
social breakdown soon follows, for where their authority 
cannot be made effective the political order is already 
corrupt. Their gifts impose on them a corresponding 
obligation. According to the "Parable of the Cave" in 
the Republic, those philosophers who have been 
enlightened are to return to the Cave to share their 
gift, for the happiness of the individual is subordinate 
to the happiness of the whole polis (011 111: 116). 
The Philosophers' Split with the Polls 
Voegelin's argument now takes a decisive step: 
But why is this duty incumbent on them? Why should 
the philosopher sacrifice himself to co-citizens who 
would rather kill him than follow him? The question 
of apolitism becomes acute QH ITI: 116). 
The reason why "the question of apolitism, becomes 
acute" for Plato is that, in the Dialogues which follow 
the Republic, he envisages a split between a spiritual 
community of philosophers and the temporal community of 
the polis as a whole. In the event that true philo- 
sophers should come to power in a polis, Socrates 
suggests in the Republic, 
the whole population over ten years of age should be 
sent out of the polis to the countryside. Then the 
philosophers should take over the children under ten 
years of age and raise them dfter their own manner 
,*,, This would be the surest and quickest way to 
establish the politeia among a people. The prog- 
ramme is ingenious and eminently practical .... Cbut] has only one flaw: it cannot be executed by 
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true philosophers, For any attempt to realize the 
order of, the idea by violent means would defeat 
itself. The authority of the spirit is an authority 
only if, and when, it is accepted in freedom 
(Ibid: 135). 
By painting to such a "flaw" Vaegelin perhaps acquits 
, himself of any charge that he advocates sheer authorit- 
arianism. -363 But his argument at this crucial point is 
perverse. He denies that the passage represents "a 
Platonic programme for political action": "the Socrates- 
Plato of the dialogue evokes the idea of the right order; 
those who have ears may listen. " The passage has "no 
other function" than to show that, given the people's 
consent, the idea is technically feasible. 
If the proposal is so modestly intended, however, its 
sequel becomes unintelligible. "The appeal went unheard, 
as might have been expected. " 
The lack of response had important consequences for 
Plato's future life and work, for he washed his 
hands of Athenian politics definitely. It meant the 
and of the philosopher-king who would realize the 
idea in Athens or anywhere else (Ibid: 1306). 
Accordingly, the Phaedrus becomes "the manifesto which 
announces the emigration of the spirit from the polis" 
(Ibid: 139). Athenian society is split into "an 
unrepresentative public order and an unrepresented 
spiritual substance" (Ibid: 140). 
Vaegelin's conclusion is striking: the societal split 
engenders a tension of such sharpness that the 
common bond of humanity between the lost souls and 
the manic souls is almost broken. The difference 
between the souls tends to become a generic differ- 
ence between a lower type of human beings, close to 
animals, and a higher type of semi-divine rank. 
This divinization, which seems absurd in the realm 
of Christian experience, is inherent in the logic of 
the myth of nature. ... The obstacle to such 
recognition which in the Christian orbit stems from 
the experience of creaturely equality before a 
transcendent God, does not exist in the Platonic 
experience (Ibid: 141). 
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This argument is"at the heart of Voegelin's political 
theory. Three criticisms. will be made of it. 
Firstly, in admitting that-the proposal fails to, 
measure up to the Christian insight of human equality 
before God, VoeSelin exculpates Plato much too lightly. 
The virtual dissolution of "the common bond of humanity" 
is not only "unchristian" (that is, open to criticism 
retrospectively, from the perspective of a more differ- 
entiated awareness of truth); it is grossly "unmetaxic". 
One would expect Vaegelin to recognize this, for he adds 
a footnote which begins "Today we live in a situation 
similar to Plato's", and quotes approvingly a reflection 
of Karl Jaspers on the "conflict of mass and nobility". 
. Jaspers writes, "The seriousness of the problem of 
how we 
can take care of the mass-man - who is not willing to 
stand in inner independence - leads to the revolt of 
existential plebianism in every one of us against the 
duty of being ourselves which God in His inscrutability 
has imposed an us" (emphasis added). Jaspers 
observes, an activist elite can easily %turn in, '%Io "a 
mincrity with all the characteristics of a new, and not 
at all aristocratic, mass" (quoted OH 111: 143-44). 
Despite quoting this passage, however, Voegelin palpably 
does not believe in any tinge of "A-xistential plebianism! ' 
in "Plato-SocratesII. -3-cI 
Secondly: if the rejection of the philosopher's 
proposal is sufficient to demonstrate the Athenians' 
incorrigibility, then the proposal itself is obliged to 
be not merely technically practicable, but also 
rationally uncontestable. 
, 
Such status is argued for 
neither in Plato's Dialogue nor in Voegelin's text. 
Thirdly: one, cannot infer from the people's rejection 
of the. proposal, that "the spirit has emigrated from the 
polis". If the philosophers are the only educators who 
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can with sureness establish the politela, the very 
acceptance of the proposal would only ratify, the fact 
that the spirit has already "emigrated" -to them. , For the 
issue does not rest on the rational merits of the 
proposal (which could be debated) but on the implicit 
claim by Plato-Socrates that the philosophers be given 
allegiance. Further, the philosophers' refusal to 
coerce, though commended by Voegelin, is of little 
significance if the people's use of the freedom allowed 
to them provokes the philosophers to renounce the polis: 
more precisely, the demand for absolute authority to be 
vested in them is itself a form of coercion when it is 
accompanied, as in this case, by such a threat. It 
seems, as it is remarked in Max Beerbohm's Zuleikra 
Dab-,: -; on, that "the Socratic manner is n. at a Same at which 
two can play". 
The theme of the wise ruler's absolute pre-ami'nence 
persists into the next dialogue, the Statesman. This 
dialogue, notes Voegelin, has a subtler psychology than 
the Republic: different people exemplify different 
virtues, which may even operate against each other, so_ 
"the virtues in themselves, without orientation and 
discipline, will not amalgamate into a stable order". 
(Hence, of course, the significance of the phronesis that 
underlies the particular virtues. ) The royal ruler (one 
of the "very few men" who possess the lcTos basilikos) is 
to weave these strands into a "supple fabric", elimin- 
ating some by death and exile, relegating others to 
slavery: he is "the mediator between the divine reality 
of the Idea and the people" <OH 111: 160,166-69). As 
such, it is clear, he must transcend the limits of 
metaxic existence and elude the limits set to his or 
anyone's virtue by Plato's "subtler psychology". 
We cannot here follow the theme of the "royal ruler" 
(i. e. the spoudaios who is accorded social predominance) 
through the subsequent Platonic writings. But we must 
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note Voegelin's deep ambivalence as to whether such a 
figure is historically, conceivable. He knows'that 
"existential plebianism! l afflicts all of us, that the 
categories of "mass" and "minority" are fluid: 
The reality of history does not have the structure 
of the model politeia in which the ruler possesses 
the logos basilikos. Nevertheless. reality is 
intelligibly related to the model, even though its 
mode should be one of derivation, or of a falling 
off Ibid: 162). 
But despite this knowledge, he applies thesymbol of the 
royal ruler to Plato himself, in two different ways. 
He writes, firstly, that Plata's development culmin- 
ates in the Laws, at which point "Plato has accepted the 
distance which separates1him from other-men; he now 
speaks as the divine lawgiver to men who are equal 
because they are equidistant from hire'. To be aure, 
Plato presupposes the "myth of nature", which posits "a 
hierarchically. differentiated psyche, -with gradual 
transitions from humanity to divinity" (OH T11: 234); 
so Voegelin can acknowledge the "theocratic limitations" 
of Plato (Ibid. 265 
,) without 
inconsistency: but the 
objection we have levelled against this construction In 
the Phaedrus applies equally here. By writing that Plato 
has "accepted" the distance between himself and all 
others, Voegelin acquiesces in Plata's self-assessment. 
One would think, though, that to place oneself at the 
absolute apex of any such natural hierarchy suggests a 
hubris close to madness, rather than the "culmination" of 
a philosopher's development. 
This impression is reinforced when Voegelin discusses 
Aristotle's perception of Plato. Plato inaugurates 
a new spiritual aeon of the world. Plato's Judgment 
on his age is confirmed, but his work is not inval- 
idated by his failure to link spirit with power in 
pragmatic politics. ... The polis may decline, 
sink to insignificance and disappear, but the world 
will go on in a movement of which the meaning is 
determined by Plato (rbid: 284). 1 
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Plato the prophet becomes Plato the proclaimed. On this 
occasion, admittedly, Voegelin implicitly criticizes 
Aristotle's serene acceptance of the decline of the polis 
and his readiness to transfer all hope from political 
to contemplative life, by contrasting it with Plato's own 
reluctance to dissociate spirit and power (Ibid: 288-89). 
As we have seen, though, Plato*s "reluctance" did not 
amount to a refusal, and Voegelin has commended "Plato- 
Socrates" for "washing his hands" of the Athenian polis. 
XaturiV and IntegriV 
"Plato-Socrates", then, retires from direct political 
involvement because the people w1l not follow him, and he 
is not willing to remain in political life an any other 
terms than that. Now Voegelin elsewhere tries to guard 
himself against the obvious accusation that he makes the 
retention of personal integrity absolutely prior to civic 
commitment. Writing of Mikhail Bakunin, he states that 
"the life of mankind in historical existence is not a 
life of sweet reason and sensible ad, j'ustment", but 
embodies the mystery of evil: 
the mystery that evil sometimes can be remedied only 
by opposing evil; that destructive outbreak of evil 
supplies the force for'breaking an unjust order, and 
subatituting an order of superior justice (ER: 232). 
Even in the case of the "storm of revolution, with its 
horrors and moral confusion", therefore, 
the man who assumes consciously the responsibility 
for releasing the storm is perhaps moved deeper by 
the sense of justice than the man who resists it 
because he wishes to preserve the values of the 
existing order; and even the rascal who uses the 
upheaval for his personal profit .... may haveýa 
positive function in the establishment of the new 
order which is denied to the man who has to stand-, 
aside because he cannot sacrifice his integrity 
(Ibid: 233). 
Voegelin does not, however, allow this, deeply felt 
comment to modify as it ought his notion of the spoudaics 
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itself, as may be seen in his important critique of the 
Utopia of Thomas More. 
The care of this critique is stated in Science, 
Politics and Gnosticism. According to the Utopia, the 
perfect society is one without private property: however, 
More is well aware that this perfect state cannot be 
achieved in the world: Man's lust for possessions is 
deeply rooted in original sin, in superbia in the 
Augustinian sense ..... This raises 
the question 
of the peculiar psychopathological condition in 
which a man like More must have found himself when 
he drew up a model of the perfect society in 
history, in full consciousness that it could never 
be realized because of original sin (Ua: 101). 
Voegelin argues in this way despite having acknowledged, 
in his extended essay of 1951, "More's Utopia", that the 
name of the reporter of Utopian life, Hythlociaeus, means 
"teller of idle tales", so that it is by no means clear 
what More himself thought of the value of the Utopian 
institutions. The "ideal" society is a literary device, 
designed to serve as an instrument of social critique 
(1951: 452.454,459). Nevertheless, according to 
Voegelin, once More had. diagnosed the evils of his time 
as a "rampage of superbiall, he ought to have prescribed 
"the Christian answer" of restored spiritual order. But 
because of "the far-reaching decomposition of his Christ- 
ianity" More could no longer experience the spiritual 
order as "a representative public order in the common- 
wealth" (Ibld: 458). Instead he playfully posited a 
society in which the evil of superbia is removed by 
institutions: 
More himself still had enough substance to know that 
such stuff can lead only to Nowhere. Nevertheless 
he indulged in the play; and the results of the play 
do not differ from the results at which the thinkers 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries arrived 
when the spiritual weakness of More had degenerated 
into spiritual impotence. ... The spiritual order 
is replaced by the social ideal (Ibid: 463). 
In other words, even Mare's fictional evocation of a 
political society without pride manifests loss of spirit, 
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and offers a precedent for those who will put forward the 
same panaceas without irony. In Science Politics and 
Gnosticism, Voegelin sums up as follows: 
we may speak, then, of the pneumopathological 
condition of a thinker who, in his revolt against 
the world as it has been created by God, arbitrarily 
omits an element of reality in order to create the 
fantasy of a new world (, 92a: 101). 
rhis summary seriously misrepresents the Utopia. More 
does not "revolt against God" (by succumbing to fantasy, 
and proposing the model of some new world in which the 
primacy of spirit over social arrangements is denied): an 
the contrary, he identifies such a "new world" precisely 
as an enlightening fantasy. Because it is the'Utopians' 
lack of hubr-is which makes possible the character of 
their political institutions, More does not imagine that 
Utopian institutions can be duplicated in arcier to 
transform other societies. It is this very misrazpres- 
entation which underpins Voegelin's attack an More, 
namely that More "drew up a model of the perfect society 
in history" knowing it to be unrealizable. In trans- 
forming More's "playful" fantasy into a "model", V-magelin 
commits the very aberration of which he accuses More. He 
overlooks what he knows perfectly well. 
Voegelin's attack an More seems to have two motiv- 
ations. Firstly, he thinks that More's work beat a path 
which others would later tread more destructively. " 
The second point bears directly on our theme of the 
spoudaios. "Even under the conditions of the all- 
embracing Hellenic polis, [Plato] knew that times may 
come when non-participation is the duty" (1951b: 455). 
"More", Hythlodaeus's interlocutor in the dialoguet on 
the contrary, defends the philosopher's attempt to 
mitigate political evil from within the king's council, 
even if he must thereby settle for "'polite philosophy" 
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rather than that which "says what it thinks regardless of 
circumstances" (More, 1965: 63). 
Vaegelin, of course, recognizes that "More"I does not 
necessarily speak for More the author. Nevertheless, he 
argues, the author, as a Christian, should have been even 
more aware than Plato that the supreme duty is "the 
orientation of life towards the su=um bonu. &'. In the 
dialogue, neitber- party presents this true alternative, 
and the dialogue therefore "dodges the spiritual issues": 
that all men are not good, and therefore-all things 
cannot be well, is sound admonition to a perfection- 
it easily can become a cover for condoning A. st; but 
crimes. What makes this argument so flat is the 
renunciation of the spirit as the ultimate authority 
beyond the temporal order and its insufficiencies 
(Voegelin, 1951b: 456). 
"More", in espousing the perennial excuse of the intel- 
lectual "collaborator" (the strong term is Vae-2-eltn'S) 1.4 
renounces philosophy: Hythlodaeus presents the sourious 
alternative of the fantasy state; and the author is 
content to conduct the debate within the radu,: tionllat 
terms of reference allowed by secular humanism. 
At first sight, this argument appears weiShty. Any 
attempt to check evil by oneself renouncing truth must be 
futile. The argument epitomizes Vaegelin's own admirably 
demanding conception of philosophy as the imitatio 
Socratis. But the charge relies for its validity an a 
gratuitous assumption: that if the fulness of philosoph- 
ical insight is, omitted from the dialogue, the author is 
guilty of reductionism. On the contrary, however, the 
Utopia, and especially its unsparing account of civil, 
judicial and ecclesiastical corruption in Part I, itself 
constitutes a refusal to condone evil: and "More""s, 
advocacy of tact among councillors is far from being an 
abandonment of truth. Instead, it is precisely an 
attempt to commnicate truth effectively, rather than 
simply to blurt it out: 
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You wouldn't abandon ship in a storm just because 
you couldn't control' the winds. On the other hand, 
it's no use attempting to put across entirely new 
ideas, which will obviously carry no weight with 
people'who are prejudiced against them. You must go 
to work indirectly (More, 1965: 63-64). -, " 
Thus, our, second point: despite the remarks we have 
cited in respect of Bakunin, Vaegelin's critique of More 
presumes that the only way to be oriented to the summum 
bonum, of being an authentic spoudaios, is to make the 
"renunciation of politics" of the Timaeus QH TIT: 180)0 
so retaining one's freedom to utter the fulness of 
philosophical truth to everyone at all times. In other 
words, Voegelin treats More on Plata's terms, but Plato 
on his own terms. Further, Voegelin's critique is valid 
only if the mitigation of evil does not itself constitute 
an orientation to the good, and if the good which can 
only be accomplished by engagement (and which is necess- 
arily forfeited by renouncing politics), counts for 
nothing. Voegelin ends up by implying t1hat only the 
absolutist is truly mature. 
Conclusions 
Vcegelin's conception of political responsibility 
combines the. repudiation of ideologies with the commit- 
ment to discernment in specific cases. 
It would be wrong to regard this position as a 
disguised way of evading political responsibilityl and it 
would beg the question to assume without argument that 
Voegelin is really rejecting all "practical politics". 
Fortunately, one recent case. that of the Czech writer 
Vaclav Havel-, has illustrated the potential of Voegelin's 
perspective. Havel's essay "The Power of the Powerless" 
(1985) does not mention Voegelin explicitly. But one who 
approaches it with a knowledge of Voegelin will smile at 
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the recognition of familiar positions expressed with a 
lucidity particular to Havel. 
Havel first asks whether "dissidents" - "a category of 
subcitizen outside the power system" - can have any 
influence an Eastern European society (Ibid: 23). The 
"psychic aggregate" (to use Voegelin's term) of that 
power system is one of a "total ideology". That-is, -it 
pervades the whole of the community', s lile, it can 
scarcely be accepted only in part, and it "offers a ready 
answer to any question whatsoever" (Ibid. 2215). Havel 
gives a vivd example: 
The manager of a fruit and, vegetable shop places in 
his window, among the anions and carrots, the 
slogan: "Workers of the World, Unite! " Why does he 
do it? .... Is he genuinely enthusiastic about 
the idea of unity among the workers of the world? 
Is his enthusiasm so great that he feels an irrep- 
ressible impulse to acquaint the public with his 
ideals? Has he rea. 11.1y given more than a moment's 
thought to how such a unification might occur and 
what it would mean (Ibid: 27)? 
T Ahe real meaning of the sign, Havel suggests, is the 
greengrocer's "subliminal but very -definite message" that 
k. he regime can rely an his docility. To have displayed 
the more accurate sign, "I am afraid and therefore 
unquestioningly obedient" would have surrendered his 
dignity too obviously. As it is, he can always defend 
himself by saying, "What's wrong with the workers of the 
world uniting? " (Ibld: 28). In this way, both the 
character of his obedience and the nature of the power 
that imposes it are disguised. 
One purpose of Havel's essay is to show that such a 
total ideology is far more fragile than it appears. A 
second purpose is to explain that opposition to it will 
not, at least primarily, be expressed through overt 
political confrontation, least of all by espousing some 
competing ideology. The most effective opposition is 
that of "-living within the truth" (Ibid: 47,39). If the 
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greengrocer removes the sign (the' removal itself being a 
symbolic action) or stops voting in elections he knows-to 
be a farce. he may well be'harrassed or attacked. But 
those who attack him will probably do so not from the 
conviction of their rightness, but, only from the same 
timid conformism which the greengrocer. has refused. Forl, 
the greengrocer has ": shattered the world of appearances". 
Precisely because the ideology is total, "everyone who 
steps out of line denies'it in principle and tbreatens it 
in Its entir-ety (Ibld; 40). 
At this point, one hears echoes of Voegelin: 
Individuals can be alienated from themselves only 
because there is something to alienate. The terrain 
of this violation is their authentic existence. 
Living the truth is thus woven directly into the 
texture of living a lie .... Only against thla background does, living a lie make any sense .... 
The singular, explosive, incalculable political 
Dower of living within the truth resides in the fact ; hat living openly within the truth has an ally, 
invisible to be sure, but omnipresent: this hidden 
sphere (Ibld: 41). 
This sphere of truth (this "second culture" as Havel 
calls it on page 78) is dangerous from the perspective of 
power. From the perspective of so-called "practical 
politics" those who try to live in truth would have to be 
classed as a negigible "mini-party" <Ibid: 44). But one 
cannot estimate the power of "dissidents" through the 
lens of the open political system. Havel suggests that 
Solzhenitsyn was driven from his own country not "because 
any of the regime's representatives felt he might unseat 
them and take their place in government", but in an 
attempt "to plug up the dreadful wellspring of truth" 
(Ibid: 42). 
It follows from this analysis that one cannot properly 
polarize political responsibility and the exercise of 
personal integrity. According to Havel, and as Voegelin 
always argued, the profoundest political reality is not 
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that of parties'and their programmes, but of a` pre- 
political" search for-truth*. The Czech dissidents have 
concluded that "there is no other way to conduct real 
politics" in their situation (Ibid: 44): 
this conclusion can be reached only by someone who 
is unwilling to sacrifice his or her own human 
identity to politics, or rather who does not believe 
in a politics that requires such a sacrifice (Ibid). 
One final aspect of Havel Is essay- must be mentioned. 
Like Voegelin, he refuses to legislate in advance for 
concretb cases, even at the risk of-seeming to exclude 
himself from the realm of practical, "responsible" , 
political choices. 'Alluding ironically (one presumes) to 
Lenin, he, asks "What is to be done, then? ". He claims 
(Ibid: 92-93) that his "scepticism towards alternative 
political models and the ability of systemic reforms or 
changes to redeem us" does not make him sceptical of 
political thought altogether. But his "existential 
revolution" aims at "a moral reconstitution of societyto: 
A new experience of being, a renewed rootedness in 
the universe, a newly grasped sense of "higher 
responsibility", a new-found inner relationship to 
other people and to the human community - these 
factors clearly indicate the direction in which we 
must go (Ibid). 
The political consequences of this will "probably" derive 
from "human factors rather than from a particular formal- 
ization of political relationships and guarantees. In 
other words, the issue is the rehabilitation of values 
like "trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, love" 
(I bid). 112" 
At this point, a reader of Voegelin is bound to recall 
such expressions as "attunement to being", "comminity of 
being", "open soul" and "open society". However, Havel 
does use one word that would disconcert Voegelin, namely 
"solidarity". And this addition offers a key to our 
interpretation. 
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In discussing Voegelin's conception of political 
responsibility in, Chapters Nine, and Ten, we have, seen 
that it combines resistance to ideologies (a resistance 
which entails one's alertness to linguistic corruption 
and one's own commitment to linguistic probity) with the 
positive attempt to live in truth, "attuned-to reality". 
The political good can be achieved only where a leader- 
ship which itself lives in truth secures adequate support 
from the wider society. Like Voegelin. Havel finds a 
-starting point-in the critique of language, in his case 
through the attempt to penetrateýthe consciousness behind 
a representative political slogan. Like Voegelin, he 
attaches far greater weight to the attempt to live in 
truth than to put forward a plausible detailed programme 
oneself. And the remarkable fate of Havel himself and 
the movement associalted with him (as it seezz at the time 
of writing -'Chis chapter) forbids one to -write off such an 
emphasis as unrealistic. 
But there are two crucial differences between them. 
Vcegelin says that ethics, "a science of mature people", 
can arise, cnly in a highly, civilized society as its 
self-interpretation; or, more precisely, in that 
stratum of a civilized society in which the excel- 
lences are cultivated and debated (OH 111: 301). 
But on Havel's account, spoudaioi can threaten the reign 
of ideology specifically because they, and the virtue of 
phronesis itself, are by no means restricted to auch 
circles. - Ideology is effectively threatened not when the 
philosopher rebels, but when the greengrocer rebels. 
Secondly, for Havel as opposed'to Voegelin, such 
'spoudaloi cannot afford to withdraw from the political 
scene. People of integrity do not, indeed, enter the 
political game under its present rules. But they only 
make themselves felt when they find a way of practising 
"real political'. The notion of political responsibility, 
so precious to Voegelin, can be expressed only through 
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the very style of engagement which he deprecates, for 
example, in the case of Thomas More. Accordingly, there 
is a kind of maturity and integrity which expresses 
itself only through accepting political responsibility. 
It involves the agent in implementing and discovering 
political norms, and then submitting them to continuous 
rational scrutiny. -4: 3 
Voegelin's conception of the spoudalas, therefore, is 
an enlightening but partial one. There is'no virtue in 
being "detached from causes" as such, except in so far as 
one is freer to'respond to truth. This is not a neglig- 
ible consideration, granted how partisanship can lead to 
self-deception. But truth is not something which can be 
possessed in tranquillity, so that one's existential task 
is already accomplished by contemplating it. Spoudaici 
have to risk engagement, because disengagement precludes 
some of the very experiences an whichýresponsible 
discernment has to be exercised. 
We have, indeed, noted Vaegelin's re3retful admission 
that-"the man who has to stand aside because he can:, = 
sacrifice his'integrity" forfeits the possibility of 
effectively opposing evil (ZR: 233). But the -mad 
consequences of such abstention are a warning'that such 
integrity is not the virtue it seems. it is only purism. 
In the metaxyý integrity can only exist concretely when 
it co-exists with compassionate engagement. There is a 
metaxic tension, which Voegelin significantly fails to 
mention', between the search for truth and the search for 
justice (where "Justice" means agape as directed towards 
. 
groups, or what one might-call "political love"). Though 
he formally acknowledges the validity of the Christian 
differentiation by which agape transcends noesis (see 
Chapter Four), Voegelin does not allow this acknowledg- 




This chapter will not add substantially to the 
conclusions reached'in the body of the study. It will 
simply make clear what they are, in twelve points. 
The Contribution Intended by this St 
, 7' 
1. There have been several expositions of Vaegelin's 
thought. Among the items listed in section II of the 
bibliography, Sandoz (1981), Sebba (1982), Webb (1981 & 
1988) and Cooper (1986) are reliable and readily access- 
ible. Sandoz,, in particular, has not only worked 
persistently to make Voegelin-better known, but elicited 
Voegelin's own Autobiographical Memoir. But no one, as 
far as I know, has made a detailed critique of Vaegelin's 
thought of the kind attempted here. On the one hand, 
no one who has tried, to assimilate Voegelin's work as a 
whole has written a systematic attack an him. On the 
other hand, among sympathetic accounts of his work, those 
of such writers as Sandoz and Sebba virtually restrict 
themselves to explication and advocacy, rarely venturing 
any criticism except on marginal, points. These men were 
decisively influenced by Voegelin, and had the benefit of 
his collaboration. Perhaps they were also daunted'by his 
erudition and his formidable capacity for riposte. Other 
writers (Nieli, Webb, Morrissey, Germino) do make 
substantive criticisms, but from a different perspective' 
than that taken in this study. ' 
, In considering-Voegelin's attack on Marx, for example, 
I have received no help from the work of Vaegelin 
scholars. Either they are silent, as if there were no 
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problem, or they tend simply to endorse his position (see 
the references to Marx in Sandoz, 1981). For their part, 
marxian scholars either do not know of Voegelin or choose 
to ignore him. Nor has anyone drawn attention to the 
complex blend of affinity and trenchant repudiation which 
characterizes Voegelin's attitude to the traditionalist 
wing of American conservatism. 
Even nore notably, Vaegelin's expositors have accepted 
without serious reservations his treatment of such 
central symbolic constructs as the spoudaios and the 
metaxy, whereas I have criticized him for the narrowness 
of his conception of the spoudaios and for his failure to 
articulate certain metaxic tensions which, if he were to 
acknowledge them would bring some of his specific 
judgments into question. 
Naturally, some of the shorter essays cited in the 
bibliography make criticisms of Vaegelin. Anderson 
(1978: 84-92) questions - in my view, correctly - the 
adequacy of Voegelin's response to the prophetic liter- 
ature; and Douglass makes a range of criticisms 
' 
of 
Voegelin's treatment of Christianity. My own arguments 
are informed by theirs without following them. For 
example, I have argued more strongly than Anderson that 
Voegelin radically misrepresents the prophetic intention. 
2. This study also seeks to make a modest contribution to 
political theology. In Chapter One we recalled Metz's 
acknowledgment of the need for a "political theology of 
the subject" (1980: 60). Voegelin's philosophy of 
consciousness is an eminent contribution to the meeting 
of this need, and yet political theologians havo so far 
paid scant attention to it. When one such theologian, 
Matthew Lamb, does discuss Voegelin, he underestimates 
the value of his work in an instructive way. = 
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Lamb (1979: 81-87) makes in brief a criticism of 
Voegelin which has been made in greater detail in this 
study: namely that he fails to give due weight to trans- 
formative action as the end and the primary criterion of 
Christian faith. He therefore regards political theo- 
logy's emphasis on "transformative praxis" as at once a 
corrective and a fulfilment of Voegelin's "disclosive 
ontology of transcending-experiences" (rbid: 87). 
But this judgment is too straightforward. One must 
add what Lamb fails to state, that political theology's 
practical emphasis needs, in turn, to be corrected and 
fulfilled by a theory of consciousness. For if it is 
asked haw anyone knows that action is transformative and 
not merely manipulative (riddled with resentments, self- 
seeking, power struggles. and so on) one can only refer 
back to the quality of individual and communal conscious- 
ness which is operative in praxis. "Transformative 
praxis" is not self-validating. It requires an adequate 
conception of the goal of transformation, namely the 
character of the good society. Lamb is right to insist 
that love impels one to praxis: but wrong to neglect the 
complementary truth that praxis can work for good only 
when it expresses 
" 
an agape which is critically controlled 
by noesis. Accordingly, he is also wrong to say that 
Voegelin's work, which admirably explores the implicat- 
ions of this truth, is in principle superseded by 
political theology. To remain fully rational, political 
theology needs to be continuously challenged from a 
position such as Vaegelin's. 
Voegelin's Contrihution to Political Theolo" 
3. When Vaegelin was asked in an interview what he 
himself-considered his "major contribution to human 
knowledge", his response was characteristically wry: 
Well, I have my doubts about the use of the term 
contribution. It smacks a bit of the progressivist 
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conception that there is an advance in the history 
of mankind, and that everybody makes his contrib- 
ution to it. ... I doubt very much that my work 
can be categorized as a kind of contribution to 
anything (1973b: 135). 
What he meant by this is that philosophy has from, its' 
origins been conceived'as an end in"itself, rather than 
as a "contribution" to some further'end. The philo- 
sopher's activity of "exploring the structure of reality* 
needs no extrinsic justification (rbid). 
In a different sense, 'Voegelin is very purposeful: 
elsewhere he speaks of "recapturing reality in opposition 
to its contemporary deformation": and reality has to be 
thus "recaptured" not only from "deformed ideologies", 
but also from "the deformations of reality by the 
thinkers who ought to be the preservers of reality, such 
as the theologians". To this end, the philosopher "has 
to'-reconstruct the'fundamental categories of existence, ' 
experience, consciousness, and-reality" (AX: 100). In 
other words, philosophy is an activity dedicated to the 
search'for noetic order, which is also the resisting of 
noetic disorder. Since that disorder threatens all human 
activities, no mode of discourse can dismiss philosophy 
as irrelevant. To be specific, political theology 
operates mainly, and legitimately, in the mode of 
"intentionality", directing its attentýion outwards with 
the practical aim of promoting social justice. But 
this extraverted emphasis can become destructive it it is 
cut away from the search for existential truth'and from 
contemplative openness to the whole of reality U. e. ýthe 
bios tbeor-etike) *' Such a zetema, especially when it is 
also a philosopher's exploration of the nature of social 
order, has much to offer to political theology. 
4. Noetic, disorder derives principally from ideologies 
which deform the structure of reality$ and from propos- 
itional systems which hypostatize experience and its 
symbolic articulations. 
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Accordingly, Vaegelin's critical acumen is central to 
his achievement. He is a masterly anaiyst both of 
literary texts (of many. different cultures) and of the 
ways, in which societal self -understanding is symbolically 
expressed, confirmed and modified: we have considered 
numerous examples of his literary and cultural penetr- 
ation, both where he wishes to affirm and defend (as in 
his exposition of Plato, and of certain biblical texts) 
and where he dissents or challenges (as in the case of 
Comte and his liberal interpreters, or in the case of the 
race imagery of National Socialism). 
In particular, he gives a satisfying account of how 
"ideas", or intellectual systems and doctrines (any 
doctrines, almost regardless of their intrinsic worth) 
are secondary constructions. They have the valid social 
function of protecting achieved insights. But where an 
idea, or system, or doctrine deflects attention from its 
engendering experience (so that the propositional state- 
ment itself becomes a quasi-absolute object of defence or 
attack) it impedes others from being further nourished, by 
the experience it nominally exists to promote. 
While acknowledging the legitimacy of Voegelin's . 
concern in this respect, I have argued that theological 
doctrines do not, in fact,, inherently have the effect or 
the function he ascribes to them. However, his perspec- 
tive reaches beyond theology. It also, for example, 
illuminates what he calls "political ideas", those whose 
function is not to support the search for truth, but is 
rather to unify some social group regardless of truth. 
Political ideas, too, can be valid, in so far as they 
nourish continued allegiance to a group or a movement. 
But they often tend to prohibit questioning. Where this 
happenst a movement will wither from the inside as truth 
ceases to inhabit it. 
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5. Despite his own mild disclaimer, therefore, one may 
say that Voegelin does have a "contribution" to offer to 
political theology. We may assess this by noting the 
full implications of his insistence that "man is supposed 
to be a questioner", not to "rest in an unenquiring state 
of faith" (1971a: 61). Philosophy itself is not the 
possessing of wisdom, but the search for it, and faith is 
not the possessing of revealed truth, but the orientation 
towards-ever-greater truth. The experience of searching 
and questioning necessarily threatens ideologies (that 
is, convictions which can survive only as long as, they 
remain unexamined): also, contrary to Vaegelin's own 
assumption, engagement in the search enables one to 
appreciate theological doctrines rightly. His emphasiST 
on questioning also permits political theory to move 
beyond "institutional descriptivism" without-being in any 
sense blas6 about institutions themselves or the need 
sometimes to reform them. Finally, and most signific- 
antly, it prevents philosophy from degenerating into the 
handmaid of any power-bloc. 
G. This assertion of the primacy of the question must be 
seen in the context of Voegelin's theory of conscious- 
ness. The German version of Anamnesis begins as follows: 
The problems of human order in society and history 
originate in the order of consciousness. Hence the 
philosophy of consciousness is the centre-piece of a 
philosophy of politics (Voegelin, 1966: 7; trans- 
lation in Voegelin, 1984a: 35). 
It was, he adds, clear to him already in the nineteen- 
twenties that, 
the poor state of political science - through its 
being mired in neo-Kantian theories of knowledge, 
value-relating methods, historicismi descriptive 
institutionalism, and ideological speculations on 
history - could be overcome only by a new philosophy 
of consciousness (1bid). 
Consciousness is the experience of, participation 
in the community of being (of the individual personj 
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society, the cosmos and God). Because he conceives 
consciousness to be constituted both by "intentionality" 
and by "luminosity", Voegelin can in principle do justice 
to experiences of creativity and actions and also to 
those of receptivity, response, grace. By taking this, 
comprehensive notion of experience as his starting point, 
therefore, he can adopt a thoroughly empirical method, 
yet without reductionism, (that is, without excluding 
certain areas of reality in order to sustain the plausib- 
ility of the system). 
Further, his experiential framework illuminates the 
rational structure of experiences of reality. Symbolic 
articulations of consciousness do, indeed, have a 
rational structure. Voegelin speaks of "equivalence": by 
this, he means that the same structure of experience, of 
participation in the community of being, is available to 
all people at all times. But this experience may have 
various degrees, of "compactness" and "differentiation", 
by which one is more or less awaz-e of one's experience. 
Similarly it is possible to attain a "reflective dist- 
ance" 
* 
from one's very linguistic symbols; one may come to 
a, deeper awareness of how language itself "participates" 
in reality and is neither identical with it nor separate 
from it. This analytic framework enables Voegelin to 
discriminate between the truth-content of different 
symbolizations, without either hypostatizing the better 
ones or relegating the worse to the realm of "falsehood". 
Questioning itself, therefore, is not an arbitrary act 
of the autonomous consciousness,. but is drawn out of the 
questioner by an encompassing and transcendent reality to 
which the questioner's search is a loving response., * 
Because the search for truth is also a response to 
reality (which includes both transcendent and societal 
dimensions), the reality of pysche cannot be separated 
from the reality of society. It is in this sense that 
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philosophy isýalways, 'in Voegelinfs view, - a resistance to 
disorder. We have seen that the paradigm of philosophy 
for him is the Indtatio, Socratis, and we'have recalled 
the circumstances that forced Voegelin to flee from' 
Austria in 1938. Since society is not a nechanis*m, but a 
"psychic aggregate"'the personal search for relevant 
truth is always, in the widest sense, "political": where 
it is not practised, the polis is already corrupt. Even 
those who differ from Voegelin on specific matters can be 
enriched by this vision and this integrity. 
7. But this theory of consciousness is set, in turn', in a 
still wider framework which he takes from Platop that of 
the metaxic understanding of human life. It might seem 
odd that Plato is so central a figure for Voegelin, and 
he has, indeed, been challenged on the matter. In a 
revealing passage in one of the "Conversations" in 
Montreal in 1967, he contrasts "classic" phi'losophy" with 
ideology, an the ground that the former is built on 
"common sense" while the latter renounces it. At this 
point'he is asked how he would respond to the charge that 
he is "culture-bound", proclaiming a single'tradition as 
the only valid one. He replies, 
I would not be impressed in the least beause the 
term "culture-bound" is an ideological term which 
assumes that there are cultures as absolutes. There 
is no such thing (Conv: 66). 
After what reads as a heated exchange, Voegelin denies 
that he "believes in Plato": that is "a demagogic 
insinuation that I am an ideologist like everybody else. 
But I am not". The reason why Plato is foundational for 
Vaegelin is that he has achieved an insight into reality 
from which one is not permitted to retreat: 
We talk in signs about reality. You are free not to 
talk about existential tension. But if you talk 
about it,, you must talk about it in the language 
developed by the persons who have discovered exist- 
ential tension; there is no other (Ibld: 89). 
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Thus, it is because this conception of the metaxy was 
decisively articulated'by Plato that Plato remains the 
almost ubiquitous touchstone of Voegelin's thought. 
Plato remains relevant because, ideologies (and propos- 
itions or systems that implicitly claim an, absolute 
status for themselves), do make this forbidden retreat 
from Plato's insight. r, 
It is this central symbol of the metaxy, together with 
the implicat 
, 
ions Voegelin finds in it, which makes a 
valuable resource available to political theologians. 
They do need it: Segundo, after all, even calls Greek 
philosophy "a museum piece" (1977: 46). The symbol 
enables Voegelin's rich conception of subjectivity to be 
rooted not in individualism, but in the fullest possible 
response to reality. 
8. In particular, this metaxic understanding is extended, 
to the social order itself. There is no "society" apart 
from consciousness, and there is no consciousness which 
is not engaged in constructing, assimilating and 
modifying the social order. As we saw in Chapter Five, 
"Justice" is primarily'a. political symbol, not an ideal 
of individual persons which has subsequently to be 
projected outward into society. Order, tool is for 
Vaegelin a dynamic symboi, which commits every person to 
the'struggle against disorder - and, e. x hypothesis there 
is no neat division between noetic and societal disorder. 
It follows, therefore, that one cannot think one main- 
tains "order" by stabilizing an unjust situation. This 
unifying of the political, personal and transcendent 
realms, when combined with such a powerful and subtle 
conception of what the nature of personal and political 
reality actually is, is a philosophical achievement which 
deserves the respect of political theologians. 
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Voegelin's Failings in tbp Light of Political TheolajW 
9. Anthony Storr. (1988: 85-105) discusses how certain 
psychologists have developed the Jungian polarity between 
extraversion and introversion. It seems clear that 
certain persons are mainly preoccupied with finding or 
imposing order an their experience, rather than with the 
pursuit of social intercourse with others (in Storr's 
phraseology, "patterners" rather than "dramatists", and 
"convergers" rather than "divergers"). Society will tend 
to be kept at a distance, by such people, rather than be 
spontaneously welcomed. 
One inevitably sees Vaegelin as an eminent example of 
this type, and his temperament seems to be the very 
condition of his achievement. He was a formidably 
dedicated scholar from his youth, and from quite early on 
was gathering materials for an overview of the history of 
political ideas. Vhen this seemed to him to be imprac- 
ticable,. he turned to a different overview, of the very 
structure of human experience in history. He sustained a 
very few intimate, virtually lifelong, personal relation- 
ships (this is true even in his scholarly life, as his 
continuous "conversation" with Plato demonstrates): but 
the forming of "community", either as a facet of his 
personal life or as a form of political action seems 
scarcely to have engaged him. 
Needless to say, such a temperamental leaning is no 
less valid than its opposite. But Vaegelin does not seem 
to have suspected that his own temperament made him 
vulnerable to the distortion by which he minimizes the 
efficacy of everyone's societal. formation, for better as 
well as for worse: or to have imagined that those of a 
different temperament might find a different kind, of 
fulfilment (i. e. not primarily through the discovery of 
meaning), In fact, it is gratuitous to assume that - 
meditative introspection is always the pz-inary means of 
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assessing even one's own beliefs. When Socrates sought 
to elucidate the nature of justice he thought it best to 
look first at society itself, where things are "writ 
large" (Plato: 1955: 101). 1 
In arguing as if society is., inherently closed to the 
spirit, so that it threatens the individual's search for 
existential truth without also forming it,, Voegelin 
neglects an insight well expressed by Lonergan: that_ 
human authenticity (which is always a withdrawal from 
inauthenticity) cannot be attained through a generalized 
rejection of societal influence: 
Just as it is one's own self-transcendence that 
enables one to know others accurately and to judge 
them fairly, so inversely it is through knowledge 
and, appreciation of others that we 
, 
come to know 
ourselves (Lonergan, 1972: 252-53)t 
10.1 have argued that Voe I gelin fails where he loses 
touch wit h his own best theoretical insights. Thus, his 
argument s sometimes implicitly posit an opposition, 
rather'thýan a metaxic tension, between the spiritual'and 
the material and between the historically immanent realm 
and the realm of the transcendent eschaton. While 
it is proper to define historical existence by the 
metaxic experience of struggle against disorder, it is 
mistaken to locate the experience of "fulfilment" 
entirely in the eschaton. I have argued in Chapter Eight 
that Voegeli'n ought to recognize a metaxic tension within 
history between fulfilment and non-fulfilment: for 
fulfilment is precisely not absent from history, though 
it cannot be experienced in some pure state free from 
-metaxic tension. As he banishes hope to the Eschaton, 
Voegeliii wrongly (and, according to his principles, 
needlessly) disallows hope for the attainment within 
history - to an indefinite, but never absolute degree 
of social Justice. In practice, he acknowledges the 
experience of decline in history while identifying the 
experience of progress as ideological. Similarly, in 
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reserving- the term "transformation" for the zoon 
noetikon and rejecting its applicability to the zoon 
politikon he splits the psychic and the political realms 
which he has been at such pains to integrate. 
11. Voegelin overvalues philosophers, if not philosophy 
itself. Plato and Jeremiah are taken as ideal types of 
the philosopher who constantly opposes ideologues in 
particular and a recalcitrant society in general. And 
yet we have seen that this polarity cannot be maintained. 
Mot only is the philosophical consciousness nourished by 
ihe very society which is supposedly tainted by folly, 
but there is no such concrete person as a "philosopher" 
in Voegelin's sense. Jeremiah's psyche is admitted by 
Voegelin to be itself the site of a conflict between the 
search for truth and the desire for revenge. Though 
Voegelin dismisses the relevance of that desire, his 
dismissal only demonstrates how he dubiously extends the 
search for truth and meaning to cover the whole scope of 
the "search" tout court: whereas the Christian differ- 
entiation implies that the search for truth finds itself 
in tension with an overriding search for agape. Plato's 
reliance an peitbo is similarly compromised, both by his 
allowing of force in the Laws and by the withdrawal of 
"Plato-Socrates" from political life when his appeals go 
unheard. And Voegelin himself, when he engages in debate 
with such opponents as Marx, argues for victory not for 
truth, thereby revealing a distinct tinge of the same 
ideological consciousness and libido dominandi which he 
condemns. It seems impossible not to attribute to 
Voegelin, as the shadow side of his particular forza of 
. insight, a kind of objective arrogance: that of implic- 
itly placing himself among the one hundred mature persons 
who, reckons Aristotle, sustain any polis, and that of 
denying that he is an ideologist "like everybody else". 
12.1 have argued that Voegelin's conception of 
"maturity" is seriously defective, even though so much 
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rests an it. A thinker who, like'Thomas More, risks the 
purity of his truth-telling by engaging in politics is 
accused of surrendering his spiritual realism, of merely 
exhibiting the decomposition of his Christian faith. 
Conversely, Voegelin allows maturity only to those, who 
reluctantly withdraw from political involvement in 
defence of their intellectual integrity. Their perspec- 
tive is rendered absolute. It is true that Plato refused 
"radical withdrawal" from political society: rather, his 
temporary withdrawal was aimed at reconstruction in the 
long term. In any given case, this might be a reasonable 
way of exercising ane's-personal responsibility for 
society. But Voegelin is unreasonable to'expect those 
still engaged in'the political turmoil to defer to the 
Judgments one makes from such a strategic retir'ement. 
I It is only those deemed to be philosophers who are 
accorded this deference. Vhen the prophets take a 
similarly uncompromising stance, Voegelin calls it not 
integrity but intransigence, and accuses them (wrongly, 
as I have argued, in Chapter Six) of practising a meta- 
static faith which-ignores the "order of necessity" which 
obtains in history. 
But the most serious potential effect of Voegelin's 
narrow conception of maturity is to disable those through 
whose faithful action society can be formed for good. We 
have seen him speak of "political or hedonistic action", 
as if all action could be classed as divertissement. 
One glimpses in Voegelin's work no recognition that the 
good society depends less on noesis than on hidden and 
infinitely scattered forces of self-giving, or that the 
search for such a social order through faith-filled 
action can express a profound and mature spirituality. 7 
Some words of Reinhold Wiebuhr about the character of 
Christian faith suggest how the notion of maturity can be 
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enriched by the Christian differentiation. Kiebuhr held 
that faith can and must nourish Christians' search for 
social justice, and empower their collaboration with 
those political groups dedicated to it. " He also held 
that faith will nourish the ethical sensitivity and the 
universal compassion which are indispensable if political 
commitments are to be redeemed from fanaticism (McCann, 
1981: 27-31). This position of Niebuhr's is subtly 
different than that, for example, of Montaigne, who 
remarked that he would take public. business "in hand" but 
not "into his lungs and liver" (Montaigne, 1949: 511). 
Montaigne would engage in public affairs with gentlemanly 
restraint, his commitment reined in by a sceptical sense 
of proportion: Niebuhr calls for a passionate commitment, 
but one that refuses to allow inn diate causes to 
overwhelm the balancing demands of a universal charity. 
Niebuhr calls for commitment to be broadened, not 
"moderated". 
But Vaegelin seldom articulates any passion for social 
justice strong enough to need restraining by his own 
"spiritual realism! '. He is closer to Montaigne than to 
Ifiebuhr. I have found his analyses of politics and its 
deformations enlightening and often exciting. What is 
more, they have often manifested a striking intellectual. - 
courage. But he does not succeed in offering a model of 
the philosopher's responsible but pcmitive contribution 




ERIC VOEGELIN: A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Voegelin was born in Cologne on January 3,1901. When 
applying for a visa to travel in Europe in 1948, he gave 
his full name as Eric Hermann Vilheim. Voegelin. His 
father was a Lutheran, his mother a Roman Catholic: he 
was raised as a Lutheran. In 1910 he moved with his 
family to Vienna, where he lived till 1938. 
He entered the University of 
received his doctorate in 1922, 
the constitutional lawyer, Hans 
know the U. S. A. when in 1924 he 
Fellowship for two years' study 
ience there emerged his first b 
amerikanischen Geistes (1928). 
Vienna in 1919 and 
which was supervised by 
Kelsen. He first came to 
was awarded a Rockefeller 
there, from which exper- 
ock, 'Uber die Form des 
In the 1920s and 1930s he taught in the University of 
Vienna, becoming Privatdozent in 1929 and Associate 
Professor in 1936. 
'As 
these positions carried no salary, 
he also worked as an Assistant to Kelsen in the Law 
Faculty, taught in Austrian colleges of higher education, 
and worked as a private tutor and freelance writer. He 
began to learn Greek when he was about thirty, in order 
to read the classics of political science: and he later 
learned several other languages in order to read primary 
texts in the original. In 1932 he married Lissy Onken, 
who survives him: they had no children. 
He had made no secret of his antipathy to kational 
Socialism. His two books of 1933, for example, were 
quickly withdrawn from circulation, and the remaining 
stocks destroýed by their German publishers. Similarly, 
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Die politiscben Religionen (1938) was seized by the Nazis 
as it came of the press in Vienna, and was reissued the 
following year in Stockholm (Sandoz,, 1981: 50-51,, 64). - 
In 1938, therefore, he was dismissed from his post at the 
University. He tells vividly (Ali) how he and his wife 
eluded the Gestapo and-managed to make their way to 
Zurich. Despite the initial suspicion of the American 
vice-consul (see Chapter One, above), Voegelin was able 
to demonstrate that he had been promised a temporary post 
at Harvard, and was therefore given a United States visa. 
After a series of short-term positions, he became an 
associate professor in the Department of Government at 
Louisiana in 1942 and a full professor in 1946. 
Throughout this time, Voegelin was working on the 
"History of Political Ideas". In August 1948, he told 
Henry A. Moe of the Guggenheim Foundation that he was 
working on its last sections: "It will be published by 
Macmillan, in either two or three volumes, with an 
aggregate of ca. 2,000-2,500 pages. It is not a text- 
book but a serious treatise" (Hoov). He abandoned this 
project, gradually realizing that ideas themselves could 
not be quasi-autonomous objects of historical enquiry, 
but were only "a secondary conceptual development". As 
he says in the Autobiographical Memoir, his interest now 
"moved from ideas to the experiences of reality that 
engendered a variety of symbols for their articulation". 
This interest eventually bare fruit in the five volumes 
of Order and History. 
Voegelin resided in Louisiana till 1958, and received 
American citizenship in 1944. In 1958 he returned to 
Europe, where he taught at the University of Munich, 
establishing there a new Institute for Political Science. 
In 1969, he retired and returned to the U. S. A., where he 
was associated for the rest of his life with the Hoover 
Institution an War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford$ 
California. He died at Stanford an January 19,1985. 
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For the biographical information given here I have drawn 
on Vaegelin's own Autoblograpbical Memoir (AX), his 
"Autobiographical Statement at Age Eighty-Two" (Voegelin, 
1984d), the papers preserved in the Voegelin Archive of 
the Hoover Institution, and Ellis Sandoz's book The 
Voegelinian Revolution (1981). 
WC: )-rll. ý3 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE 
1. See, for example, the document entitled The Road to 
Damascus: Kair-cs and Conversion, signed by Third World 
Christians from seven countries, published by C. I. I. R., 
Christian Aid, and the Center of Concern Washington, 
London 1989. If para. 27 savours a little of slogan- 
izing, para. 78 is more cogent. 
2. cf. Terry Eagletan's remarks about some Victorians' 
expectation that, given the apparent decline of religion, 
literature might serve as a means of social control: 
"Since literature, as we know, deals in uni , 
versal human.. 
values rather than in such historical trivia as civil 
wars, the oppression of women or the dispossession of the 
English peasantry, it could serve to place in cosmic 
perspective the petty demands of working people for 
decent living conditions or greater control over their 
own lives ;*,, Literature from Arnold onwards is the 
enemy of ideological dogma', an attitude that might have 
come as a surprise to'Dante, Milton and Pope" (Eagleton, 
1983: 25-26). 
3. The project, undertaken by the Louisiana State, UniV- 
ersity Press, will comprise thirty-four volumes. The 
first volumiss'will appear in 1990 and completion of the 
project is planned for the year 2001. 
4. The essays in Mieth & Pohier, 1984, bring these two 
perspectives into dialogue,, in comparing the "ethics of 
autonomy" and the "ethics of liberation". 
5. Those characteristics which are not central to the 
concerns of this thesis will be mentioned only summarily. 
For a general survey and commentary, see Dumas, 1978. 
6. - Such theologi'es naturally differ among themselves with 
respect to the theoretical ground proposed. As examples, 
Lamb cites Bultmann's critical appropriation of both 
liberal'theology and the theology of Barth, an approp- 
riation itself grounded in an existentialist philosophy 
of experience and decision: among Roman Catholics, he 
cites de Lubac and Dani6lou, who ground, their theology in 
the patristic reconciliation of unity and diversity; and 
Rahner, whose theology is grounded in a transcendentalist 
anthropology. 
II 
7. Clearly, Lamb's typology highlights the advantages of 
the type of model he 
, 
favours, just as David Tracy's 
different typology is implicitly an act of advocacy for, 
his own "Revisionist Model" over against "Orthodox", o "Liberal", "Kea-Orthodox" and "Radical" theologies 
(Tracy, 1975: 22-42). Lamb's account of the positive 
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characteristics of -political theology will be incorpor- 
ated in the points which follow. 
8. To the extent to which the Enlightenment sought 
freedom from the domination of social life by the 
churches, themselves, it tended to attract the undisguised 
hostility of previous theological discourse. 
9. Fiorenza, 1977: 147-71 gives a historical survey from 
the Stoics onward. cf. also Fierro, 1977: 71; Forrester, 
1988: 18-26,58-59; Moltmann, 1974: 321-25; Moltmann, 
1984: 97-100; S61le, 1974: 56-59. 
10. Voegelin's book of 1938, Die politischen Religionen, . 
uses the term "religion" to, describe not only the "great 
redemptive religions" but also any motivating ideology 
which claimed for itself an absolute status (Vaegelin, 
1986: 6). He would not later have used such terminology, 
as he explains in AX: 51-52. 
11. Thus, Lord Byron could remark, fiercely if half- 
Jokingly, "I have simplified my politics into an utter 
detestation of all existing governments .... The 
fact 
is, riches are power, and poverty is slavery all over the 
earth, and one sort of establishment is no better nor 
worse for a people than another" (Byron, 1984: 139). His 
position represents a simplified politics, but not a_ 
denial of politics. Similarly, Vdclav Havel can play an 
the assumptions evoked by the term "politics" to commend 
a paradoxical "anti-political politics" of "practical 
morality, service for the truth, Eof] essentially human 
and humanly measured care for our fellow-humans", (1988: 
397). Of course, such a commendation itself risks 
distortion; for example, that of disdaining the necessary 
mediating function of institutions. 
12. For Voegelin, it may be noted, political science is 
simply that activity which "presses beyond the self- 
understanding of society to the noetic interpretation 
and thereby pushes the social reality into the position 
of an object" (An-R: 146). See Chapter Five, below. 
13. A vision which claims to be of universal application 
can undoubtedly generate specific interventions, as is 
shown by Roman Catholic official statements about 
sexuality, property, human rights, and many other issues. 
Sometimes, at least, these statements challenge those in 
power (cf. the documents in O'Brien & Shannon, 1977). 
The theoretical question that arises from Segundo's 
remark is whether any ciriterion can conceivably be 
"here-and-now", or whether it can only emerge from some 
general philosophical framework, a framework which, 
naturally, is in its turn constructed from the experience 
of many instances of the here-and-now. 
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14. In Segundo's usage, therefore, " ideology" . is not a 
pejorative term. Faith needs to be mediated to specific 
situations, for it does not itself determine the means ýof 
its becoming socially effective. But particular ideolog- 
ies are provisional, and require no assent beyond that 
merited by, their concrete efficacy. They are thus 
"relative" with regard to the "absolute" commitment'of 
faith. At a different level, however, faith is relative 
to ideology, since it is merely notional unless mediated 
by some-ideology (1977: 97-124). To accept that theology 
is contextual, therefore, is to commit oneself to making 
particular ideological judgments without universalizing 
them. In this study, unless otherwise statedo "ideology" 
will be given the more common sense which it has for 
Voegelin, the sense pithily defined by a character in one 
of Saul Bellow's novels as "a net of binding falsehoods". 
Karl Mannheim writes of ideology in a third, intermediate 
sense. For him it-does-not denote a conscious political 
deception, but is used neutrally "to designate the 
outlook inevitably associated with a given historical and 
social situation, and the Veltanscbauung and style of 
thought boundýup with it" (Mannheim, 1936: 125). Ideo- 
logies will differ in their truth, or falsity. Presum- 
ably, growth in maturity will permit increased awareness 
of and freedom towards one's ideological heritage. - 
15. The usage, even if problematic, has a solid trad- 
ition. Maritain writes as early as 1936, "Capitalism 
needs no longer to be brought to trial; its candemnation 
has even become a commonplace to which minds who dread 
platitude fear to return" (1973: 114). 
16. Elsewhere, Maltmanrx attempts to specify a form of 
"democratic socialism! ' which is both "realistic" and 
64pregnant with the future in Europe', (1979: 67-619). For 
a discussion which carefully distinguishes the different 
forms taken by both capitalism and socialism in the 
contemporary world, cf. Heilbroner, 1980. 
17. See, for example, Metz, 1980: 229-37; Lamb, 1982; 
Forrester, 1988: 128-49; and some of the essays in Boff & 
Elizondo, '1986. 
18. Voegelin'S discussion of the biblical Exodus offers a 
case study of the status of historical achievement: see 
.. 
Chapter Six. The relationship between history and the 
eschaton will occupy us in Chapter Eight. 
I 
19. For a brief discussion of the relationship of theory 
and practice in philosophy and Christian theology, cf. 
Post, 1970. For a typology of the relationship between 
theory and praxis in contemporary Christian theologiest 
cf. Lamb, 1982: 61-99). For a'full-length treatise, cf. 
Clodovis Boff, 1987. 
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20. On this understanding praxis-theology is a specific 
application'of William'James's epistemological prag- ' 
matism: "The pragmatic method starts from the postulate 
that there is no difference of truth that doesn't make a 
difference of, fact somewhere; and itýseeks to determine 
the meaning of all differences of opinion by making the 
discussion hinge as soon as possible on some practical or 
particular issue" (James, 1976: 81). 
21. This second emphasis-coincides with the grounds of 
Marx's rejection of the "Young Hegelians". As Kolakowski 
explains, their "critical philosophy" supposed that the 
sovereign free spirit "preserves the autonomy of a Judge, 
and the standards by which it measures reality are not 
derived from that reality but from itself". For Marx's 
philosophy of praxis, however, "self-awareness must 
emerge from the immanent pressure of history itself and 
not from extra-historical principles of rationality" 
(Kolakowski, ý 1978: 105). 
22. Naturally, Fiorenza generalizes. Salle approves of 
the "Latin American tendency" (1976: 421). And Lamb* 
actually defines political theology in line with that 
tendency: "I call 'political' all those theologies which 
acknowledge that human action, or praxis, is not only the 
goal but the foundation of theory" (1979: 81). 
23. One may add that political theologians character- 
istically "suspect" the interests of the churches no less 
than those of outside groups. And their praxis typically 
leads them to pay as much attention to the churches' 
concrete social presence as to their formal teaching 
(Lamb, 1977: 33). 
24. Metz's discussion of "pathic praxis" appeared simul- 
taneously with Fierro's book, and so was unavailable to 
him. Voegelin's philosophical work of the 1930s, refer- 
red to at the beginning of this chapter, would constitute 
praxis in Metz's sense, but not in Fierrols. 
25. Segundo's notion of "suspicion" (borrowed from 
Ricoeur) will be misused unless one follows Ricoeur in 
understanding it as the necessary conplement to a- -1 
disposition of openness to and trust in the traditions 
one interprets. See Webb, 1988: 14,141-42. 
26. On Voegelin's view of theology as such. cf. Chapter 
Five, below. 
27. In assessing Voegelin's thought from such a vantage 
point, it will be necessary to beware of"'positioniamr. -- 
i. e. of making one's own prior concerns and opinions the 
decisive criterion for assessment (Germino, 1982: 131). 
However, one cannot dispense with some independentý'f rams 
of reference, nor simply pretend to inhabit a thinker's 
own world. 
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28. On all these factors, in the context of his account 
of a Basic Christian Community, cf. Galdamez, 198ra., 
29. Thus, in a recent address, the British playwright 
David Hare said, "If you ask me for the reasons for the 
chronic problems of reaction in the British, then it is 
to the character of their intimate lives, their attitude 
to their children, their ways of giving and failing to 
give love, to their uncertainties and crises of spirit I 
would look, rather than rely on the much more material- 
istic outlook I had when I was young" (Hare, 1989: 4). 
30. Obviously, I do not suggest that the problem of 
poverty in the affluent industrial nations themselves is 
negligible. In Britain, for example, as opposed to many 
societies in which overt destitution is prevalent, 
poverty is likely to be accompanied by a demoralizing 
social isolation that heightens the intensity of 
suffering and hopelessness. For a description of what 
lopoverty" means in Britain, cf. Donnison, 1982: 1-9, 
225-28. The author was chairman of the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission from 1975-80. 
31. Holland and'Henriot, writing in the U. S. A., make the 
point concretely: "The rise of the price of oil affects 
the price of food. The amount of gasoline used by U. S. 
motorists affects and is affected by our-foreign policy. 
Thelashions of New York determine employment patterns in 
South Korea" (1983: 38). 
32. Voegelin's contribution will occupy us especially in 
Chapters Two and Seven of this study. 
33. For a sober projection of "crises in the world- 
system! ', cf. Wallerstein, 1984. By "crisis", he means 
"the circumstance in which an historical system has 
evolved to the point where the cumulative effect of its 
internal contradictions makes it impossible for the 
system to 'resolve' its dilemmas by 'adjustments' in its 
ongoing institutional patterns". 
34. 'In psychological, as opposed to moral terms, Bergson 
points to the phenomenon of a weighty, though entirely 
subjective, sense of the "ebb and flow of history", 
rooted in the psychic mechanism by which the gains 
painfully achieved by one generation count for little 
with the next, whereas the drawbacks of previous 
achievements loom large (Bergson, 1935: 292-93). Human 
perception tends to be skewed, dominated by one's needs 
and discontents. Forecasts of satisfying social progress 
tend to overlook this psychological quirk. 
35. Freud's "realise does not preclude his-believing 
confidently in the progress of science and reason (Ibid: 
233,237-41), without any supporting argument to justify 
3ý5 
what smacks of a virtually determinist faith. He does, 
of course, rule out eschatological hope. It is interest- 
ing that Freud does not appear in the index of Moltmann' s 
Tbeology of Hope. Though a chapter of The Cj-ucified God 
argues briefly against Freud's charge that religion and 
religious hope are infantile and inherently regressive, 
Moltmann does not contest Freud's account of the dynamics 
of civilization (1974: 291-316). 
36. That "goals", in Metz's sense of the term, tend to be 
thwarted is a perennial theme of mythology. As, Emerson 
recalled in his essay "Compensation", "Achilles is not 
quite invulnerable; for Thetis held him by the heel when 
she dipped him in the Styx, and the sacred waters did 
, 
not 
wash that part. Siegried, in the Nibelungen, is not 
-, quite immortal, for a leaf fell on his back whilst he was 
bathing in the Dragon's blood, and that spot which it 
covered is mortal. And so it always is" (1906: 65). 
37. See Lonergan, 1977: 6-10, who counts Voegelin's 
distrust of doctrines and his reliance on experience and 
its symbolic articulations as a kind of praxis. 
38. On "philodoxers" cf. Chapter Four, below. 
_ 
39. As will be seen in Chapter Six below, the divine 
"disclosure" to Moses is not a private eventseparable 
from the social situation of the Hebrews or from the 
practical response demanded of Moses himself and the 
whole people. It is true that for Voegelin the revel- 
ation is "logically" prior to the action entailed by it: 
but such priority is compatible with Fiarenza's first 
model of political theology, in which theory leads to 
praxis. And the revelation to Moses, though a direct 
divine 'initiative, is at least occasioned by the Hebrews' 
oppression in Egypt. 
40. On the'contrary, neither can one say that worship and 
community ire' self-authenticating, apart from 
, 
the 
"fundamental orientations of life as a whole". As 
Cullinan explains(1981: 163), "The primacy of prayer, and 
therefore the importance of 
, 
withdrawal in the life of any 
person of faitb:, ... comes from the very nature of God himself and the fact that everything else in life, one's 
own self and all one's relationships, are at root nothing 
but participations in the being and life of God". Para- 
doxically, therefore, disinterested worship itself has a 
function, the 
, 
stripping of the, false notion, that one's, 
self (or one's community) is autonomous. 
41. The recent history of the West has rendered this 
characteristic emphasis of, say, Taoism, almost 
inaccessible. cf. Poem 57 of the TAO TO Cbing-. "The 
adherence of all under heaven can only be won by 
letting-alone. ... Therefore a sage has said: /So long 
as I 'do nothing' the people will of themselves be 
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transformed. /So long as I love quietude, the people will 
of themselves go straight. ISo long as, I act only by 
inactivity the people will of themselves become 
prosperous" (Waley, 1977,211),,. _ 
42. For example, Mao urged his followers to "oppose book 
worship" and to "investigate the problem! '. "To take such 
an attitude is to seek truth from facts. 'Facts' are all 
the things that exist objectively; 'truth' means their 
internal relations, that is, the laws governing themr. 
In Mao's scheme, however, with its "strong" conception of 
praxis, strict limits are placed on the search for truth. 
For to "draw correct conclusions" one must throughout be 
"guided by the general principles of Marxism-Leninism! '. 
Again: "Stalin rightly says that *theory becomes purpose- 
less if it is not connected with revolutionary practice*". 
It is clear that critical questioning ofMarxism-Leninism 
or "revolutionary practice" in the name of truth is 
prohibited by Mao (Mao, 1967: 130-32). For Voegelin's 
argument that Marx himself prohibited such critical 
questioning, of. Chapter Nine, below. The suppression of 
rationality, though, is not an inevitable consequence of 
the orientation to praxis. We have noted S611els repud- 
iation of the equation between praxis and instrumental 
reason, and Segundo's recognition that "interests" are 
not immune from challenge. 
43. In Chapter Seven we shall consider whether Voegelin 
himself is guilty of this mistake. 
44. The related language of "commitment" can be used in 
such a way as implicitly to deny the possibility of a 
disinterested search for truth. Commitment would then 
degenerate into what Lonergan calls "bias"t which is 
"radically uncritical" and "possesses no standpoint from 
which it can distinguish between social achievement and 
the social surd",, (1958: 230-32). In their accounts'of 
praxis, Lamb and Davis both seem to share Eagleton's view 
that knowledge is "constituted by interests". In their 
different ways, Lonergan and Voegelin acknowledge this 
conception while deepening it. 
45. For-example, a Confucian respect for tradition will 
tend to find different social expression than a Marxist 
suspicion that tradition favours the economically 
dominant. From what standpoint does one arbitrate 
between them? 
46. Chapter Wine will discu6s Voegelin's critique of the 
forms taken by an ideologically inspired-political 
irresponsibility. Chapter Ten will discuss his oWn"' 
positive conception of, and discharge of, political 
responsibility. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO 
1. In an unpublished paper of about 1978, "The Beginning 
and the Beyond" (Hoov), Vaegelin writes, "Aristotle, wbo 
has to deal with the same problem Ei. e. of the metaxyl, 
prefers to speak of it as the area of divine-human mutual 
participation, as the metaleptic reality". Voegelin 
himself often uses this term, "Imetaleptic reality" or 
"metalepsis", as equivalent to 'I'metaxy". Somewhat 
surprisingly, he does not, yet use the term 11metaxy" in 
the earlier OH III. 
2. OH V uses a different terminology to express the same 
understanding of reality- In so far as reality is the 
object of consciousness, Voegelin speaks of the "thing- 
reality". He gives the name of the "It-reality" to that 
mysterious reality which "comprehends the partners in 
being, i. e. God and the world, man and society" (OH V: 
16). See also Voegelin, 1981: 245. 
3. He recalls some of his own childhood experiences of 
participation in An-E: 36-51. See the explanatory 
comment in AR: 71-73. 
4. Similarly, of the debate about whether language is 
"conventional" or "natural", Voegelin writes: "The 
conventionalist opinion, today the more fashionable one, 
is moved by the intentionality of consciousness --o. to regard words as phonic signs, more or less arbitrarily 
chosen to refer to things. The naturalists are moved by 
a sense that signs must have some sort of reality in 
common with the things to which they refer, or they would 
not be intelligible as signs with certain meanings" 
<OH V: 17). To the suggestion that any such intelligib- 
ility is entirely conferred by human creativity, that we 
thereby constitute our world by language (cf. Cupitt, 
1937: 48-51), Voegelin would reply that human creativity 
is, in one of its aspects, response. 
5. 'The assertion that there is one single human perspec- 
tive which cannot coherently be denied naturally allows 
that on another level there is a plurality of individual 
human perspectives, and a relative tension between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Thomas Nagel writes that 
his book The View From Nowhere Ilis about a single 
problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular 
person inside the world with an objective view of that 
same world, the person and his viewpoint included". He 
adds, "A view or form of thought-is more objective than 
another if it relies less an the specifics of the 
'individual's makeup and position in the world, or an the 
character of the particular type of creature he is" 
(1986: 3, '5). Nagel's introduction (Irbid: 3-12) is a 
useful complement to Voegelin. 
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6. One might also challenge Voegelin with the notion of 
the "limit-concept": for purposes of understanding, it is 
sometimes necessary to posit as a concept what is held 
not to exist in reality. Juan Luis Segundo gives as an 
example "pure nature without grace". There is in reality 
no ungraced human nature, but the concept is needed to 
explicate that of grace itself (Segundo, 1977: 141). If 
not actually experienced, the "transcendent" or the 
"infinite" might conceivably be limit-concepts. 
7. In the present context I am concerned only with the 
structure of Voegelin's criticism of Feuerbach, and with 
the manner in which it illuminates Vaegelin's own 
position, not with its validity. 
8. The most important instance for this study is 
Voegelin's discussion of Marx. See Chapter Nine. 
9. Denying that consciousness "exists", William James 
writes, "I mean only to deny that the word stands for an 
entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does 
stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal 
stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which 
material-objects are made, out of which our thoughts of 
them are made; but there is a function in experience 
which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which 
this quality of being is invoked" (James, 1976: 4). 
10. This myth is strikingly different from the more 
familiar one deriving from Aeschylus, in which Prometheus 
steals the divine fire and is punished for it. But 
Voegelin argues that even the Aeschylean Prometheus bears 
nothing of the meaning with which it was later invested: 
"The Promethean symbolism of Shaftsbury and Goethe, of 
Shelley and the young Marx, belong to the age of enlight- 
ened, human self-reliance, of the titanism of the artist, 
and of the defiant revolutionary who will take the 
destiny of mankind into his own hands. All that has 
nothing to do with Aeschylus" (OH It: 254). 
11. Plato uses not agnola but amatbia or ancia for that 
kind of ignorance which is the attitude of the alienated 
one who does not wish to engage in the search. This 
disposition, sometimes rendered by the biblical term 
"folly", is an "existential deformation of noetic 
consciousness" (Vaegelin, 1981: 271). 
12. We shall find that much of Voegelin's critical energy 
is directed at theorists who, by tearing the concept of 
"reason" from its symbolic roots, claim either to banish 
the transcendent or to dispel "ignorance". John Passmore 
(1970: 53-59) notes the Stoic conception of a rationalism 
that claims to dispel ignorance by uniting creature and 
Creator. In Stoicism, "likeness to God" implies conform- 
ity to God's will, but not obedience in the Hebraic 
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sense. Passmore cites Seneca: "I do not obey God, but I 
assent to what he has decided". See Eugene Webb's 
explication of Vaegelin (1983: 358-63): Webb disting- 
uishes between two types of knowledge, episteme and doxa. 
The transcendental point of orientation may be known "as 
an object of ultimate intention", not categorically 
(doxically). Episteme is therefore equivalent to the 
Christian conception of the cognitic fidei. Truth is not 
a formula but that made of existence which allows the 
mystery of 
, 
reality to become luminous. Conversely, 
"false opinions are a symptom of closed existence, not 
its essence. Its essence is ... the eclipse of the Question". Finally, logic may, at best, be effective in 
challenging "complacent closure", driving the hearer into 
"a more acute and conscious realization of anxiety" in 
which the Question may be allowed to re-emerge. 
13. VoeSelin writes of a plurality of parallel leaps in 
being in Israel, Hellas, China and India (OH IT: 3-4), 
which, however, differ with regard to the radicalism of 
their break with cosmological symbolism and the "compreh- 
ensiveness and penetration of their advance toward the 
truth about the order of being". 
14. In practice, though, some of Voegelin's detailed 
analyses raise without, in my opinion, solving the 
difficult problem of the proper relationship between 
flattunement to being" and the necessities of pragmatic 
action. This theme will recur throughout our study. 
15. For example: differentiations open the way to 
previously unsuspected possibilities of distortion. 
See the discussion of St. Paul in Chapter Eight. 
16. An analogy may be seen between this account and the 
concept of evolution, as enunciated by Teilhard de 
Chardin: nothing comes to be "which has not already 
existed in an obscure and primordial way" (The Phenomenon 
of Man, quoted in Segundo, 1977: 68). Lesslie Newbigin 
(1986: 52-53) speaks of the notion of "conversion" as 
being, in one of its aspects, what Voegelin would call a 
differentiation: the converted understanding might "find 
a place for the truth that was embodied in the former 
vision and yet at* the same time offer a wider and more 
inclusive rationality than the older one could". 
Voegelin notes that the symbol of the depth is preserved 
as an insight in "contemporary depth-psychologies and 
-psychologies of the unconscious". Where these become 
potentially deformed is where they are tempted to claim 
that the depth has a topography amenable to scientific 
specification (1970b: 225). 
17. Plato's repudiation of the Homeric gods, for example, 
is presented as a differentiation which aims to preserve 
the essential Homeric insight while countering prevalent 
misunderstandings (Voegelin, 1981: 273-74). On the other 
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hand, -just, as Voegelin 
thinks that contemporary psycho- 
logies deform the symbol of the "depth", by claiming 
scientific knowledge of it, so he thinks Hegel deforms 
the symbol of the "Beyond", or the "Boundless", (the 
Apeiron), by claiming to "absorb the beyond of 
consciousness into consciousness itself" (Vaegelin, 
1971c: 351). In doing this, according to Voegelin, Hegel 
dispels that agnoia which is inherent in metaxic 
existence. In fact, the very aim of Hegel's philosophy 
is to replace ignorance with "actual knowledge" 
(wirkliches Vissen) (SM: 40). 
Hegel's ubiquity as a point of reference for Voegelin 
is not reflected in the present study, because Voegelin's 
discussions are so complex as to require lengthy treat- 
ment, and yet are marginal to-, our present purpose. In 
his "Response to Professor Altizer", Voegelin records his 
lifelong struggle with Hegel, "a thinker whom I consulted 
at every step in my own work" but whom at first "I simply 
could not understand" (1975b: 768). The major references 
are SM: 40-44; ER: 255-70 (on Marx' s use of Hegel); 
OH IV: 260-71; OH V: 54-70. Among Voegelin's essays, see 
especially 1971c (the fullest discussion), 1975b: 768-71; 
1981: 256-57. The reference to OH V suggests that 
Vaegelin was still working on Hegel at the time of his 
death. In general, Voegelin's response to Hegel becomes 
increasingly appreciative and decreasingly polemical, 
though he always maintains a stance of dissent. 
18. On the dispute between Plato and the sophists and its 
lasting importance, see the section an theology in 
Chapter Four below. 
19. It is hybris and revolt towards the ground that 
Vaegelin is condemning, not revolution as a political 
act. We shall see throughout this study that "Order"-is 
not stasis, and attunement to it not an inherently 
conservative act. His choice of language, though, is of 
interest. Complacency and apathy are equally offences 
against faith, hope and love, but do not provoke from him 
so explicit an attack; and one might consider Plato's 
equanimity a dubious virtue. This point will be 
discussed shortly, and again in Chapter Eight. 
20. For another example, see Vaegelin's discussion of 
Wilhelm van Humboldt's educational theory and its 
consequences. Vaegelin argues that this theory, decisive 
for the ethos of German universities, represents human 
development, as absolute, and is therefore a narcissistic 
closure of the spirit. In particular, people educated to 
non-public autonomous existence are unlikely to resist 
ideological movements. They have received an education 
(Bildung, but not an upbringing (Er-ziehung) (Vaegelin, . 1985: 17-23). 
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21. The most vivid example of Comte's messianic self- 
consciousness is that of his Hygidne cdr6brale. Voegelin 
cites the final volume of the Cours, to which Comte 
appended a kind of intellectual autobiography, the 
Prdface Pez-sonnelle. Having gathered his 
, 
material, Comte 
"denied himself the reading of any literature which had a 
bearing on the subject-matter on which he was working. 
Vhen he approached the second part of the Cours, that is, 
the volumes on sociology, he went further and stopped 
reading any philosophical and political periodicals, 
dailies or monthlies. ... [Hence] the 'precision, 
energy and consistency' of his conceptions" (E. R: - 
146-47). 
22. See also Voegelin, 1974b: 510-12, an the conservative 
and revolutionary aspects of Comte's thought, 
23. "All science is implicitly committed to a distinction 
between its concepts, theories and descriptions and the 
facts of the matter, To give a realist interpretation of 
scientific theories does not require us, indeed it 
forbids us, to assume that we have attained some ultim- 
ately valid description of the world" (W. Outhwaite, in 
Skinner, 1985: 38). 
24. We shall return to each of these issues in Part Two 
of the study. 
25. For a critical discussion of the thought of Isaiah 
Berlin, perhaps the most persuasive advocate of a 
radically pluralistic notion of the good, cf. Parekh, 
1982: 23-47. 
26. For a discussion of the non-noetic excellence which 
Aristotle calls phronesis, and which Voegelin recognizes, 
see Chapter Ten. 
27. Earlier in this chapter, we noted Voegelin's recog- 
nition, following Heraclitus, that openness to the ground 
of being expresses itself through love and hope, as well 
as through knowledge. But he does not explore how this 
openness might be expressed, and I shall suggest that 
Vaegelin assumes that action does not express love. 
28.1 suggest, in passing, that where Vaegelin is least 
reliable is rarely in formal argument, but in the biasses 
that become apparent only'as they gleam fitfully through 
such loose diction as I here indicate. This theme will 
be considered in Chapter Nine. 
29. Voegelin sometimes approaches the depreciation of 
politics implicit in the famous couplet from Oliver 
Goldsmith's poem, "The Traveller"; "How small, of all that 
human hearts endure, /That part which 
, 
laws or kings can 
cause or cure". But Goldsmith did not live as a peasant 
in the Thirty Years War, or as a Jew under Hitler. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE 
1. This chapter will discuss the general principles 
underlying Voegelin's account of symbolization. Chapter 
Four will then consider four specific modes of symbolic 
discourse: myth, classical philosophy, Christian theology 
and history. A fifth mode of discourse, that of politics 
will be examined separately in Chapter Five. 
2. This distinction does not, of course, imply that the 
"experience as such" can be apprehended without some act 
of interpretation: only that the experience itself is not 
amenable to sceptical questioning in the same sense as is 
any conceivable interpretation. 
3. On the dangers of science's "murdering to dissect", 
see Bohm, 1983: 28-32. 
4. The ability to distinguish between the knowable and 
the unknowable does not imply that one can specify the 
precise boundary between them. As P. J. Fitzpatrick, 
writing under the name of G. Egner, has neatly written of 
theology, "not only is our linguistic medium inadequate; 
it is inadequate to the task of drawing bounds to its 
inadequacy" (in McCabe, 1987: 155). 
5. See Milan Kundera's novel The Unbearable Lightness of 
Being, in which the narrator discusses "the parade" as a 
symbolic event. For Franz, a Swiss academic studying in 
Paris, a "demonstration" was a step out of the "unreal" 
world of books 
- 
(though books, in fact, made up his "real" 
world! ), a bracing immersion in the world where history 
is made. But Sabina, a Czech who had been made to 
participate in the Communist May Day parade since her 
childhood, finds even Western protest marches against the 
Soviet invasion of her own country intolerable. Her 
French friends are amazed. But "she would have liked to 
tell them that behind Communism, Fascism, behind all 
occupations and invasions lurks a more basic, pervasive 
evil and that the image of that evil was aa parade of 
people marching by with raised fists and shouting 
identical syllables in unison. But she knew she would 
never be able to make them understand. " (Kundera, 1984: 
99-100). The "thing-in-itself" of a parade cannot exist 
. apart 
f, rom meanings generated by their respective exper- 
iences: capable of revision, but not easily so. 
6. Dan Cupitt, criticizing a position he calls "objective 
symbolism! ', assumes that whereas the "reality referred 
to" cannot be an object of investigation the symbols 
themselves can be such an object: "We are stuck on the 
near side of our symbols: we cannot get at the far side 
to see how they work. " Symbols are historical construct- 




96,98). Voegelin, however, is both. more 
radical and more consistent when he also, denies that the 





mistaken to invest the symbol with a reality denied to 
what is symbolized. 
7. The use of Koestler's narrative has perhaps demonst- 
rated that Vaegelin's understanding of symbolism is not 
peculiar. to himself. He claims to articulate , 
the 
structure of human experience in general, which anyone 
can bring to awareness by anamnetic meditation. There 
is, in fact, a deep affinity between Vaegelin's work and 
PaulTillich's account of the nature of reason and 
symbol. (Though Tillich (1886-1965) was writing his 
Systematic Theology at the same time as Voegelin was 
working on Order and History, neither writer ever 
mentions the other. ) Tillich, too, understands "reason" 
to be far more than "technical reason" (1968,. 1: 79-117). 
He speaks of "grasping reason" and "shaping reason". of 
"controlling knowledge" and "receiving knowledge", of the 
tensions within reason (See also Kelsey, 1989: 139-41). 
Again, mystery actively moves to reveal itself, but only 
because it is also the "object" of "ultimate concern" 
(Ibid: 14-16,122-24). Vaegelin differs from Tillich in 
exploring the rational and historical structure of , specific symbols (i. e. in terms of compactness, differ- 
entiation, and deformation): and in regarding such 
exploration as the key to understanding political reality 
as well as theological language. See, for example, the 
analysis of race symbolism in this chapter, and of the 
symbols of "Justice" and "exodus" in Chapters Five and 
Six respectively. 
8. It is this sense of hierarchy which underlies the 
virtue of "attunement". See Chapter Two. 
9. For example: the psychologist Robert J. Lifton has 
criticized Freud's contention that all interest in , immortality is compensatory, and that one's only approp- 
riate attitude to death is to face it unflinchingly; to 
excise the experience, so to speak, of immortality. 
Lifton posits five modes of conceiving (and therefore 
symbolizing) the experience of "death and the continuity 
of life", the experience that life transcends death. A 
person or a community may experience a shift in emphasis 
from one to another mode, but the experience itself 
cannot be prohibited, either by decree of sceptical 
intellectuals or by self-censorship (Lifton, 1976: 
29-47). Vhile partially endorsing Lifton's view, 
Vaegelin also slights him needlessly and inaccurately 
(Conv: 130). 
10. The same belief has been cogently expressed by the 
Australian poet Les A. Murray: "'Since the spiritual dimension universally exists in human beings, it has to 
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be dealt with by them in some way or other; a sacrament- 
ally minded Christian would say that it has to be , 
fed. 
It can be wrongly fed, though, with dreadful results for 
the world. God's Spirit may stir our soul , 
and then not 
be allowed to enlighten it". Murray suggests, for 
example, that human sacrifice persists in our civil- 
ization. "Surely there's a distinction to be made here 
between the literal and the metaphorical? My answer is, 
there may be, but I don't know of one watertight enough 
to prevent the blood from seeping through it. Vhen I 
hear someone say, as I did yet again the other day, that 
this country needs a war to restore and cement its sense 
of community, I recognize that as a call to literal human 
sacrifice, to be performed for one of the classic archaic 
reasons" (Murray, 1984: 110- 1,1). 
11. That this essay was written in the U. S. A. should not 
disguise the courage involved in its composition, for it 
summarizes themes in Voegelin's works written in German 
in the 1930s. For summary accounts of these, see Sebba, 
1982: 10-14; Byrnes, 1973: 55-67. For an account of 
"Judaism and Christianity in the Ideology and Politics of 
National Socialism", see Scholder, 11989: 168-81. 
12. Analysis of society in terms of class, for example, 
works with "political ideas" in Voegelin's -sense. A 
group, by being called a "class", is deemed to have 
shared characteristics and interests. This putative 
common ground, rather than any of the indefinitely varied 
beliefs, capacities, ages or temperaments represented 
among its members, can then be represented as the proper 
source of their social allegiances. 
13. As Voegelin explains in a footnote, he does recognize 
differences of "ethical and metaphysical value" between 
ideas. Political ideas may be necessary and illuminating 
or they may be corrupt. They may or may not be held and 
propagated in good faith. But such differences of value 
do not necessarily depend upon their respective 
"correctness" as pictures of social reality. 
14, Klemm thought in terms of the assimilation of the 
active race, the conquerors, into the passive, or 
conquered, race. Even conquest itself, therefore, tended 
to promote the emergence of an egalitarian society. For 
Gobineau, an the contrary, "cultural values are secure as 
long as the strong, efficient races are able to-retain 
their dominant position in the symbiosis": assimilation 
entails deterioration, exhaustion and extinction (Ibid: 
298-99,302). 
15. Vaegelin notes that in Hobbes's view "the Christian 
realm of light was the sovereign state-church unit" and 
the realm of darkness was the Roman Catholic Church: 
"since that time the stream of political ideas has become 
a stream of satanistic ideas" (Ibid: 308). 
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16. It would be a gross. error to attribute such demon- 
izing constructions to a few fanatics only. As Kermode 
points out (1967: 112), the word "Jew" appeared in lower 
case in all editions of the works of T. S. Eliot, before 
the last edition within his lifetime, that of 1963. 
17. Vaegelin wrote this provocative passage in 1940. 
The sequence could readily be extended, as scientific 
paradigms succeed each other at an increasing rate. But 
at least the units of the sequence (socic-biolcgy, 
cybernetics, etc. ) are now quite likely to be 
I'deconstructed" by those outside the, intellectual circles 
which, propagate them. Voegelin later became sanguine 
that the "superstition of science" (noto of course, 
science itself) was being overcome, at least in the 
scholarly world. We shall discuss this hopefulness in 
Chapter Eight. 
18. In the 1930s Voegelin seems always to have conveyed 
his political opinions indirectly (though unmistakeably). 
Thus, in an essay of 1936 written in Vienna, in the 
course of attacking rigid positivism in science, he slips 
from argument to apparently irrelevant (but, surely, 
calculated) invective: "Science is to provide the key for 
the comprehension of the world. All other ways of 
understanding and experiencing the world .... are frequently unmasked as ideology, dissolved as false- 
problems, denounced as the fabrication (in order to 
stupefy the people, or to gain personal wealth or power) 
of Jesuits, Freemasons, Jews, or the bourgeois" (1936b: 
597, my translation). As Robert Knight implies (1989: 
797), to ridicule-anti-Semitic stereotypes at that. time 
went against the cultural grain in Austria scarcely less 
than in Germany. 
19. See Chapter Seven, below. 
20. This study is--concerned with Vaegelin's philosophy. 
To examine the difficult matter of how effective or 
otherwise he was as an "anti-Nazi" would require a quite 
different method of socially contextualized biographyl 
beyond the competence of the present writer. It is clear 
that observing the conventions of academic discourse 
imposed serious limits an his overt opposition to 
National Socialism. But since he lived in Austria from 
-, as early as 1924 he was inevitably distanced from the 
brutal practical struggle. He was resourceful in helping 
others at risk to escape Germany, as a good deal of 
correspondence in the Hoover Archive makes clear (for 
example, a letter of August 1938 written from Zurich to 
F. A. van Hayek arranging assistance for the historian 
Friedrich von Engel-Janosi). Aurel Kolnails passionate 
but cavalier book of 1938 (see the index for the many but 
unsystematic allusions to Voegelin)s which depicts 
Voegelin's nuanced, patrician criticisms of the Nazis as 
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an inadequate repudiation of them, was published outside 
the Axis countries. Perhaps with charges such as these 
in mind, Gregor Sebba refers to Vaegelin's books of 1933 
as follows: "When I read these two, books, I knew that 
Voegelin would be on the Nazi list when Austria fell. I 
still wonder how he had the nerve to publish both books 
in Hitler's Germany, and how two German publishers could 
accept them! ' (1982: 11). 
21. A second break in his programme will be noted in 
Chapter Four, in the section on History. 
22. Quentin Skinner describes the hermeneutic approach to 
the human sciences as an approach that "will do justice 
to the claim that the explanation of human action must 
always include - and perhaps even take the form of - an 
attempt to, recover and interpret the meanings of social 
actions from the point of view of the agents performing 
them! ' (Skinner, 1985: 6)., Of course there still 
smoulders the debate on how far such comprehensions such 
a "fusion of horizons" (Gadamer), is possible. See 
Chapter One above, on the need to balance the hermeneutic 
of suspicion with the hermeneutic of openness or trust. 
Voegelin's reliance an the sources, of course, did not 
lead him to disregard secondary scholarship. His acute 
judgment of the monographic literature covering the 
subjects of his enquiry may be sampled in OH L., 148-62 
& 282-303, where he assesses the state. of scholarship an 
the Pentateuchal history and the Imperial Psalms respect- 
ively,, 
23.,, The, case of Comte was discussed in Chapter Two, that 
of Marx will occupy us in Chapter Nine. It will 
- 
be 
apparent that this thesis seeks, as one element of its 
method, to apply the same critical, strategy to Voegelin 
himself. He knows that life is not only ncesis, and we 
have seen that he cites Aristotle's statement that 
neither the zoon noetikon nor the zoon politikon has an 
ontological primacy over-the other. But he invariably 
stresses noetic adequacy as the test of symbols and 
movements. If not "ideological" this virtual exclusion 
of reciprocity may at least signify a failure to 
apperceive. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR 
1. As these examples indicate, because the depth of .' 
reality is not experienced as static, mythical symbolism 
is typically embodied in narrative. 
2. Vaegelin introduces an elaborate analysis of "Plato's 
Egyptian Myth" by noting that "the techniques for the 
interpretation of myths have only quite recently been 
developed to a point where the analysis of the late 
Platonic myths can be approached with some hope of 
success's (1947: 307). 
3. Gregor Sebba writes, "It has been well said of myth 
that those who do not live in it cannot know what it is. 
while those who live in it do not know that it is myth. " 
(1982: 35). Our account suggests that this formulation, 
which postulates two mutually exclusive modes of 
consciousness, is, too simple. It is possible, indeed 
essential, to live witli myth, reflectively, and 
discriminatingly,. On Voegelin's treatment of the 
creation narrative of Genesiss, see Turner 1988a. 
4. Like Voegelin, Ernst Cassirer argues that myth must 
not be explained away, either by reinterpreting it as 
allegory or by reducing it from "belief" to "make- 
believe" (1962 72-79; see also Kolakowski, 1982: 13-16). 
It has its'Own valid cognitive principle. Both the 
positivist view that myth is a primitive pseudo-science 
and the "functionalist" view (of such thinkers as 
Durkheim), according to which myth has a social rather 
than a cognitive function, purport to uncover the "real" 
meaning of myth, a meaning unknown to or unacknowledged 
by those who accepted the myth as valid. Their 
perspective, by a dubious hermeneutical procedure, is 
crudely overridden. Raymond Williams lists the various 
senses given to the word I'myth":, including the pejorative 
sense of an untrustworthy invention; and the "would-be 
positive" sense by which myth is either linked to post- 
Christian accounts of the depths and creativity of the 
imagination, or becomes the medium for Christian 
restatement (1976: 176-78). 
5. See the section an theology, below. Scientists, of 
course, need not regard their findings as absolute; the 
destructive mistake will only be made by those who 
falsely oppose science to myth. 
6. Perhaps, indeed, myth is the most precise instrument 
for communicating "the psychic excitement of the exper-' 
ience of transcendence" (An-Tz; 
, 





of consciousness. So Cassirer says 
of Plato, "we cannot think of Platonic philosophy without 
thinking of the Platonic myths. In these myths - in the 
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myths of the Isupercelestial place', of the prisoners in 
the cave, of the soul's choice of its future destiny, of 
the judgment after death, Plato expressed his , most 
profound metaphysical thoughts and intuitions. And at 
the end he gave his natural philosophy in an entirely 
mythical form: he introduced, in Timaeus, the conceptions 
of the demiurge, of the good and the evil world soul, of 
the twofold creation of the world" (1946: 71-72). 
7. Durkheim, of course, also holds that ' 
religious myth 
has the function of conserving the social order, not 
challenging it. 
8.. Hesiod, in fact, fits A. D. Nock's definition of the 
prophet: one who "experiences a sudden and profound 
dissatisfaction with things as they are, is fired with a 
new idea, and launches out on a new path in a sincere 
conviction that he has been led by something external and 
objective" (Nock, 1933: 2-3). Prophecy, like philosophy, 
is "resistance to disorder". The fact that Hesiod's 
advance towards truth is propelled by his experience of 
injustice might well be taken as paradigmatic by . 
political theology. But, as we shall see in Chapter 
Seven, Voegelin adopts the Aristotelian position that the 
privileged epistemological perspective is that of the 
contemplative mature person, the spoudaios, not that of 
the marginalized as such. 
9. See, for example, Voegelin's favourable review of 
R. B. Levinson's In Defense of Plato a work written 
against Karl Popper's attack on Plato in The Open . 5ociety 
and Its Enemles (Voegelin, 1954). 
10. In Voegelin's interpretation, the Republic, for 
example, is elaborately arranged round such symbolic 
fields as height/depth, darkness/light and ascent/descent 
(OH 111: 46-134). 
11. For Voegelin's discussion of the sophists, see OH TT: 
267-331. There is the hermeneutical problem that, apart 
from a few fragments, we know of the sophists' teaching 
only through Plato's own writings. Voegelin thinks, it 
likely that their formative contribution to the 
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is disguised by the 
manifest points of disagreement (Ibid: 276-77). 
12. On the thinkers of the Enlightenment, see Chapter 
Seven. 
13. A sardonic footnote in Voegelin's essay on Bultmann, 
shows how Voegelin himself distinguishes true from false 
philosophers: " Das Daseln Ubernimmt sich selbst' is a 
stock phrase of Heidegger's existentialism. The English 
reader should not be deprived of the Jay of knowing that 
the phrase in German has a double meaning not intended by 
its author. It can be rendered either as 'existence 
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takes charge of itself' (the meaning intended) or as 
I existence overreaches itself I (what, indeed, it does 
when it takes charge of itself). Needless to say, no 
philosopher would play with the fire of 'taking charge' 
of hi 
,s 
existence. " (Voegelin, 1964a: 68). The jibe 
reflects Voegelin's deepest convictions, as well as his 
taste for cut-and-thrust. 
14. The dimensions of the symbol were discussed in 
Chapter Two. Voegelin's most systematic discussion 
occurs in the essay of 1974, "Reason: the Classic 
Experience" (An-E: 89-115). 
15. Elsewhere, Vaeg elin speaks of the divine 'pull' 
(helkein, of which the counter-movement is the human 
search (zetein) (Vaegelin, 1971a: 71). There is no 
noesis, therefore, that is. divorced from a loving 
openness to. the ground. 
16. See Vaegelin's critique of Bultmann (Vaegelin, 
1964a). 
17. Although in a, more formal context Vaeggelin might well 
have refined this statement, which was made in a recorded 
conversation, it does not misrepresent his views. See,, 
for example, Voegelin, 1971a: 88. 
18. Even it one accepts so broad a conception of the 
scope of theology as does Bernard Lonergan (whose work 
was well-known to Vaegelin), namely that theology is a 
discipline which "mediates between a cultural matrix and 
the significance and role of a religion in that matrix" 
(Lonergan, 1971: xi), it is clear that Vaegelin is 
scarcely concerned to "mediate" in any such way. 
Similarly, Kelsey describes Tillich's aim as that of 
mediating between contemporary culture and historical 
Christianity in order to demonstrate that the two are not 
incompatible (1989: 136). 
19. This aspect of the Pauline differentiation will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
20. This is the key to Vaegelin's critique of Bultmann 
(1964a). Bultmann's existentialism entails "untruth by,,, 
omission", for it is only the omission of whole sectors 
of, reality and experience which lend to the positive 
propositions their appearance of consistency. 
21. A parallel passage in the Republic (Plato, 1955: 95- 
97), is discussed at some length in Voegelin's 
unpublished paper of 1977, "Deformations of Faith" 
(Hoov). 
22. According to the Seventh Letter and the Second 
Letter, Plato refused to write down the care of his 
philosophy and objected when his student Dionysius wrote 
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it down. Those who could understand did not need the 
written propositions, those who did not understand would 
pervert them (OH ITI: 19-20). 
23. In fact, the notion of-proof does occur in the 
Preface to the Proslogion: Anselm recalls that he "began 
to wonder if perhaps it might, be possible to find one 
single argument that for its proof required no other save 
itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that 
God really exists. ... (Anselm, 1965: 102-03). This 
occurrence does not invalidate Voegelin's argument, 
especially as Prefaces tend to be written last! 
24. By "the ecumenic situation" Vaegelin means one where 
different cultural traditions co-exist, and where those 
with political power do not seek to impose a cultural or 
religious uniformity over their political subjects. Even 
defective doctrine, therefore, might have a valid social 
function, if the insight it conserves is less corrupt 
than the rival doctrines which oppose it. 
25. See the stimulating and very positive remarks an the 
critical power of the Christological, Trinitarian and 
Marialogical doctrines in Voegelin's letter to Schutz 
(Opitz & Sebba: 449-57). For example, "The achievement 
of the Trinity dogma is to have combined, in one theolog- 
ical symbol, experiences that must remain differentiated 
if speculative fallacies are to be avoided". These 
experiences are three: the radical transcendence of God; 
the divine transforming intervention into nature and 
human nature; and the presence of the spirit in the 
community of the faithful. Voegelin traces the fatal 
consequences of excising any of these experiences in the 
name of "radical monotheism! ' (rbid: 454-55). 
26. An example is the term "metaphysics" itself: its 
meaning in Aristotle, its hardening into "a propositional 
science of principles, universals, and substances", and 
the eventual response of Voltaire, who rejected the 
misconceived crystallization rather than the classical 
noesis of which the Enlightenment "knows nothing" (An-R: 
193-94). Similarly, Voegelin finds the theological terms 
"person" and "nature" both misleading and redundant: 
misleading to contemporary Christians who are not 
burdened by the intellectual problems which once provoked 
their use, and redundant because they do not analyse such 
Christians' own experience (Conv: 94-96). 
27.., Noting that when Vaegelin disparages "theologyw he 
tends to mean these derivative codifications, the ý American scholar Michael Morrissey reports that Vaegelin. 
when challenged, in later life about his "religious 
affiliation", was known to call himself a "pre-Nicene 
Christian" (1988:, 410,414). 
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28. In this' matter, as of ten elsewhere, Robert Musil Is 
great novel, The Man Without Qualities is an admirable 
companion to the reader of Musil's younger contemporary, 
Voegelin. According to Ulrich, the novel's protagonist, 
different faiths each, by their doctrinal systems, seek 
to shelter a "highly important" "pattern of inner 
movement". But the churches have always mistrusted 
visionary experience, just as a bureaucrat mistrusts "any 
individual spirit of enterprise". "And when the 
spiritual despotism of the churches and their terminology 
became obsolete, not suprisingly this condition of ours 
came to be regarded as no more than a flight of fancy. 
Vhy after all should a bourgeois civilization, taking 
over from a religious civilization, be more religious, 
than its predecessor?! 16 (1979,111: 117). 
29. See Lawrence, 1983: 338-45. It is symptomatic that 
Voegelin cites as one example of propositional theology 
Anselm's ontological argument, which is commonly envis- 
aged as a piece of pb1losopbical reasoning (cf. the 
remarks on Anselm as philosopher/theologian in Copleston, 
1950: 156-65). 
30. The two terms are interchangeable for the purposes of 
this discussion, perhaps distinguishable in that dogma 
implies a more specific reference to a given teaching 
authority. Lonergan suggests that dogma embodies a claim 
to be the one and only true proposition an any issue, 
whereas doctrine might accept the relativity of 
linguistic and cultural contexts (Lonergan, 1971: 333). 
But Sabrina's usage simply differs; see note 32. 
31. According to Lonergan, doctrine presupposes 
"conversion" and a communal engagement in the search'for 
truth: "doctrines, based on conversion, are opposed to 
the aberrations that result from the lack of conversion. 
Accordingly, while the unconverted may have no real 
apprehension of what it is to be converted, at least they 
have in doctrines the evidence both that there is 
something lacking in themselves and that they need to 
pray for illumination and to seek instruction" (Lonergan, 
1971; 299). 
32. On the, Christological dogmas, cf. Sobrino, 1978: 
312-26. Like Lonergan, Sobrino denies that dogma withers 
the capacity for experience. Any dogma, after all, must 
itself be interpreted by the recipient, and this 
-interpretation presupposes some experiential basis, some 
sharing in the community's own participation in reality. 
According to J. L. Segundo, "Dogma isnot an encapsulated 
version of the absolute": "we reject the idea that dogma 
is a translation of the outcome or result of the 
educational process. --- there is no end to the process 
of learning to learn. ... Dogma merely defines the 
boundaries within which we can say that we are still 
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operating inside 1the3 same educational tradition" (1977: 
175,180). In this respect, the theologians cited here 
represent the contemporary consensus. Reviewing a pair 
of biographies (on Barth and Tillich), John Updike sums 
up limpidly: "theology is not a provable accumulation, 
like science, nor is it a succession of enduring monu- 
ments, like art. It must always unravel and be reknit" 
(1983b: 835). 
33. From a very different perspective, the same eccles- 
iastical tendency to mitigate the demands of the Gospel 
by specifying minimum demands of belief and conduct, is 
identified and discussed in Segundo, 1977: 179-80, 
211-16. Voegelin would not, of course, claim that the 
churches had available to them some astute "alternative 
strategy". by which they could have averted all danger of 
rebellion. 
34. Even Justin was first attracted to Christianity an 
non-philosophical grounds: "I myself used to rejoice in 
the teachings of Plato and to hear evil spoken of 
Christians. But as I saw that they showed no fear in 
face of death and of all other things which inspire 
terror, I reflected that they could not be vicious and 
pleasure-loving. " (cited in Nock, 1933: 255). Conversion 
is indeed the fulfilment of a search, but searches are of 
many kinds (Ibid: 254, an the Acts of the Apostles). 
Naturally, Justin's reminiscence would not warrant one's 
cont. rastin, T Christians with philosophers, since Nock 
shows that philosophy, too, attracted converts because it 
was a way of life Ubld: 164-86). 
35. Naturally, I do not suggest that "The Gospel and 
Culture" does nothing but depreciate Christianity. It 
contains valuable insights about the specific spiritual 
dynamic of the Christian movement. For a later, less 
tendentious comparison of the philosophical and Christian 
movements, see Voegelin, 1981: 279-85. 
36. This point will be expanded in Chapter Six, below. 
37. Such assessments are sometimes made in passing, 
almost instinctively: as when he gives the opinion that the Gospel holds out its promise "to the poor in spirit, that is to minds enquiring, even an a culturally less 
sophisticated level than Justin's" (1971a: 661). One 
partial exception, his early unpublished paper. 
"Clericalism! ', will be mentioned in Chapter Ten. 
38. Kolakowski rightly insists that the mere assent to doctrinal propositions does not itself have significance 
as an "instrument of communion with the Sacred": "our 
brain stores countless fragments of vitrified knowledge, 
connected to nothing, serving no purpose .... and there is no reason why some of them should not be theo- logical in content". Religion, on the contrary, is "a 
393 
way of life in which understanding, believing and 
commitment emerge together in a single act (somethin& 
which is expressed with difficulty in 'doctrinal' terms) 
(1982: 218-19). For additional comments on this theme, 
see McCarroll 1986: 285-91. 
39. See OH IV: 304, for. five "insights into the structure 
of history-which are generally valid"i Their core is 
contained in the quotation from OH IV given in the next 
paragraph. For an overview of Vaegelin's philosophy of 
history, cf.. Webb, 1981. See also Porter, 1975; Sebba,,, 
1982; Gebhardt (in Sandoz 1982: 67-86); McKnight 
(inMcKnight, 1978: 26-45). See chapter Eight for one 
topic which might have fallen within this section, 
Voegelin's thinking about the notion of human progress. 
40. Vaegelin's opposition to any positivist conception of 
historical fact is complemented by his rejection, of what 
he holds to be the contrary reductionism, that by which 
Bultmann dissolves historical phenomena into states of 
consciousness. In Bultmann, "the Torah changes into the 
'thou shalt' that is alive in everyman's conscience"; 
"the historical relation between the Law and the Gospel, 
between the Old and the New, Testament, is thus trans- 
formed into the-ontological tension between the natural 
existence of man and the Christian existence in faith. 
History, the sense of the prog-ressus of mankind in timej 
shrouded in the mystery of a meaning incompletely 
revealed - the history we have in mind as long as we are 
not existentialists - has somehow disappeared. " 
(Voegelin, 1964: 69). 'As Karl Rahner puts the matter, 
human beings do not "grasp Etheirl transcendental 
subjectivity by means of an unhistorical reflection and 
introspection which is possible in the same way at every 
point in time": but, on the other hand, "the moment that 
history .... no longer grasps its transcendental 
depths as the condition which makes genuine history 
possible, this very history itself also becomes blind" 
(Rahner, 1978: 140), 
41. See also the exchange which began with Vaegelin's 
review of Hannah Arendt's book of 1951, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (Voegelin, 1953a: 68-85). In his closing 
summary of the exchange, Vaegelin suggests that Arendt is 
willing to accept the "well-distinguished complexes of 
phenomena" (of liberalism and totalitarianism) as 
"ultimate, essential units". For him, historical 
investigation "inevitably will start from the phenomena" 
without "accepting the units thrown up in the stream of 
history at their face-value". Arendt allows facts to , control her enquiry, whereas Voegelin lestarts from! ' facts 
but quickly moves to the level of philosophy. Vhat is 
decisive for him about the political movements is not 
their bitter, opposition on the "scene of history" but- 
their close relationship (not, as Arendt takes him to 
say, their "sameness") on the "level of essence". It is 
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clear that Voegelin does not merely distinguish between 
two levels of historical enquiry. He specifies their 
comparative status. The over-riding emphasis an meaning 
revealed in his debate with Arendt is consistent with his 
stance with regard to theology. He is concerned to 
identify a social process which "includes not only the 
totalitarian movements but also palitical, -movements 
apparently opposed to them! ' (McCarroll, 1981: 17). 
42. Thus, Vaegelin holds that ideological movements have 
the goal of "stopping history"; he means not, obviously, 
that the sequence of events in time is somehow checked, 
but, that the struggle for order is renounced. 
43. Voegelin suggests (AX: 106) that "philosophy of 
history" as a topic does not go back further than the 
eighteenth century, and was from its beginning marked by 
this reductionism. Among the advocates of unilinear 
history, Vaegelin numbers Voltaire (for whom human 
progress led up to the mature reasoning of the Enlight- 
enment philosophers), Comte <see above, Chapter Two), 
Marx (see below, Chapter Nine), and Hegel, who, in 
Voegelin's view (1971c) regarded his awn consciousness as 
the consummation of divine revelation. Naturally, within 
the ideological framework determined by "intramundane 
religious sentiment" the quality of the empirical insight 
might well be remarkable (BR: 12). 
44. This explains Voegelin's interest in those 
Renaissance thinkers who dissented from Eurocentrism: 
"we have letters from Poggio in which he shows himself 
sick and tired of the glary that was Greece and Rome and 
ranks the military and political achievements of 
Tamerlane higher than those of Caesar" (Vaegelin, 1944b: 
747). Eventually, this particular "closed horizon" was 
breached by the irruption of new materials - especially 
those from the pre-classic and non-Western civilizations, 
as Voltaire realized (ER: 8-9). But in Voegelin's view, 
Voltaire was closed in another sense, to transcendent 
meaning. It was Voegelin's realization that be himself 
was in danger of constructing too straightforward a 
linear narrative, one that would insufficiently stress 
"the richness of the spirit as it reveals itself all over 
the earth in a multitude of hierophanies", which prompted 
his rethinking of the scheme of Order and History. This 
explains the gap of seventeen years between the public- 
ation of OH ITT and OH IV (Sebba, 1982: 51-56). Whatever 
criticisms one directs at Voegelin, I suggest one must 
admire the integrity with which he pursued the truth he 
discerned, even when this required the re-structuring of 
his entire life's work. 
45. In a different context, almost identical questions 
are posed in OH IV: 316. In "History and Gnosis" (11D64), 
Voegelin criticizes St. Paul for going an in Rowns to 
offer his own answer to these questions, since the 
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questions identify mysteries, not problems. However, the 
"answer" Paul provides is not an empirical solution but 
the assertion in faith that the mercy of God embraces 
all. His answer, far from dissolving a mystery, 
articulates a still deeper one! 
46. A more comprehensive consideration of Voegelin's 
reflections on history would include the following 
elements: (1) his several discussions of the varied, ý 
typologies of history (such as the distinction between 
"sacred" and "profane" history which was an influential 
symbol from Augustine to Bossuet <e. g., E. R: 3-34); 
(2) his exploration of "historiogenesis", i. e. a form of 
"mytho-speculation" which traces the origin and cause of 
a given society's order (OH IV: 59-113); (3) his-positive 
account of the differentiation attained by the Christian 
world which, in his view, alone proved capable of 
developing a philosophy of history (OH It: 22). 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE 
1. For brief resum6s of Voegelin's political theory, see 
Germino, 1967; Germino, 1982; Havard, 1982: 107-14. 
2. As Schumacher remarks (1977: 63), any "restriction in 
the use of instruments of cognition has the inevitable 
effect of narrowing and impoverishing reality". Posit- 
ivism, for example, dismisses all, theoretical construct- 
ions which are not confined within its own horizon. 
3. Popper's attack on Plato in Volume I of The Open 
Society and its Enemies was first published in 1945. 
Voegelin's essay of 1947, "Plato's Egyptian Myth", was 
incorporated virtually intact into OH TIT: 171-80. 
4. See Crick, 1982, especially Chapter One on the nature 
of political activity, and Chapter Two, "A Defence of 
Politics against Ideology". Crick regards politics as 
the process, conducted in, freedom, which negotiates and 
reconciles plural and potentially conflicting human 
purposes. 
5. As such they naturally-deserve attention, Vaegelin 
began his career as a student of law, and never abandoned 
his interest. There is in the Hoover Archive a type- 
script of 98 pages, dated 1957, material given to the 
students attending Vaegelin's course on Jurisprudence at 
the Louisiana State University Law School. 
6. For an extended critique of any "political science" or 
"political theory" which prescinds from questions of 
order and focuses exclusively an secondary systematiz- 
ations, see Voegelin's essay of 1944, "Political Theory 
and the Pattern of General History". He insists instead 
that "the so-called non-political ideas, as for instance 
the eschatological sentiments and ideas$ are the great 
source of political fermentation and revolution through- 
out Western history to this day" (1944b. - 753). 
7. Similarly, Dumas (1978: 118) points out how many 
changes of political organization are undergone by the 
Chosen People: "a tribal confederation; temporary,. 
charismatic judges who do not found a dynasty; a hered- 
. itary monarchy and the fragmentation of the kingdom; 
deportation; colonial dependence; wars of independence; 
controlled independence; and then a last revolt leading 
to annihilation. One might say that every kind of 
political regime is attempted and often endured without 
the establishment of any lasting ideal". Certainly, the 
"identity" of Israel is not constituted by the details of 
its political order. 
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8. The central works of Voegelin's later years - Order 
and History itself, and such essays as "Wisdom and the 
'Magic of the Extreme" - are scarcely concerned with 
politics in the narrower, sense. His views on specific- 
ally "political" phenomena will be found mainly in the 
"History of Political Ideas"' (which was begun to a 
publisher's commission but overwhelmingly outgrew the 
agreed dimensions), and, in the reviews, lectures and 
papers by which he subsidized his unremunerative 
scholarly work. After 1958, given greater financial 
security in Munich and then -in Stanford, he wrote almost 
no book reviews and far fewer "occasional" essays. But 
his increased freedom to focus on theory implied no 
radical shift of method or principle: Uber die Form des 
amerikanischen Geist, his first book (1928), was already 
little concerned to be "topical"; and, his late views on 
practical politics, when he has occasion to express them, 
are broadly consistent with his earlier ones. 
9. See Chapter Ten, below, on such "civil theologies". 
The "subtext", of this passage, written in the 1940s, 
becomes clear as Voegelin adds, "In retrospect we may 
wonder whether Gladstone would be so enthusiastic about 
submissive Churches when the State which they recognize 
as their master is not the State of England but a 
National Socialist German or a Communist Russian State, 
and whether he would be quite so indignant about the 
insolence of church leaders who pride themselves that 
they are not unconditionally submissive". 
10. In an unpublished paper of 1972, "Notes on 
'Civilization and Foreign Affairs"' (Hoov), Voegelin 
recounts how, when he came to set up the Institute of 
Political Science in Munich in 1958, he annoyed many 
political scientists in Germany by introducing as the 
required basic courses classical politics and the 
"thorough knowledge of Western civilization", instead of 
concentrating an "Hegelian, Marxist and positivist 
ideologies" and "the political issues of the day". 
11. As with virtue, so with vice. Voegelin gives a 
remarkable analysis of the political nature of "personal" 
vice in discussing the wrath of Achilles in the Iliad (Qj 
U: 83-92). This ate, (blinding passion), is not seen 
just as a factor contributing to the Achaeans' defeatj or 
one cause among others of social disorder. -It is the- disorder itself. In the Homeric world, cholos (wrath) is 
both an emotion and a custom; in its authentic expression 
it resists injustice, and restores justice. But the 
cbolos of Achilles is simultaneously ate, and therefore 
vicious; and this inner drama determines the external 
action of the Iliad. 
12. For a notable contemporary analysis of "heroism! ', see 
Becker, 1973. , 
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13. That there are writers who-misinterpret Voegelin in 
this way will be argued in, Chapter Nine. 
14. For a key passage of the Gorgias, see Plato, 1960: 
115-17., It remains to be considered how far it is true 
to attribute the order or disorder of society to the 
psyche of its members without the reciprocal assertion 
that consciousness is moulded by societal institutions. 
See Chapter Seven, below. 
15. Voegelin's discussion of Solon hints that "order" 
will best be ensured by-its being entrusted to some wise 
leader to whom the populace must always defer. Solon's 
conduct in government seems to have matched his rhetoric: 
he did not exploit his position for his own advantage,, 
and when pressed to favour one of the competing factions, 
even left Athens for ten years to escape molestation. He 
therefore becomes for Voegelin "the prototype of the 
spiritual statesman" (rbid: 199). The problem glimpsed 
here seems to me a crux in Vaegelin's thought, and will 
be considered in Chapters Seven and Ten, below. 
16. In the case of Bakunin, similarly, "the experience of 
revolt is an irreducible factor in human existence" (ER: 
195-216). Bakunin therefore deems revolt to be the 
normative social condition and harmony its negation. 
17. In the Republic, the da. vai about Justice are 
expressed pungently by Thrasymachus and, more plausibly 
(because in less extreme form), by Glaucon and Adeimantus 
(Plato 1955: 63-99). The latter two claim to be voicing 
popularly held views that do not convince them but 
nevertheless cause them unease, For Vaegelin's 
discussion of this passage, see OH IIL: 71-82. 
18. The issue-has been lucidly stated by the philosopher 
Aurel Kolnai: principles may tell us "at what points or 
along what lines of practice moral emphasis .--. is likely to arise. The pitfall to be avoided is the 
assumption, or postulate, that a unitary constructive 
concept of ethics may supex-sede our direct apprehension 
of the data of moral experience" (Kolnaij 1977: 1190 
author's emphasis). For Kolnai, of course, the right to 
act on one's ethical apprehensions is not exclusive to 
legislators. 
-19. In the "History of Political Ideas" Voegelin traces 
the early development, of the Christian theory of law, 
which is an instructive counterpart to the Statesman. In 
a first position, divine law is decisive; according to 
Origen, "one may obey the laws of-the state only when 
they agree with the divine law"'. (This position implies 
that although state law is flawed, it potentially , 
reflects divine law. ) In a second position, it is held 
that there exists a "relative natural law", - that-is, 
positive law, though imperfect, is appropriate to the 
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fallen human state. (According to-Augustine, for 
example, because even tyrants are ordained, by God, their 
Authority must be respected. Their very tyranny can be-, 
regarded as a punishment for sin, and therefore as a 
legitimate and remedial mediation of the wrath of God. ) 
As one might expect, since there was no method by-which, 
positive civil law could directly be compared with the 
"absolute" natural law the Church claimed the right to 
determine when positive law imperfectly represented 
divine law and when it betrayed it altogether (Hoov). 
20. Voegelin has frequently and extensively analyzed the 
historical ocurrences of such symbolisms. cf. NZE: 52-59 
on the general problem of cosmological symbolizations, 
and on their survival into the twentieth century; OH 1: 
13-110, on the Near Eastern instances; "The Mongol Orders 
of Submission to European Powers, 1245-125511 (Vaegelin, 
1941: 378-413), on the self-interpretationot the 
mediaeval Mongol empires. 
21. -Thus, in the example given earlier, Gladstone's 
suspicion of the Roman Catholic Church is intelligible, 
whether justifiable or not. As a counter-example to this 
separation of politics and spirit, take Vcegelin's. 
account of St. Thomas Aquinas in the "History of 
Political Ideas". In the De Regimine Frincipium U, 1) 
and the Summa contra Gentiles, (111,117), Aquinas makes 
freedom or servitude the criterion of good or bad 
government. If the members of the ca=unity cooperate 
freel. r in the enterprise of common existence, the 
government is, good, whatever its institutional character. 
Even the "good forms" of Aristotle are now regarded as 
bad, because his theory of the polis presumed the 
existence of "natural slaves", whereas Christianity 
recognizes no natural slaves. For Aquinas, of course, 
freedom, the end of government, is not absolute, but is 
ordained, like the political order itself, towards 
eternal beatitude. 
22. It seems that even Kant, in his famous essay "Vhat is 
Enlightenment", hypostatizes the freedom he wishes to 
celebrate. Thus, he applauds the freedom of intellect 
(carefully sealed off from any social consequences) 
awarded by the Emperor: "Argue as much as you will, and 
about what you will, only obey! ". The scholar-cleric 
must divide his life sharply between exercizing a 
"private" function towards his congregation, there 
"speaking at the-dictation of another", and his 
"unlimited freedom to use his own reason" as a scholar, 
In each case, any discernment of the nature and 
responsibilities of freedom is prohibited (Kant, 1986). 
For a brief essay which Voegelin might approve, because 
it properly values "freedo&l while not using it as a 
slogan, cf. Parekh, 1988: 25-26, an the question of the 
universities' obligation to admit socially inflammatory 
speakers in the name of "freedom of speech". 
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23. Thus, as used by Mrs Jeanne Kirkpatrick in the 1980s 
to distinguish allies of the West from its opponents, the 
distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism 
would need to be evaluated quite differently. 
24. For a brief and sardonic account of democracy as the 
preferred self-description of an "exceedingly hetero- 
geneous class of modern states", cf. Dunn, 1979: 1-27. 
In Dunn's view, to label a society "democratic" is to say 
little about how political power is acquired and nothing 
about how it is exercized. 
25. Its validity is not obvious. Lord Hailsham's phrase 
"elective dictatorship" is much in vague as I write this 
study. It is also plausible to suggest that Western 
industrial societies smack of plutocracy rather than 
democracy, in that government policies are sometimes 
determined by non-elected commercial interests, and in 
that many people would experience their responsibility 
for government and the government's accountability to 
them as merely notional. 
26. Voegelin's point here is not to be dismissed as proof 
of his Eurocentric arrogance. It stems from his own 
experience of the political life of Germany and Austria. 
Musil's The Man Without Qualities gives a scathingly 
ironical account of the Austrian polity which points up 
the bizarre irrelevance of the formal constitution (1979, 
1: 32-33). 
27. See Chapter Four above on the Biblical notion of the 
"fool", and how the presence of the fool influences the 
course of philosophy and theology. 
28. This contrast of the spaudaios and the plethos 
underlies both the authority Voegelin attributes to the 
true philosopher, and the heat of his critique when he 
sees so-called philosophers touched with folly. cf. "The 
Oxford Political Philosophers", who swallow whole the 
"civil theology" of the English state. (Vaegelin, 1953b). 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX 
1. Vaegelin is always alert to visual symbols, as, for 
instance, ' to the cosmological symbolism of Salomon's 
Temple and even of the high priest's robe (OH 1: 320); 
but his writings include no formal account of, say, 
iconography. In later life, he became deeply interested 
in palaeolithic art (AA: 83-84), and visited archeo- 
logical sites in Ireland in 1972. In a letter of June 
14,1972 to Henry Regnery, he wrote "I gave a coffee hour 
talk to the personnel of the Hoover Institution [a noted 
stronghold of AmericarL conservatism where Voegelin then 
held the post of Henry Salvatori Distinguished Scholar] 
an the nealithic cultures of Malta and surroundings; a 
subject matter of which they had never heard before. 
They were fascinated and there was a trail of remarks 
that they had heard something that makes more sense than 
the continuous yapping against communism" (Hoov). 
2. Israel and Revelation does almost ignore the Wisdom 
Literature and, more surprisingly, omits any detailed 
examination of the prophet Ezekiel. We shall return to 
this latter omission. Voegelin's major discussions of 
Christian literature are as follows: N. SE: 133-61, an 
puritanism; OH It: 10-19, on Christian symbolisms of 
history; OH IV: 13-20, on the Gospel of John; OH TV: 
134-37 & 239-71, on St. Paul; Conv: 37-111, in which 
Christianity is a recurring topic; discussions of Jesus, 
Francis of Assisi, Luther, Calvin and others in the 
"History of Political Ideas" <Honv); the letter of 1953 
to Alfred Schutz on Christianity (Opitz & Sebba, 1981: 
449-57); the response to Thomas Altizer of 1975; "Immor- 
tality: Experience and Symbol" (1967); "History and 
Gnosis" (1964), a discussion of issues arising from 
Bultmann's thought; "The Gospel and Culture" (1971); "The 
Beginning and the Beyond" (ca. 1976, unpublished); 
"Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme" (1981); "Quod Deus 
Dicitur" (1986). Although the list is extensive and 
weighty, it nevertheless understates how ubiquitous a 
point of reference Christianity is for Voegelin. 
3. Roland Mushat Frye makes a similar case in his essay 
'$A Literary Perspective for the Criticism of the Gospels" 
(Miller & Hadidian, 1971: 193-221). He notes Bultmann's 
axiom that the Bible is to be treated critically as are 
other, kinds of literature. Now, "of all critical 
principles the most basic is this: the critic is not free 
to alter, or deny, or ignore the text in order to suit 
his own presuppositions" (p. 195). But many eminent 
authorities, including Bultmann, not only "demythologize" 
but reject or rewrite parts of the scriptural texts in 
accordance with their theory. Frye treats the Gospels as 
"dramatic histories" (he defines this genre in n. 28, 
p. 219 and illustrates it from the Prologue of Henry V), 
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which are concerned with "veracity" before "historicity". 
His essay recalls a principle enunciated by his father, 
Northrop Frye: "if anything historically true is in the 
Bible, it is there not because it is historically true 
but for 
, other reasons .... 
of spiritual profundity or 
significance" (IT. Frye, 1983:, 140). 
4. In order to limit the scope of an analysis which could 
easily occupy an entire thesis, our emphasis will fall 
heavily on Voegelin's account of the Hebrew rather than 
the Christian Testament. For general discussions of 
Voegelin's work an the Scriptures, see the essays by John 
Kirby, Lynn Clapham and William Thompson in Kirby & 
Thompson, 1983, and by Bernhard Anderson (in McKnight, 
1978). According to his letter of 11 November 1978 to 
Anderson's editor Stephen McKnight (Hoov), Vaegelin found 
this last article especially interesting. 
5. For an historian's discussion of the Exodus, cf. Noth, 
1960: 110-21 & 133-38. For the perspective of political 
theology, cf. Guti6rrez, 1973: 155-60; Fierro, 1977: 
140-51; Miranda, 1977: 78-88. 
6. The force of this distinction may be illustrated by 
the way in which certain scriptural injunctions are 
supported by declarations such as "I am YHVH", or "I am 
YHVH thy God". Martin Buber writes, "Translated into our 
language: this is not a moral commandment but a command- 
ment of faith; the declaration means accordingly: I 
command this to you not as human beings as such, but as 
My people" (1951: 71). The Exodus is the event which 
constitutes Israel as "My people". 
7. For example, speaking in 1966 of Germany under Hitler, 
Voegelin, suggested that persons of spiritual stature had 
to distance themselves from the "collective insanity" 
around them, and that this "inner emigration" could, 
under the, pressure of events, "eventually lead to the 
outer one" (Voegelin, 1985: 22-23). Clearly, he accords 
priority to the inner decision. We shall shortly return 
to this use of the term "emigration". 
8. We shall, however, have to return to this estimate in 
this chapter. It is latent throughout the second half of 
rs. rael and Revelation, as when he writes that "the 
prophets were torn by the conflict between spiritual 
-universalism and patriotic parochialism that had been 
inherent from the beginning in the conception of a Chosen 
People" (p. 357). Elsewhere, Vaegelin writes that once 
the insight was gained that the universal order of human 
existence under God "could not be adequately represented 
by the constitution of a Chosen People on a definite 
territory", the Chosen People "broke asunder in the two 
equally vehement responses of the withdrawal into the 
shell of Judaism and the explosive expansion of Christ- 
ianity" (OH IT: 10). After making this statement, to be 
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sure, he goes to some lengths to qualify it (1bid: 
10-12), as he'discusses the Pauline theology of Judaism 
in Ronans. 
9. This saying of Augustine (Enarrationes in Psalmos 
64,2) meant much'to Vaegelin and recurs periodically in 
his work. It confirms for him that "the structure of 
history is the same as the structure of personal 
existence" (Voegelin, 1967a: 262). The'interior aspect 
remains for him prior to the historical one, as is seen 
in his double use of the saying in OH IV, where it 
articulates "the existential exodus from the pragmatic 
world of power", and is neigbour to "the philosophers' 
noetic consciousness of existence in erotic tension" 
MH IV: 172,178). A mystical interpretation of the 
exodus symbol is not, of course, peculiar to Augustine, 
and Voegelin is not to be accused of arbitrarily 
selecting an eccentric source congenial to his inter- 
pretative-purpose. cf. for example, Origen's Homily, 
"De Transitu Jordanis", remembering that Origen's 
mystical theology seemed to Voegelin "a high point which 
has hardly ever been surpassed" (Conv- 105-06, see 
Chapter Four, above): "When you left the darkness. of 
idolatry and were anxious to reach the understanding of 
the divine law, you began your exodus from Egypt. When 
you were numbered among the catechumens and first 
undertook to obey the laws of the Church, you crossed the 
Red Sea .... " <for Latin text, Origen, 1841: 36-37). 
10. Similarly, just as the Exodus begins with God's 
hearing the cry of Israel, God will also "hear the cry" 
of any widows, orphans or strangers who are oppressed 
within Israel (E. Yodus 22: 21-22,27). Practising such 
oppression would place Israel itself in the position 
taken by Pharaoh in B. -codus, and would invite a righteous 
divine intervention that might be no less militant than 
the liberation from Egypt. 
11. Thus'Moltmann (1967: 305-16), in speaking of an 
"Exodus Church", accepts the biblical narrative as 
paradigmatic not just for the confrontation between 
prophets and kings (cf. above and OH 1: 384-85 an the 
ImItatio Xosis) but for the life of the Church itself, 
which is never to become merely a pillar of civil society 
or a refuge from it. 
12. An answer to, this further question will be proposed 
in the next section of this chapter. 
13. Vaegelin, of, course, knows the Torah itself to be 
more than merely a burdensome "Law"' (see OH 1: 372-79), 
As Eichrodt points out, the prophetic interpretation of 
the covenant concept looks less to Sinai as such than to 
Yahweh's act of deliverance taken as a whole, which act 
cannot be miscontrued as Yahweh's "obligatory" adherence 
to a quasi-legal covenant (Eichrodt, 1961: 61,52). 
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14. This section obviously-does not pretend to do justice 
to the richness of OH 1: 111-351, but merely seeks to 
establish one point which is fundamental for the thesis. 
15. See Vaegelin's remarkable account of the Song of 
Deborah (OH 1: 199-212). ý 
16. The Scriptures emphasize this unproductiveness: to 
finance the construction Solomon sold twenty cities in 
Galilee to Hiram of Tyre, cities in such poor condition 
that "they are called Cabul (no good) to this day" (OH I: 
256-59, citing I Kings 5: 13-18 & 9: 10-22). 
17. Voegelin therefore holds the religion of "the 
community organized under the Torah" to exemplify what 
Henri Bergson calls, "static religion". As Bergson 
explains, inward, or "dynamic" religion "needs static 
religion for its expression and diffusion" (Bergson, 
1935: 179), so the latter is not merely an aberration. 
But static religion is never creative and, unlike dynamic 
religion, it can plausibly be explained in terms of its 
function in nourishing social cohesion. Bergson 
summararizes his exposition by defining static religion 
as "a defensive reaction of nature against what might be 
depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for 
society, in the exercise of intelligence" (Ibid: 205). 
Though Voegelin does not use Bergson's terminology, he 
repeatedly records his admiration for the book. 
18., Interestingly, as John Barton explains (1986: 154- 
78), the prophets themselves came to be read as Torah (as 
well as read in other ways). This does not make Voegelin 
mistaken, since a community of the Torah might possibly 
read any canonical literature in terms of its own 
perspectives or prejudices. But it makes the notion of 
"mutual death sentences" seem unduly schematic. It is at 
this point that Voegelin's omission of any treatment of 
the prc7pbet-priest Ezekiel, potentially a counter- 
example, seems unfortunate. Ezekiel is a "watchman for 
the house of Israel" Q; 17-21), one with the task of 
bringing the concrete historical society back to Yahweh. 
It is true that he is to warn people individually, since 
community is henceforth not to override personal respons- 
ibility (Buber, 1949: 186-88). 
19., In an extended footnote (OH 1: 447), Voegelin 
interprets prophetism as an attejvpt to disengage 
existential from normative issues, and discusses the 
motives, of the Talmudic resistance to prophetism, most 
significant of which is the attempt to suppress 
"pneumatic irrationalism! '. Voegelin likewise holds 
irrationalism to be a threat to order, but does not think 
that dogmatic construction can help. 
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20. ý Of course,, norms'admit, of exceptions by definition, 
so do not necessitate absolutism; and Buber's assertion 
that the normative articulations of the Torah are 
ultiAntelY existential is well-taken. But these observ- 
ations do, not cancel the need for the distinction itself. 
21. -The prophets were faced with formidable difficulties, 
as Vaegelin recognizes, forýthey could find no secure 
ground from which to attack the social order. To attack 
foreign cults was easy, if politically risky. To condemn 
the iniquity of the new upper class "through appeal, to a 
glorified peasant existence, complete with independence, 
freedom, abundance, and peace" was tricky, for nomad 
existence would attract no one, and the few traces of it 
left in the Bible are not all edifying: Voegelin cites 
the Song of Lamech (Genesis 4: 23-24, with "its blood- 
curdling boasts of revenge" (OH 1: 181). 
22. As-a point of comparison for the passages from 
Isaiab, Voegelin cites the "late historiographic work of 
the Chronicler". Whereas Il Kings 3 recounts how the 
kings of-Israel and Judah, after praying to Yahweh at the 
bidding, of Elisha, defeat the Mcabites in battle, 
II Cbr-onicles 20 tells how the kings' prayer even 
relieves them from the need to fight (OH 1: 449-50). 
23. The Autoblograpbical Memoir tells how Vaegelin 
consulted van Rad about this analysis, and coined the 
term "metastatic faith" as a concession to von Rad's 
horror at the thought "that a grandiose spiritual prophet 
like Isaiah should be a magician". As Voegelin adds, "I 
am not so sure that today I would make this concession" 
(AA: 69-70). 
24. Martin Buber's The Prophetic Faith has been of 
particular help in the development of this analysis. I 
have also used Bernhard Anderson's essay (McKnight, 1978: 
62-100) and several general works as listed in the 
bibliography: Barton, 1986; Carroll, 1962; de Vaux, 1961; 
Heschel, 1969 & 1971; Jenni, 1962; Kaiser, 1972 & 1974; 
North, 1962; van Rad, 1968. 
25. The Gospel of Matthew, for example, would an this 
hypothesis have accomplished a differentiation beyond, 
Isaiab: for the commissioning of the disciples in Chapter 
10 instructs them to be "wise as serpent and innocent as 
doves",, to be free from anxiety when delivered up to 
councils, governors and kings, but to flee from persec- 
ution., Their trust in God is not to exclude the exercise 
of human prudence, so that synergy is not repressed. , 
26. To take one example, the census (rr Samuel: 24) is 
sinful, even though enacted at the divine commandl 
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Presumably David's sin is the presumption that he himself 
can "name" the people and therefore possesses some auto- 
nomous authority over them. Instead, they are God's., 
27. The extravagance of Isaiah 30: 17, for example, ("a 
thousand shall flee At the threat of one") shows clearly 
that the saying is not meant as an amateur soldier's 
prediction about the outcome of battle. It states the 
spiritual principle that military arrogance will always 
meet with humiliation. Elsewhere, Vaegelin acknowledges 
that the Imperial Psalms express not "a programme of 
world dominion in practical politics" but "an experience 
of cosmic order as the source of social order" and have 
", nothing to do with the size or success of the social 
unit which uses the language" (Ibid: 290-91). 
28. Voegelin finds Hosea to be a transitional figure, 
attempting "to bring the Kingdom of God in the, souls of 
men forth from its theopolitical matrix" (OH 1: 456). 
29.1 have challenged only one link in Voegelin's chain 
of argument, the claim that Ahaz's trust in the prophet 
would have been metastatic, and that he was therefore 
justified in securing the realm of expediency against the 
intrusion of prophetic claims. 
30. Our argument suggests that Vaegelin regards Jeremiah 
as a kind of Hebraic equivalent of Plato, who for 
Voegelin is the source and criterion of order in Athens 
(OH ITT: 36-39). Voegelin's position in this regard was 
criticized in Chapter Four, where it was argued that 
neither Jeremiah nor Plato could be unreservedly regarded 
as the authoritative source of social order. 
31. For this purpose we must rely an allusions, rather 
than extended arguments. But the allusions are less 
scattered than they may seem to be. Voegelin uses The 
Sermon on the Mount, especially the Beatitudes, to 
illuminate his accounts of Plato (OH ITT: 226-28) and 
Tolstoy <FR: 219-21). But this discussion of Plato 
reworks material from the unpublished "History of Polit- 
ical. Ideas"; and ER, though published only in 1975, is 
itself an editor's selection from the same "History". 
Though Voegelin abandoned the "History" because of its 
inadequate theoretical framework, he did not repudiate 
its specific analyses. It must be used cautiously, 
.. 
because it is a comparatively early work and because it 
was never substantially revised to prepare it for 
publication. But it is methodologically legitimate to 
use the "History"Is explicit treatment of the Beatitudes 
to elucidate subsequent writings which use the "History" 
as a quarry. 
32.,, To make this criticism is not oneself to-invest "the 
original prophetic discourse" with absolute status. It 
is clear that the status of the Sermon on the Mount is 
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not that of positive paranesis. But Voegelin dissolves 
the tension assym trically, qualifying the applicability 
of the original sayings while attributing to some other 
source a definitive authority. 
33. Vaegelin, gives the analogy of Marx's early writings. 
The proletariat is "a class which is not a class" because 
it is not integrated into the hierarchy of privileges. 
Proletarian misery cannot be remedied by any reform of 
the present order, but only by emancipation from it. 
Like the "poor" of the Lukan Beatitudes, the proletariat 
belongs proleptically to the eschatological realm in 
which the present world order is dissolved. In this 
respect, the structure of Marx's eschatological myth 
(though, not its content) is the same as that of the 
Gospel (Honv). 
We shall take up the theme of eschatology in Chapter 
Eight: but meanwhile remark that E. P. Sanders (1977) 
contrasts the Jewish religious mode of "covenental 
nomis&' with Paul's conception of Christian existence as 
"participationist eschatology". In other words, the 
religious c, onsciousness of Christians is formed by the 
experience of sharing in the death and resurrection of 
Christ, and of receiving his Spirit, so that the Kingdom 
of God is in some way present now, is not only to be 
awaited: a fortiox-l, the Lukan Beatitudes are not to be 
classed as an expression of what Max Weber called 
ressentiment, by which hope is directed entirely to an 
other-worldly settling of accounts with the privileged of 
this age. 
34. For example, St. Jerome endorses what he already knew 
as a popular proverb, "The rich person is either an 
unjust person or the heir of one" (Miranda, 1977: 15). 
Max Weber (1964: 106-17) characterizes resentment as one 
possible component of the "religious ethic of the 
disprivileged", one facet of their awareness of their 
need for salvation. "Other things being equal, classes 
with high social and economic privilege will scarcely be 
prone to evolve the idea of salvation. Rather, they 
assign to religion the primary function of legitimizing 
their own life pattern and situation in the world" (rbid: 
107). The "Woes" therefore embody a wholly sane 
challenge to the rich (that they do need salvation), and 
an authoritative resistence to disorder. It should be 
-noted that Weber specifically exempts Jesus from any 
charge of hostility to the rich (Ibid: 115-16). 
35. Writing elsewhere of the future prospects of 
civilization, Vaegelin distinguishes various senses of 
the term: "songeons-nous A une Icivilisation' au sens 
restreint o6 l1entend Toynbee, avons-nous en vue 11image 
polybienne d1un monde en marche vers VEmpire universelt 
11image paulinienne d1une humanit6 de mission vivant dans 
llattente de la*Parousie, ou faisons nous plutot allusion 
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au grand mouvement r6volutionnaire qui slesquisse A la 
Renaisance pour rendre 11homme mattre et possesseur de la 
Nature? " (Vaegelin, 1961a: 135-36). The spiritual 
potential of civilization varies according to these 
different usages. - Toynbee's usage is non-evaluative, 
simply because so many various civilizations will exist 
(as he estimates, about 1743 million! ) (OH 1: 125). For 
Polybius, civilizations are inherently expansionist. 
But their rise and fall offers a futile spectacle in 
which success leads to prosperity, profligacy, loss of 
morale, corruption and decay; Fortune lends her favours 
only to withdraw them subsequently <cf. OH IV: 117-32). 
Civilization as conceived by the Enlightenment, the 
"grande mouvement r6volutionnaire", is hostile to the 
spirit, in particular by rejecting the obligation of 
"attunement". Of the senses Vaegelin mentions, only the 
Pauline image of civilization promises hospitality to a 
true spiritual movement. 
36. Vaegelin gives no example from Talstoy's works. One 
vivid example from his fiction is the representation of 
the Judiciary and clergy in Resurrection. In Chapters 
39-40 of Book I, the liturgy is a corrupt and manipul- 
ative charade: the priest does not really believe "that 
he had indeed swallowed a piece of God - no one could 
believe this - but he believed it was his duty to believe 
in this belief". The most persuasive argument, far him 
as for the deacon, is his income (Tolstoy, 1947: 168-75). 
37. Though it was unsought, Vaegelin was, of course, 
poignantly aware of it. See page I of this study. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN 
1. These statements were made in the Foreword to the 1966 
German edition of Anamnesis. -This Foreword was omitted 
from the 1978 English edition of Anamnesis. I quote the 
translation made later by Voegelin himself. 
2. See An-E: 114, where Voegelin gives a table of "levels 
of being" and of the dimensions of huma 
,n 
life "as a 
person in society and history". The table prohibits all 
constructions by which the higher levels of being are 
treated as epiphenomena of the lower levels: as he sums 
up, "all 'philosophies of history' which hypostatize 
society or history as an absolute, eclipsing personal 
existence and its meaning, are false". For a similar 
conception of such a hierarchy among the levels of being, 
see Schumacher, 1978. 
3. In the Suppliants, King Pelasgus of Argos is faced 
with the choice whether or not to offer refuge to fifty 
women of DanaUs, who have sought sanctuary with him after 
fleeing the certain prospect of forced marriage with 
their'father's conquerors. Nomos (the law of the 
country), as well as political expediency, requires them 
to be abandoned to their pursuers. But the dike of Zeus 
requires the offer of hospitality to the refugees. King 
and people choose justice together, just as they are 
willing to bear together the evil of the war that might 
result from their refusal46 surrender the women. 
4. cf. the Republic's narrative of the decline of a good 
polis. The , decline is inexorable whether the polis 
should take the form of a "timarchy" <rule by the most 
ambitious and competitively energetic), an oligarchy, a 
democracy or a tyranny (Plato, 1955: 312-49). Neither 
Plato 
- 
nor Voegelin speculates whether, if a good polis is 
bound to degenerate, a vicious polis is not bound to 
improve. 
_ 
5. For a brief illustration, given by a theologian, of 
, "structural injustice" through the economic structures-' 
which trap the poorest countries in their poverty, see 
Dorr, 1985: 52-73. The trap is "structural" in that no 
amount of industriousness or frugality practised in the 
poor countries can free them from it. But such struct- 
ures are not the only factor in any situation, and do not 
annul human responsibility. Even among victims competent 
management is preferable to thriftlessness: even more 
important, it would show bad faith an the part of the 
wealthy countries to regard as inflexible the structures' 
they themselves enforce. 
6. Of course, if there were "structures" apart from the 
act of interpretation, no one could point to them anyway, 
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just as a collocation of stars becomes a "constellation" 
only in the, mind. Indeed the notion of the longue dur6e 
itself is a construct of the historian's consciousness. 
7. His essay of 1951, "Machiavelli's Prince: Background 
and Formation", for example, argues that Machiavelli's 
later moralistic detractors have not understood how the 
thought of his age was influenced by the awareness (one 
might call it a mental structure) of Italy's vulner- 
ability to conquest by its neighbours, of impending 
catastrophe. Among-his contemporaries some, 
, 
such as 
Guicciardini (born 1483) thought Machiavelli an unreal- 
istic optimist. Machiavelli's mythical prince was one 
who by his own'virto could defend Italy against the naked 
force of others: he reports in his life of Castruccio, 
"He used to say that man should try everything and not 
shy away; and that God loves strong men, for, as anyone 
may see, 
, 
he always castigates the powerless by means of 
the powerful" (Voegelin, 1951a: 168). 
8. One aspect of this paper, concerning the conditions 
which are required for democracy's effective functioning, 
was discussed in Chapter Five, above. 
9. Vaegelin cites two nineteenth century thinkers, Renan 
and Sorel, who went so far as to base their hopes for 
regeneration (of France and of the international labour 
movement respectively) an the assimilation of the ethos 
of discipline exemplified by the Prussian army! They 
were less wise even than Xusills figure of fun, General 
Stumm von Bordwehr, who is alarmed by a sudden perception 
that order <or, at least, military order) is good only in 
moderation: 
, 
"In the army, where we have the highest 
degree of order, we also have to be prepared to lay down 
our lives at any moment. I can't quite explain why. At 
a certain stage order somehow creates a demand for 
bloodshed. " (Musil, 1979,11: 198). 
10. For a limpid account of the relationship between 
individual and community, cf. Niebuhr, 1945: 35-62. The 
influential sociological investigation of this relatiOn7 
ship by Berger and Luckmann, (1971) is subjected to a 
philosophical critique by D. Z. Phillips (1979). On the 
range of connotations and the conflicting evaluations of 
the concept of community itself, see Plant: 1974: 8-36. 
cf. also Polanyi, 1973: 203-45; Pannenberg, 1985: 157-90. 
1I. - Reversing "the usual and so deceptively plausible 
opinion". Hans Jonas argues (1971: 506-07) that the 
introspective knowledge of one's own mind "is a function 
of acquaintance with other minds": "Since we begin life 
as infants (a fact philosophers so easily forget)o coming 
into a world-already peopled with adults, the particular 
'I' to-be is at first far more the receiver than the 
giver in this communication. ... We learn from others 
whatwe ourselves can be, can will, and can feel"- 
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12. As Dr. Haddon Willmer has argued in seminar 
discussion with the present writer, individualism itself 
is a social phenomenon. It has its own intellectual 
provenance (its "tradition"), and "individualists" are 
often eager to persuade others of their case. The' 
reverse proposition needs to be added: at least after the 
"macroanthropic differentiation" has been ma4e, collect- 
ivism is, among other things, an individual mind-set. 
13. Quinton's view of political society echoes, knowingly 
or not, Bossuet's view of religion (BE: 14-18). Bossuet 
thought that the Reformation demonstrated that "the 
intellectual powers of the individual cannot substitute 
for the accumulated wisdom of the collectivity" (the 
collectivity in this case being the Church, and espec- 
ially the Fathers of the Church). Voegelin distances 
himself from Bossuet's position by a typically artful 
ploy, giving an illustrative quotation in which Trotsky 
condemns the "individualism! ' revealed by his petty- 
bourgeois opponents! We saw in Chapter Four that the 
very breakthrough to philosophical consciousness is 
linked, in Voegelin's view, with the attack on hierarch- 
ically preserved tradition. 
14. Some conservative thinkers, such as Michael 
Oakeshott, recognize this problematic: cf. Pitkin, 
1979: 507. 
15. Czeslaw Milasz describes an "historical law, little 
known, but of considerable moment": the process of 
decline affects people in ways unknown to them, beneath 
the threshold of their consciousness. ... extending to the most intimate of human relations including the erotic 
.... with the result that distressed individualists 
vainly seek the help of psychiatrists trained In th4 same 
individualist school (1985: 228). 
16. For a discussion, drawing especially an Freud, of the 
psychology of such "slavishness", cf. Becker, 1973: 
127-58. Jung speaks of the "mental contagion", by which 
individuation is repudiated as one succumbs to the 
"propensity to imitate" one's neighbours or one's ruler 
(Jung: 1971: 164-65). 
17. Voegelin pushes the argument further. If the wise 
cannot affect the political society directly, they must 
reluctantly form an alternative community to affect it 
indirectly. So, in an important passage, he defends the 
withdrawal of Socrates from politics as explained in the 
Republic <QH ITT: 90-91; cf. Plato, 1955: 258). 
18. Every "alternation" of consciousness, argue Berger 
and Luckmann, has its own social matrix. St. Paul's 
Damascus experience, for instance, admittedly antedates 
his altered community affiliation. "But this is not the 
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Point. , 
To have a conversion experience is nothing much. 
The real thing is to be able to take it seriously; to 
retain a sense of its plausibility. " They wittily adapt 
the tag extra ecclesiam nulla salus: "By salus we mean 
here (with due apologies to the theologians .... ) the 
empirically successful accomplishment of conversion" 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1971: 177). 
19. For Vaegelin's cogent discussion of the forms taken 
by this, irrationalism, cf. 1961c: 278-81. 
20. On the "true alternative", cf. also OH 111: 321-23. 
The strategy seems to allow of two conceivable realiz- 
. ations: 
leaving present rulers in power and "converting" 
them, or raising to power those who possess "spiritual 
substance". The "true alternative", which Voegelin 
admits to be implausible, is not even coherent unless he 
substantiates the claim that such spiritually mature 
persons (spoudalol) exist and can be identified and 
educated for social leadership. When we consider his 
positive view of responsible politics, we shall have to 
consider whether his conception of the spoudalos bears 
, scrutiny. 
See Chapter Ten, below. 
21. For instance, he acknowledges that faced with the 
"truly dreadful. confusing, and oppressive state" of the 
ancient world, the gnostics sought flight whereas the 
Christian movement strove to practice "loving action" 
(Ua: 12). 
22. "Remembrance", of course, is anamnesis itself. 
Eugene Webb concisely characterizes Vaegelin's use of 
this term: "a symbol for the recognition that the explic- 
ation of experience is the bringing into consciousness of 
what had previously been implicitly present but 
unconscious" (Webb, 1981-, 277). 1w 





to Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion 
as 
- 
"the classic masterpiece of contemporary philosophy of 
society". The enthusiasm of this tribute explains the 
emphasis given to our analysis here. 
24. On Plato's "acceptance" that other human beings are 
equal'only in their distance from him, and an Voegelin's 
attitude towards that acceptance, see below, Chapter Ten. 
25. Germino, 1982: 148-69 makes a contrary Judgment. He 
argues that Bergson's emphasis on transforming the world 
through 
, 
action overlooks "the full implication of his. own 
discovery: viz. the eschatological character of the open 
society symbol" (Ibid: 168). For Vaegelin, "universal 
mankind is an eachatological index", not a "Society 
existing in the world" (OH IV-. 305). In Chapter Eight we 
shall claim what Voegelin and Germino must logically 
contest, that action itself can have an eschatolOgiC&I 
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character., A methodological limitation of Germino's book 
(significantly dedicated-"To Eric Vaegelin, Nagistez") is 
that Voegelin's conception of openness is taken, as an 
authoritative basis for Germino's criticism of Bergson, 
without itself being subjected to criticism. 
26. To explain this dimension of receptivity, Bergson 
offers the example, of Robinson Crusoe. Even his, solitary 
survival is possible only given the objects he salvaged 
from the wreck and the skills he had acquired socially. 
"But a moral contact is still more necessary toýhim, for 
he would be soon discouraged if he had nothingýelse to 
cope with his incessant difficulties except an individual 
strength of which he knows the limitations. He draws 
energy from the society to which he remains attached in 
spirit" (Bergson, 1935: 160). As Kenneth Burke writes, 
"the 'personality' involves complex social relationships 
not wholly reducible to terms of the individual, possible 
to-persons only a part of a social collectivity" (in 
Kuntz, 1968: 182). 
27. Thus, Brueggemann discusses the prophetic critique of 
the "royal consciousness". which systematically attempts, 
by propaganda or the suppression of dissent, to convey 
that "all is well", to numb the awareness, of injustice 
(1978 44-61). On Jesus's own prophetic consciousness, 
Ibld: 80-95. 
28. Moltmann's ecological theology in God In Creation, 
for example, is generated by a sense of worldwide envir- 
onmental crisis. From this starting point, the book 
moves to a theology of affirmation and appreciation. For 
instance, it stresses the need to pass from the under- 
standing of God's creation as nature (considered, 
perhaps, as the'suitable object for technological 
exploitation) to the understanding of nature as God's 
creation, which we must respect (1985: 21). 
29. This sweeping suggestion will be explored in Chapter 
Ten. For a critique of the sociologist Peter Berger, an 
the analogous grounds that Berger attributes all social 
roles to "bad faith", cf. Phillips, 1979. Phillips's 
argument is relevant to our discussion, as is clear in 
his claim, "what Berger cannot allow is that people do 
not have comyn n interests in order to have common bonds. 
He cannot see that their interests are their bonds" 
(Ibid: 105). Phillips therefore regards "common 
interests" primarily as a sign of a wholesome community 
of feeling, not as a sign of group "closure". Also in 
contrast to Berger, Richard Sennett argues that 
"convention is itself the single most expressive tool of 
social life" (1977: 37). To place conventions or 
institutions under systematic suspicion is to eliminate 
the very possibility of gaining shared societal meanings. 
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30. Segundo's account (1977) presumes that of Guti6rrez 
and does not contradict it. See also Lakeland, 1984: 7- 
20. The political theologianýwho has, best affirmed the 
positive character of the social world is perhaps Metz. 
cf. especially, 1968: 51-55. In, his later work, however, 
Metz shifts his emphasis sharply towards critique of that 
"world" which seeks to. negate the potential of faith, for 
societal transformation. This is a prominent theme of 
Faith In History, and Society. 
31. The Hoover Archive gives no indication where or when 
this paper was delivered. It is dated "ca. 1939". As a 
new immigrant and a refugee from Nazism, Voegelin was 
briefly a regular speaker at, public meetings and on local 
radio stations. 
32. On the constitutional factors which originally 
allowed the Nazis into power, however, cf. Chapter Five, 
above. 
33. One recalls Max Weber's insistence that the Israelite 
prophets were interested in social injustice only because 
it constituted a violation of the Mosaic code and thus 
invited the divine wrath, and that "Jesus was not at all- 
interested in social reform as such" (1964: 50-51). But, 
no one isAnterested in "social reform as such"; the 
point is that the enhancement of people's lives is not a 
matter neatly separable from social reform. Similarly, 
one could press Weber and ask wby social injustice 
violates the divine will. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT 
1. Perhaps, for example, some reflections of the elderly 
Augustine can scarcely be superseded: he recalls the 
blessings experienced amid "a life so full , of many and various evils that it can hardly be called living". If 
the blessings are so great and of such quality, what can 
those fuller blessings be like to which such anticipat- 
ions point? See Brown, 1967: 328-29. 
2. Elsewhere, of course, the Pauline expectation finds 
different expression, as in I Corintblans 15, according 
to which the "imperishing" (aphtbarsla) will occur "in 
the twinkling'of an eye". 
3. See especially Chapter Two, and the section about 
philosophy in Chapter Four, where classical philosophy, 
as well as Christian discourse, is argued to be a 
response to revelation. 
4. According to an unpublished paper of 1976, "The 
Beginning and the Beyond", we can speak of faith when the 
human response "becomes luminous to itself as a quest for 
the divine ground and when the quest becomes an act of 
reflexive questioning" (Hoov>. The questioning, the 
ignorance, is not to be dispelled, but neither may the 
search ever rightly be called off. 
5. An analogous twofold account of faith is also found in 
the Christian Fathers: for example in the fifth cate- 
chetical lecture of Cyril of Jerusalem: "The word faith 
is one word in the vocabulary, but has two separate 
meanings. For there is one kind of faith that has to do 
with doctrines, and involves the assent of the mind in 
respect to such and such a doctrine". (His prime example 
is the belief "that Jesus Christ is Lord and that God 
raised him from the dead". ) The second kind of faith is 
"that given by Christ by a particular grace". Cyril 
quotes I Corintbians, 12: 8-9, to show that these gifts 
empower bothýnoetic illuminations and "activities 
surpassing human nature" (Cyril, -1955: 122-23). 
6.1 have in mind especially, J. B. Metz, J. Moltmann and 
A. Fierro. See Piorenza 1968a: 145-47. Among others who 
discuss Bloch's work, Fiorenza himself (1968a, 1968b, 
1969) is-sympathetic, Kolakowski (1978: 421-49) severe, 
Stern (1988) pungently hostile. 
7. He criticizes psychoanalysis, for instance, for envis- 
aging the preconscious and unconscious as exclusively the 
Nb-Longe. r-Consciousm.. as that which has sunk beneath the 
threshold of consciousness or has been repressed, and 
therefore needs to be recovered (1986: 115-16). Not 
surprisingly, he also attacks Plato (though without 
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supporting analysis), for whom "all knowing is merely 
anannesis, a re-. remembering cir something seen befdrdl: a 
"merely contemplative knowledge necessarily, refers to 
what is closed and what is past, it is helpless against 
what is present and blind to the future" (Ibid: 140,198, 
author's emphasis). - 
8. Bloch's own "anticipatory consciousness" is nourished 
by his dwelling on an immense range of the European, 
thought of the past. Conversely, the Platonic anamnesis 
has, in a sense, a future dimension, since it is also a 
search, an incomplete activity, in response to the divine 
pull, I 
9. A second area of unease for Bloch's readersýmay well 
lie in his confidence that the Soviet Union is the 
effective carrier of this liberation <1986: 205, but 
frequently elsewhere). Bloch sees no need to defend his 
confidence explicitly. - 
10, Bloch presumably takes his cue from Marx's own vision 
of the future, which is no less absolute. See Chapter 
Nine, below. 
11. We shall later return to a potentially weightier 
charge made by Fierro, to see whether it might hold 
against Voegelin: the chaý, ge that a transcendentally 
directed eschatology is an escapism, serving only to 
inculcate indifference to concrete social programmes 
(Ibld: 283-84; cf. also Segundo, 1977: 126). 
12. For another account of the French thinkers discussed 
in ER, cf. Part IV of Xanuel & Xanuel's immense survey of 
utopian thought (1979: 413-518), which also offers a very 
full bibliography., A discussion from a Christian stand- 
point, well known to Voegelin (cf. Sla: v) is that of 
Henri de Lubac, 1949. See also Passmore, 1970. 
13. See Voegelin's wide-ranging analysis (ER: 35-73). 
There also arises the question of the legislators' own 
passions, how it might be ensured that they will be 
subject to "reason" and free from partisanship. In fact, 
Helv6tius recognized that his own society's failure to 
realize the public good was a threat to his theory, since 
the theory aspires to a universal validity: but he blamed 
the fanatics who obstructed popular enlightenment in 
order to guard their sectional interests. Progress was 
only now feasible, he claimed, because the age of 
fanaticism had given way to the age of reason. The 
argument is either self-defeating or circular, depending 
on whether or not the arrival of the age of reason is 
held-to abolish the dominance of the amour de soiO of 
passionate self-interest. 
14. In particular Voegelin attributes such a methodo- 
logical abuse to Comte (ER: 113-18). It is noteworthy 
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that utopian literary fiction often takes the same step. 
For example, as David Lodge notes, it tends to concen- 
trate on the creation of a plausible external framework, 
with character and motive subordinate, since progress can 
less plausibly be attributed to them - but see note 15. 
Thus, in A Modern Utopia, H. G. Wells celebrates the 
technology of fast and comfortable travel, without 
speculating about its possible drawbacks. A non-utopian 
thinker, John Ruskin , on the contrary, had protested "that the Vye valley was being desecrated by a railway 
viaduct in order that a Buxton fool might find him-self in 
Bakewell and a Bakewell fool in Buxton at the end of 
twelve minutes" (Lodge: 1986: 230-35>. 
15. For a, classic statement of meliorism by a very 
different thinker than Turgot (one-who insists, for 
example, that "all public ends look vague and quixotic 
beside private ones"), see Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 
"Politics". Emerson holds "thought" and "character" to 
be the decisive factors of politics: "The history of the 
State sketches in coarse outline the progress of thought, 
and follows at a distance the delicacy of culture and of 
aspiration. ..., We think our civilization near, its , 
meridian, but we are yet only at the cock-crowing and the 
morning star., In our barborous society the influence of 
character is in its infancy. As a political power, as 
the rightful lord who is to tumble all rulers from their 
chairs, its presence is hardly yet suspected. " (Emersonj 
1906: 319,312,321. ) 
16. Naturally, believers in progress were not necessarily 
blind to evil. For Turgot, especially, progress served 
as a theodicy, through which alone a providential 
character could be attributed to a history soaked in 
suffering (Manuel & Manuel, 1979: 476-90). 
17 As an example of Condorcet's "atrocities of vulgar- 
ization'l-p Voegelin'gives a lengthy and chilling'extract 
from the Esquisse (ER: 127). One may add that 
Condorcet's call for an authoritative Directorate itself 
implies a subliminal recognition that "progress" might 
well, unless controlled, defeat itself and lead to the 
disintegration of the social order. Voegelin wryly notes 
the indignation which tends to surface as soon as people 
suspect that progress is not automatic, expressed in such 
remarks as "It is outrageous that such things should 
happen in the twentieth century" (ER: 110). 
18. For an illuminating poetic reflection on this theme, 
cf. W. H. Auden's "The Shield of Achilles". At first 
sight, the appalling future glimpsed in the shield 
suggests an historical pessimism of the kind we shall 
consider in the next section: but this future is the 
outgrowth of the specific folly of expecting a harmonious 
world to be the fruit of the grim expertise of Achilles 
and the armourer. The devastation exacts retribution for 
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the goddess's pursuit, on-., her son's behalf, of both 
unique military prowess and unique immunity from, injury. 
19. Thus: Huxley's Ape and Essence portrays the conseq- 
uences of an insufficiency of both power and benevolence; 
Orwell's Nineteen Eigbty-Four explores the combination of 
effective power with malevolence; and in Huxley's Brave 
New World, the rulers embody both power and benevolence. 
But all are dystopias. 
20. An emphasis on historical decline is compatible with 
utopianism: One's utopia simply becomes some variant of a 
past "Golden Age". In a review article about the 
anthropologist Claude L6vi-Strauss, for instance, John 
Updike suggests that the contrast elaborated by L6vi- - 
Strauss between the primitive societies he so admires and 
our own society relies an a Marxist analysis, with the 
difference that the ideal society pre-dates class 
divisions, technology, etc. (Updike, 1983: 668-69). 
Manuel & Manuel distinguish this "Edenic" form of 
utopianism from the "Promethean" form (1979: 539). 
21. Two of the "Outlandish Proverbs" collected by George 
Herbert, taken together, put the matter pithily: "I wept 
when I was borne, and every day shewes why. "; "He that 
hath no ill fortune is troubled with good. ". And yet, -in 
the words of a third,, "Hope is the poore man's bread. " 
(Herbert, 1945: 327,333,337 respectively). Thus, 
whereas Camus comm nds a grim but supposedly satisfying 
indifference to circumstances, the proverbs' tonality is 
subtly different., Happiness is not to be found in 
external circumstances themselves, so one needs to, 
cultivate a certain detachment. But the proverbs do not 
claim that impassivity suffices for happiness. 
22. Similarly, Sch6nberg is said to have described his, 
choral work FrIede auf Erden as "a delusion for mixed 
choir", although the concept of "peace on earth" is no 
more a delusion than is that of an unmitigated "discord 
on earth". - The exper-ience of such "anti-optimism! ', of 
course, is undeniable, so long as it is not projected into 
a theory. As Saul Bellow's Herzog exclaims, "Justicel 
Look who, wants justice! Most of mankind has lived and 
died without - totally without it. People by the 
billions and for ages, sweated, gypped, enslaved, 
suffocated, bled to death, buried with no more justice 
than cattle. But Moses E. Herzog, at the top of his 
lungs, bellowing with pain and anger, has to have 
justice. " (Bellow, 1965: 227) 
23. One might, contrast the position of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
for. whom eternity stands both "at the end of time" and 
"over time" (as "the ultimate source and power of all 
derived and dependent existence"). Present events, thens 
partake of eternity (1943: 309-12). 
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24. For example, Frank Kermode (1967: 3-31) discusses the 
device of literary narrative known as "peripeteiall. All 
narratives proceed to an end, but the more sophisticated 
the narrative, the more devices are found to defer, ' - 
tease, or I'disconfirm! ' the reader's expectations, so as 
to make the final consonance more satisfying. Peripeteia 
would naturally be futile for a reader with no 
expectati 
- 
ons whatever; but expectations are there to be 
temporarily cheated. By analogy, it is not incoherent to 
envisage the whole of history as a peripeteia, to be 
resolved only in the parousla: in that case, to expect 
one's hopes to be satisfied within history would"be a 
simple category mistake. 
For a classic litarary instance of what might be termed 
"moralistic Sisyphism! ', cf. Samuel Johnson's poem, "The 
Vanity of Hunan Wishes", especially the concluding, 
section. 
25. The illustration shows Tillich's argument to be 
dubious, since one would have said that "breadth and 
refinement" were qualitative factors: and if quantity is' 
contrasted with quality witbin the realin of norality, it 
is hard to see why quantitative increase denotes progress 
at all. As Philip Larkin's poem "Dockery and Son" has it 
(in a very different context), ", Why did he think adding 
meant increase? / To me it was dilution" (1964. - 38). 
26. An example will clarify the issue, Anthony Storr has 
noted a plausible suggestion of Ernest Gellner, that the 
release from material insecurity enjoyed by modern 
affluent societies has merely displaced the primary 
location of their suffering to the realm of personal 
relationships (Storr, 1988: 13-14). For political 
ethics, there is the related further problem that many 
relevant good 
,s 
are "positional" (to use the term coined 
by Fred Hirsch in The Social Limits to Gz-owth). That is, 
some goods can in logic only be enjoyed by excluding 
other people from sharing them. "Numbered lithographs, 
for instance, a* re'each priced higher the fewer of them 
there, -are, since they are valued partly because they are 
scarce. Everyone could own a mere print but not everyone 
can enjoy a numbered guarantee that not everyone has one" 
(Hollis, 1985: 98). Perhaps power is similarly rationed, 
so that, as some people newly gain power, others newly 
become victims. 
27. V, oegelin acknowledges that Plata's emphasis on the 
structure of reality is similarly prone to distortion 
when severed from such a meditative process as Plato's 
own: as, for example, when it is regarded as ratifying a 
fixed definition of human nature (OH IV: 253). 
28. H. G. 'Wells likewise insisted that his "Modern 
Utopia" was not static, but was an ascent through stages 
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of perfection. As John Passmore writes, "Perfection is 
dead, long live perfectibility! " (1970-. -169). ' 
29. As Keck neatly expresses the matter, "The content of 
that transformed world cannot be, discerned now since 
every description is but the projected obverse of the 
known" (1972: 222). 
30. On this distinction, of. Hastings, "Hope and 
Optimism" (1986: esp. 114-15). 
31. As Karl Rahner writes, "the history of salvation is 
coexistent with the whole history of the human race 
(which is not to say identical, for in this single 
history there is also guilt and the rejection of God, and 
hence the opposite of salvation)" (1978: 142). 
32. Voegelin elsewhere draws on the work of Jacob , Burckhardt to make a similar point (OH TV; 192-97). 
33. Dumas (1978: 38-42) notes that the Bible does not 
echo the Greek philosophers' myths of decline. Its many 
stories of decline fit into a larger pattern, in which 
decay tends. to have the sequel of regeneration and 
bitterness of reconciliation. 
34. For a brief and elegant comparison of some different 
understandings of "human nature", cf. Jonas, 1971. For 
Jonas himself, human nature is "possibility", rather than 
determinate fact, and he writes of the "transcending 
trait of our nature by which we are always indefinably, 
more than our present being" (Ibid: 511). ., 
On the type of 
ethical theory which derives from the assumption that the 
invariant essence of human nature is accessible to 
reason, cf. Mahoney, 1987: 72-83. 
35. In Chapter Four, we cited Voegelin's own insistence 
that the human being is no less a zoon politikon and, a 
zoon bistorikon than a zoon noetikon: cf AN-E: 91-92. 
36. A taped conversation cannot be counted as a 
definitive statement. But he had earlier expressed the 
conviction that what he then termed "gnosticism" was 
self-defeating and must "explodell(ME: 164-66) - though 
there, too, he noted that explosions could be dangerous, 
The ambivalence to which I refer derives from his 
insistence that any new insight tends in its turn to 
spawn a new orthodoxy (AX: 110-11), so that the socially 
liberating force of the insight is inexorably betrayed. 
Logically, this insistence ought to inhibit his own 
confidence about the death of ideologies, since it is 
unlikely that unreason will fail to find new forms. 
37. It would also rule out the position we argued for in 
Chapter Seven, that society can nourish, as well as 
threaten, the individual's noetic life. 
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38. See Metz's discussion of the relationship between 
"redemption" and "emancipation" (1980: 119-35). 
39. - In The Idea of a Universal History, Kant asserted 
that it was morally necessary to believe in human 
perfectability, since otherwise our moral effort would be 
weakened: perfectability is therefore a "regulative 
idea". Ve are making the stronger claim that hope 
expresses a truth as well as a duty. Thus, Macquarrie 
rightly discusses hope in its emotional, volitional and 
cognitive aspects (1978: 4-15). Heraclitus had already 
distinguished faith, love, and hope as sources of 
knowledge (An-E: 184). 
40. Ruether argues that, whereas Judaism looked to a 
messianic era an earth followed by the "end of the 
world", Christianity wrongly appropriated the messianic 
era to Christendom itself: the only further conceivable 
fulfilment was "the otherworldly hope of the soul after 
death". Thus, "total hope" was banished to "the apoca- 
lyptic religions of the poor and the oppressed", who 
retained the urgent aspiration for some historical 
vindication against the holders of power (Ibid: 238). 
41. Ruether admits that she does not expect "contemporary 
radicals" to welcome the historical perspective she 
provides, because their ecstatic commitment naturally 
rules out a sober sense of historical probability. 
42. The Sisyphist belief that history under the shadow of 
the end has the, character of "peripeteiall remains - 
logically unfalsifiable. But history's "direction" would 
in that case be predominantly a "detour", which-I suspect 
is incompatible with the Pauline experience affirmed by 
Voegelin. For some stimulating remarks on the choice of 
perspective according to which evil is either the 
demonstration of cosmic absurdity or is believed to have 
a meaning because it will eventually be absorbed into a- 
greater good, cf. Kolakowski, 1982: 34-39,210-15. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE 
1' As background texts for this section, the following 
have proved useful: Buber, 1958; Kolakowski, 1978; Lash, 
1981; - Lichtheim, 1975; McGovern, 1987; McLe 
* 
llan, 1970. 
For Marx's ethical theories, see Kain, 1988; Kamenka; 
1969; Lukes, 1985; MacIntyre, 1967: 199-214; Stojanovid, 
1988. On Marx's 1850 Address to the Communist League, 
see Avineri, 1968,195-97; Lichtheim, 1964: 122-29; 
Nicolaievski & Maenchen-Helfen, 1973: 211-40; Wolfe, 
1967: 151-58. None of'these authors mentions, Voegelin. 
2. See Veber 1958: 90-92 on the "Protestant Ethic" (first 
published 1904-05). Voegelin remarks in 1936 that he 
likes to tease his communist students by assuring them 
that their opinions are the product of a passion for 
Justice rather than of their class location and material 
interests (1936b: 598). 
3. Marx's Inaugural Address to the First International 
(1864) uses official reports and statistics to refute the 
theory that has come to be called "trickle-down" (Marx, 
1977: 531-37). Contrary to earlier predictions, the 
"intoxicating epoch of economical progress" in Europe had 
led to increasing pauperization. Marx himself predicts , 
that "every fresh development of the productive powers of 
labour must tend to deepen social contrasts and point 
social antagonisms" (Ibid: 534). 
4. In speaking of "modern industrial societyll, ýVoegelin 
attributes alienation to industrialism as such. Marx 
specifically indicts capitalism. as the "Paris Manu- 
scripts" have it, "the essential-connection of private 
property, selfishness, the separation of labour, capital, 
and landed property, of exchange and competition, of the 
value and degradation of man, of monopoly and competit- 
ion", and "the connection of all this alienation with the 
moneyýsystem! ' (Marx, 1977: 78). Thirty years later, in 
the Critique of the Gotba Programme (1875), Marx's 
position is unchanged (Ibid: 569). 
5. In slightly varied forms Voegelin made this charge 
frequently, over a long period (e. g. NEF-: 25; AM: 49; 
An-R, ' 102, in a section dating from 1974). 
6. ' It is noteworthy that Voegelin's expositors have never 
seriously questioned the quality of his arguments against 
Marx. Germino (1982: 127) has qualms about Voegelin's 
habit ofýdeducing spiritual disease from bad arguments, 
and would prefer Voegelin to distinguish the sin from the 
sinner. But he does not doubt Marx's sin, or Voegelin's 
uncovering of it. Sandoz (1981: 27-29) merely applauds 
Voegelin and attributes his "hard words" to the need to 
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serve truth in "unmistakeable language":, having, exper- 
ienced the consequences of ideology, Voegelin-attacks it 
with "an Aeschylan wisdom born of suffering". In fact, I 
have not seen in any secondary literature a properly 
critical examination of Vaegelin's attack on Marx. 
7. This topic is a standard one among students of Marx, 
especially "revisionists": see. for example, Kolakowski, 
1978: 418-20, McGovern, 1987: 49-89, Lichtheim 1970: 
271-72. 
8. Parousiasm is a mode of Gnosticism (SI-Q: 48-49). For 
an account of Marx's antecedents in this respect, cf. 
Voegelin's discussion of left-wing Puritanism (RaE: 
144-52). He writes, their "scriptural camouflage cannot 
veil the drawing of God into man. The [Puritan] Saint is 
a Gnostic who will not leave the transfiguration of the 
world to the grace of God beyond history, but will do the 
work of God himself, right here and now, in history": 
Voegelin counts Marx and Engels among later lIgnostic 
revolutionaries" (Ibid: 147-48). 
9. For a brief discussion, cf. Levy, 1981: 87-101. 
10. Indeed, capitalism might simply take new f. orms to 
cope with new pressures or contradictions, rather as, 
according to Holland & Henriot, industrial capitalism has 
already successfully modulated through three phases: 
(1) Laissez-Faire; (2) Social Welfare; (3) National 
Security (1983: 64-86). 
11. To give an example from Marx which is not mentioned 
by Voegelin: iný The German Ideology Marx argues that it 
is "empirically established" that the communist revolut- 
ion, in overthrowing "the existing state of society" will 
accomplish "the liberation of each single individual" 
(Marx, 1977: 171). One might ask what the phrase 
"empirically established" could possibly mean. 
12. 'For an autobiographically based reflection on that 
kind of experienced need for "faith", both among Marxists 
and anti-Marxists, which may really be "a need for a 
simplified outlook on life", cf. Milosz, 1988: 108-279 
especially 113-15. 
13., Writing from a stance of "ethical socialism! ', John 
Milbank argues that rejecting Marxism would allow a more 
efSective critique of capitalism: "For Christian 
socialism, unlike Marxism, capitalism did not appear as a 
partial, contradictory development of freedom - instead it was denounced as a pseudo-progress and a mere 
contingency, whose rise was the shame of Christendom! * 
(1988: 5). By telling "a theoretical story in which' 
history gradually unravels a condition of absolutely 
spontaneous peace and freedom! ', Marxism neglects the truth that "genuine political freedom for the individual 
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involves-a sympathetic taking into account of the, endless 
demands of others", and avoids such central practical 
questions as "what kinds of property are allowable under 
what conditions" (Ibid: 7-8). 
14. See ER: 296-98. My own citations are taken from 
McLellan's selection (Marx, 1977: 277-85),. which gives 
the text entire. - 
15. The terms are crude but convenient, and their 
inadequacy as descriptive of particular theoretical 
positions will not affect our argument. 
16. The two streams are sometimes called respectively 
"nec-liberalisn! l and "neo-conservatism! ': the prefix is 
appropriate because they are conscious rejections of 
worldviews, especially socialism, which arose over 
against earlier liberal and conservative movements 
(Steinfels 1981: 39). As late as 1987, when one might 
think that the New Right had become a dominant force in 
Britain, -Barry treats it instead as a challenge to the 
post-war consensus, "the critique of a prevailing 
intellectual fashion" (1987: 190; cf. also 1-22). 'See 
also Hoover & Plant, 1989: 76-90. 
17. It is true that Gray specifies a positive content for 
liberalism. This content is not rendered vacuous even if 
it be true, as Voegelin claims, that the positive ideas 
emerged by negating other ideas. 
18. For analogous comments on religious and scientific 
liberalism, not directly relevant to our argument, see 
Voegelin, 1974b: 517-519. 
19.,, I.. have only gradually become aware of these circum- 
stances. 
20. The documents I cite in connection with this 
incident, as with other correspondence on which I rely 
heavily in this chapter, may be found in the Voegelin 
Archive at the Hoover Institution. 
21. As Voegelin was later informed off the record, the, 
essay was, written by Time's Senior Editor, Max Ways, who, 
in the. same year reviewed Kirk's The Conservative Mind, 
devoting to it the whole of Time's book section (Nash, 
1976: 74). 
22. V. M. Byrnes (1973) argues that Voegelin's seeming 
fixation an Gnosticism belongs to a transitional phase in 
the development of -,, his theory of consciousness. 
Gnosticism is scarcely mentioned in Order and History 
and Anamnesis. By the time of "Wisdom and the Magic of 
the Extreme" (1981) Voegelin's emphasis is firmly on "the 
positive effort to clarify the meaning of existential 
consciousness" (1981: 270) of which Gnosticism (whether 
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ancient or modern) is only one possible deformation. 
Some years later, Voegelin confessed that he had earlier 
placed-too much emphasis on Gnosticism, in effect corrob- 
orating Byrnes's argument (Conv: 149). 
23. It must in fairness be added that some other 
contributors, such as Michael Oakeshott, and Hannah 
Arendt, are by no means "Cold Varrors". 
24. In the French Revolution, on the contrary, "the 
radical wave of gnosticism was so strong that it 
permanently split the nation into the laicist half that 
based itself on the Revolution and the conservative half 
that tried, and tries,, to salvage the Christian trad- 
ition" (NEE: 188). The sentence dooms French Christians 
to perennial conservatism! 
25., Since Voegelin appears here at his most dislikeable, 
it ought to be noted again that AR is the typescript of a 
series of taped interviews, and is not a carefully 
revised written work. 
26. For Voegelin's discussion of Husserl, cf. An-R: 
9-12,14-35. 
27. Levy refers to Hayek's book, The XJraTe of Social 
Justice. For a summary of Hayek's position, cf. Barry, 
1979: 137-43; on its influence in British politics, cf, 
Hoover & Plant, 1989: 42-75. For Hayek's general 
objections to the adjective "social", see his essay of 
1982, which happens to appear in Freedom and Serfdom, 
edited by Hunold (1961), to which we have referred. 
28. In Chapter Five I discussed Voegelin's demonstration 
of how the symbol "Justice" emerges in Greek thought 
precisely as a political symbol, not as a function of 
individual morality. 
29. What is implied by "taken-for-granted" reality may 
also be seen in two of Russell Kirk's "six canons of 
conservative thought" (1978: 7-8>. What Kirk wishes to 
be taken for granted includes "tradition, sound 
prejudice, and old prescription" ýwhich are "checks upon 
both man's anarchic impulse and upon the innovator's lust 
for power"); and "orders and classes, as against the 
notion of a 'classless society"'. Kirk regards class 
structures as "natural distinctions", not to be be 
effaced. By maintaining them, conservatives are "the 
party of order". These canons clearly drift far from 
Voegelin's conception of noetic life. (Kirk's book was 
published by Henry Regnery's "Gateway" imprint. > 
30. For a pungent expression of Voegelin's view of 
ecclesiastical fundamentalism, see his letter to Alfred 
Schutz (Opitz & Sebba, 1981: 456-57). In a letter of 
March 1981 to Michael Berheide, Voegelin remarks that 
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though conservatives find support in his work, some of 
them have criticized his 
, 
analysis of Christian writings: 
this is understandable "because certain deformations in 
the ideological sphere result from fundamentalist deform- 
ations in the theological sphere - and the deformations 
in the theological sphere are cherished as part of the 
'tradition"' (Hoov). For, an essay in which Schall tries 
to legitimate his own ideological anti-Marxism by 
appealing to Voegelin' s critique of any ideology, see 
"Secularizing Salvation" (1989). 
31. Similarly, Voegelin writes of the tension in Israel 
between the word of God that had been "mummified in the 
sacred text", and the word of God as spoken through the 
prophets: "One can imagine how horrified Jeremiah must 
have been when he saw conformity of action to the letter 
of the law supersede the obedience of the heart to the 
spirit of God" (C)H 1: 367). 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN 
1. See, especially, Chapter Four, for his polarizing of 
philosophers and philodoxers, according to which the two 
terms refer not to "ideal types" but to actual persons: 
so that Plato, and even Voegelin himself, appear as 
representatives of noetic truth and not as thinkers who 
are themselves subject to the metaxic tension between 
truth and falsehood. Also, see Chapter Four on the 
terminology with which he contrasts the Christian 
movement and classical philosophy; and Chapter Nine for 
his attack on Marx. 
2. For brief critical studies of Kraus, cf. Heller, 1984, 
and Stern, 1986. 
3. Voegelin appears to have in mind the chapter of Cancer 
Ward entitled 11 Idols of the Market Place" (Solzhenitsyn, 
1971: 460-77). "Idols" in that chapter are those errors 
of others which one voluntarily accepts even though they 
deny reason and one's own experience. 
4. As prime examples of non-experiential language, 
Voegelin cites with 
, 
relish some of the more blatant 
reductionisms discussed by Sorokin (1958): that, for 
example, by which the human mind is defined as "an 
organism's selection of particular kinds of material 
operations to perform upon particular kinds of matter- 
energy in order to minimize the organism's own probable 
work"; and that by which consciousness is defined as "an 
electron-proton aggregation" (Hoov). On 11pneumo- 
pathology", cf. An-E: 102-03. 
5. At the time of this brave lecture, Heidegger's 
complicity with the Nazis was a topic usually treated 
with nervous discretion. 
6. That the phrases lose their potency in translation 
helps to make Voegelin's point: respectively, they may be 
rendered "the presence of that which is present", "the 
thinging of the thing", "the negation of the nothing", 
and "the pointing sign of the pointing implement". 
7. For a recent example of such a critique of language, 
see Jonathan Raban, God, Man and Xrs. Tbatcber, 1989. 
Recall the case, quoted in Chapter Three above, of Milan 
Kundera's Czech protagonist, Sabina. She even refuses to 
shout slogans (about "Soviet Imperialism! ') with which she 
sympathizes, because of her experience of the basic and 
pervasive political evil of sloganizing itself. 
8, In Book I of Browning's The Ring and the Book, the 
narrator mentions the difficulty of assessing the truth 




know we save by worth-of word? ". On the other 
hand, to_assess'the "worth of word", one must Judge the 
credibility of the speaker - which cannot be done without 
evaluating, the quality of. the, testimony. It is this same 
circularity, this reciprocity between , 
language and 
experience, which any Jury has to penetrate. 
9. Exemplary cases of substantive communication would be 
Plato's programme of education through "persuasion" and 
Aeschylus's dramatic-representation of the tragic dimen- 
sions. of political choice. 
10. Voegel 
, 
in told in the lecture how in Vienna, during 
the rule of Hitler, one could readily buy periodicals 
from Switzerland or elsewhere. But no Nazi would buy 
foreign journals which might report what the Nazis 
preferred to ignore. It is possible, therefor , 
e,. for 
writers and readers to collude in a "willed ignorance". 
That is, one first intuits certain truths in order then 
to refuse to receive them fully or divulge them. 
11. Voegelin admits that Plato's position is ambiguous in 
more than one respect. He did withdraw from public life 
to found the Academy, but only because he thought that in 
this way he could better influence political society in 
the long term. Again, in the Statesman, Plato (who "is 
not a Christian saint") allowed "the admixture of a heavy 
dose of violence to the Persuasion of the royal ruler" 
(OH 111: 225-26, OH TT: 364). See also Voegelin, 1951a). 
12. Voegelin's acceptance of this new truth attained by 
Christianity decisively separates him from two thinkers 
who were almost his contemporaries and might seem to have 
much in common with him. For Leo Strauss, religion is a 
delusion which true philosophers will see through. But 
because religious beliefs promote the masses' docility 
towards rulers, philosophers will keep their scepticism 
. 
to themselves. On Strauss, see the review article by 
S. Holmes, 1989. Like both Voegelin and Strauss, the 
Spanish philosopher Jos6 Ortega y Gasset thinks in terms 
, of select minorities who 
decisively affect the quality of 
social life. But for Ortega, it is the "biological 
'mission" 
of the masses to be I'docileff, accepting the 
leadership of "exemplary men" who alone possess "the 
power of organic creation". On Ortega y Gasset, see the 
, review article by R. Carr, 1989. 
Against Strauss, Voegelin holds, firstly, that scept- 
ici 
, 
sm belongs to sophists, not philosophers: 'secondly, 
, 
that everyone has the duty to seek the truth that 
philosophers seek. Against Ortega, Voegelin holds that 
such docility is no longer permissible, for in the 
- Christian differentiation everyone is called to the life 
of the "minority". Ortega's "docility" would, incident- 
ally, disable the "exemplary men" themselves, who would 
lose contact with society at large. 
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13. For a fuller account, see Cooper, 1983, especially 
pages 282-86. 
14. Discussing Weber's theory of bureaucracy, Alasdair 
MacIntyre speaks of the rise of "managerial expertise", 
which combines "the aspiration to value neutrality and 
the claim to manipulative power" (1987: 86). 
15. See, especially, Voegelin's analysis of Thucydides 
(OH IT: 349-73). The progressive Athens, full of 
"civilizational energy'l, 'inevitably expands at the 
expense of its culpably passive neighbours, whose 
inaction invites conquest. But equally, Athens's 
brutality and transgressions of Justice already contains 
the seeds of its subsequent political disaster. 
16. By'"the Church" Voegelin here means principally the 
Roman Catholic Church. He uses the term "clerical" 
idiosyncratically, opposing it to "secular" rather than 
to "lay". Therefore, "clericalism! ' does not bear the 
pejorative sense of "episcopal directives in politics" 
(Hogv) but signifies the Church's attempt'to use its 
influence in politics by any means; such as forming 
political groupings of Christian inspiration. 
17. The failure is of the same sort, presumably, as the 
paradigmatic failure of Isaiah, faced with Ahaz. 
Isaiah's "metastatic faith" prevented his making the 
n, ecessary accommodation to civilizational necessity, so 
ensuring his irrelevance. See Chapter Six. 
18. Vaegelin does not, of course, think the Church to be 
alone in failing to integrate spirit with power and 
practical good sense. We saw in Chapter Nine that he 
accused the West of sharing "Gnostic dream assumptions" 
by creating a power vacuum to its own disadvantage after 
the Second World War; its aspirations to peace were 
vitiated, firstly by a lack of political realism and 
secondly by the repudiation of power and its obligations. 
19. For example, the vindictiveness which exacted the war 
reparations from Germany could be regarded as a modern 
analogue of the ate, the blinding passion, of Achilles to 
which we referred in Chapter Five). 
20. Voegelin gives striking examples (KEE: 55-59,62-63). 
21., Voegelin does not mean that imperialism is a national 
characteristic fixed for ever. He is precisely opposing 
such static conceptions; and, in any case, it would be 
implausible to posit imperial consciousness oft say, 
twentieth century Sweden. But if the imperial heritage 
remains alive, renewed material power must be expected to 
reactivate it. This emphasis on structure rather than 




Annales school of historians discussed in, Chapter 
Seven. It also suggests that practical politics cannot 
afford to be oblivious to what Voegelin calls, in 
connection with Thucydides,., the "order 
, 
of necessity". 
For some reflections on this latter theme, with a sketch 
of the historical events referred to by Voegelin, see the 
lecture by Klaus Scholder, "Fate and Guilt in History'll, 
(Scholder, 1989: 19-34) 
22. This is for Voegelin a classic case of how the 
opponents of destructive ideology failed to "catch. on" to 
the, spiritual realities of politics because of their 
overvaluation of external forms. See Chapter Five on the 
policy of Dollfuss, and on Hitler's manipulation of 
"democratic" structures. 





_, Mankind"' (1962), and 
, 
Geoffrey Barraclough's helpful 
discussion (1981) with its many references to OH IM. 
The potential of Voegelin's type of political analysis is 
suggested by. his prescient comment of 1973: "It is 
unimaginable that, for instance, a Soviet empire can 
permanently maintain itself in the present form against 
the ethnic cultures of the non-Russian people who are 
more than fifty per cent of the population" (AX: 112). 
24. For an analogous instance, see Dennis P. McCann's 
argument that Reinhold Niehuhr's "Christian realism! ' 
shirked the problems of American hegemony (1981: 106-21). 
25. cf. the contrast drawn by Guti6rrez between 
development (or "developmentalisn! '), which supposes a 
prevailing element of continuity in socio-economic 
structures, and liberation (1973: 21-42,81-99). 
26. See our account, in Chapter Seven, ' of the conserv- 
atism discussed by Quinton. The Aristotelian model by 
which the needy are disqualified from participation in 
the polis (since competent participation requires a 
certain 
, 
leisure and a freedom from urgent necessity) is a 
prominent influence on the conservatism of Burke and 
Oakeshott. cf. Pitkin, 1979: 510-15. As we have seen, 
Voegelin thinks this model is ruled out by Christianity. 
For a comically polemical use of the organic metaphor, 
see the sequence of speeches in Shakespeare's Coriolanus 
(I, i), in which Menenius Agrippa defends the senate's 
privileges before a rebellious populace. The senat 
, 
e, 
"cupboarding the viand", "never bearing/Like labour with 
the rest", is the stomach, acting in the service of the 
common people, "the great toe of this assembly". On 
the political application of the concept of community, 
see Plant, Lesser & Taylor-Gooby, 1980: 204-46. 
27. Perry Anderson neatly contrasts the "traditional" and 
"radical" images of community, when he writes of a 
'' possible shift "from the seamless sharing of customary 
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values to a heightening-of mutual vulnerability, which 
accepts conflict as itself a positive value" (1989: 37). 
28. Holland and Henriot emphasize that "revolution" does'. 
not meet their criteria for such transformation (1983: 
40). - Perhaps they would endorse the dictum of Camus, 
that revolution "is a movement which describes a complete 
circle, which leads from one form of government to 
another after a total transition" (1971: 76-77). 
29. Even if it were true that the proposed new structures 
conformed to the cultures of those nations who most 
suffer from the present system, Holland and Henriot are 
proposing radical global changes, which would therefore 
need also to be negotiated in the dominant powers. 
30. See Vogaman, 1988: 94-98, on such U. S. A. "liberal" 
theologians as John Coleman, who combine a radical 
analysis with a reformist or incrementalist strategy. 
31. Such usage tends to provoke its own backlash: in the 
U. S. A., during the 1988 Presidential election, both 
"liberal" and "radical" were used as derogatory terms, 
which even Democrat candidates felt obliged to disavow. 
32. In fact, the shared assessment of a tradition's 
status is itself part of that tradition. "Every time I 
select a programme on the radio I modify a little the 
balance of current cultural valuations. ... Indeed, 
whenever I submit to a current consensus, I inevitably 
modify its teaching; for I submit to what I myself think 
it teaches and by Joining the consensus on these terms I 
affect its content". Conversely, all dissenters part- 
ially submit to the existing consensus, and implicitly 
claim social authority for themselves as teachers 
(Polanyi, 1973: 208-09). 
33. Voegelin's claim explains the extensive treatment 
given to classical philosophy in this key section. 
Aristotle's observations on desire are "christianized" by 
St. Augustine in a famous passage of Book Ten of the 
Confessions (Augustine, 1961: 228-30). 
34. ' Aristotle's principle "that the science of ethics can 
be cultivated only by men whose character is sufficiently 
mature to serve as an instrument of cognition" is incip- 
iently present in Hesiod ME TT: 140). An analogous 
principle is that of adaequatio: that all realities are 
perceived according to the capacity of the knower, and 
therefore that an inadequate understanding will construct 
an impoverished version of reality (cf. Schumacher, 1978: 
50-73. Naturally, it follows that one spoudalos can only 
be recognized by others. 
35. Plato uses the term dikalosune not to denote the 
specifically ethical virtue of "Justice", but with an 
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equivalent force as Aristotle'uses pbronesis. - For wisdom 
itself "is of no avail unless a virtue higher than wisdom 
sees to it that wisdom will indeed prevail in the soul 
over the passions. That higher virtue is dlkaiosunell (Qjj 
ILL: 111). Another equivalent is the Christian virtue of 
pr-udentia. In one of his letters to Schutz Voegelin 
writes: Prudentia is the first of the ethical virtues, 
and "has absorbed into its ethical knowledge the know- 
ledge that stems from the experiences of transcendence" 
(Opitz & Sebba, 1981: 451). On this view any ethics 
based, say, an strictly utilitarian considerations cannot 
encompass the virtues that are opened up by experiences 
of transcendence. 
36'. See, the anecdote recounted by Willmer, 1982: 30. For 
a discussion of the question whether the poor have a 
privileged stance in respect of the Gospel, see Hellwig, 
1983, especially page 145. Such insights of pbronesis 
can be non-conceptual: "It is said that American Indians, 
when trying to discover whether a stranger was a friend 
or an enemy, used to ignore his words and listen-to his 
tone of voice" (Keightley, 1986: 136). 
37. One must again stress that the word "masses" is not 
for'Voegelin an index of social class or status. When he 
insists, in his "Autobiographical Statement", that 
"stupidity" is "a relevant social factor", the "mass of 
passionately directed people" includes intellectuals and 
de facto political leaders (Lawrence, 1984: 114-15). 
38. But see OH 111: 265, where Voegelin discusses the 
"Nocturnal Council", the spiritual court proposed in the 
Laws. The Council has the power of life and death over 
dissidents. It "looked sinister indeed" as long as one 
envisaged it as the alternative to "freedom of the 
spirit". But Plato was influenced by his experience of 
"the tyranny of the rabble and the murder of Socrates". 
Voegelin does not think-such a court a feasible pragmatic 
response to the "problems of the age"; "but we have lost 
our illusion that 'freedom' will lead without fail to a 
state of society that would deserve the name of order". 
39. David Brandon wittily challenges those who seek to 
"change society" on the assumption that they themselves 
need not change: "The currently popular term 'catalyst' 
is ironically and unintentionally approp, r-iate as it 
'means 
strictly 'an agent in an effect produced by a 
substance that witbout undergoing cbange Itself aids a 
chemical change in other bodies"' (1976: 81). 
40. In the case of Nietzsche, however, Voegelin recog- 
nizes that a thinker cannot be blamed for subsequent 
misuse of his work: a sensitive philosopher "will be able 
'to 
chart the course of social disintegration for a 
considerable time ahead": but to think Nietzsche caused 
the disintegration he diagnosed would betray the 
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"fantastic assumption" that a healthy Western world 
"began drifting towards the predicted catastrophe because 
a philosopher chose to publish a false analysis of the 
situation" (Voegelin, 1944a: 177-78). 
41. Elsewhere,,. discuSsing Goethe in an essay of almost 
the same date, Voegelin acknowledges that it is pedagog- 
ically legitimate to restrict one's articulation of truth 
to the capacity of the reader to receive it (1952b: 61). 
The point is well-taken in its context, but is incon- 
sistent with his treatment of More. He seems not to have 
made a mental connection between the two essays. 
42. Havel does not propose adopting the structures of 
Vestern democracy as a remedy, any more than Voegelin 
does. That would only be to prefer an alternative 
ideology. "This static complex of rigid, conceptually- 
sloppy and politically pragmatic mass political parties 
run by professional apparatuses and releasing the citizen 
from all forms of concrete and personal responsibility; 
and those complex foci of capital accumulation engaged in 
secret manipulations and expansion; the omnipresent 
dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising 
*... can only with great difficulty be imagined as the 
source of humanity's rediscovery of itself" (1985: 91). 
43. It is, important to note the type of thinker to whom 
Voegelin allows maturity. In the "History of Political 
Ideas", -he turns from John Milton and the "leveller" 
Gerard Winstanley to discuss Sir James Harrington with 
the remark, "To turn from the forces, passions and pathos 
of the Revolution to Harrington's Oceana 116563 is like 
entering a sun-flooded room": "he had studied Aristotle 
and Machiavelli carefully, he had a good knowledge of 
ancient constitutions, he had read the Bible not with the 
eye of a Christian but of a scholar who wants to know how 
the constitution of Israel worked". He had travelled 
widely "and had brought home from Italy not only know- 
ledge, but something of Mediterranean matureness in 
political. affairs". "To read the 'preliminaries' of the 
Oceana, in which he set forth his principles, is a rare 
delight in a field where the bulk of literature is marred 
by passion or by the vanity of the writer who believes 
that his opinions are important because the subject 
matter with which he deals is important" (Hoov). 
, Also in, the "History of Political Ideas". Vaegelin 
praises the philosopher Jean Bodin at length for the kind 
of contemplative detachment which can flourish only in 
, those who refuse adherence to any "cause". The major 
reason for Bodin's neglect as a political thinker, says 
Voegelin, "has to be sought in his greatness": for "the 
contemplative realist is, and always will be, an isolated 
figure": the centre of attention is always held by those 
who are "nearer to the excitement and intoxication of the 
political struggle". 
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NOTES'FOR CHAPTER ELEVEN 
1. Nieli, Webb and Morrissey are primarily interested in 
Voegelin as a philosopher of consciousness, though Webb's 
earlier book concerns Voegelin's philosophy of history. 
Cooper, Germino and Havard have discussed Voegelin's 
political philosophy, but none attempts a fundamental 
critique. See the bibliography for details of all these 
writings. 
2. See our preliminary discussion in Chapter One. 
3. For a typically scathing review of a work of political 
science which in Voegelin's view falls into servility 
through the pretence of objectivity (the shallow object- 
ivity of "equidistance from two parochialisms") see 
Voegelin 1946d. 
4. This point is expanded and explored by Caringella, 
1988. 
5. For-example, Voegelin speaks of "the intellectually 
disordered-language in which we indiscriminately speak of 
the meaning of life. ... or the fact of existence which has no meaning, or the meaning which must be given to the 
fact of existence, as if life were a given and meaning a 
property it does or does not have" (1971a: 63). To thist 
he replies that existence is not a fact: "if anything, 
existence is the non-fact of a disturbing movement in the 
In-Between". It is true that from the experience of this 
movement, from the anxiety about losing the right way in 
the "In-Between of darkness and light" arises the enquiry 
concerning the meaning of life. But it arises "only 
because life is experienced as man's participation in a 
movement with a direction to be found or missed; if man's 
existence were not a movement but a fact, it would not 
only have no meaning but the question of meaning could 
not even arise" (Ibid). 
As an example of what he is rejecting, Voegelin here 
cites Sartrels "assumption of a meaningless facticity of 
existence and his desperate craving for endowing it with 
a meaning from the resources of his Moil'. But Voegelin, 
too, is arguing existentially, resting his whole argument 
on a qualitatively deeper kind of experience which has 
been brought to noetic self-consciousness. 
6. The danger of self-delusion which attends any personal 
reflection which remains oblivious to its social location 
is incisively identified by the former Superior General 
of the Society of Jesus, in attempting to explain its 
commitment to "solidarity with the poor": "One who claims 
to be free from class mentality is rightly suspect. Only 
with great difficulty do we escape from the claims of 
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class. The extremely privileged, who have not felt 
institutionalized injustice in their own flesh, react 
with amazement and defensiveness before the demands of 
the masses for a new order. In tranquil possession of 
what they believe to be their rights they look upon them- 
selves as above the conflict. When they find themselves 
the object of claims on the part of others, they speak of 
unjust aggression on what is irrevocably theirs, and 
maintain that it-is licit to defend themselves in every 
way. This unconscious sense of class is a determining 
element in the situation. On the other hand, the great 
masses of the dispossessed, schooled by a long history of 
suffering and privation and more recently by ideological 
propaganda, are keenly aware of what is just and unjust. " 
(Arrupe, 1980: 249-50). 
My criticism here does not, of course, mean that I 
charge-Voegelin with the ideology of "individualisn! '. as 
that is neatly described by Parekh (1982: 190-93). 
7. See the essay "Conflicting Paradigms of Conversion", 
(Evans,, 1986). 
8. --That is, faith demands "ideologies" in Segundo's sense 
of the term "ideology". See note 14 to Chapter One. 
This is the kind of ideological commitment "tentatative 
and open to criticism and open to change', which Voegelin 
thinks "will not work" (Conv: 33). 
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